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Abstract 
American security discourse has intensified profoundly since 9/11. For nearly two 
decades, anxiety about the threat posed by the foreign other against the American self 
has influenced policy debates, the legitimization (and execution) of exceptional 
measures and the public mood. These changes in security discourse have co-occurred 
with seismic shifts in the increasingly complex media and information marketplace. 
The proliferation of media actors has stimulated more targeted news produced for niche 
audiences, meaning that public processing of security issues has also changed 
dramatically. Cable news in particular has matured into a polarized genre of 
information that commands the widest audience in the US.  
Through a cross-disciplinary approach that integrates securitization theory from 
International Relations and the broad framing scholarship from political 
communication, this thesis investigates the relationship of these developments. 
Specifically, it investigates the impact of media in the social (de)construction of 
security threats. Two illustrative case studies are considered across two presidential 
administrations from 2001-2016. First, the securitization of terrorism is explored with 
an emphasis on the discursive (de)legitimization of torture as an exceptional response. 
Even among exceptional measures, torture is exceptional: its practice has been banned 
both during and outside of wartime. That it is even up for debate – never mind that it 
briefly became “standard operating procedures” and nearly half of all Americans 
support it – is evidence of the successful securitization of terrorism. The second case 
study focuses on the securitization of unauthorized immigration, analyzing the 
contestation of competing remedy proposals and moral evaluations of the foreign other. 
Despite the oft-invoked immigration-terrorism nexus, American attitudes toward 
unauthorized immigrants have softened.  
In both cases, press framing appears to have influenced public attitudes, above and 
beyond political elite signals, suggesting that the media can act as an independent and 
strategic actor. This has implications for securitization theory, which traditionally 
relegates media to a facilitating role, rather than an independent securitizing actor. This 
also has broader democratic implications as unelected press actors increasingly assume 
political roles and drive the (de)legitimization of exceptional measures. Further 
contributions of this project include the discovery of cross-sectoral patterns, such as the 
consequences of silencing and the effectiveness of euphemisms. Finally, this thesis 
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demonstrates the value of synthesizing concepts in framing scholarship with 
securitization theory. Methodological tools commonly used in framing studies – 
content and public opinion analysis – empower securitization theory with quantitative 
sophistication and hypothesis-tested assumptions that have been previously overlooked.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
American security discourse has intensified profoundly since 2001 (Bigo, 2008; 
Holland, 2013; MacDonald & Hunter, 2019). The September 11 attacks that year 
ushered in nearly two decades of heightened anxieties, influencing policy debates and 
the public willingness to accept extraordinary measures aimed at curtailing the 
development of perceived security threats. This has been principally evidenced by 
terrorism and unauthorized immigration, two highly salient issues that have been used 
to justify a broad array of exceptional measures including military campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Donnelly, 2013); the use of torture in military prisons and 
“black-sites” abroad (McCoy, 2012); retrenchment of civil liberties and privacy (most 
infamously through the USA PATRIOT Act); the restructuring of federal government 
to combine policing of terrorism and immigration into a single Department of 
Homeland Security; the construction of extralegal border barriers (Mittelstadt, Speaker, 
Meissner, & Chishti, 2011: 9); and other policies ranging from minor airport security 
procedures to draconian deportation policies targeting children and families. The 
perceived severity of the threats that inspired and legitimized these measures has hardly 
diminished over time. Counterterrorism remains a central component of the U.S. 
National Security Strategy (2017), while Donald Trump’s presidential victory 
following a campaign of demonizing immigrants as “rapists” and criminals (Trump, 
2015a) to be barred from entry by a border wall (Trump, 2015b) signal the continued 
characterization of foreign others as existential security threats to Americans. Proposed 
and materialized exceptional measures underscore the urgency to examine the 
mechanisms underlying their legitimization.  
Yet the American public’s evaluation of security threats and tolerance for exceptional 
measures has been inconsistent. Moreover, attitudes have not always aligned with cues 
from political elites, traditionally regarded as the primary speakers in security (Buzan, 
Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998). Support for torture against suspected terrorists, for 
example, infamously increased, becoming the majority opinion briefly for the first time 
early in Barack Obama’s presidency, despite his anti-torture campaign rhetoric and 
immediate ban on his predecessor’s “enhanced interrogation” program (Zegart, 2012). 
Similarly, American attitudes have grown increasingly pro-immigrant (Hartig, 2018; 
Jones, 2019; Pew Research Center, 2018b) despite mixed signals from political elites: 
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border security bluster and record deportations in recent years have co-occurred with 
compassionate rhetoric and legal reprieve for “dreamers”. If not cues from political 
elites, what accounts for the observed variation in security attitudes?  
In International Relations (IR), the social construction of security threats has been 
studied within the analytical framework of securitization theory. The theory suggests 
that security issues emerge and dissolve through a political elite-driven contestation of 
competing securitizing and desecuritizing discourses that respectively invest an issue 
with or detach it from a threatening complexion (Balzacq, 2011b). Recognizing the 
aforementioned disconnect between political elite cues and public security attitudes, 
this thesis advances securitization theory to consider the role of media in the social 
(de)construction of security threats. High engagement between the American public 
and the press (Knight Foundation, 2018; Media Insight Project, 2014) underscores the 
imperative to consider the impact the press has had on public security attitudes by 
accounting for its selection, emphasis and promotion of particular frames (Gitlin, 1980: 
7). This link is all the more crucial as public trust in the media erodes (Jones, 2004) and 
concerns of “fake news” disrupting the political process proliferate. First, 
understanding the influence of media messaging on security attitudes can illustrate the 
depth and reach of this distrust. More specifically, it can demonstrate which press 
actors are considered more trustworthy and on which issues for different audiences. 
Second, if the press is shaping public security attitudes, then it may be driving political 
behavior and voting preferences (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Martin & Yurukoglu, 
2017). Policymakers attuned to the mood of an electorate that is deriving its cues from 
the press may be reacting to these pressures when deliberating exceptional measures 
(Baum & Potter, 2008). In other words, media messaging may be driving policymaking 
on security issues by both influencing the voting electorate and tapping into the 
motivations of public officials seeking to score political points. Analyzing the role the 
press plays in security construction is thus critical not only for understanding its impact 
on public perceptions, but also on the broader political and exceptional politics process.  
Through a cross-disciplinary integration of securitization theory and framing 
scholarship, two illustrative case studies are considered within the American security 
context across two presidential administrations (2001-2016). First, the securitization of 
terrorism is explored with an emphasis on the discursive (de)legitimization of torture as 
an exceptional response. While several exceptional measures have been proposed and 
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adopted in the counterterrorist effort, torture is exceptional even among exceptional 
measures: its practice has been banned both during and outside of wartime. That it is 
even up for debate – never mind that it briefly became part of “standard operating 
procedures” (Gourevitch & Morris, 2008) and nearly half of all Americans support it 
(Tyson, 2017) – is strong evidence of the successful securitization of terrorism. The 
second case study focuses on immigration security discourse, analyzing the 
contestation of competing remedy proposals and moral evaluations of the foreign other. 
Specifically, different characterizations of unauthorized immigration – as either a 
criminal threat to society or a procedural issue to be resolved through documentation – 
are juxtaposed. Together these two issues, terrorism and unauthorized immigration, 
represent two principal issues governing American security discourse; they are also 
interrelated constituents of a broader terrorism-migration nexus in securitization 
literature (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). A more in-depth justification for the selection 
of these cases is discussed below, but it is worth recognizing that, as “newsworthy” 
issues that contain dramatic and compelling arcs (Lewis, 2012), the issues are critical 
candidates for testing and developing the theoretical integration of securitization theory 
and media framing.  
This introductory chapter identifies the theoretical points of entry, primary research 
questions and ambitions of this research. It is followed by a scene-setting discussion 
and justification of the two case studies selected – terrorism and immigration – and a 
necessary contextualization of the American media landscape. Finally, a summary of 
contributions is discussed alongside an outline of the chapters to come.  
1.2 Theoretical Entry Point and Aims: Analyzing Security Discourse  
The Copenhagen School’s (CS) securitization theory has been the primary vehicle for 
relating security and discourse in IR scholarship. Grounded in constructivism and the 
effort to broaden and widen security studies, the framework holds that security threats 
are constituted through an intersubjective negotiation between security speakers and 
their audience (Buzan et al., 1998). Rather than identifying security and threats as 
objective truths “out there”, the CS argues that threats are socially constructed through 
the articulation of an issue as a threat – or a speech act – and subsequent acceptance by 
the audience of this characterization (Balzacq, 2005; Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 
2016; Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995a). In short, security is manufactured through 
intersubjective dialogue. The acceptance of an issue as an existential threat – or 
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securitization – pushes that issue outside the domain of everyday politics and 
potentially into the realm of emergency politics, where exceptional measures may be 
applied. Desecuritization moves in the opposite direction – it describes the discursive 
contestation of the securitization narrative and legitimacy of operating in the exception; 
when successful, exceptional measures can be delegitimized, shifting the contested 
issue back down to the domain of regular politics. While this socially constructed 
process opens the doors to a multitude of security issues in different sectors, there is 
always the potential for competing (de)securitizing narratives to pit different identities 
against each other: the threatened Self against the threatening Other and those that 
securitize against those that desecuritize (Hansen, 2013). The focus in this dissertation 
is on the latter set of competing identities: the securitizing Self versus the desecuritizing 
Self.  
Recognizing opportunities for interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, this study 
synthesizes securitization theory with research on framing and framing effects. The 
marriage not only resolves some of the key theoretical, methodological and empirical 
limitations within securitization theory, it also draws on insights from the vast framing 
scholarship. Theoretically, the securitization framework overemphasizes political elites 
as securitizing actors to the neglect of other actors like the press (Watson, 2012). The 
press-state debate within framing scholarship and political communication more 
broadly, on the other hand, outlines the conditions under which the press can act 
autonomously and even drive policy (e.g., Baum & Potter, 2008; Callaghan & Schnell, 
2001; Robinson, 1999). Further, while securitization theory offers a structuring logic 
and expectations for the process and implication of socially constructing security 
specifically, the literature on framing and framing effects offers useful more general 
quantitative methodological tools that can enrich the context-defining discourse 
analyses typically used in securitization research; this in turn enables oft-neglected 
cross-case comparison. Specifically, securitization theory points to a certain “internal, 
linguistic-grammatical” (Buzan et al., 1998: 32) set of rules for articulating security 
that are congruent with the “particular dialect of the different [security] sectors” (33). It 
steers the analyst toward language that (de)legitimizes exceptional measures or 
(un)characterizes an issue as a threat. Framing offers the logical next step: guidance on 
how to measure this discourse in a standardized, comparable and reproducible way. 
Moreover, through hypothesis-testing, framing effects research has identified key 
variables that influence when and why certain frames resonate with audiences. The 
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findings can be integrated to explain why certain (de)securitizing narratives are more 
successful, bringing the otherwise underdeveloped and inadequately measured audience 
(Balzacq, 2011a; Balzacq et al., 2016; Stritzel, 2007; Watson, 2012) more consciously 
into the securitization framework. Framing also provides methodological tools that 
enable objective and consistent measurement of the competition between securitizing 
and desecuritizing frames, thus giving more attention to the desecuritization process 
(Watson, 2012). In short, the inquiry is largely situated within and guided by the 
theoretical securitization framework, but complementary methodological tools and 
concepts from framing research are used to operationalize the empirical analysis, 
accommodating multiple actors (like the press and audience) and processes (like 
desecuritization) while also enabling quantitative comparisons across actors and cases.  
A secondary aim of this thesis is to lay the theoretical and methodological groundwork 
for future securitization scholars seeking to show how security is (de)constructed from 
multiple perspectives using a flexible and widely applicable framework. While a rich 
scholarship already exists on studying securitization through discourse analysis 
(Balzacq et al., 2016; Watson, 2012: 282), a mixed-methods design that combines 
qualitative discourse and quantitative content analysis is lacking and the role of the 
audience remains critically underdeveloped (Balzacq, 2011a; Balzacq et al., 2016; 
Stritzel, 2007; Watson, 2012). Watson (2012) recognizes several abstract parallels 
between securitization and framing, recognizing the former as a subfield of the latter. 
This project aims to explicate and operationalize these parallels – in doing so, it makes 
theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to securitization scholarship by 
justifying, implementing and drawing inferences from a robust research design.  
The more immediate aims of this synthesis are to resolve important theoretical and 
empirical puzzles. Despite high engagement between the press and the public, the role 
of the former as an actor in the social construction of international security threats has 
received scarce attention. The press has largely been sidelined as a functional actor. Yet 
the persistent narrative of an increasingly influential press – and as evidenced in 
subsequent chapters, recognition among political elites of the loss of autonomy to the 
press – suggests that the press may be more than a mouthpiece for elites, and may 
instead be an independent securitizing actor. International relations literature has not 
engaged deeply with this possibility. Thus, this thesis is primarily driven by the 
following research question: can the media be an independent (de)securitizing actor? 
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Heeding calls in political communication scholarship (e.g., Baum & Potter, 2008), the 
media is not treated as some undifferentiated mass, but is disaggregated at the outlet 
level. Securitization theory acknowledges the press (again, as a functional actor), but 
stresses political elites as the primary speakers of security (Watson, 2012). This first 
research question analyzes the extent to which the press can act as an independent and 
strategic actor in the securitization process. Tactically, this requires investigating how 
framing – again, by specific media outlets – of security issues diverges from political 
elite messaging, and under which conditions divergence exists. Given that 
(de)securitization is an intersubjective process, the project will analyze whether frames 
trickle down to audiences in the form of framing effects. In doing so, this thesis 
addresses another theoretical gap in existing securitization research: the measurement 
of the audience in the intersubjective process. While the audience is recognized as an 
integral component of the securitization process, attempts to bring it into existing 
research have lacked scientific rigor and consistency. In short, the first question aims to 
resolve two gaps in existing securitization research: the role of media as a securitizing 
actor, and the measurement of audience in the intersubjective process.  
The second research question addresses empirical puzzles related to two salient issues: 
terrorism and unauthorized immigration. The prevailing narrative suggests that the 
Obama administration promoted an anti-torture agenda. Nonetheless, the public has 
become more tolerant, with a majority of Americans briefly supporting torture against 
suspected terrorists early in Obama’s presidency. Similarly, despite the discursive 
linkage of unauthorized immigration to terrorism – both in speech and policy – 
Americans have become more pro-immigrant in recent years. While these two 
paradoxical outcomes alone merit exploration, the simultaneous rejection of foreign 
Others in one case (demonstrated in the growing support for torture against suspected 
terrorists) and embrace of foreign Others in a separate case illustrate yet another 
striking puzzle: Americans have shown inconsistent attitudes toward foreign Others. 
These empirical puzzles motivate the second research question: how did exceptional 
measures become (de)legitimized in the US in response to the perceived threats posed 
by terrorism and unauthorized immigration, and how were these contested by 
competing frames? This question offers an opportunity to contrast securitizing and 
desecuritizing dynamics across two sectors of security – societal and military – 
offering, for the first time, an opportunity to explore how media and audience effects 
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materialize within and vary across sectors. These cases are described in greater detail 
and justified next.    
1.3 Case Selection: Terrorism and Unauthorized Immigration in the 
US (2001-2016) 
This thesis explores the securitization of terrorism and unauthorized immigration in the 
US from 2001 to 2016. The US represents a critical and revelatory case (Yin, 2009). As 
a democratic system with checks and balances that holds officials accountable (to the 
public and other branches of government) and requires the legitimization of exceptional 
measures, it is a critical case because it meets conditions for testing and developing 
securitization theory. Specifically, the interaction of a rich American media landscape – 
described in greater detail in the following section – and democratic institutions 
provides a useful test of whether the press can have an independent securitizing effect. 
As the site of the 9/11 attacks and primary instigator of the resultant “war on terror”, 
the US has undergone significant shifts in security discourse over the decade and a half 
following 9/11. Even discounting the role that media has played, a longitudinal study of 
security discourses post-9/11 is significant in its own right, because it contributes to a 
better understanding of how oppositional (de)securitizing identities were formed and 
juxtaposed. Nor are the discursive shifts limited to home: as the predominant military 
power in the world, the US can influence security discourses and priorities for its 
security partners. The insights drawn from analyzing the US can potentially inform 
securitization dynamics in other states with similar political and media landscapes. The 
US is also a revelatory case in that it has received comparably less attention in the 
largely European securitization scholarship (Watson, 2012). Still, its democratic 
political structure and free press norms make the case generalizable to other contexts.  
The sixteen-year timeframe further adds longitudinal (Yin, 2009: 49) value, because it 
analyzes security issues in two different political contexts: a Bush-led Republican 
administration (2001-2009) and an Obama-led Democratic administration (2009-2016). 
Selecting two different administrations from different parties maximizes the range of 
possible discourse on politically charged issues. The wide timeframe also ensures a 
holistic analysis that minimizes bias by capturing discourse and public opinion not only 
when issues are salient, but also when they are relatively muted. Watson (2012: 298) 
notes that securitization research is typically limited to “episodic changes and short 
time frames” – he argues that integration with the framing research programme can 
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show how perceptions change over time and “in response to a number of external 
changes” . Donnelly (2013: 52) similarly argues that current securitization analyses 
should accommodate “the more subtle nuances in the way in which agents are speaking 
security from beginning to end” (emphasis added). By expanding this research through 
two presidential administrations, these subtleties are captured, thus contributing 
significantly to theory building (Yin, 2009: 47).  
Despite the singular focus on the US, a multi-sectoral design is adopted to add 
empirical richness by analyzing (de)securitization in two different security domains. 
These are discussed in turn.  
1.3.1 Military Sector: Terrorism 
The first case study on terrorism is critical to theoretical debates on what constitutes a 
security issue, because despite the low threat objectively posed by terrorism (Mueller & 
Stewart, 2018), it has consistently ranked a high concern among the public since 2001 
and has been invoked to justify an array of policies and exceptional measures. The 
threat has been described as “far and away the largest issue in American politics for 
almost a decade” (Mayer & Armor, 2012: 440); and recent attacks in the west (e.g., in 
Belgium, France, and the US) as well as a growing network of related issues (e.g., ISIS 
in Syria/Iraq, border security, and the curtailment of civil liberties) have secured 
terrorism a dominant position in political and press discourse and the broader 
international security climate (Agamben, 2005; Croft, 2006; Salter, 2011). Terrorism 
also fits neatly into the military sector of the securitization framework – it has been 
framed by security speakers as an existential threat to not only American lives (e.g., the 
near 3,000 deaths in the September 2001 attack), but also nation-defining ideals such as 
democracy and the “Western way of life” (Thorup, 2010: 130).1 The inescapable “war 
 
1 Terrorism might also be analyzed within the securitization framework as a societal or political threat 
(e.g., to a “way of life”). The CS agrees that threats are not perfectly delineated, but the preference for 
analyzing terrorism within the military sector here is motivated by the nature of the response to the threat 
as one that employs armed forces and the intelligence community – entities commonly associated with 
the military sector – as well as how the threat is interpreted by the audience. Certainly the “traditional” 
role of the armed forces has expanded into non-military sectors like peacekeeping, nation-building, and 
civil society engagement (Brooks, 2017), but the primary counterterrorism missions and engagements 
have been within traditional military scope, such as militarized campaigns against al Qaeda, the Taliban 
and their sponsors.  
22 
 
on terror” as well as the military campaigns and normative debates it has inspired 
indicate that terrorism will remain a critical concern in American foreign policy, media 
coverage, and the public conscience (Croft, 2006; Mayer & Armor, 2012). 
Still, while many have accepted that terrorism constitutes a problem, exceptional 
measures have been controversial. Several exceptional measures have been employed 
in the counterterrorism effort – including drone strikes, surveillance and military 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan – but torture offers the most pertinent contribution 
to securitization theory because it is exceptional, even among exceptional measures. 
Not only is it beyond “everyday politics” (a necessary condition for securitization), it is 
prohibited even in wartime (Malley-Morrison, McCarthy, & Hines, 2013). It is thus 
unlike other “exceptional measures” frequently justified and adopted in the military 
sector, such as airstrikes, ground troop deployment, and economic sanctions. The 
torture debate has also undergone major shifts: executive branch policy has fluctuated 
between and within administrations, and public opinion – well documented and tracked 
for over a decade – has moved from largely opposing torture before and immediately 
after Abu Ghraib to a near even split in more recent years (Mayer & Armor, 2012).  
While it has received less attention in securitization research, a central component of 
framing research on torture is the use of alternative labels invoked by actors to signify 
the practice (e.g., Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2006; Jones & Sheets, 2009; 
Rowling, Jones, & Sheets, 2011) and the impact of different frames on individual 
attitudes in experimental settings (e.g., Blauwkamp, Rowling, & Pettit, 2018; Rios & 
Mischkowski, 2018). This research adds to these studies by engaging data across 
diverse contexts and tackling important questions with theoretical implications: how 
has this practice been legitimized over time, even against countervailing cues from 
political elites like President Obama, who outlawed the “enhanced interrogation” 
program within days of taking office? Moreover, how did it become legitimized despite 
being antithetical to liberal norms and legal wartime conduct? It is imperative to 
understand how torture was legitimized not only because of its empirical consequences, 
but also because it pushes the boundaries of securitization theory: specifically, it 
represents an extreme case of securitization where a universally forbidden method 
entered the realm of debate (and practice).  
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Finally, like terrorism, torture still haunts American public policy debates and the 
social conscious. The mercurial Trump administration has repeatedly signaled its 
willingness to reverse the Obama administration’s ban and reintroduce torture (De Luce 
& McLeary, 2016). Mayer and Armor (2012: 439-440) further argue “the threat that 
caused the shift [in public opinion] remains present, and in the aftermath of future 
attacks, the use of torture or harsh interrogation techniques would certainly be 
reconsidered”. What is lacking in securitization, framing and public opinion literature – 
a gap this thesis fills – is an investigation of how torture was legitimized through the 
interactions of political discourse, media messaging and public attitudes over time and 
across shifting political contexts. Specifically, the terrorism case study examines the 
paradoxical coincidence of the Obama administration’s anti-torture tenure in office and 
a radical shift toward support for torture among nearly half of Americans.  
1.3.2 Societal Sector: Unauthorized Immigration 
Compared to terrorism, immigration has received substantially more attention in the 
securitization literature (e.g., Bigo, 2002; Buonfino, 2004; Huysmans, 2000; Karyotis 
& Patrikios, 2010), though largely in the European context. The US – despite its 
reputation as a “melting pot” nation founded on immigrants (Smith, 2012) – however 
offers no less fertile ground for analyzing the social construction of unauthorized 
immigration as a threat. Like terrorism, unauthorized immigration is a highly salient 
issue in American security discourse owing to historically high movement across the 
US-Mexico border and nativist anxiety – a Gallup study found that “illegal 
immigration” was ranked as the most important issue facing Americans in 2018 
(Newport, 2018). Also like terrorism, proposed remedies have polarized both public 
opinion and policymaking, most clearly embodied by myriad failed legislative 
proposals to address illegal immigration through comprehensive immigration reform 
(CIR). No CIR bill has passed to date despite several attempts between 2006 and 2013. 
The discourses that developed throughout the Bush and Obama administrations have 
furthermore had lasting impacts that enable a more nuanced understanding of current 
immigration debates. Specifically, the Trump presidential campaign has made 
unauthorized immigration and border security the signature components of its political 
agenda. As shown in this thesis, his campaign’s promises to build a “wall” between 
Mexico and the US, institute travel bans, deploy military personnel at the border to 
prevent asylum-seekers from entering, and overturn Constitutional birthright provisions 
are byproducts of framing contests that occurred after 9/11 and elevated unauthorized 
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immigration into the security realm. These presidential priorities have energized 
supporters and opponents alike, securing immigration’s position as a top priority for 
Americans and making it an empirically crucial and timely case study for this project.  
Other proposed (and adopted) measures over the last two decades have included 
enhanced border enforcement technology (e.g., surveillance and sensors), increased 
border enforcement personnel, the deputation of federal immigration enforcement 
powers to state and local police officers, and deportation or detention of unauthorized 
immigrants. What unites these exceptional measures is the attribution of criminality 
and illegality to immigrants. This creates a conceptual distinction between 
“exceptional” and “unexceptional” responses to immigration. Unlike terrorism, the 
securitization of immigration is characterized by what Huysmans and Buonfino (2008) 
call the dual “politics of exception” and the “politics of unease”. In some cases, 
exceptional measures are clear cut: they are recognized and articulated as such, 
contested as extrajudicial and may directly invoke security. In other cases, policies 
designed to deal with immigration are part of “everyday politics”, where the debate 
centers on the wellbeing of citizens (such as labor competition, welfare distribution, 
and culture/language preservation). These are often resolved through unexceptional 
political processes. This requires making subjective choices about where the distinction 
lies between routine responses to immigration/immigrants, and bona fide exceptional 
measures. To avoid this tension and its inevitable biases, the case study here focuses on 
unauthorized immigration (as opposed to legal immigration). This field of security sits 
somewhere between the “politics of unease” and the “politics of exception”, though 
closer in the US context to the latter. Certainly identity, culture and economic 
considerations are referent objects worthy of analysis as well, but these fields of 
(in)security have been invoked to justify less extreme measures, and thus sit closer to 
“unease”. Unauthorized immigration, on the other hand, has been used to justify border 
fences, deportation, detention, and constitutional amendment.2 This thesis accordingly 
focuses on unauthorized immigration, because it better fits the politics of exception in 
the US.  
 
2 Cultural, economic, and xenophobic motivations may underlie attempts to securitize unauthorized 
immigration, but the analysis here focuses on the frames used by actors to justify exceptional measures, 
regardless of hidden motivations.   
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The vast literature on the framing of immigration and immigrants acknowledges that 
criminality is the most prevalent narrative used in discourse (Blinder & Allen, 2016; 
Dunaway, Branton, & Abrajano, 2010; Igartua & Cheng, 2009; Soroka, 2006; Suro, 
2008) and that both political elite and press discourse is generally negative (Abrajano, 
Hajnal, & Hassell, 2017; Merolla, Ramakrishnan, & Haynes, 2013; Thorbjørnsrud, 
2015). Examining frames that promote or contest this narrative over a sixteen-year 
period spanning two presidencies enables testing the negativity bias and analyzing 
cross-contextual differences in their prevalence. While existing research already points 
to the impact of media in shaping hostility towards ethnic minorities (Boomgaarden & 
Vliegenthart, 2009; Domke, McCoy, & Torres, 1999; Oliver, 1999; Vergeer, Lubbers, 
& Scheepers, 2000), bringing the audience into this longitudinal analysis will show 
whether this effect on public attitudes is persistent or if it has varied over time and 
context, and how attitudes relate to exposure to specific frames. In short, this 
investigation can help deepen the understanding of when and why immigration frames 
produce high levels of anxiety and support for exceptional measures.  
The immigration case study is also significant to theoretical debates on desecuritization 
and raises questions on where Americans are getting their cues. Despite inflammatory 
rhetoric, detention policies and record deportations that reproduce the criminal 
immigrant metaphor, Americans have become increasingly pro-immigrant over the last 
twenty-five years (Hartig, 2018; Jones, 2019), increasingly favor policies to grant legal 
status to unauthorized immigrants, and increasingly reject exceptional measures (e.g., 
Tyson, 2018). How does this harmonize with the vast literature that recognizes a 
predominant negative bias and criminal attribution in both political and media 
discourse? And if support for exceptional measures is declining, is this evidence of 
desecuritization? If so, unauthorized immigration offers a launchpad to a theoretical 
discussion of desecuritization with rare empirical evidence to explain it.  
The two case studies under investigation then individually contribute to both theoretical 
debates within securitization theory and provide empirical insights on critical 
contemporary security issues. They also preliminarily point to divergent trends and 
contrasting logics, encouraging a multifaceted analysis: within the timeframe under 
consideration, support for torture has increased, suggesting that terrorism has become 
more deeply securitized over time, despite anti-torture cues from the Obama 
administration and infrequent terrorist acts in the US. Attitudes toward unauthorized 
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immigration, on the other hand, have softened despite a steady (though waning) stream 
of unauthorized immigrants entering the country and anti-immigrant political discourse.  
Beyond the contributions of each individual case study to theoretical debates and 
empirical outcomes, the thesis secondarily aims to use an integrated methodology that 
enables cross-case comparison. Given that integration has been wanting in 
securitization (Buzan & Waever, 2003)3, media (Bennett, 1990: 20; Soroka, 2002) and 
public opinion (Zaller, 1992: 2) research, analytical techniques are replicated across 
both cases to consciously identify cross-sectoral dynamics, overlaps and differences – 
this tests whether issue and sector attributes affect the dynamics of the public-political-
media nexus. Both issues are already inextricably linked: terrorism “has involved 
rhetoric of exclusion and fear of foreigners combined with a political demand for 
intensifying control of the cross-border movement of people” (Huysmans & Buonfino, 
2008: 766). Their shared context makes it practical to discuss the two salient co-
occurring issues in a single project and to draw comparisons between both. As national-
level priorities, they involve overlapping actors, institutions and dynamics. 
These overlaps notwithstanding, different focuses are stressed to maximize analytical 
and knowledge gain. The siloing occurs along two sites of contestation differentiated 
by the specific function a frame serves to fulfill – whether to propose a remedy for a 
problem or offer moral evaluation of an issue (Entman, 2004). The terrorism case study 
centers on the remedy proposal frame function by exploring the legitimization of a 
specific exceptional measure – torture (or “enhanced interrogation”). Unlike other 
exceptional measures in counterterrorism, torture has remained separate from 
immigration discourse, because it has largely occurred beyond US borders (e.g., in Abu 
 
3 With the exception of Buzan et al.’s (1998) Security, applications of the securitization framework tend 
to be limited to a single case within a sector. The same design and analytical techniques have rarely been 
applied across sectors. Certainly single cases can overlap across multiple sectors – immigration may have 
implications in the economic sector, and the “war on terror” may spill over into the political sector – but 
conscious evaluation of cross-sectoral dynamics has been overlooked. The approach here, on the other 
hand, enables determining whether, apart from the natural features of the threat, securitization dynamics 
differ across sectors; and if certain securitizing actors – such as media or political elites – or frames are 
more effective in one sector over another.  
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Ghraib and CIA black sites).4 The case study on the securitization of unauthorized 
immigration, on the other hand, explores oppositional frames along the remedy 
proposal and the moral evaluation axes. The former focuses on competing proposals to 
resolve unauthorized immigration: an expansionist approach that provides individuals a 
pathway toward citizenship; and a restrictionist approach that emphasizes border 
security. The moral evaluation axis centers on the threat itself, and competing attempts 
to (de)link unauthorized immigrants and criminality. This link in turn has consequences 
for audience evaluations of exceptional measures. The terrorism case study thus uses 
the remedy proposal axis to introduce the operationalization of securitization using 
framing methodology; and the immigration case study adds empirical richness and 
complexity by considering both the remedy proposal and moral evaluation axes.  
1.3.3 Case Studies Disclaimer 
Two disclaimers are necessary to calibrate expectations. First, this thesis does not aim 
to adjudicate the veracity or sincerity of arguments made by actors, nor the morality of 
exceptional measures; normative discussions are sidelined. The goal instead is to 
excavate, as objectively as possible, the attempts to discursively legitimize and 
delegitimize exceptional measures. While a sixteen-year case study naturally requires 
selecting some discursive events and excluding others, the focus is primarily on 
defining moments that had the potential to deepen or challenge the (de)securitization of 
threats (Donnelly, 2013) – this methodological device is explained in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. Moreover, for each case study, an inherently subjective discourse analysis is 
accompanied by a rules-based, computer-automated content analysis as a check on the 
former. Second, given that language and rhetoric are central elements of analysis, 
certain terms are preferred in the analyses. For consistency, unauthorized immigration 
is used as a catch-all for synonymous (albeit politically loaded) terms like illegal 
immigration, undocumented immigration, and irregular immigration that all describe 
the paperless entry of individuals into the US. The choice is somewhat arbitrary, and 
used primarily to differentiate the abstract concept from purposeful labels.5 Similarly, 
following convention in previous scholarship (e.g., Mayer & Armor, 2012; McCoy, 
 
4 Compare this to, for example, the USA PATRIOT Act, surveillance measures, airport security and 
other border enforcement processes which were born out of a counter-terrorism agenda but also overlap 
significantly with immigration security discourse.  
5 The choice also reflects consensus that the paperless entry of individuals into the US is a civil rather 
than a criminal infraction (e.g., Coutin, 2005: 13; Thorbjørnsrud, 2015: 779).  
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2012; Pyle, 2009) the term torture is preferred to alternatives like interrogation and 
abuse – the latter two are used largely to reference the particular use of those terms by 
either political elites or media actors.6  
To summarize, this thesis examines how terrorism and unauthorized immigration 
became (de)securitized in the US since 9/11, and the role of the media in this process. 
The two cases share similar contexts and center on the conflict between the American 
self and foreign others. This overlap is recognized as an asset because it permits a 
coherent analysis between cases that have comparable logics. Both cases not only have 
the potential to contribute to theory development, but they also contain dramatic 
elements that make them newsworthy and thus prime candidates for identifying 
whether the press can have an independent (de)securitizing effect. For background, the 
next section provides a brief overview of how the press environment has evolved in 
recent decades.  
1.4 Contextualizing the American Media Landscape 
The tradition of objective journalism and balanced reporting has been a central tenet of 
the American media landscape. Even overtly slanted and partisan outlets at least pay lip 
service to this tradition, suggesting that it is a norm valued by audiences and critical to 
maintaining credibility. While critics have held that an ideologically liberal slant has 
long stained mainstream media (Groseclose & Milyo, 2005), network broadcast 
channels – like ABC, CBS and NBC – nonetheless sought to provide a “homogeneous 
and generic ‘point-counterpoint’” (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009: 20) experience for most of 
the post-World War II era. But the August 1987 repeal of the “fairness doctrine” – 
which obligated television and radio broadcasters to present both sides of any political 
opinion story – and technological advancements triggered the rise of a more polarized 
and fragmented information environment.  
This shift was fueled particularly by partisan cable news. The success of CNN 
(established in 1980), the first channel to offer 24-hour nonstop news coverage, paved 
the way for the Fox News Channel (henceforth Fox News) and MSNBC to surface in 
1996. Fox News emerged as a response to the dearth of conservative voices in cable 
 
6 In subsequent chapters, italicized font is used to differentiate frames signifiers from more general uses 
of the term (e.g., torture).  
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news television. Building on the success of conservative talk radio program, it was only 
moderately more conservative than its two major cable news competitors for most of its 
first decade of existence. In fact, it aligned closely with MSNBC in terms of ideology 
between 2001 and 2004 (Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017). Beginning in the mid-2000s, 
however, the two networks began to diverge sharply – Fox News became increasingly 
politically conservative while MSNBC moved further left (Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017). 
This shift has largely been attributed to the proliferation of news actors (both digital 
and traditional) which created a competitive environment and business incentives to 
target niche audiences rather than the broad general public (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; 
Stroud, 2008). The result has been increasing polarization and an “echo chamber” 
effect among audiences: the increasing diversity of information environments enable 
news consumers driven by motivations to reduce cognitive cost to customize their news 
experience so that it validates or aligns with existing viewpoints (Bennett & Pfetsch, 
2018; Coe et al., 2008; Gentzkow, 2016; Stroud, 2008). The desire to retain and grow 
audiences motivates news organization to further cater content to specific audience 
preferences, resulting in the coexistence of separate, oppositional discourses (Benkler, 
Faris, & Roberts, 2018).  
Still, all three cable news outlets preach norms of fairness, objectivity and balance, 
even though popular primetime evening programs have seen the replacement of 
dispassionate news anchors with often partisan personalities. The new genre of 
reporting bears stylistic resemblances to traditional network news – experts are invited 
to contribute, supporting footage accompanies stories, anchors speak from desks while 
graphics are superimposed to their side – but the separation between objective factual 
reporting and opinion commentary has blurred, where detached news reporting 
overlaps with often argumentative political punditry and personal commentary.7 
While cable television outperforms all other sources of news in audience size, print 
newspapers and their online versions remain competitive, claiming readership by 
almost half of American adults (Shearer, 2018).8 The New York Times, in particular, 
 
7 Key personalities that were figureheads of their respective networks from 2001 to 2016 included Sean 
Hannity and Bill O’Reilly on Fox News; Rachel Maddow, Chris Matthews and Keith Olbermann on 
MSNBC; and Lou Dobbs and Anderson Cooper on CNN. 
8 While television and news websites command the largest audiences, social media and radio remain 
competitive with 20% and 26% of Americans respectively getting their news from these platforms. 
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holds not only the highest circulation among Sunday papers (Pew Research Center, 
2014b), but its readership has also increased despite overall declines in newspaper 
readership (Barthel, 2017). As an esteemed and reputable source, it often sets the 
agenda and signals to other press actors which issues are most salient (Wanta & Hu, 
1993). Certainly the Times is less overtly partisan than the three cable news actors – 
and its format precludes the belligerent style generally associated with primetime cable 
news – but it is still recognized as left leaning, particularly in its editorial pages. The 
“wall of separation” that exists between editorials and outwardly objective news 
coverage notwithstanding, Kahn and Kenney (2002) have demonstrated that bias 
expressed in the former can bleed into the latter. Thus, even newspapers like the Times 
are susceptible to partisan and ideological slant. 
These partisan divisions in the American press are important, because they are likely 
fault lines along which different security discourses are debated and contested. The 
two-party dominated political system in the US – left-leaning Democrats and right-
leaning Republicans – has resulted in most political contests occurring along partisan 
lines. Certainly there may be opponents and proponents of exceptional measures within 
a given security context on both sides, but partisanship is a useful heuristic for charting 
out competing discourses and the oppositional identities they align with. Still, this 
feature of American politics is not taken for granted: a thorough discourse analysis 
maps out the boundaries that divide identities on security issues, recognizing even that 
some issues (particularly immigration) can fashion alliances across party lines.  
1.4.1 Audience Engagement and Trust 
A central contribution of this thesis is recognizing the role of the audience in 
securitization theory. In the US, the public relies primarily on the press for learning 
about foreign policy issues (Baum & Potter, 2008; Graber & Dunaway, 2018; Paletz, 
2009). Generally, Americans are highly engaged with news: nearly all Americans (92% 
in 2016 and 89% in 2017) believe that it is at least somewhat important to keep up with 
news and information; to that end, approximately two-thirds of Americans actively 
seek out news and information; the same amount also engage with news at least once a 
day (Media Insight Project, 2016, 2017a).9 Digital options and social media are 
 
9 During election years, consumption is higher. In 2016, for example, 79% of Americans consumed news 
at least once a day (Media Insight Project, 2016).  
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becoming increasingly popular, but television still leads: over 80% of Americans rely 
on it as their primary source of information in 2016 (down from 87% in 2014); print 
newspapers conversely attract attention from 48% of Americans (down from 61% in 
2014) (Media Insight Project, 2014, 2016).10 While print newspaper circulation has 
been dropping since the early 2000s, digital circulation has largely absorbed this share, 
suggesting that “traditional” newspapers are not only still relevant, but second only to 
television news (Pew Research Center, 2018a).  
Despite high perceptions of bias in the media (Knight Foundation, 2018), public trust in 
the press is surprisingly high, and especially for individually preferred sources. Just 
over three-quarters of Americans report that the media is at least somewhat trustworthy, 
while 80% trust their own preferred media sources (Media Insight Project, 2017a). 
Similarly, 83% agree that media in general is at least somewhat accurate and 90% 
believe that their own preferred media is accurate (Media Insight Project, 2017a). These 
findings suggest that while perceptions of bias and distrust exist, these negative feelings 
are largely directed against other media sources. More consequentially for this study, 
individuals are likely to accept as reliable and trustworthy the news frames from their 
preferred outlets (Stroud, 2008). It is thus all the more critical to study the impact of 
individual outlets rather than the aggregate media as an undifferentiated mass. What 
remains to be resolved, however, is whether this trust drives security attitudes. 
Alternatively, and to reiterate the primary research question, can the media be an 
independent (de)securitizing actor?   
1.5 Contributions and Thesis Outline 
The contributions of this research are empirical, methodological and theoretical. 
Empirically, the case study on terrorism unravels the social construction of perhaps the 
 
10 Notably, social media platforms have surpassed print newspapers in terms of audiences (Shearer, 
2018). Still, as a news source, social media commands a smaller audience than television and news 
websites, the latter often an outlet for traditionally print sources to mirror their content to a wider 
audience. That attention to newspapers – both digital and print – remains competitive (Media Insight 
Project, 2017a, 2017b) despite subscription fees is an indicator of the continued relevance and 
importance of newspapers. For this reason – and also because social media platforms have become 
popular only in the recent decade – social media platforms are excluded from analysis in this thesis. 
Their growth nonetheless merits investigation in future studies bounded to timeframes that intersect more 
fully with the ubiquity of social media.  
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most salient security issue (Mayer & Armor, 2012) – and even a new security paradigm 
altogether (J. Collins & Glover, 2002; Silberstein, 2002) – in American policy 
discourse for nearly two decades; it is also an entrypoint for engaging the primarily 
Europe-centric securitization theory framework in a relatively scarcely examined 
American setting. The specific focus on the (de)legitimization of torture confronts and 
contributes to the debate on American support for torture and the drivers of attitudes 
(Blauwkamp, Rowling, & Pettit, 2018). While giving attention to political elites, the 
investigation also brings in previously underexamined actors like the press and the 
audience. The subsequent analysis of the securitization of unauthorized immigration 
similarly shows how audience attitudes towards exceptional measures related to both 
political and media frames. In a sharp reversal from previous studies, the analysis 
identifies significant changes in the way that unauthorized immigrants have been 
framed over the last sixteen years. The analysis largely focuses on the Bush and Obama 
presidencies, but it captures shifts that occurred toward the end of the latter’s 
administration as Trump’s campaign made immigration the signature component of its 
agenda. The case studies directly answer the two central questions in this dissertation. 
First, the analysis of different media frames demonstrates the extent to which press 
actors can behave as independent and strategic securitizing actors. Second, 
investigating competing frames over a sixteen-year period alongside corresponding 
attitudes explains how exceptional measures became (de)legitimized in the US in 
response to the perceived threats posed by terrorism and unauthorized immigration.  
Several major theoretical and methodological contributions emerge from the research 
as well. First, both the immigration and terrorism case studies validate a key 
assumption undergirding securitization theory: security construction is an 
intersubjective process that does not necessarily depend on the presence of objective 
threats. Despite low incidents of terrorism, the issue remains heavily securitized, with 
American attitudes toward illegal exceptional measures to counteract the threat evenly 
split. Similarly, despite fairly steady immigration rates, attitudes toward unauthorized 
immigration have softened over time; quantitative models further show no effect of 
objective factors – like living in a region with high or low levels of unauthorized 
immigrants – on immigration policy attitudes. Security construction instead appears 
strongly linked to framing. Second, the findings suggest that press actors can be 
independent securitizing agents. There is some uncertainty given that the models 
preclude definitive causality, but even absent theoretical assumptions on the flow of 
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influence, the general alignment suggests reinforcing spheres of information. Third, the 
emphasis on the audience and methodological tools for measuring audiences fill major 
gaps and remove much of the conjecturing that is typical in securitization scholarship. 
Rather than cherry-picking a few convenient polls, the comprehensive and extensive 
approach here ensures accurate and methodical representation. Finally, the integration 
of framing theory with securitization brings methodological and operationalization 
advantages – like identifying and measuring the prevalence of competing securitizing 
and desecuritizing discourses – and an arsenal of explanations on why certain frames 
are more effective. The results show, for example, how euphemisms (like interrogation 
or undocumented immigration) may backfire at first, but can become normalized and 
mainstreamed over time. Specifically, euphemisms invoked with the intention to 
minimize the exceptionalism of a threat of exceptional measure can be recognized as a 
deceptive tool initially; as they are repeated over time, however, audiences can become 
desensitized and inured to them, such that the original duplicitous nature of the term 
becomes forgotten. The design presented here is also flexible, scalable and empirically 
agnostic, empowering future securitization scholarship to take advantage of the 
standardized approach and enabling cross-case comparisons. 
These contributions are spread across the following seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides 
a theoretical foundation, introducing concepts from framing scholarship and 
securitization theory. Drawing on literature from political communication and 
psychology, the discussion on framing identifies what frames and framing effects are, 
how frames spread, and what makes some frames more effective than others. The 
discussion segues into a brief history and the key concepts within securitization theory. 
Some limitations are introduced, and justification is provided for integrating concepts 
from framing to overcome weaknesses in securitization theory. Chapter 3 dives deeper 
into this cross-fertilization and explains how the research is operationalized through a 
triangulation of methods. First an idealized and abstract model of securitization is 
broken down into key components: identifying frame competition, source 
differentiation and impacts on the audience. This breakdown guides the mixed methods 
design of a practical model, which includes a political elite discourse analysis, a mixed 
political elite and media content analysis, and tools for measuring audience alignments. 
A formalized discourse analysis framework based on Lene Hansen’s (2013) security-
identity nexus is introduced. Importantly, Chapters 2 and 3 equip the reader with 
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theoretical foundations and the required vocabulary to understand how to differentiate 
important terms like major discourse, basic discourse and frames. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the social construction of terrorism as a security issue, 
recognizing it as a potentially new security paradigm altogether (Collins & Glover, 
2002; Silberstein, 2002). This is the entry point for engaging the primarily Europe-
centric securitization theory framework in a relatively scarcely examined American 
setting. The specific focus on the (de)legitimization of torture confronts and contributes 
to the debate on whether Americans have become more supportive of torture and what 
is driving this change (Blauwkamp et al., 2018). Chapter 4 presents a discourse analysis 
of political elite rhetoric – specifically, it charts the evolution of the torture debate 
within terrorism discourse. The analysis reveals that two competing frames were 
differentiated in the legitimization of the Bush administration’s intelligence-gathering 
program: one that centered on torture as an illegal and immoral act; and another that 
promoted interrogation as an effective counterterrorist option. The excavation is 
structured into four sequential, though overlapping, phases of denial, rebranding, 
justification and silencing. These findings are used to inform the quantitative analysis 
in Chapter 5, where the focus is broadened to include the press and the audience. 
Significant differences in press and political elite framings are exposed through a 
content analysis, suggesting a largely autonomous framing strategy between the two. 
Next, emphasizing the audience component of securitization, public attitudes toward 
torture are analyzed and modeled on exposure to these frames. The findings not only 
resolve the debate over whether the majority of Americans support torture (e.g., 
Blauwkamp et al., 2018; Gronke et al., 2010), but they also provide evidence that 
attitudes are strongly aligned with attention to media sources. 
Chapters 6 and 7 comprise the unauthorized immigration case study. The discourse 
analysis in Chapter 6 shows that, on the one hand, unauthorized immigration became 
inextricably linked to 9/11 and terrorism discourse as the latter was attributed to foreign 
enemies and vulnerabilities at the border. The link moved immigration into the domain 
of national security, heightening the criminality narrative typically used to frame 
immigration. On the other hand, both Presidents Bush and Obama often emphasized 
shared values between Americans and immigrants, characterizing unauthorized 
immigration as a procedural problem rather than a criminal one. Though the content 
and audience analysis in Chapter 7 is similarly structured to the terrorism content 
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analysis, an additional layer of complexity is added by looking at two pairs of 
competing frames. Namely, analysis occurs along the remedy proposal axis (border 
security versus expansionist policies) and the moral evaluation axis (criminality versus 
procedural problem). This additional complexity is deliberate: the terrorism case study 
aims to acclimate the reader to the concepts, but the proverbial training wheels are 
removed in the immigration case study for a richer analysis. In addition to contributing 
to an empirical understanding of how unauthorized immigration was securitized in the 
US, the analysis reveals previously undiscovered patterns. In a significant departure 
from previous scholarship that has identified a strong negative bias and an 
overwhelming emphasis on the criminality frame in immigration news coverage, this 
project finds fairly balanced coverage by certain outlets throughout the Obama 
administration, demonstrating the value of a longitudinal (rather than episodic) study. 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, these changes in press framing align with 
shifting (and increasingly pro-immigrant) public opinion.  
The final chapter discusses findings from the two case studies in an integrative fashion, 
with an emphasis on cross-sectoral similarities and differences. The empirical, 
theoretical and methodological contributions are discussed in greater detail. A final 
section in the conclusion chapter considers limitations and identifies opportunities for 
future research.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations 
2.1 Introduction 
The analysis of media and political elite influence on security attitudes is driven by a 
synthesis of securitization theory and framing. Securitization theory provides a critical 
constructivist account of how security issues emerge, evolve and subside. Its 
introduction to security studies has generated a rich scholarship on a variety of security 
issues that challenges traditional approaches to analyzing security as an objective 
experience restricted to the military domain; the theory instead offers that security is an 
intersubjective process that occurs in multiple sectors (Buzan et al., 1998). It provides 
an organizing logic and a set of expectations for how (in)security is constructed in these 
different sectors, which actors are involved, and the implications of speaking security.  
Despite its wide applications and recognition among security scholars as a significant 
contribution to security studies (Balzacq, 2011a), however, the theory suffers key 
theoretical, empirical and methodological limitations. Theoretical limitations include 
the underdevelopment of key actors (e.g., the audience) and processes (e.g., 
desecuritization) (Watson, 2012); the overemphasis on political elites as securitizing 
actors; and ambiguity on what constitutes securitization. This has led to empirical gaps 
like a lack of guidance on how to operationalize the audience, how to measure 
legitimization of exceptional measures, and how to link both to securitizing moves. An 
overemphasis on political elites has also led to the cordoning off of the securitization 
process to one set of actors and the de facto designation of discourse analysis as the 
“obvious” method for understanding how security is constructed. While discourse 
analysis is indeed a powerful tool for studying political elites, it poses empirical 
challenges for measuring security discourse objectively and systematically across a 
wide array of actors and texts. Finally, the underdevelopment of desecuritization has 
also resulted in little guidance on how to identify and operationalize the undoing of 
security.   
Scholarship on framing and framing effects offers a way to overcome these limitations 
and push securitization theory to its full potential, while answering the central question 
of this research: can news media actors influence public attitudes on international 
security issues? The vast literature on how frames emerge, how they influence 
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audiences through framing effects, what determines frames effectiveness, and how to 
measure these processes fills important gaps in securitization theory, making it possible 
to bring in the audience, other securitizing actors and rigorous methods to link the two 
(Watson, 2012). A rich scholarship on directions of influence between the news media 
and political elites (broadly the press-state debate) within framing literature also 
provides guidance on the conditions under which the media can drive a policy debate.  
Toward setting the foundation for integrating framing and securitization, this chapter 
proceeds in three parts. It first introduces framing theory, defining key concepts like 
frames and framing effects, and explaining the mechanisms that drive them. Next, 
securitization theory and its key components are introduced. The chapter closes by 
identifying limitations of securitization theory and offering advancements through 
cross-fertilization with framing theory. In short, the framing literature offers richer 
methodological approaches and guidance on how to measure framing effects, while 
securitization theory provides an organizing logic and a set of expectations that are 
specific to the construction of security. Drawing on framing scholarship, three revisions 
are proposed for securitization theory: first, it should expand the role of who can speak 
security beyond political elites to include press actors; second, it should better account 
for the audience; and third, quantitative methods should be introduced to increase 
analytical rigor.  
2.2 Framing Theory 
The tension between the “myriad ways of describing events in the world” (Norris, 
Kern, & Just, 2003: 4) and constraints such as time and word limits requires 
compressing information into consumable packages that convey the most salient details 
of an issue. Framing is the process of “selecting and highlighting some aspects of a 
perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that 
reality.” (Entman, 2004: 26) Even absent a deliberate strategy to manage or manipulate 
perceptions, expediency and knowledge constraints lead to the natural selection and 
promotion of some aspects of an issue and the neglect of others (Entman, 1993; Norris 
et al., 2003; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1993). Still, actors can and do employ 
strategies to promote their preferred frames (Edelman, 1993), and existing research has 
demonstrated how different variables influence the success of framing strategies.  
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In order to understand these strategies and what causes them to succeed or fail, this 
section begins by defining frames and framing effects. Relevant concepts are identified 
to show how scholars have operationalized frames and framing effects. Entman’s 
(2004) cascade activation model is introduced as a foundational framework for 
identifying key actors and the processes in the emergence and spreading of frames in 
the American foreign policy context. The model also sets the scene for a broader debate 
on press-state relations that seeks to resolve who influences whom, providing context 
for two important questions for this thesis: 1) does the news media simply popularize 
political elite foreign policy discourse, or can it act independently? and 2) under what 
circumstances do these dynamics change? This section ends by outlining the variables 
that influence a framing strategy and determine whether a frame will gain traction (and 
produce framing effects) or fail to resonate with audiences.  
2.2.1 Frame Anatomy 
Robert Entman (2004) deconstructs frames into two analytical components: function 
and focus. The functional dimension analyzes the purpose or role of a frame – this can 
include problem definition, causal identification, moral evaluation, and remedy 
proposal (Entman, 2004). The primary function of a frame is to define an issue and 
explain its relevance. For example, a frame can highlight that deaths have occurred, 
further lives are at stake, and/or that the well-being of people or their values are 
threatened. A frame can also identify the cause of the problem – such as a terrorist 
group, a foreign government, or human error – and assign a moral evaluation to it – 
such as condemnation or praise. Finally, a frame can propose a remedy like military 
intervention, border security, or other forms of mobilization to address a problem. The 
second dimension of a frame is the focus or unit of analysis, which includes issues, 
events, and political actors (Entman, 2004: 24). Issues can include terrorism, 
immigration or political/economic problems; events can include specific attacks, 
humanitarian or economic crises, political elections or policy implementations; and 
actors can include political elites, the press, citizens, terrorist groups or migrants. A 
single frame may exhibit multiple frame functions and focuses: for example, Entman 
(2004: 24-25) illustrates a post-9/11 frame in which an event (the 9/11 attacks in the 
US, the problem definition) had been perpetrated by actors (al-Qaida and the Taliban, 
the cause) and ignited a further event (the war in Afghanistan, a remedial action). 
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Together, the two dimensions are lenses through which frames can be analyzed and 
understood. While a particular frame does not need to satisfy each of these dimensions 
– nor are the different lenses impervious to overlap – Entman’s matrix demonstrates the 
selections made by framers to describe, analyze, evaluate and deal with an issue, event 
or actor. Two frames might agree on the definition and cause of unauthorized 
immigration, for example, but they can differ on the proposed remedy (e.g., border 
enforcement versus immigrant integration) and moral evaluation of central actors (e.g., 
unauthorized immigrants as criminals or victims of a broken documentation system).  
2.2.2 Framing Effect 
A framing effect occurs when “alternative ways of posing a policy issue produce 
distinctly different public responses” (Bartels, 2003: 56). When the selection of features 
used to frame an issue to an audience accounts for the different preferences that the 
audience adopts, a framing effect is said to have occurred. This is in contradistinction 
to rational choice theory which suggests that individuals respond consistently through a 
process of reasoning over alternatives (Bartels, 2003; Druckman, 2004; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1989; Zaller, 1992). Instead framing effects occur when variation in how 
frames are presented influence the considerations activated, thus shaping responses to 
those frames and attitudes more broadly (Bartels, 2003).  
Druckman (2004: 672) distinguishes between equivalency framing effects, in which 
logically equivalent statements evoke different reactions; and issue framing effects, 
where by “emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker leads 
individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions”. 
Equivalent (or “objectively identical”) frames can vary by their valence (positive versus 
negative) or other logical manipulation. Quattrone and Tversky (1988) demonstrate this 
in their study which asked respondents to choose between two logically identical policy 
proposals. One set of respondents was prompted to indicate preference for either a 
policy that generated 90% employment and a 12% rate of inflation; or another policy 
that generated 95% employment and 17% inflation. The second set of respondents was 
presented the same policies, but with rates for workforce unemployment (10% and 5%). 
Though functionally identical, the prompts produced different preferences: the first 
group showed greater support for the 90% employment policy, while the second group 
preferred 5% unemployment. Similarly, Sapiro’s (1998) study asked one set of 
respondents to rate on a one hundred-point scale “opponents of abortion” and 
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“supporters of abortion”, while a second set rated “pro-life people” and “pro-choice 
people”. Again, despite being functionally equivalent, “pro-life people” and “pro-
choice people” were rated more favorably than their counterparts, “opponents of 
abortion” and “supporters of abortion”. 
Issue framing effects, on the other hand, result from “qualitatively different” attributes 
of a frame focus (Druckman, 2004: 672). The difference in audience reaction stems 
from assessment of distinct attributes of an issue rather than logical manipulations. 
Both Nelson et al.’s (1997) as well as Chong and Druckman’s (2007) studies, for 
example, find that different cues can shape responses to a white supremacist rally. The 
“pro” treatment group was prompted to consider free speech and was thus significantly 
more likely to express tolerance for the rally, while the “con” group was prompted to 
consider public safety concerns, leading them to show less support for the rally. Unlike 
Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) employment-unemployment distinction, in which both 
frames essentially express the same outcome, the rally frames activate considerations of 
separate issues – free speech and public safety. Domke et al. (1999) similarly find issue 
framing effects for immigration: those prompted to consider economic factors were 
more likely to interpret immigration solely in material terms; whereas those prompted 
to consider human rights, morality and personal responsibility interpreted immigration 
in both material and ethical terms.  
In short, framing effects imply that wording differences can influence audience 
evaluations even when the meanings of the different wordings are the same (Zaller, 
1992: 34). This occurs both when the activated considerations are different (issue 
frames) and when the frames are functionally identical (equivalent frames). Attitudes 
are then neither invariant nor purely rational, but dependent on framing choices.  
2.2.3 How Frames Emerge and Spread 
2.2.3.1 Schema Activation and Spreading Activation 
Frames rely on the activation – or “bringing thoughts and feelings to mind” – of 
schemas – “clusters or nodes of connected ideas and feelings stored in memory” – to 
emerge and spread (Entman, 2004: 7). Both the framer as well as the audience fit 
interpretations of reality into preexisting cognitions of related concepts. By 
“[encouraging] particular trains of thought about political phenomena and lead[ing] 
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audiences to arrive at more or less predictable conclusions” (Price, Tewksbury, & 
Powers, 1997: 483), frames act as shortcuts, enabling mental associations between 
existing “cognitive knowledge structures” (Domke et al., 1999: 573). Entman’s 
example of a terrorism schema links September 11 to nodes associated with “the World 
Trade Center, airplane hijackers, Osama bin Laden, the New York fire department, and 
New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani” (2004: 7), where each node in the network 
occupies shared emotional and cognitive space. When any one node in a schema is 
activated by a frame, networked nodes are also activated to “guide information 
processing and the construction of attitudes” (Domke et al., 1999: 573), a process 
known as spreading activation (Berkowitz & Rogers, 1986; Entman, 2004). Domke et 
al. (1999: 573) further add that “schemata activated by contextual cues remain on top of 
the mental bin, making them highly accessible for a period of time.” As mental 
associations are repeated and rehearsed, their commitment to long-term memory makes 
them easily accessible when similar frames are later encountered (Domke et al., 1999; 
Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998; Entman, 2004; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Higgins & 
King, 1981; Lodge & Stroh, 1993). Entman’s September 11 schema, once learned, can 
then be retriggered every time “terrorism” or another issue seemingly related to 
terrorism is invoked. Spreading activation, Entman argues, means that the order of 
information intake is crucial, because “[f]irst impressions may be difficult to dislodge” 
(2004: 7).  
Importantly, schemas that are activated by a frame are used by individuals to evaluate 
the frame’s focus (Domke et al., 1998). Rather than drawing on the “entire repertoire” 
of knowledge available to comprehend a reality, individuals apply only what is 
accessible (Domke et al., 1998; Higgins & King, 1981; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) – in 
other words, only the nodes that have been activated by a particular frame are used to 
evaluate it. This differentiates two models of processing, memory-based and 
impression-driven: in the former, known facts in memory are used to comprehensively 
evaluate an issue; in the latter, impressions are made “on the fly” (Lodge, McGraw, & 
Stroh, 1989: 400-401). Impression-driven processing is more likely to occur, because it 
is less cognitively taxing. Thus, the choice of frames can activate nodes which 
condition audience evaluation of the frame focus; alternative frames activate other 
nodes, generating possibly different evaluations.  
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2.2.3.2 Cascade Activation Model 
In the marketplace of competing frames and different interpretations, Entman’s (2004) 
cascade activation model uses a hierarchy to illustrate the “flow of influence” between 
different actors in the activation and promotion of frames in the US political context. At 
the top of this structure is the Administration, composed of White House and cabinet 
officials (e.g., Secretaries of the State and Defense Departments). These actors are 
empowered with the most autonomy and flexibility to form the “first public expressions 
about an event” (9) and influence the boundaries of discourse available to subsequent 
levels, in declining influence: other elites (e.g., the legislature, political/military and 
foreign leaders), news media, news frames (the actual text and images employed by 
journalists), and the public. Similar chains-of-command exist within each tier as across 
the tiers – national newspapers, for example, are more influential than neighborhood 
gazettes. The New York Times, for example, sets the boundaries of discourse available 
to other media by privileging certain frames (Reese & Danielian, 1989; Wanta & Hu, 
1993).  
Actors use power and strategy to “spread their ideas through the cascading system” 
(Entman, 2004: 19) in order to deliberately “[magnify] those elements of the depicted 
reality that favor one side’s position, making them salient, while at the same time 
shrinking those elements that might be used to construct a counterframe” (Entman, 
2004: 31). Entman’s (2004) illustrative study of the First Gulf War depicts how 
division among public opinion (and political elites) before the war motivated the Bush 
administration to use strategic narratives to rally support for military escalation. This 
was achieved by “explaining the policy better, by making a great public show of 
consulting Congress and obtaining U.N. approval” (Entman, 2004: 82), and by 
controlling the magnitude – or amount of coverage – of the administration’s preferred 
hawkish frame. By reducing cognitive costs, signaling due diligence, repeating the 
preferred frame, and suppressing competing frames, the Bush administration drew 
support for its military escalation.   
2.2.3.3 Press-State Models  
Yet executive branch officials are not the only framing entrepreneurs. The cascade 
activation model recognizes both downstream and upstream influence – while actors at 
the top enjoy the most flexibility in production of frames, downstream factors can 
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impose constraints. A particularly important relationship exists between the press and 
political elites. The media’s watchdog responsibility creates a natural inclination to 
engage with and respond to cues from the most powerful elites, because the latter are 
most likely to affect policy (Althaus, Edy, Entman, & Phalen, 1996; Bennett, 1996; 
Entman, 2004; Entman & Page, 1994). Entman argues the news media has less freedom 
and autonomy to shape and create news frames than political elites. It has the “capacity 
to ask questions and to decide precisely which words and images to assemble and 
transmit” (2004: 91), but must conform to the discursive domain set by the 
administration and other political elites. Certainly the press can voice dissent against 
political elite frames, but Entman argues that this requires “energetic sponsors” (2004: 
110) in Congress or elsewhere; without this support, the media’s watchdog attempts do 
not resonate with the public and are ineffective.  
In the broader debate on press-state relations, Entman’s characterization fits the 
indexing hypothesis, occupying the middle ground between the manufacturing consent 
model and more autonomous models of media behavior, like the CNN effect. At one 
end of the spectrum, the manufacturing consent model states that the media is exploited 
and used to promote official policy frames (Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Robinson, 
1999). Influence flows from political elites to media and “media does not create policy 
but…is mobilized (manipulated even) into supporting government policy” (Robinson, 
1999: 301). Robinson (1999) describes this executive version as the media’s promotion 
of the official (e.g., White House-generated) frame. He distinguishes it from the 
indexing model, in which media coverage reflects (or indexes) debates occurring 
between political elites (see also Althaus et al., 1996; Bennett, 1990, 2016; Bennett et 
al., 2006). For Robinson and Entman alike, this means that “news coverage critical of 
executive policy is possible when – and perhaps only when – there exists elite conflict 
over policy” (Robinson, 1999: 304). Still, other models suggest that the news media 
can exert upward pressure through the CNN effect – or the notion that “real-time 
communications technology [can] provoke major responses from domestic audiences 
and political elites to global events” (Robinson, 1999: 301). This model endows the 
press with greater autonomy and the power to influence political decision-making by 
framing issues (such as humanitarian crises) in subjective and ethical terms, linking 
inaction to poor governance.  
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The tension between different press-state models and which ones to expect under which 
conditions remains unresolved. Some have argued that the issue itself determines press-
state relations, because the press shifts allegiances based on the actors most capable of 
affecting policy in each case (Althaus et al., 1996). Callaghan and Schnell argue that 
“at least some of the time, the media themselves drive the political debate” (2001: 186), 
but they find that coverage of foreign policy, military affairs and macroeconomic 
policy best fits the indexing model, due to the “easy indexing capabilities” of such 
stories (201-202). Carruthers (2011) instead shows that with regard to war and conflict, 
the media is more likely to mobilize in support of political elites, lending support to the 
executive manufacturing consent model. This “calibration to power” (Entman, 2004: 
78) is short-lived according to Baum and Potter (2008), who argue that media 
deference to political elites occurs in the early “rally around the flag” (43) stage of 
foreign conflict during which information asymmetry disadvantages the press and 
creates a reliance on the executive version of the facts (see also Althaus et al., 1996; 
Bennett, 1996). As the information gap narrows between actors and dissent becomes 
mainstreamed, media coverage can shift to better fit the indexing model. The CNN 
effect, on the other hand, is more likely to occur on humanitarian/ethical issues (Gilboa, 
Jumbert, Miklian, & Robinson, 2016). News coverage of the 1991 Kurdish refugee 
crisis (Shaw, 1996) and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre (Hansen, 2013; Robinson, 2000), 
for example, are both presumed to have driven Western intervention by using graphic 
language and images that made it difficult for political leaders (and their constituents) 
to ignore (Entman, 2004; Robinson, 1999). Similarly, Bennett et al. (2006: 468) suggest 
that “dramatic and troubling events” can motivate news media to break with political 
elites and produce their own frames (see also Livingston & Bennett, 2003) in pursuit of 
resolving the collective national dissonance. 
Still others suggest that broader contextual factors determine which model will prevail. 
The news media’s increased autonomy and capacity to drive foreign policy-making, for 
example, has been attributed to the post-Cold War “collapse of the old anti-communist 
consensus” (Robinson, 1999). Entman (2004: 96) adds that “With the disappearance of 
the Red Menace, invoking patriotism to block opposition becomes more difficult, 
opening space for more independent influence by the media in defining problems and 
suggesting remedies.” Robinson (1999: 308) also finds that the press gains control 
when there is general uncertainty among political elites; but when government policy is 
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more coherent, it can “draw upon its substantial resources and credibility as an 
information source to influence news media output”. 
Importantly, many of the press-state assumptions predate the proliferation of media 
actors and the extreme polarization (especially among cable news actors) discussed in 
section 1.4. Increased competition creates business incentives to specialize toward 
niche audiences; this in turn restructures media priorities away from objectively 
informing and toward sustaining viewership/readership. This necessitates a deeper 
investigation of the framing strategies used by the press and political elites. Still, a key 
implication of the press-state debate is that, contra Entman (2004), other scholars have 
found evidence of media acting autonomously of political elites, especially when 
humanitarian or ethical outcomes are at stake. This is also particularly likely to occur in 
the absence of a unifying threat (e.g., “the Red Menace”) and when political elites fail 
to construct a unified, coherent framing strategy (e.g., because of internal division). The 
following section describes in greater detail what drives an effective framing strategy.  
2.2.4 Framing Strategy and Effectiveness 
Despite the infinite ways to frame any given phenomenon, certain frames gain traction 
and “stick” while less effective frames are selected out and fail to cascade down. What 
determines a frame’s resonance? The variables that influence frame resilience occur at 
three levels of analysis: the source of a frame, attributes of the frame itself (such as 
strength, valence, magnitude, arrangement and cultural congruence), and the recipient 
of the frame.  
2.2.4.1 Frame Source 
Entman (2004: 106) notes that not all actors are equal in the American policy framing 
context: “Republicans, ideologically more unified on foreign policy and more amenable 
to following disciplined leadership, generally supply counter-frames more effectively 
than the fractious Democratic coalition”, making them better equipped to push frames 
to the public. Owing to their “flimsier control over news frames” (Entman, 2004: 106), 
Democrats are less effective at rallying the public. An ineffective strategy can enable “a 
power vacuum that opposing elites and journalists may enter with their own 
interpretations”, while effective ones “can endow frames with extra energy to penetrate 
down through elite networks to news organizations, journalists and their texts, and 
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finally to the public.” (Entman, 2004: 91) Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) find that 
popular presidents are also better able to persuade the public (see also Edwards, 1990; 
Entman, 1989, 2004).11 Similarly, Chong and Druckman (2007) distinguish between 
“strong” (reputable and prominent) and “weak” sources, demonstrating through 
experiments that credible sources were more likely to produce framing effects than 
non-credible sources (see also Druckman, 2001). Certainly this indicates that framing 
effects are subjective: what is deemed credible to one audience may not be credible for 
other audiences. In the US political and media context, Democratic audiences may be 
more susceptible to frames produced and promoted by Democratic leaders and left-
leaning press outlets, while Republican audiences will sympathize with Republican 
media and elites (assuming other frame attributes are constant). 
2.2.4.2 Frame Attributes 
Strength 
Features of the frame itself, however, can predict its efficacy. The strength of a frame is 
defined as its “perceived persuasiveness” and logical coherence (Chong & Druckman, 
2007: 638). Strength rests on three pillars: availability, accessibility, and applicability 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007: 639-640). Strong frames are able to activate schema that 
are stored in memory (availability) and within cognitive reach of the audience 
(accessibility). In order for an audience to process a frame, the frame must activate 
existing schemas (Chong & Druckman, 2007: 639). Even if the schemas are stored in 
memory, they must also be accessible through “passive, unconscious processes that 
occur automatically and are uncontrolled” (Higgins & King, 1981: 74). The schemas 
raised by a frame must also be relevant to its focus and useful to evaluating it 
(applicability) (Chong & Druckman, 2007: 640; see also Hartman & Weber, 2009; 
Slothuus, 2010; Zaller, 1992). 
In their study, Chong and Druckman (2007) showed that frames that activated 
applicable schemas were more influential than weaker frames that did not. 
Interestingly, they found that weak frames can even backfire by causing the “recipient 
to infer that the weaker side has an indefensible position” (Chong & Druckman, 2007: 
 
11 Page et al. (1987) also find that media commentary influences public opinion, but they study political 
elites and media in isolation without acknowledging how the two compete. This thesis attempts to 
address this gap.  
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640; see also Herr, 1986; Martin & Achee, 1992). Entman’s (2004) study of the 
media’s mixed coverage of Cold War-era military ventures in Grenada, Libya and 
Panama also exemplifies a weak strategy: the incoherent use of pro- and anti-war 
frames prevented the latter from gaining traction, leading the public to sympathize with 
the comparably less ambiguous official executive frame. These findings suggest that 
logic and coherence can influence whether a frame resonates among its audience. 
Entman (2004: 31) argues that magnitude – the “sine qua non” of successful foreign 
policy framing – is also related to strength. Repetition and rehearsal make frames more 
likely to “penetrate the consciousness of a public with little motivation to pay foreign 
affairs much attention”. By increasing the exposure of a particular frame, it naturally 
becomes more accessible to the audience, and is thus more likely to form or influence 
public attitudes (Domke et al., 1999; Domke et al., 1998; Entman, 2004; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991; Higgins & King, 1981; Iyengar, 1994; Lodge & Stroh, 1993; Nabi, 2003; 
Price & Tewksbury, 1996; Zaller, 1992). Those features of an issue that “get a greater 
allocation of an individual’s cognitive resources” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993: 57) matter 
most for audience evaluations.12 In the context of security, Oren and Solomon (2015: 
317) argue that the repetitive utterance of ambiguous securitizing phrases by actors can 
generate a collective “ritualized chanting” within society – they liken the process to 
“the principal characteristic of modern mass marketing campaigns”: repetition. 
Through a disciplined strategy of persistent messaging – like a “drumbeat” – certain 
security frames can become lodged into the audience’s memory akin to an “earworm” 
(324), increasing the likelihood of audience acceptance of that frame.  
Valence and Emotional Cues 
While frame strength determines effectiveness of issue frames, valence – or the 
positive/negative charge of the frame – can influence whether equivalency frames 
resonate with audiences and produce framing effects. In general, research points to a 
“negativity bias”, the notion that negative frames are more effective than positive 
frames (Druckman, 2004: 677; see e.g., Jordan, 1965; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; 
 
12 Chong and Druckman’s (2007) controlled experiment, however, finds that repetition is only effective 
when the frame is strong, and should thus be subordinate to frame strength in assessing frame influence. 
In other words, the frequency of exposure to a frame is important, but also depends on the frame’s 
perceived persuasiveness. 
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Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).13 Positive frames can 
nonetheless influence attitudes and spark “favorable associations in memory” (Levin, 
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998: 164; see also Levin & Gaeth, 1988) as demonstrated in 
Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) employment-unemployment study (see also Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Similarly, Rasinski (1989) finds that a frame identifying “assistance 
to the poor” generates more sympathy than “welfare”, presumably because of the 
latter’s negative connotation; and others find that “not allowing” public speeches 
against democracy draws more sympathy than “forbidding” them (Rugg, 1941; 
Schuman & Presser, 1981).  
Emotive rhetoric – particularly if complemented with visual images – can also increase 
a frame’s effectiveness by “constructing villains” (or others) to emphasize the 
existential nature of a threat posed to the public. This tactic enables political elites to 
frame corrective action as “an emotionally satisfying and politically beneficial tale of 
triumph” (Entman, 2004: 99). Gadarian’s (2010) research also shows that emotionally 
powerful frames can produce more hawkish preferences among the public. This has 
obvious implications for security issues: fear-inducing and threat-invoking news 
coverage may resonate more strongly with audiences, influencing support for 
exceptional measures.  
Arrangement and Co-occurring frames 
The arrangement and co-occurrence of frames alter what schemas are activated and in 
which order. Research suggests that joint and separate evaluations, for example, can 
influence preferences (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). Illustrating this, Kahneman, 
Ritov, and Schkade (2000) asked participants to evaluate on a scale of 0 to 6 the 
importance of two issues: multiple myeloma among the elderly and cyanide fishing in 
coral reefs around Asia. When the two frames were presented in isolation, cyanide 
fishing was evaluated as more important on average; in the joint evaluation, however, 
the disease was deemed more important (see also Kahneman & Ritov, 1994). Schuman, 
Kalton, and Ludwig (1983) demonstrated a similar effect in their 1981 study (see also 
Hyman & Sheatsley, 1950; Schuman & Presser, 1981). They offered two frames:  
 
13 As discussed in the immigration content analysis in Chapter 7, both the press and political actors give 
more attention to negative frames than positive frames.  
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(1) Do you think the United States should let Communist newspaper reporters from 
other countries come in here and send back to their papers the news as they see 
it? 
(2) Do you think a Communist country like Russia should let American newspaper 
reporters come in and send back to America the news as they see it?  
Presented in isolation or before frame (2), frame (1) generated little support; however, 
when the order was reversed, activating the respondents’ considerations of reciprocity, 
frame (1) generated much more support.  
The presence of counter-frames can also shift influences by activating competing 
interpretations (Druckman, 2004; Schuman et al., 1983). Druckman (2004) 
demonstrates that framing effects can be moderated by elite competition – where 
frames are complemented with counter-frames – as well as interpersonal deliberation in 
a group. Their findings show that individual frames can become less effective when the 
audience engages in deliberate evaluation of the frame and its alternatives rather than 
passively ingesting a single frame. In the same study, reframing effects are also tested 
to determine whether the most recently encountered or the “loudest frame” (in terms of 
magnitude) affects preferences after conscious deliberation of the original frame and 
counter-frame. For example, in the first step, a negative frame and a positive counter-
frame are first presented, resulting in intermediate evaluation of both; in the second 
step, the negative frame is repeated, thus being the loudest and most recently 
encountered frame. The findings suggest that the intermediate evaluation indeed 
moderates the effect of the final frame (Druckman, 2004: 680-681). Framing effects 
may thus be moderated by competition, where competing interpretations cancel each 
other out, resulting in weak, if any, framing effects.   
Cultural Congruence 
Frames aim to reduce “cognitive cost” by adopting the grammar and structure of 
similar past events, enabling audiences to fit new concepts into existing schema 
(Entman, 2004: 14). The audience uses the familiar old as a reference point to process 
the foreign new. As certain frames are repeated and mainstreamed, they become 
reliable mental shortcuts “embedded in the social construction of reality” (Norris et al., 
2003: 5). Subsequent frames can “tap into” these pre-formed and accessible memory 
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networks, simplifying audience processing, and becoming more effective (Entman, 
2004: 24). These “culturally congruent” frames resonate with the least cognitive cost, 
are most likely to persist over time (Entman, 2004: 14-15), and are most likely to 
produce framing effects (6). Conversely, emotionally or cognitively dissonant frames 
that challenge existing beliefs are less likely to gain social traction and more likely to 
be blocked from spreading (Brewer, 2001; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman & 
Nelson, 2003; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Shah, Domke, & Wackman, 1996). In 
other words, frames that are less likely to produce cognitive dissonance are likelier to 
be more effective. 
2.2.4.3 Frame Recipient 
Unlike media and political elites, the general public is presumed to react “naturally” 
and non-strategically in adopting frames, without deliberating on which “mental 
associations to arouse either within themselves or on their interpersonal networks” 
(Entman, 2004: 91). Because this research focuses primarily on the aggregate public, a 
deeper discussion on the individual-level variables that determine frame resonance is 
sidelined here. Briefly though, audience susceptibility to framing effects varies by 
political sophistication – an individual’s “intellectual or cognitive engagement with 
public affairs” (Zaller, 1992: 21) – and motivation (Nabi & Oliver, 2009; Zaller, 1992). 
Political sophisticates are more likely to respond to news framing and to “understand 
(new) information and integrate this into their opinion formation” (de Vreese, 
Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2011: 184). The evidence is mixed, but most studies 
support a strong relationship between high political sophistication and susceptibility to 
framing effects (Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Nelson et al., 1997; Sniderman & 
Theriault, 2004; cf. Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001; 
Zaller, 1992). Chong and Druckman (2007) argue that sophisticates can more easily 
recall information, because their frequent engagement with political issues increases 
information accessibility. They find that less engaged individuals require increased 
exposure to frames in order for framing effects to appear, while frequency has little 
impact on sophisticates.  
Framing effects can also be driven by motivations to minimize cognitive costs (Downs, 
1957) and avoid emotional dissonance. This suggests a subconscious desire to “pull” in 
familiar frames that require minimal cognitive processing and are congruent with 
existing ideological and other belief systems (Entman, 2004: 13; see also Hartman & 
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Weber, 2009; Slothuus, 2010). Cognitively or emotionally costly frames are rejected in 
favor of familiar frames. This selective exposure may not only drive what types of 
content a person is motivated to consume, but also the sources and medium through 
which the content is delivered (Stroud, 2017).  
2.2.5 Conclusion 
The main implication of framing scholarship is that linguistic choices made by actors to 
discuss an issue can have consequences on how their audiences interpret the issue. 
Variations in framing can activate different schemas which condition how the frame 
recipient evaluates information. The strength and presence of these framing effects are 
further influenced by several variables, among which magnitude – or the frequency of 
frames and competing counterframes – and repetition are recognized as the most 
important (Entman, 2004; Oren & Solomon, 2015). Entman’s (2004) cascade activation 
model ties these concepts into the broad American policymaking context and explains 
how frames emerge and spread. He emphasizes a top-down model in which the flow of 
influence cascades down from political elites (and especially executive branch officials) 
to the media and the public. The press-state debate offers some expectations on when 
media actors can act autonomously; changes in the media landscape – like the 
proliferation of news sources and targeted programming – suggest that media actors 
may be increasingly independent.  
Importantly for this thesis, the framing literature provides theoretical and 
methodological guidance on how to operationalize and measure competition between 
different actors, and how to measure the effects on the public. The framing strategy and 
frame effectiveness literature suggests that certain variables – principally the frequency 
of exposure and consistent “drumbeat” messaging – will increase the potency of frames 
and thus the impact on audience preferences. Scholars have also demonstrated that 
audiences do not draw on the entire repertoire of knowledge to assess issues, but 
instead respond to subtle variations in issue or equivalence framing that activate some 
considerations over others. This provides significant methodological guidance for this 
thesis, discussed in depth in Chapter 3; briefly, this thesis will identify issue and 
equivalence frames, measure their prevalence, and determine if exposure to these 
frames correlates with public attitudes. Top-down assumptions suggest that foreign 
policy information generally flows from political elites and media down to the public. 
Finally, framing literature also answers important questions on whether the media can 
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act independently: the consensus is that political elites set the boundaries of available 
discourse, while the press has more flexibility in choosing how to frame the issues. The 
press is likelier to exercise independence when political elites lack a coherent framing 
strategy. What remains to be resolved, however, is how these processes play out in the 
domain of security and in an evolving information environment, where cable news 
operates under a new paradigm. This necessitates first a better understanding of how 
security issues are socially constructed.  
2.3 Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School 
2.3.1 Introduction – Securitization and Framing  
In securitization theory, the Copenhagen School developed an operational framework 
for studying framing effects in international security studies (Watson, 2012). But rather 
than simply narrowing framing theory to a specific domain, securitization theory 
encapsulates a broader network of interconnected concepts, of which framing is a key 
component. The theory offers a rich set of explanations and expectations for how 
(in)security – in the IR context of existential threats – is constructed and potentially 
legitimizes the use of exceptional measures to ensure the survival of some referent 
object. Specifically, securitization theory injects the logic of international security into 
the framing process by advancing expectations on the primary actors involved, the 
contextual conditions that aid and derail (de)securitization attempts, and the political 
implications of framing effects (e.g., the legitimization of adopting exceptional 
measures). Securitization theory and framing both share the position that “societal 
actors construct problems/threats through discursive practices” (Watson, 2012: 283), 
but the former is attuned to the specific dynamics of security construction and its 
implications.  
This underscores the value added by securitization theory to this dissertation and 
studying framing in international security broadly. On its own, framing theory is 
general and derives its analytical power from its wide applicability across domains 
(Watson, 2012: 287) – Neuman, Guggenheim, Jang, and Bae (2014), for example, 
focus on 29 issues from six domains including economics, foreign affairs, government, 
public order, social issues, and the environment. While securitization theory’s own five 
sectors intersect these issue areas, its authors delimit the scope of the theory to issues 
that pose an existential threat to some referent object. Ever cautious of diluting 
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“security” to the point of analytical uselessness (e.g., Waever, 1995a), the Copenhagen 
School offers a tightly defined process for how an issue moves along a political-
security continuum. Without guidelines to narrow the research, framing research risks 
becoming a subjective and atheoretical exercise in assigning certain frames importance 
and value without a priori guidance or justification. Framing research requires some 
organizing and structuring logic to guide a research agenda and set expectations for 
which actors, dynamics and frames to analyze. For international security issues, 
securitization theory fulfills that purpose.  
Still, the absence of scholarly attempts to consciously and deliberately synthesize 
securitization theory and framing has left the former underdeveloped.14 Methodological 
approaches common to framing scholarship can empower securitization theory with 
analytical rigor and quantitative richness that it currently lacks. Entman’s (2004) 
cascade activation model, for example, provides a theoretical basis for expanding the 
set of actors involved in the framing process, while the vast literature on measuring 
frame effectiveness generates a useful guideline for anticipating and understanding why 
some (de)securitizing frames “stick” and others collapse. Moreover, tools for 
measuring the audience and processes like desecuritization address critical operational 
gaps in securitization theory. In short, lessons and concepts from research in framing 
theory can enrich securitization theory. This thesis aims not only to synthesize the two 
fields of inquiry, but also to improve securitization theory by laying the methodological 
groundwork for future scholars seeking to show how security is constructed from 
multiple perspectives. To that end, this section outlines the history and key components 
of securitization theory. It is followed in the next section by a discussion on the 
limitations and areas for advancing securitization theory through conscious and 
deliberate integration with framing theory.  
2.3.2 Securitization Theory Overview and History 
Born out of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen near the end of 
the Cold War, the Copenhagen School (CS) sought to “move security studies beyond a 
narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states” (Huysmans, 1998: 
 
14 Watson (2012) argues abstractly about the shared “theoretical terrain” and motivations for integrating 
securitization theory and framing, but he does not explain how to operationalize the integration or what 
such a synthesis would substantively look like.  
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482). The effort to widen the security agenda and create a framework for analyzing 
security largely came to fruition in the development of securitization theory, most 
comprehensively articulated in Security: A New Framework for Analysis (henceforth 
Security) by Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Waever (1998). Securitization theory 
provides a framework for analyzing how security issues develop and enable leaders to 
adopt counteracting measures. The theory challenges traditional interpretations of 
security as solely the domain of objective, military threats to be resolved by the use of 
force between states (e.g., Walt, 1991; Waltz, 1979; see also Waever, 1995a). Instead it 
argues that security issues are varied in their nature and are socially constructed. The 
theory has several fundamental components that illustrate how security is constructed, 
who is involved, the sites of security issues, and the undoing of security 
(desecuritization) – these concepts are discussed in turn.  
2.3.2.1 The Speech Act and Securitization Move 
According to securitization theory, security issues are constructed via a top-down 
process in which securitizing agents – typically political elites (Huysmans, 2002: 54) – 
attempt to convince an audience – typically the general public (Aradau, 2004: 395) – 
about the presence of an existential threat that requires an urgent and extraordinary 
response to curtail its development (Balzacq, 2005; Buzan et al., 1998). That the threat 
is existential reinforces the imperative to respond to it in ways beyond the normal 
deliberation and rules or procedures of everyday politics – the issue instead needs to be 
dealt with urgently because inaction will challenge the very existence of some 
threatened object worth protecting. Unlike rationalist and positivist IR approaches that 
attempt to propose “‘brute facts’ about the world, which remain true independent of 
human action” (Brown & Ainley, 2009: 48), securitization theory adopts a 
constructivist ontology and is unconcerned with whether a threat is “real”. Rather, for 
securitization scholars, threats are socially constructed though an intersubjective 
negotiation between speakers and their audiences. This is partly motivated by the 
widening agenda, but is also useful in explaining why an issue might be considered a 
security threat in one context, but not in another. Buzan et al. (1998: 24) highlight, for 
example, that culture might be securitized in the former USSR and Iran, but not in the 
UK or the Netherlands.15 Detecting securitization is then not just an analysis of the 
 
15 That cultural threats have in recent years been articulated to justify, for example, Brexit in the UK and 
the “burqa ban” in the Netherlands – several years after the CS’ 1998 publication of Security – is 
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threat or threatened object absent context, but of the articulations that discursively 
“construct” the threat.  
The speech act is the crucial articulative element of the framework. Building on 
Austin’s (1962) “performative” language framework, the CS argues that the existential 
nature of the threat and the necessity of extraordinary measures is conveyed through the 
actual or metaphorical utterance of “security”:  
security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the 
utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, 
giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state 
representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and 
thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to 
block it. (Waever, 1995a: 55) 
The performative speech act can also constitute a securitizing move, the attempt to push 
an issue out of the domain of everyday politics and into the domain of security. By 
doing so, actors attempt to legitimize the use of exceptional measures to respond to the 
threat. Exceptional measures vary depending on the issue and referent object, but can 
include use of force, extrajudicial policies, or restraints on civil liberty. Once a 
securitizing actor articulates a security issue that poses an existential threat, the 
securitization move can be either accepted or rejected by the audience; if accepted, 
exceptional measures are legitimated (Buzan et al., 1998) and securitization is 
successful. Conversely an audience rejection can theoretically restrain the adoption of 
exceptional measures for fear of political backlash.  
To be sure, not all cases of audience acceptance will result in the adoption of 
exceptional measures (Collins, 2005: 573; Jackson, 2016: 313) nor will all instances of 
audience rejection result in restraint (e.g., Roe, 2008). While Buzan et al. (1998: 25) 
argue that exceptional measures have to be legitimized, even if not implemented, Roe 
(2008) instead argues for two stages of securitization. In the stage of identification, the 
audience recognizes an issue as a security threat; in the stage of mobilization, the 
 
emblematic of security issues being a rhetorical and contextual outcome rather than objective security 
issues.  
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responses (exceptional measures) to the issue are legitimized. Stritzel (2007: 367) 
argues that the CS’ conceptual labeling of responses as “exceptional” neglects that 
“many security practices deal with ‘threats’ below the level of exceptionality” and thus 
“prohibits making securitization theory more widely applicable to ‘real-world’ 
securitizations”. Huysmans and Buonfino (2008: 767) similarly distinguish the “politics 
of exception” – which focuses on existential threats and the measures they warrant – 
from the “politics of unease” that typically reflect less pronounced “deviant and illegal 
practice” and the policing efforts they require.  
Similarly, not all successful cases of securitization will be preceded by a speech act – 
indeed some security issues can become institutionalized, particularly threats that are 
persistent (Donnelly, 2013: 48-49; Hansen, 2013: 39-40; Roe, 2008: 618-619). In the 
post-9/11 context, the terrorism frame achieved sufficient salience that securitizing 
actors did not need to fully explicate what was at stake to justify counter-terrorism 
efforts (Buzan, 2006: 1104; Vultee, 2011). These established security issues reinforce 
the notion that security is socially constituted. 
2.3.2.2 Securitizing Actors 
Securitizing actors are the persons or groups that declare a referent object existentially 
threatened. Overlapping with Entman’s cascading activation model, securitizing actors 
can include “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure 
groups” (Buzan et al., 1998: 40) who may be representative of a bigger collective – 
such as the state, nation or other group. Huysmans (2002: 54) similarly argues that 
“statesmen representing the state and uttering security in the name of the state are the 
privileged agents in the securitization process”. These agents must persuade an 
audience that a threat is sufficiently severe and requires the adoption of exceptional 
measures. The securitizing actor should not be conflated with the object being 
threatened, however – this is only appropriate in certain cases, such as the traditional 
military sense in which the securitizing actor and referent object may both be the state.  
2.3.2.3 Referent Objects 
Referent objects are the units “that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have 
a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). While the state may still be the 
“privileged” referent object, other objects deemed worthy of protection can include 
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culture, the environment, or human lives, depending on the nature of the threat and the 
security sector in focus. Nor does this mean that anything can be labeled a referent 
object – securitization claims require the audience to agree that the object is worth 
protecting at the cost of implementing emergency measures.  
2.3.2.4 Functional Actors 
Functional actors influence securitization by contributing to the dynamics of the threat, 
sector or securitization process. They are neither referent objects – because they are not 
the object being threatened – nor are they securitizing actors, because they either lack 
the legitimacy to do so or have no interest. Buzan et al. (1998: 36) use a polluting 
company as an example of a functional actor in the environmental sector, for whom 
securitizing the environment would be counterproductive. Other functional actors 
recognized in the literature include promoters of the securitizing actor’s voice such as 
influential security actors (Nasu, 2012; Williams, 2003: 25), members of the media16 
(e.g., Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010; O'Reilly, 2008; Wilkinson, 2011), and other high-
profile elites. They can also be either agents of the threat (e.g., terrorists, mercenaries) 
or threat neutralizers, such as “instruments of force” or “the arms industry” (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 57).  
2.3.2.5 Audience 
Despite the CS’ undertheorizing and understating of the audience in their work 
(Balzacq, 2005, 2011a; Balzacq et al., 2016), the concept remains a fundamental part of 
the securitization process. Because of asymmetric access to information, the audience 
relies on the securitizing actor to communicate threats to them (Balzacq, 2005). Buzan 
et al. (1998) emphasize, however, that the audience, rather than the securitizing actor, 
decides whether a securitization move is legitimate and thus whether securitization is 
successful (see also Roe, 2008). Specifically, the audience “accept[s] that something is 
an existential threat to a shared value” (31). This point reinforces the intersubjective 
nature of securitization theory – threats are discursively negotiated between actors. It 
also shields securitization theory from ethical criticism by not defining a priori what a 
security threat is or what security should be, but allowing it to emerge through a 
socially constructed process (Williams, 2003). While there is debate on what comprises 
the audience (Léonard & Kaunert, 2011; Roe, 2008; Salter, 2008), Vuori (2008: 72) 
 
16 Though it is contended in this thesis that the media can be more than a mere functional actor.  
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suggests redefining the audience as the group that can “provide the securitizing actor 
with whatever s/he is seeking to accomplish with the securitization”. In the absence of 
clearer theoretical guidance on who the audience is, most empirical applications of 
securitization theory adopt the general voting electorate as the empowering audience. 
Weaknesses in the CS’ (under)theorizing of the audience are described in greater detail 
in section 2.4. 
2.3.2.6 Facilitating conditions 
Facilitating conditions refer collectively to dynamics that “might enable a securitizing 
move to be more successful” (McDonald, 2008: 567). This concept within 
securitization theory overlaps significantly with the variables that contribute to framing 
effectiveness (Watson, 2012): facilitating conditions can include, for example, the 
grammar used in the speech act, the social position of the securitizing actor and 
attributes of the threat articulated (Buzan et al., 1998: 32-33; Stritzel, 2007: 364; 
Waever, 2000: 252-253). The “internal, linguistic-grammatical” (Buzan et al., 1998: 
32) component emphasizes the actual language and contents of the speech act – it 
should not only follow the rules of articulating security, but also be congruent with the 
“particular dialect of the different sectors” (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). The extent to which 
the speech act is persuasive and applicable can determine how well securitizing moves 
resonate with the audience, and thus the likelihood of successful securitization. If the 
securitizing actor can “identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests”, 
success is likelier (Balzacq, 2005: 184; see also Léonard & Kaunert, 2011). The 
securitizing actor must also hold a position of sufficient authority to make the claim 
credible in the specific sector (Watson, 2012). While state leaders, for example, might 
monopolize securitization in the military sector, religious elites may be better equipped 
with social capital to command audiences on societal sector threats (e.g., Karyotis & 
Patrikios, 2010). Attributes of the threat itself, beyond what is articulated, can also 
facilitate securitization, particularly historical memories of similar threats (Buzan et al., 
1998; McDonald, 2008; Waever, 2000, 2003). For example, the memory of a recent 
terrorist attack may increase support for the suspension of civil liberties or military 
engagements abroad to prevent future terrorism.  
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2.3.2.7 Sectors 
The CS’ choice to redefine security as an intersubjective negotiation with fluid 
components makes securitization theory applicable across multiple sectors. The 
different sectors – military, political, economic, environmental and societal – reflect 
different arenas where security threats can emerge (Buzan et al., 1998). While each 
sector has its own unique set of actors, referent objects, threats, and vulnerabilities 
(what it means to be existentially threatened), they share a common threat construction 
dynamic: security issues are constructed through a negotiation between securitizing 
actors and their audience via a speech act, potentially aided by functional actors and 
facilitating conditions. Empirical applications certainly have overlapping dimensions – 
for example, dynamics in the military sector overlap with those in the political sector – 
but the significance of cross-sectoral dynamics has received little attention. This has 
hindered generalizations and identification of patterns that may exist across different 
sectors.  
2.3.2.8 Desecuritization  
A heightened state of security, the Copenhagen School argues, is normatively 
undesirable, because it indicates a failure to solve an issue using established normal 
rules; it requires breaking existing rules and creating new emergency rules that 
prioritize national security over all other concerns (Waever, 1995b). In addition to 
breaking rules, it is morally questionable as it heightens feelings of enmity and the 
possibility of violence (Avant, 2007; Waever, 1995a). In most cases17, the goal should 
be desecuritization – the reversal of extraordinary measures and the return to normal 
politics in which everyday rules apply (Waever, 1995a; Williams, 2003). The CS 
defines desecuritization as language that avoids references to security or proposes 
deescalating a security issue back down to regular politics (Buzan et al., 1998: 34), 
“thus undermining the extent to which democratic processes can be overridden” 
(Donnelly, 2013: 45). Waever (1995a: 56) argues that “transcending a security problem 
by politicizing it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away 
from such terms” (emphasis in original). Other normative proponents of 
 
17 Some have argued that securitization – and the increased focus and urgency it brings to resolve an 
issue through mobilization – may be normatively advantageous, particularly on threats related to the 
environment (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2011), disease (Sjostedt, 2011), gendered security (Hansen, 
2000), and minority rights (Roe, 2004).  
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desecuritization have argued that it can only occur by rethinking issues outside of the 
Schmittian enmity construct that perpetuates us versus them relationships (Aradau, 
2004; Huysmans, 1998).  
Despite this theoretical guidance, desecuritization has received comparably less  
empirical attention (Waever, 1995a; Watson, 2012; Hansen 2012) beyond its normative 
aspects (Aradau, 2004; Huysmans, 1998). This may be linked to ongoing debates on 
what desecuritization actually is – Hansen (2012), for example, identifies four 
variations of desecuritization. These include change through stabilization which entails 
shifting away from explicitly security-centric discourse toward a “less militaristic, less 
violent and hence more genuinely political form of engagement” (Hansen 2012: 539); 
the replacement of one security issue with another, thus pushing the original issue into 
a desecuritized state; the explicit rearticulation of resolving an issue using political 
means; and the silencing of issues altogether within security discourse. The myriad 
conceptualizations of desecuritization may have contributed to a difficulty in 
identifying what desecuritization looks like empirically.  
Furthermore, Behnke (2006) argues that participating in discourses on security – even 
if to subvert them – inadvertently reinforces the nexus between the issue and security. 
For him, desecuritization can only occur from lack of speech. Donnelly (2015) 
contends, however, that desecuritization is possible through speech, demonstrating this 
through an analysis of how Queen Elizabeth II’s bilingual speech acts in her address to 
official counterparts at Dublin Castle may have contributed to a desecuritizing process. 
Still, the lack of direction on what desecuritizing frames look like in the real world 
points to a major limitation in securitization theory – this and other limitations are 
discussed in the following section with an aim to synthesize concepts from framing 
theory and address the Copenhagen School’s oversights.  
 
2.4 Limitations and Advancements  
Its vast contributions to security studies and numerous applications notwithstanding, 
securitization theory neglects important actors and processes, while overemphasizing 
discourse analysis over other methods of inquiry (Watson, 2012). Certainly political 
elites are privileged securitizing actors (Bigo, 2002: 75-76; Huysmans, 2002: 54), but, 
as described above, empirical research conducted on press-state models has 
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demonstrated that the press regularly acts autonomously and employs frames that can 
influence the public and political elites on a variety of political issues in different 
domains. Securitization scholars dismiss the press as a functional actor that simply 
popularizes political elite discourse (O’Reilly, 2008: 66) and the broader IR literature 
relegates news media to “a linkage mechanism rather than an independent, strategic 
actor” (Baum & Potter, 2008: 50). The press is frequently minimized to a mouthpiece 
for political elites (Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig, 2002; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Malek 
& Wiegand, 1997). Given the widely recognized influence of media in framing 
literature – exemplified by the CNN effect – this oversight in securitization theory 
leaves underexplored the extent to which media and political elite frames compete for 
public influence on security issues. 
The CS also shows mixed interest in the currently underdeveloped audience component 
(Watson, 2012). The ambivalence is rooted in a broader conceptual problem in 
securitization theory: its authors suggest at once that the speech act itself constitutes 
securitization – making discourse analysis the “obvious” method of inquiry – while 
suggesting elsewhere that audience acceptance of the exceptional measure determines a 
successful case of securitization (Stritzel, 2007: 364; see also Aradau, 2004: 395). Not 
only does this tension affect a coherent reading of securitization, the methodological 
implications are severe. Discourse analysis reduces audiences or removes them from 
analysis altogether. Moreover, the CS offer no guidance on how to precisely measure 
audience acceptance or rejection of securitizing moves. By extension, desecuritization 
is also unclear: without solid ground from which to identify securitization, identifying 
the reverse process becomes equally opaque, suggesting a plausible explanation for the 
lack of empirical attention given to desecuritization. While extensive attention has been 
given to what desecuritization means theoretically (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995b), 
its political implications (Aradau, 2004) and the blurring of separation between the 
exceptional and the “everyday” (Donnelly, 2013), considerably less attention has been 
given to what desecuritizing frames look like in practice.  
The remainder of this chapter lays the theoretical foundation for cross-fertilizing 
framing and securitization theory as a means to addressing these limitations and better 
operationalizing security analysis. The justifications here pave the road for a deeper 
discussion on methodology in the following chapter. This section proceeds by first 
arguing that securitization theory should include actors beyond political elites; it then 
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discusses the limitations of the speech act as originally described by the CS; and 
finally, it recommends synthesis with framing scholarship as a means to address these 
gaps and enable empirical analysis of both securitization and desecuritization.  
2.4.1 Beyond Political Elites 
The CS’ preference for political elites as primary securitizing actors in empirical 
studies (Salter, 2011: 118) is not itself problematic, but their neglect of other actors in 
this role is theoretically incoherent and empirically limiting. Theoretically, the 
emphasis on political elites perpetuates a realist hierarchical alignment of the state 
above other actors in security studies (Avant, 2007; McSweeney 1999; Williams, 2003) 
because political elites (especially heads of state) are representatives of the state. 
Reflecting realism’s prioritization of the “survival of the state” (Williams, 2003: 516; 
see also Walt, 1991; Waltz, 1979), and “institutionalized hierarchy of decision making 
and agenda setting that determines the position from which security can be legitimately 
spoken” (Huysmans, 2002: 55), securitization theory privileges political elites as 
security speakers. This “ontological gerrymandering” is inconsistent with the CS’ 
constructivist claims – Huysmans (1998: 493) argues that the CS is “radical 
constructivist in one sense and only basically constructivist in another sense”. A more 
consistent constructivist approach should allow a variable (rather than fixed) field of 
security, where security speakers can vary by context. This logically follows from the 
CS’ ontological and theoretical assumptions: fluidity should extend to both threats as 
well as mediators in the intersubjective processes that socially construct those threats. 
In most cases (particularly when threats first emerge), political elites may indeed be 
primary securitizing actors – as “generally accepted voices of security” (Buzan et al., 
1998) who possess asymmetric access to intelligence, they are natural authorities on 
security issues (Entman, 2004). But as the information gap narrows, other actors may 
become empowered drivers of public discourse, promoting and selecting competing 
interpretations (Baum & Potter, 2008; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Mortensgaard 2018). 
These actors need to be brought into the securitization framework to facilitate a holistic 
analysis of the discursive marketplace. In short, a thorough securitization theory 
grounded wholly in constructivism must remain flexible to evolving social 
relationships and institutions, acknowledging the potential for other actors to drive 
(de)securitization.  
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Beyond theoretical inconsistency, the preference for political elites has empirical 
consequences: it renders analysis “too static and exclusive” (Stritzel, 2014: 50) and 
one-dimensional. A political elite-centric approach locks securitization theory into a 
static post-Cold War Western European experience wedded to the theory’s inception 
(Waever, 2003: 26) and agnostic to shifting information environment like the current 
US cable news media landscape. A deeper constructivist approach that accommodates a 
constantly evolving media/information landscape can ensure that securitization theory 
stays flexible, modern, and relevant. Non-state actors that increasingly influence 
security policy – whether through direct impact on political elites (e.g., the CNN 
effect); strategic selection and promotion of certain frames and speakers (Watson, 
2012: 299); or indirectly through shaping constituent preferences (Norris et al., 2003: 
13) – can include the press (Baum & Potter, 2008; Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Entman, 
2004), interest groups (Cigler & Loomis, 2007), religious leaders (Karyotis & Patrikios, 
2010), international NGOs and transnational corporations (Avant, 2007).  
The wide audience that the press commands, the high level of engagement between the 
public and the press (as discussed in section 1.4.1), and the press’ powerful role as a 
mediator between political elites and the public makes it a particularly indispensable 
part of the securitization process. Per Entman (2004: 3), political elites may have the 
upper hand in shaping the domains of security discourse, but they are “conditioned in 
part by how fully the media cooperate.” The general public’s reliance on mass media – 
particularly accessible and low cost formats like television, print and radio news for 
political learning (Page et al., 1987: 24) – as the primary source of information on 
political content (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; McCombs & 
Shaw, 1972; Zaller, 1992) is likely intensified for security issues given that “[i]n times 
of crisis, citizens turn to political leaders and the media to make sense of new and 
frightening events” (Gadarian, 2010: 469). This layer of mediation between political 
elites and the public, however, can transform messages through partisan filters, as well 
as selection, emphasis and omission of certain features and frames, thus shaping 
audience evaluations and influencing voters’ political preferences (Dalton, Beck, & 
Huckfeldt, 1998; Page et al., 1987). In a democratic environment, these influences can 
trickle back up to shape “the public policy agenda, including the response to events by 
government officials and the security services” (Norris et al., 2003: 13). While other 
non-state actors – NGOs, religious elites, corporations, lobbyists – may have similar 
influences, their influence is constrained to specific domains and issue areas, and thus 
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smaller audiences. The press, on the other hand, cuts across individual differences (and 
thus commands more attention than other actors), covers a broad array of both general 
and specific subjects, and is more deeply embedded in society and individuals’ 
everyday lives (owing to its accessibility and low cost). This also shifts the analytical 
focus from discrete securitizing moves invoked by political elites to subtler ongoing 
(de)securitizing processes in discourse (Mortensgaard 2018). 
Further strengthening the case for considering the media as a securitizing actor, the 
press is inherently a political institution (Cook, 2006). As the oft-nicknamed “fourth 
branch” of the government, news media reflects the political culture both in content and 
structure (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Kaplan, 2002), particularly in the US context, 
where divisions along ideological and partisan lines are visible in cable and print news. 
As discussed in section 1.4, the replacement of objective news anchors with partisan 
pundits has further endowed the press with political characteristics. The press also 
bridges political elites and the public they are accountable to by informing the latter of 
the goings-on of government and policymaking. As an intermediary between political 
elites and the public, then the press has great power to drive (de)securitization – it can 
filter, frame and reframe political and security developments by “form[ing] the lens 
through which all issues are viewed” (Frohardt & Temin, 2003: 6).  
Still, the press has largely been neglected as a potential independent and strategic 
securitizing actor. On the theoretical front, Stritzel’s (2014: 50) criticism of the “a 
priori selection of agency/agents within securitization theory” and Hansen’s (2000) 
suggestion that actors are not constant and uniform, but are constituted through the 
speech act, both create a theoretical basis for democratizing the securitizing actor. Even 
the CS’ hints at widening the array of agents in the securitization process is 
encouraging: they only stipulate that those with sufficient social capital and/or the will 
to raise an issue onto the security agenda can securitize (Buzan et al., 1998; Vuori, 
2008: 77). While the press can satisfy both these criteria, however, extant securitization 
research has given little empirical attention to the media. When acknowledged (e.g., 
O'Reilly, 2008; Vultee, 2011; Wilkinson, 2011), it has largely been subordinated to 
political elites, thus “neglecting how the media actually grants, reproduces or 
challenges authoritative securitizing positions” (Watson, 2012: 299). Wilkinson (2011: 
29) recognizes that the press functions as both a “securitizing actor” and “functional 
actor”, but she emphasizes the latter role, focusing on political and protest leaders as 
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the dominant securitizing actors. Vultee (2011: 78) settles on security as the domain of 
political actors, only to be “amplified or tamped down by the news media”. He 
acknowledges that media dissent only gains traction after becoming salient in political 
elite debates. Mortensgaard (2018) commendably integrates framing and securitization 
theories to acknowledges that the press can behave as a securitizing actor, but her 
qualitative approach forecloses the potential for a comprehensive and long-term 
analysis of (de)securitization processes; moreover, her analysis is limited to visuals. 
Unlike some framing and political communication scholarship – which recognizes the 
possibility of autonomous media capable of influencing both policy as well as public 
opinion (e.g., Althaus et al., 1996; Baum & Potter, 2008; Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; 
Gadarian, 2010; Robinson, 1999; Wood & Peake, 1998) – the securitization literature 
currently has given limited consideration to news media actors as independent and 
strategic securitizing actors.  
Yet the proposed expansion of the securitization framework to include the media as a 
securitizing actor is consistent with the CS’ ontological and theoretical assumptions, 
and it also brings substantial empirical improvements. A hallmark of the security 
widening/deepening effort has been the expansion of types of actors in security, 
including referent objects and the audience (Buzan et al., 1998; Roe, 2008; Salter, 
2008). Beyond the state, Buzan et al. (1998: 36) argue “a much more open spectrum of 
possibilities has to be allowed” for referent objects; elsewhere Buzan and Waever 
(1997: 243) “prefer to take a social constructivist position ‘all the way down’”, also in 
regard to referent objects. Similarly, there is agreement among securitization scholars 
that audiences vary across different cases and different sectors (Balzacq, 2011a; 
Léonard & Kaunert, 2011; Roe, 2008; Salter, 2008; Vuori, 2008; Waever, 2003). As 
allowances have been made for referent objects and the audience, expanding the 
securitizing actor beyond political elites to include press actors is well within the CS’ 
ambition to take a social constructivist position “all the way down.”  
In addition to theoretical coherence, analysis of the press as a securitizing actor 
provides a more holistic empirical representation of the social field within which 
(in)security is formed, strengthening the original theory by making it more applicable 
to modern case studies. High levels of engagement between the American public and 
the press make it critical to factor news media into analysis of security construction. 
Moreover, as news options proliferate, press actors become increasingly integral 
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players in shaping elite and public opinions, and consequently foreign policy. The press 
reorganizes the social field that the CS takes for granted as structured and fixed 
(Stritzel, 2014). An analysis of social construction is severely narrow without factoring 
in a prominent information mediator, and the proliferation of mass media and its 
prevalence in society renders such investigations incomplete.  
Actively bringing media into the securitization framework, however, brings 
methodological challenges. It expands both the qualitative scope and the quantitative 
scale of data. While the limited number of political actors and smaller volume of 
textual data (speeches, press releases, and executive statements) makes discourse 
analysis an attractive and practical method of inquiry for investigating political elite 
speech acts, news data is more voluminous. The press does not issue discrete and 
momentous “speech acts” like executive orders or policy declarations – its information 
stream is gradual and continuous. Discourse analysis is thus prohibitively impractical 
for a comprehensive reading of news media which frequently lacks these symbolic, 
defining speech acts. Further, the lack of institutionalized hierarchy among news 
sources precludes ascribing importance to individual articles or news segments, which 
rarely carry the symbolic weight to individually affect discourse or significantly shift 
public opinion, especially when compared to, for example, a single presidential state of 
the union address. This blurs the boundary between pivotal and trivial texts. Analysis of 
media content thus requires tools beyond discourse analysis.  
2.4.2 Beyond the Speech Act and Discourse Analysis 
Its inapplicability to news media analysis notwithstanding, the speech act concept as 
originally defined by the CS is fraught with limitations (Léonard & Kaunert, 2011; 
Waever, 2003). In his critique of securitization theory, Stritzel (2007: 364) underscores 
that the CS “fluctuate between the terms process and speech act/utterance as if both 
were synonymous” (see also Balzacq, 2005, 2011a; Léonard & Kaunert, 2011; 
Williams, 2003). Securitization is defined both as an action taken by a securitizing 
actor and also as the effect of a mediated process between a securitizing actor and an 
audience. A focus on political elites suffices for examination of the first version, but the 
second version requires examining the audience’s evaluation (Roe, 2008; Stritzel, 
2007), because it suggests that securitization involves both the securitizing actor’s 
speech act and audience acceptance (Balzacq, 2011a; Williams, 2011). The consensus 
in securitization literature points toward a preference for the process-oriented and 
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context-driven negotiation rather than a single speech act (Balzacq, 2005, 2011a; 
Donnelly, 2013; McDonald, 2008; Salter, 2011; Vuori, 2008; Williams, 2011). 
Accepting this version however escapes neither the predominance of the securitizing 
actor as the unit of analysis nor the CS’ undertheorization of the audience. Important 
methodological questions are unanswered, like what audience acceptance looks like in 
practice (Léonard & Kaunert, 2011: 58; Watson, 2012); how to identify the audience(s) 
(Balzacq, 2005; Salter, 2008; Vaughn, 2009); and how to identify audience 
acceptance/rejection of a securitization attempt (Cavelty, 2008: 26; Salter, 2008).  
While others have given more attention to the audience (e.g., Balzacq, 2011a; Léonard 
& Kaunert, 2011; Roe, 2008; Salter, 2008), the lack of guidance on how to 
operationalize audience evaluation has yielded disparate methods and underwhelming, 
unscientific evidence. Roe’s (2008) use of public opinion polling and parliamentary 
voting results to measure audience evaluations of securitizing moves, for example, is a 
significant contribution, but he only presents sporadic data rather than a comprehensive 
account of these figures throughout the long process of securitizing the Iraq War in the 
UK. Leonard and Kaunert (2011) employ Kingdon’s “three streams model” to 
demonstrate the UK’s failure to securitize migration, but they provide only anecdotal 
evidence of audience evaluations. Salter’s (2008) study also uses anecdotal evidence 
and lacks comparability across cases. Stritzel (2007: 359) laments that inconsistent and 
disparate analyses stymy comparative efforts and risk perpetuating the liberties future 
scholars take in imperfect assessments of the audience. Watson (2012: 298) further 
critiques that “most studies of securitisation connect successful securitising claims with 
policy or behavioural change, making it impossible to distinguish between acceptance, 
apathy and acquiescence”. 
The problematic implications of the speech act then are threefold: what audience 
acceptance/rejection is empirically remains unclear; guidance on how to measure 
audience preferences consistently across different cases is absent; and qualitative 
discourse analysis centered on securitizing actors (Balzacq, 2011a: 31) is the dominant 
method. This latter proclivity is not unfounded: discourse analysis examines the social 
construction of phenomena by placing texts in context. It explains how certain realities 
emerge through an intersubjective process, just as securitization demonstrates how 
security issues emerge and become existential threats through a negotiation between 
actors. Fierke (2004: 37) characterizes discourse analysis as the “mapping of process by 
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which worlds change” – so too is securitization a transition from a world of everyday 
politics to a world of emergency and security. It is not surprising then that 
securitization studies have relied so heavily on discourse analysis. But the exclusive use 
of discourse analysis leads to an overemphasis on the speech act and further neglect of 
the audience. Rather the goal should be to buttress discourse analysis with evidence of 
a representative and relevant audience’s acceptance or rejection.  
2.4.3 Cross-Fertilizing Framing and Securitization Theories  
These limitations in securitization theory can be overcome by integrating concepts and 
methodologies from framing scholarship. The two research programs are already 
compatible given that both focus on discursive practices and “assert that linguistic-
grammatical composition is essential to understanding political outcomes” (Watson, 
2012: 283). Framing scholarship, however, offers tools that can push securitization 
theory beyond its emphasis on political elites, the speech act and discourse analysis. 
This section builds a conceptual bridge between both securitization theory and framing 
scholarship, identifying how features of the latter can address limitations in the former. 
It sets the stage for a more practical discussion on methodological operationalization in 
Chapter 3.  
Frames provide a useful heuristic to organize, quantify and operationalize competing 
securitizing and desecuritizing discourses. Certainly it is up to the analyst to identify 
the parameters of these oppositional frames through interpretivist approaches like 
discourse analysis, but once delineated, tools for evaluating frame effectiveness from 
framing research can be merged in to determine whether securitizing or desecuritizing 
discourses can penetrate through the public and produce framing effects. The strength 
or magnitude of oppositional (de)securitizing frames and the frame source’s 
credibility18, for example, can help predict and explain the outcome of competing 
discourses. Frame source credibility is subjective and can vary – thus it is important to 
differentiate audience segments according to their calibration toward “credible” sources 
(e.g., news watching habits). Framing scholarship also offers expectations on the 
moderating effects of co-occurring frames, where competing interpretations of issues 
may cancel out framing effects. This may be particularly consequential in the analysis 
 
18 In CS parlance, this mirrors the “social capital” facilitating condition attributed to a securitizing actor 
(Buzan et al., 1998).   
69 
 
of certain media, where norms of balanced reporting may not render framing effects. In 
short, framing scholarship provides a roadmap of useful indicators of effective 
messaging – such as magnitude, valence and source attributes – that can be used to 
measure the potency of (de)securitizing frames.  
Framing research also more thoroughly addresses the audience deficit in current 
securitization scholarship (Watson, 2012: 298). Not only does the concept of framing 
effects directly allude to an audience, but it also explains how framing effects occur. 
Schema activation suggests that audiences rely on fragments of discourse (as opposed 
to the entire repertoire of knowledge) when forming evaluations: the activation of one 
node can activate other nodes through cognitive links. These links can strengthen over 
time as they are repeated and rehearsed, making them more accessible. If a security 
threat is invoked with language that highlights certain familiar and institutionalized 
features, such as “terrorism”, then it will be more accessible to the audience. This 
focuses analysis to key accessible nodes that may trigger the activation of other nodes 
used for evaluation. Again, a prior comprehensive discourse analysis is necessary to 
chart out key nodes; but once they are identified, analysis can be extended to more 
voluminous types of content such as news media. As discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter, discourse analysis can be used to identify key frames and extend 
operationalization to a content analysis on a larger, more comprehensive data set. Still 
another asset in framing scholarship is the approach to measuring audience preferences 
through analysis of polls and public opinion data (Watson, 2012: 298). Again, while 
this has been utilized by some securitization scholars, the approach has typically been 
unsystematic and unthorough.  
The scholarship on frame anatomy also provides useful axes along which to identify 
oppositional discourses – its integration with securitization theory can help 
operationalize securitization and desecuritization. To reiterate, frames can have 
multiple functions: to define a problem, identify its cause, provide moral evaluation and 
propose remedies (Entman, 2004). The latter two are particularly useful for 
securitization theory: oppositional (de)securitizing discourses can contest the moral 
evaluation of a potential issue (e.g., as a threat, a problem below threat level, or not a 
problem at all) or the remedy used to address it (e.g., exceptional measures in the case 
of securitizing discourses versus routine unexceptional procedures in the case of 
desecuritizing discourses). To identify comparable desecuritizing frames, the analyst 
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can refer to those frames that contest securitizing discourses along the remedy proposal 
or moral evaluation axis. Frames can also vary along the issue-equivalency distinction, 
providing yet another dimension of analysis for securitizing and desecuritizing frames. 
Importantly, these axes provide a way to identify, demarcate and measure the oft-
neglected practice of desecuritization. Where actors filter, select, and emphasize 
aspects of an issue that move away from security (Waever, 1995b), the resulting frames 
may be desecuritizing. These frame components essentially provide useful axes along 
which securitizing and desecuritizing narratives can be juxtaposed. Watson (2012: 300) 
also argues that longer timeframes that are frequently used in framing research (as 
opposed to shorter episodic timeframes in securitization research) can better 
accommodate the examination of “processes of resistance that could serve as a model 
for exploring processes of desecuritization”.  
Finally, the synthesis of framing and securitization reinforces the expectation that 
framing effects are top-down. While political elites and news media certainly consider 
the mood of the electorate and their audiences, the cascade activation model suggests 
that the flow of influence moves from political elites and the press to the public 
(Entman, 2004). Watson (2012: 286) notes that the “uneven contest” is shared between 
securitization and framing scholarship, where “certain actors hold a privileged position 
in signaling important developments and in establishing those developments”. This is 
important insofar as it identifies an audience in policymaking (the public) and it 
provides some expectations in causality and directionality. Specifically, audience 
alignment with particular sources – political elite or press actors – may be cautiously 
interpreted as a reflection of framing effects of the latter on the former.  
2.5 Conclusion 
By selecting and highlighting those aspects of a threat that convincingly demonstrate an 
existential threat to some referent object, securitizing actors attempt to persuade an 
audience of their interpretation of an issue as an existential threat, so that the audience 
arrives at similar evaluations and legitimizes the adoption of exceptional measures. The 
very notion of framing effects implies an intersubjectivity that is shared with 
securitization theory. Framing literature further suggests that attitudes are largely 
shaped by the considerations that are activated – rather than drawing on the entire 
corpus of relevant knowledge on an issue that an individual may hold, efforts to 
minimize cognitive costs result in only using the activated considerations to evaluate a 
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frame. Similarly, securitization theory argues that threats are not objective truths with a 
fixed meaning, but are socially constructed through discursive resources: threats are not 
objective realities, but must be framed as such. How this resonates with an audience – 
the framing effects – depends on who the framer is, the way the issue is framed, the 
considerations that it provokes and what is cognitively accessible to the audience.  
Embracing the parallels between securitization and framing scholarship, this project 
also engages the areas where the two scholarships do not yet overlap. Securitization 
theory emphasizes that media can be a functional actor that popularizes the discourse of 
political elites (the manufacturing consent or indexing approach), but has not explored 
– as literature in framing scholarship has – whether media can act as an independent 
and strategic actor, influencing the audience (and perhaps political elites, as the CNN 
effect dictates). Framing literature also more consciously embeds the audience – or 
frame recipients – into analysis, both conceptually (through framing effects) and 
methodologically (using public opinion data). For securitization theory, the audience 
remains underdeveloped and inadequately measured. Having demonstrated then that 
the standard approach to securitization (1) potentially underprivileges the role of media 
as a securitizing actor; (2) is unable to satisfactorily incorporate the audience; and (3) 
ignores important processes (like desecuritization) through a methodological 
overreliance on discourse analysis, the next chapter outlines a mixed methods design 
that synthesizes the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory and the framing 
research program into an operational framework.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
3.1 Introduction –Triangulating Methods  
Integrating framing and securitization theories offers a way forward for addressing the 
primary research question of this thesis, and determining whether media can have a 
securitizing effect independent of political elites. Their integration also creates 
methodological opportunities to empirically expand securitization scholarship. 
According to the CS, discourse analysis – the investigation of “how the socially 
produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created and are held in place” 
(Hardy, Harley, & Phillips, 2004: 19; see also Hardy, 2001; Phillips & Hardy, 2002) – 
is the “obvious method” (Buzan et al., 1998: 176) for analyzing securitization (see also, 
Watson, 2012). Central to discourse analysis is the idea that meaning is fluid and that 
texts – whether literal written statements or other representations that convey meaning 
– are not intrinsically meaningful; rather meaning is mutable and derived from context 
(Neumann, 2008: 62-63). Discourse analysis is a natural fit for studying security, 
because it “says something about why state Y was considered an enemy in state X, how 
war emerged as a political option, and how other options were shunted aside” 
(Neumann, 2008: 62); for Balzacq (2011a: 39), discourse analysis “map[s] the 
emergence and evolution of patterns of representations which are constitutive of a 
threat image.” In short, it can reveal how threats and security issues are socially 
constructed through the interpretation of texts and the context in which they emerge. 
Balzacq (2011a: 47) laments, however, that “discourse analysis is strong in 
understanding how securitization operates, but weak in uncovering why certain 
securitizing moves succeed and when.” Methodological pluralism, he argues, can help 
create “a much richer version of securitization processes” (52). With this ambition in 
mind, this chapter justifies new methods for the securitization toolkit. It begins with a 
definition of what an ideal model of securitization should look like and how this ideal 
model can be operationalized. The discussion next shifts to a broad overview of the 
methods used in this study and a justification for combining them into a singular 
framework. In the final two sections, the structure of analysis for each case study is 
discussed in more depth. Specifically, the case studies will be split into a macroanalysis 
and a microanalysis. The macroanalysis investigates securitization as a naturally 
occurring process, with all the complexities of sociohistorical context. It uses discourse 
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analysis to identify frames, which in turn inform the content analysis of news media 
texts. A longitudinal public opinion analysis introduces audience preferences and offers 
preliminary assessments on relationships between political elites, media and public 
attitudes. These relationships are made more explicit in the microanalysis, which uses 
multi-year cross-sectional survey data covering a representative sample of Americans 
to link support for exceptional measures to media and political attention.   
3.2 Defining a Securitization Effect – From an Ideal Model to a 
Practical Model 
An ideal model of a securitization effect should demonstrate that a securitizing actor’s 
rhetoric can motivate an audience’s preferences for adopting exceptional measures in 
defense of some referent object. In this research, such an idealized model should further 
differentiate securitizing actors (the news media and political elites) and their ability to 
drive securitization independently of each other. The source of the frame must be 
controlled for in contexts with multiple possible securitizing actors to isolate the origin 
of the effect on public opinion. A link should be established between exposure to 
securitizing (or desecuritizing) frames and support for (or opposition to) exceptional 
measures.  
This ideal model requires measuring four constructs: frame competition, source 
differentiation, audience attention to sources, and audience acceptance/rejection of 
exceptional measures. One realization of this idealized model could be an experiment, 
in which participants are treated with different frames from different sources and asked 
to indicate their preferences for exceptional measures (e.g., Coe et al., 2008; Iyengar & 
Hahn, 2009). While traditional framing experiments have high internal validity, they 
lack external validity – oversimplified and unrealistic laboratory settings produce 
fleeting framing effects that have limited generalizability to real life (Abrajano et al., 
2017). The advantage of manipulating frame competition, source differentiation and 
exposure is offset by the failure of the artificially controlled setting to account for the 
complexity of context and temporality. Moreover, experimental settings in which 
“individuals receive only a single frame in a single exposure” (Abrajano et al., 2017: 8) 
have dominated existing framing scholarship – this research aims to further contribute 
to existing research by developing a more realistic and practical model that 
accommodates longer timeframes and retains context (and thus exposure to multiple 
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frames) by separately measuring the four identified constructs and stitching insights 
together.  
3.2.1 Frame Competition 
The first objective is to identify and measure competing securitizing and desecuritizing 
frames. Securitizing frames emphasize the threat and promote support for (or positive 
evaluations of) exceptional measures by the audience, while desecuritizing frames 
promote negative/alternative evaluations that move away from security. The discussion 
on frame attributes in the previous chapter identifies several attributes that influence the 
effectiveness of a frame. Of these, frame magnitude has been recognized as the most 
powerful determiner of framing effects and thus is the primary vehicle through which 
frame competition is assessed in the following chapters. This suggests that, in a 
competitive frame environment, the most prevalent – or “loudest” – frames will become 
most accessible and should thus have the strongest impact on audience preferences 
(Bartels, 2003; Zaller, 1992). This effect is moderated, however, by other factors 
identified in Chapter 2: a weak or unpersuasive frame lacking in either one of 
availability, accessibility, and applicability will be less influential than a strong frame; 
“catchy” frames can resonate through repetitive invocation; negative frames on balance 
are more effective; the co-occurrence of multiple frames will promote internal 
deliberation and thus weaken the effect of any one frame; and culturally congruent 
frames that fit into established modes of interpretation and consensus values will be 
least cognitively costly and thus most effective, while frames that produce emotional or 
cognitive dissonance will be blocked.  
3.2.2 Source Differentiation 
Source differentiation measures variation in employment of frames by different actors. 
In order to isolate the impact of different sources, the diversity, balance and range of 
frames must be characterized. If audience attitudes align with the particular balance of 
frames being employed by a source, then there is increased confidence that framing 
effects are occurring; conversely, if audience attitudes do not align with a source’s 
output, then it is unlikely that the source is producing framing effects. Determining the 
differences in coverage of frames by different sources also provides evidence of 
whether or not different press actors are aligning with political elites (or with each 
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other). This targets the central component of independence in the primary research 
question that this thesis aims to answer.   
3.2.3 Audience Attention to Source and Response to Exceptional Measures  
Finally, a link must be made between the frames used by securitizing actors and 
audience attitudes toward exceptional measures and security threats to confirm a 
framing effect. Framing research suggests that a source’s credibility and popularity will 
affect audience susceptibility to framing effects (Edwards, 1990; Entman, 1989, 2004); 
the CS similarly argue that the speaker’s social capital is a facilitating condition. This 
requires, then, measuring both audience acceptance/rejection of exceptional measures 
while also determining (and controlling for) their calibration to sources they deem 
credible. Some clarity is required on what audience acceptance or rejection looks like 
empirically. Rather than creating arbitrary measures of success (e.g., 51% approval for 
some exceptional measure), linking changes in frames used by the press and political 
elites on the one hand and changes in public opinion on the other hand can indicate the 
persuasiveness of the frames. Thus, an ideal model should identify both trends in public 
opinion as well as static data that links audience preferences for exceptional measures 
to their calibration to actors.  
When combined together, the four components – frame competition, source 
differentiation, audience attention to different sources, and audience evaluation of 
exceptional measures – can empirically identify securitization processes and link the 
appropriate actors. Frame competition and source differentiation help determine which 
frames – securitizing or desecuritizing – are most salient and the relationship between 
actors invoking those frames. Analyzing audience preferences over time recognizes 
shifts in support for exceptional measures that can be linked to frames used by actors. 
The next section shows how to operationalize these ideal concepts into practice. 
3.3 A Mixed Methods Design 
As discussed in the previous chapter, discourse analysis is an effective tool for 
analyzing political elite texts, but insufficient for analyzing audiences and other 
potential securitizing actors such as the news media. Audiences do not collectively 
produce texts the same way as political elites, making it difficult to include them in a 
discourse analysis; and the diversity of press actors and volume of content makes news 
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media incompatible with discourse analysis. A lack of formal hierarchy among press 
actors also makes it difficult to ascribe importance or symbolic value to individual 
articles or news segments, unlike, for example, presidential addresses to the nation. 
Hierarchies among political elites (e.g., the president), on the other hand, dictate which 
actors are most likely to impact discourse and deserve the most analytical attention. 
Discourse analysis is also more vulnerable than positivist approaches to researcher bias 
through “cherry-picking” (Santa Ana, Treviño, Bailey, Bodossian, & de Necochea, 
2007), because of a priori assumptions of what is discursively relevant: only those texts 
that meet some researcher-subjective criteria of what is important are included in the 
discourse analysis. While this can help narrow research, focusing only on mainstream 
and salient events neglects the aggregated effect of “everyday” minutiae. This is 
problematic, because while some events may be individually insignificant, they may 
become meaningful when analyzed as a sum of their parts. A lone news article 
advocating exceptional measures may be trivial, but the aggregate effect of multiple 
such articles can constitute a significant shift in discourse. As discussed in section 3.3.2 
below, a content analysis with broadly defined boundaries can widen the net, making 
research less vulnerable to analyst blind spots. Finally, the methodologically 
interpretivist logic of discourse analysis limits replication across sectors and cases, 
because the idiosyncrasies of one security issue will prevent the same path of discovery 
for another security issue (Buzan et al., 1998). This makes it harder to extrapolate 
patterns between contexts. A rules-based positivist approach, on the other hand, can 
overcome this limitation by applying a systematic framework for analysis and tweaking 
parameters (e.g., keyword search criteria) as necessary to fit different domains.  
Still, discourse analysis should not be fully dismissed: a formalized and systematic 
design – such as Hansen’s (2013) framework for security discourse analysis – can 
mitigate subjective bias and standardize analysis. The proposed research design here 
retains discourse analysis but supplements it with tools grounded in positivism that not 
only show how securitization occurs, but why (Balzacq, 2011a: 47). Using mixed 
methods retains the contextual benefits of discourse analysis while injecting rules-
based objectivity, reducing blind spots, and measuring with quantitative precision 1) 
the presence, breadth and relative proportion of (de)securitization frames attributed to 
different actors over time; and (2) audience acceptance/rejection of securitization 
attempts. These methods measure frame/source competition and audience 
acceptance/rejection of exceptional measures in a reliable, generalizable and replicable 
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way. While some subjective boundaries are necessary, this approach casts a wider net 
than discourse analysis and adds statistical rigor to an otherwise qualitative discourse 
analysis-driven framework.  
The remainder of this chapter maps out in detail the methodological framework used in 
the following chapters. The framework is divided into a longitudinal macroanalysis – 
which includes a political elite-centric discourse analysis, a press-centric content 
analysis and an audience-centric public opinion poll analysis – and a cross-sectional 
microanalysis that links audience security preferences to their calibration to different 
information sources.  
3.3.1 Political Elite Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis achieves two functions in this thesis: first it provides an in-depth 
illustration of political elite rhetoric and practices. Specific focus is given to competing 
securitizing and desecuritizing discourses. Second, the rhetorical links that signify and 
juxtapose the two opposing discourses are used to drive the subsequent content analysis 
of news media. Discourse analysis thus offers a way to map out the boundaries of 
discourse – set by political elites – through the analysis of texts and attribute them to 
both securitizing and desecuritizing identities. It is critical for addressing the research 
questions of this thesis, because it provides a reference point against which to compare 
media discourse and determine whether it mirrors or contests political elite rhetoric. In 
other words, it can demonstrate whether the press acts independently of political elites, 
thus satisfying a preliminary step in identifying whether the media can be an 
independent securitizing actor. Discourse analysis also demonstrates how threats were 
socially constructed – again, a first step towards identifying how exceptional measures 
emerged in public discourse and became (de)legitimized through audience interaction.  
Taking seriously Balzacq’s (2011a: 41) claim that “a minimum of formalization in 
discourse analysis is a scholarly requirement,” the methodological point of departure 
here is Lene Hansen’s (2013) framework for security discourse analysis developed in 
Security as Practice. She argues that foreign policy utterances – or “performances” 
(Butler, 1990: 25) – articulate “particular directions for action” (Hansen, 2013: 19), 
while also both invoking and (re)producing identities. On the one hand, identities are 
naturally invoked in foreign policy through a juxtaposition between the Self and the 
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Other. In security discourse, this can take the form of the Self recognizing the Other as 
a threat. For example, the recognition and articulation of a terrorist threat invokes a 
“terrorist” Other against a threatened Self. On the other hand, uttering security also 
reproduces competing Self identities: competing utterances can construct Selves that 
differ based on their relationship with the Other. For example, the identity of a 
“terrorist” Other can position the Self in a different space from identification of the 
same entity as a “freedom fighter” or “state sanctioned solder” (Der Derian, 1992: 92-
126; Hansen, 2013: 17). The choices made to interpret the Other necessarily reconstruct 
and pit opposing Self identities against each other: one version of the Self is threatened 
by the “terrorist”, while another Self recognizes the legitimacy of a “freedom fighter”. 
To choose one frame over the other not only differentiates the identity of the subject, 
but also of the speaker’s relation to the subject (Hansen, 2013: 16). Thus, alternative 
ways of defining a foreign policy issue can constitute different competing Selves. The 
construction of these different Selves gives other actors – political elites, the public and 
the press – a pole to affix their own identities to.  
For Hansen (2013), the juxtaposing basic discourses that arise out of different Selves 
are components of a broader security policy debate, or a major discourse. She suggests 
identifying two to three basic discourses “that articulate very different constructions of 
identity and policy and which thereby separate the political landscape between them” 
(47). One way to do this is to identify discourses that vary in their radicalization of the 
Other – for instance, the identification of an illegal immigrant as an existential threat 
that must be ejected is a more radical construction of the Other than the characterization 
of the same immigrant as an entity to be received and integrated into society. The 
different constructions of the Other necessarily invoke (and reproduce) two different 
Self identities: a restrictionist Self that seeks to block immigrants from society and an 
expansionist Self that seeks to include and integrate immigrants. The construction of 
different Others and Selves means that competing basic discourses naturally lead to 
different foreign policies or recommendations for courses of action (Hansen, 2013: 48). 
In the context of security, the push for some exceptional measure will constitute a 
securitizing Self aligned with a securitizing basic discourse, while articulations away 
from security will constitute a desecuritizing Self aligned with a desecuritizing basic 
discourse. Both discourses compete within a broader (de)securitization debate (or a 
major discourse). It is these juxtapositions that reveal the different frames used by 
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competing (de)securitizing identities/discourses – e.g., to provide moral evaluation and 
propose remedies – and provide the foundation for the oppositional content analysis.  
These oppositional discourses underscore a key strength of Hansen’s framework for 
securitization theory: it requires the analyst to position discourses relative to each other 
in order to identify what is securitizing and what is desecuritizing. Complex security 
issues can have several policies and related discourses in play. Analyzing any one in 
isolation requires making a subjective choice as to whether it is part of a securitizing or 
desecuritizing discourse. In some cases, this may be obvious, but in other cases, a 
policy could represent either discourse depending on its temporal, spatial and semantic 
proximity to other policies. The proposed detention and treatment of suspected 
terrorists as prisoners of war under Geneva Convention guidelines may appear at first 
to be part of a securitizing discourse; however, against an alternative proposal in which 
these detainees are recommended to be tortured in violation of Geneva Convention 
protocol in the name of security, the former discourse is a significant move away from 
the exceptionalism of the latter. Relatively speaking then, the former discourse is 
desecuritizing to the extent that it is a move down from the alternative discourse of 
torture and consistent with the rule of law.19 This is especially important given that 
different Selves can agree on the presence of some threat (stage of identification) 
without necessarily agreeing on the adoption of exceptional measures (stage of 
mobilization). By identifying different discourses per Hansen’s (2013) framework, they 
 
19 Importantly, desecuritizing discourses need not fundamentally unmake security – nor do such 
discourses cause the securitization of an issue to entirely collapse. While the presence of competing 
desecuritizing discourses can certainly act as barriers toward securitizing an issue (like terrorism) and 
legitimizing exceptional measures, they are a single component of a broader discourse. In the case of 
terrorism, the legitimacy of torture as an exceptional measure was a single (albeit significant) component 
of the securitization of terrorism, alongside other exceptional measures like domestic surveillance, 
military campaigns and emergency legislation. Thus, desecuritizing discourses that aimed to delegitimize 
torture did not cause the securitization of terrorism to entirely collapse, but rather acted as a 
countervailing force in the tug-of-war between competing discourses. This reinforces Roe’s (2008) 
fundamental distinction between the stage of mobilization and the stage of identification: an issue can be 
identified as a threat, but still exist below the threshold of requiring exceptional measures. This thesis 
aims to catalog the securitizing and desecuritizing trends in discourse as a continuous and dynamic 
process, without necessarily adjudicating whether an issue is securitized/desecuritized as a final state.  
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can be mapped out and positioned relative to each other to identify what role – 
securitizing or desecuritizing – they play.  
To that end, this research recognizes securitizing and desecuritizing basic discourses 
that are employed by and constitute competing Selves. Rather than specific actors, 
Selves are used to demarcate oppositional identities, where multiple actors can 
constitute a Self through alignment with basic discourses associated with that Self. 
Disagreement on the legitimacy of an exceptional measure can, for example, juxtapose 
a securitizing Self against a desecuritizing Self. Each identity subscribes to and 
promotes a particular basic discourse. For analytical purposes, these basic discourses 
are treated as general policy positions, vocabularies and modes of thinking that are 
interconnected with their associated Selves. Basic discourses can be further broken 
down into frames, which are used in the case studies as linguistic signs within the 
broader discourse (whether securitizing or desecuritizing). The identification of frames 
(as units of basic discourse) makes the discourse analysis conceptually translatable into 
guidelines for the content analysis.  
Tactically, identifying securitizing and desecuritizing frames requires a comprehensive 
review (through a discourse analysis) of the range of discourses surrounding a 
particular issue or threat and narrowing the focus to a particular site of contestation of 
the threat image or exceptional measure. Debates on the legitimacy of exceptional 
measures to counteract a potential security threat are key focal points, because they 
directly confront the question: is the issue sufficiently threatening that it requires 
operating within the realm of security and exceptional politics? In other words, should 
this issue be securitized? Opposition to exceptional measures suggests conversely that 
the issue is not sufficiently threatening to justify the use of exceptional measures – it is 
a move away from securitization, or in Hansen’s (2012) typology of desecuritization, 
the rearticulation of resolving an issue using political mean. The arguments on either 
side of this debate can constitute securitizing and desecuritizing basic discourses. 
Distilling these to competing desecuritizing and securitizing frames then requires 
identifying the rhetorical links and differences that either bound or differentiate the two 
competing discourses. The analyst must ask: are there particular vocabularies or terms 
that distinctively represent either of the two competing discourses? The use of different 
rhetorical signs used in each of the different discourses can be used as indicators of a 
particular discourse. Similarly, securitizing and desecuritizing discourses/frames can 
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also emerge in the contestation of threat images. The characterization of an issue as 
threatening or in security-centric terms can belong to securitizing discourses, while less 
militaristic and less threatening characterizations can in comparison represent 
desecuritizing discourses – what in Hansen’s (2012) typology is marked as change 
through stabilization.  
Hansen (2013: 65) acknowledges that “‘reality’ is always larger than the number of 
questions one can ask of it; to formulate a research project is therefore inevitably to 
make a series of choices.” Identification of and juxtaposition of different Selves is one 
such choice in her four-pronged research design. Figure 3.1 shows three other 
considerations for the analyst: the temporal perspective, the selection of texts 
(intertextual models), and the number of events to analyze. According to Hansen (2013: 
69), “foreign policy can be studied as it addresses either events at one particular 
moment or through a longer historical analysis”. In the latter group, studies can either 
“[trace] the evolution of identities across centuries” (69), or – more appropriate for this 
study – be limited to a smaller number of events at “clearly defined points in time 
which are tied to particular foreign policy” issues (70). As argued in the case selection 
in Chapter 1, both the terrorism and immigration cases are delimited to the Bush and 
Obama administrations,20 from 2001 to 2016. These represent, in Hansen’s (2013: 70) 
terms, “changes in important political structures or institutions” that are still 
comparable. Thus the temporal perspective for both case studies is a sixteen-year 
analysis of comparative moments (see figures 3.2 and 3.3).  
  
 
20 Political actors are frequently generalized and referred to collectively as “the administration” for ease. 
While a monolithic “Bush administration” or “Obama administration” is an oversimplification, this 
shortcut makes it possible to identify the main actors and official policy positions in the debates 
surrounding terrorism and immigration (see also Donnelly, 2013, p. 9). 
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Figure 3.1 Security Discourse Analysis Research Design Template 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This is a replication of Hansen’s (2013) template for a security discourse analysis research design. 
 
Next, Hansen’s recommendations for material selection stretches from analyzing 
official discourse – particularly primary texts like “statements, speeches, and 
interviews” – to an “intertextual” approach that includes “journalism, academic writing, 
popular non-fiction, and, potentially, even fiction” (2013: 49). Because the overall aim 
of this thesis is to understand the role that the press plays in influencing securitization, 
academic, fiction and non-fiction literature are excluded from analysis. Further, since 
the aim of the discourse analysis is to uncover the boundaries of political discourse – 
with the aim of analyzing media content in subsequent chapters – official texts are the 
primary focus.21 Executive and legislative branch actors set the rhetorical agenda, thus 
creating boundaries for the range of discourse (and thus frames) available to others, 
including the media (Althaus et al., 1996; Entman, 2004). These agents are few in 
number, but symbolic and compelling for shaping perceptions of reality – the 
articulations of a few prominent elites (e.g., the president or congresspersons) influence 
“what count as proper representations within a particular foreign policy issue” (Hansen, 
 
21 Respecting the audience emphasis and acknowledging that most Americans did not have access to 
classified documents, texts are emphasized as they enter mainstream discourse in time. The discourse 
analysis is written with the broad US electorate as its reference point. It seeks to deconstruct texts and 
events in ways that the average American might have experienced and interpreted them. 
STUDY 
Intertextual models 
• Official discourse 
• Wider political debate 
• Cultural representations 
• Marginal political discourses 
 
Number of events 
• One 
• Multiple – related by issues 
• Multiple – related by time  
 
 
Temporal perspective 
• One moment 
• Comparative moments 
• Historical development 
 
Number of Selves 
• Single 
• Comparison around events or 
issues 
• Discursive Encounter 
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2013: 6-7). Individual journalists lack this capacity making discourse analysis better 
suited to analyzing political elites than the press. Nonetheless, it is impractical to 
wholly exclude the media, since political elites and media respond to one another to 
construct discourse. Abu Ghraib, for example, broke to the public via news media, and 
necessitated a political response (Hansen, 2013: 54); and immigration policy debates in 
2006 and 2007 were heavily influenced by media mobilization. To ensure priority is 
given to political elite constructions, major media contributions are identified, but with 
emphasis on how political elites responded. Following Hansen’s (2013: 76) 
recommendations, primary texts are selected using the following criteria: they clearly 
delineate identities, they are widely read and they “have the formal authority to define a 
political position.”22 
The analysis goes a step further and considers legislation, executive actions and other 
programs put into place, since these events can shape public impressions and influence 
security discourse (Bigo, 2002). Moreover, these events frequently draw responses – 
whether in support or protest – in the form of “traditional” discourse and speech acts. In 
short, these practices generate discourse and the responses can forge new or reify 
existing identities, thus further influencing the security environment (Bigo, 2002).  
Finally, discourse analysis can revolve around a single event or multiple events that are 
related to each other by the issue or period of analysis. In this research, events are 
selected by their relation to two issues, terrorism or immigration. Event selection is 
guided by Donnelly’s (2013) concept of “defining moments” and Hansen’s (2013) 
similarly characterized “key events”. Both have similar thresholds: for Donnelly, 
defining moments are significant events that can change the direction and magnitude of 
securitization dynamics. These events can amplify securitizing dynamics, but can also 
polarize public opinion in the short-term, leading to either the survival or collapse of an 
ongoing securitization process. Moreover, these events are likely to engage 
(de)securitizing actors. Similarly, Hansen defines (2013: 28) key events as “situations 
 
22 Still, other types of content in Hansen’s (2013) intertextual approach can naturally fall into a research 
design that attempts to circumscribe analysis to solely political elite content. Culturally salient texts (like 
films and television) can elicit reactions and commentary from political elites, thus indirectly 
contributing to foreign policymaking. The film Zero Dark Thirty, for example, drew public reactions 
from Senators on the torture debate (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). While outside the domain of 
strictly political elite texts, artefacts that provoke political elite texts are also considered. 
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where ‘important facts’ manifest themselves on the political and/or the media agenda 
and influence the official policy-identity constellation or force the official discourse to 
engage with political opposition and media criticism.” She argues that key events offer 
a way to trace official discourse and “construct a timeline”.  
Emphasizing the latter point, events are presented in chronological order to best 
understand how frames develop meaning (Hansen, 2013: 79). Meanings are unfolded 
over time, and to present them nonsequentially overlooks how discourses gain meaning 
from previous discourses and how they inform future ones (Hansen, 2013: 49). 
Neumann (2008: 66) cautions, “A given discourse cannot be entirely detached from all 
other discourses. They are ordered and scaled in relation to one another.” The discourse 
on terrorism and immigration in particular is mired in euphemisms, redefinitions and 
heuristics, whose meanings depend on their temporal and spatial locations (Balzacq, 
2011a: 40). For Hansen (2013: 49), this means “that texts are situated within and 
against other texts, that they draw upon them in constructing their identities and 
policies, that they appropriate as well as revise the past, and that they build authority by 
reading and citing that of others.” If language is neither fixed nor do words speak for 
themselves, a deconstruction of meaning requires a chronological, sequential unfolding, 
lest the meaning of syntactically similar symbols be erroneously conflated across 
different temporal or spatial contexts.  
3.3.1.1 Terrorism 
The securitization of terrorism in the US is analyzed in this study through the specific 
(de)legitimization of torture as an exceptional measure. As shown in figure 3.2, two 
Selves are juxtaposed in the debate: one side employs securitizing discourse to 
legitimize torture by linking it rhetorically to successful intelligence gathering, 
counterterrorism, and the prevention of attacks. It is invoked as part of a broader 
schema of links that emphasize the existential threat posed by terrorism and necessity, 
while also justifying torture through ambiguous euphemisms like “enhanced 
interrogation.” A separate counter-discourse opposes the pro-torture identity and 
appeals to American liberal democratic values as well as international norms and laws 
(e.g., the Geneva Conventions). The analysis uncovers two different frames for the 
remedy proposal function of Entman’s (2004) model: one that aims to legitimize 
interrogation as an appropriate, lawful method; and a counter-frame that attempts to 
delegitimize the same practice, recognizing it as illegal torture. Importantly, the 
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discourse analysis shows that these two signifiers, torture and interrogation, were 
referring to the same practice but with different evaluations of each.  
Figure 3.2 Securitization of Terrorism in the US Discourse Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Using Hansen’s (2013) template, this is the proposed design for the terrorism discourse analysis in 
this study.  
 
3.3.1.2 Unauthorized Immigration 
The unauthorized immigration discourse analysis differentiates Selves along both the 
remedy proposal and moral evaluation functional axes (see figure 3.3).23 The moral 
evaluation axis juxtaposes characterizations of immigrations as either criminal 
(securitizing) or non-criminal (desecuritizing); while the remedy proposal axis 
juxtaposes restrictive measures aimed to block unauthorized immigrant access to the 
US (securitizing) against expansive measures aimed to include and regularize 
unauthorized immigrants through, for example, pathways to legalization and citizenship 
(desecuritizing). Both frame functional axes pit two Selves against each other: 
restrictionists versus expansionists. As with terrorism, the immigration securitization 
 
23 While the debates naturally differentiate identities of the Other as well (e.g., criminal versus non-
criminal immigrants), the focus in this thesis is on the differentiation of Selves. Still the two are 
essentially mirror images of each other: by invoking a different Other, the speaker constitutes a different 
Self. 
SECURITIZATION OF  
TERRORISM IN THE US 
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Multiple events 
related by issue 
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Number of selves 
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proposed remedy axis 
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debate employs metaphors, euphemisms and other rhetorical strategies to link 
immigrants to criminality and construct them as threats to society. It has coexisted with 
an oppositional discourse that aims to deconstruct the threatening image and push a 
humanizing portrayal of immigrants as individuals who should be integrated into 
American society through legalization. The rhetorical links and signifiers that make up 
these competing narratives are uncovered through a discourse analysis and are used as 
parameters in the media content analysis.  
Figure 3.3 Securitization of Unauthorized Immigration in the US Discourse 
Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Using Hansen’s (2013) template, this is the proposed design for the unauthorized immigration  
discourse analysis in this study.  
 
3.3.2 Media Content Analysis 
Content analysis – “a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the 
scientific method” to measure frames “as they ‘naturally’ occur” (Neuendorf, 2004: 33) 
– has been widely employed in framing literature to analyze political elite and media 
texts (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2014). Like discourse analysis, content analysis generates 
meaning from text (Weber, 1990: 19), but unlike discourse analysis, it allows the 
analyst to control contextual factors to, for example, weight identical units of text (e.g., 
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words) equally.24 A constructivist approach to discourse analysis is predicated on the 
ideal that the analyst will arrive at (nearly) the same subjective interpretation as what 
naturally occurs among the actors in the case being studied – it is vulnerable to the 
whims and subjectivities of the analyst. Content analysis, on the other hand, replaces 
these subjective decisions with defined rules and parameters (Blinder & Allen, 2016). It 
can be more “accurate” (Balzacq, 2011a: 51) because it is  
objective in the sense that the analytic categories are defined so precisely 
that different coders may apply them and obtain the same results; 
systematic in the sense that clear rules are used to include or exclude 
content or analytic categories; and quantified in the sense that the results 
of content analysis are amenable to statistical analysis (Hardy et al., 2004: 
20) 
Quantification and standardization further enables comparisons between actors and 
across cases/sectors (Blinder & Allen, 2016).25  
Content analysis is used in this project to quantify securitizing and desecuritizing 
frames in primarily media but also political elite discourse. While the discourse 
analysis guides the content analysis by identifying the key securitizing and 
desecuritizing frames and their signifiers, the content analysis charts the prevalence of 
competing frames over the entire period of analysis, recognizing important periods of 
coverage rather than singular texts. By quantifying the frames through their signifiers, 
it is possible to measure competition between opposing frames in each source 
(demonstrating, for example, whether and by how much a particular actor favors the 
desecuritizing or securitizing frame); map the evolution of frame coverage and framing 
strategies over time; compare frame prevalence across multiple news sources to 
identify overlaps and divergence in framing strategies; and compare the press to 
 
24 An advantage of content analysis is its ability to accommodate context as needed through the use of 
rules. The term “wall”, for example, can refer to border security or finance (Wall Street). A rule can be 
added that 1) checks for the term “border” within k words of “wall”; 2) ignores collocations of “wall” 
and “street”; and 3) requires that the stem “immigr” occurs in the text. Context is thus coded into the 
content analysis model in a controllable and replicable way (Neuendorf, 2004: 34).  
25 Content analysis, in fact, necessitates some comparison – whether it is across time, actors or topics – in 
order for quantitative data to be useful (Hermann, 2008: 160-161). 
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political elites in an objective and systematic way. This makes it possible to explicitly 
answer the primary research question of this thesis and demonstrate whether the press 
can be an independent securitizing actor. It also addresses the secondary research 
question, because content analysis makes it possible to quantify the contestation of 
competing frames. 
If content analysis improves upon discourse analysis because it ensures the same results 
by anyone following the same coding plan, its primary deficit is its inability to capture 
context and nuance in meaning and understanding of the world as it occurs naturally. 
Meanings of texts and words evolve, even in short periods, and content analysis cannot 
adequately account for these shifts in meaning in language. This limitation is overcome 
by adopting both methods, drawing on the advantages of each. Discourse analysis 
provides a holistic understanding of contextual factors that can then be built into the 
content analysis as rules to ensure only relevant features are quantified.26 The ability to 
leverage computer assistance, meanwhile, accommodates analysis of much larger 
volumes of textual data in a consistent and meaningful way (Blinder & Allen, 2016), a 
necessity for analyzing large sets of text, such as new media. The corpora used in this 
study cover over 300,000 texts – analyzing these using discourse analysis (or even 
manual content analysis) has obvious time and resource costs. Human analysis of a 
smaller corpus is also problematic because it risks an unbalanced analysis, the result of 
influence and “learning” from previous texts. Computer assisted content analysis 
ensures consistency and minimizes bias while accommodating large volumes of text 
data (Baker, 2006; Mautner, 2009).27 News coverage is also more compatible with the 
aims of content analysis: unlike discourse analysis which uncovers how frames become 
meaningful, content analysis makes it possible to measure and quantify important 
attributes of frames (such as strength and magnitude) and explain why they influence 
 
26 This still raises the concern that content analysis reproduces the same subjectivity bias that it seeks to 
overcome in discourse analysis in the selection of rules and frames to analyze. Some choices are 
necessary to make in order to guide and narrow the analysis. The content analysis nonetheless improves 
on discourse analysis by widening the selection of texts analyzed.   
27 Roberts et al. (2014) further demonstrate significant overlap and high correlations in findings between 
automated and hand-coded content analyses, lending confidence in the former as a replacement for the 
latter. 
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public preferences (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009; Dunaway, Goidel, Kirzinger, 
& Wilkinson, 2011; McLaren, Boomgaarden, & Vliegenthart, 2017).  
Neuendorf (2004: 35) suggests a sequential strategy in which discourse analysis 
provides “clues” and coding guidelines that help shape the parameters and boundaries 
of a content analysis. Despite being more “objective”, content analysis requires 
subjective decisions to bound and guide analysis – choices must be made “about the 
limits of what is or is not included in a model or data set” (Herrera & Braumoeller, 
2004: 18). Discourse analysis can adequately provide this contextual information 
(Hermann, 2008). A content analysis on terrorism, for instance, requires delineating the 
general discourse – e.g., who are the major players, what context of terrorism is 
relevant to the study, and in which media/settings are relevant messages on terrorism 
likely to exist. Discourse analysis can inform the limits of content analysis, while the 
latter adds replicability and reliability (Balzacq, 2011a: 51; Hardy et al., 2004: 20) 
through “the assurance that the findings are not entirely the product of one analyst’s 
opinion” (Neuendorf, 2004: 35). Each can uncover findings not captured in the other 
(Neuendorf, 2004: 35).  
3.3.2.1 Operationalization 
The content analysis measures frame competition and source differentiation across four 
news media sources – CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, the New York Times – and political 
elites (presidential and congressional discourse). While the analysis of news media 
introduces to the securitization process four news actors that represent a range of 
ideology and mediums, the inclusion of political elites serves to both complement the 
discourse analysis and quantify political discourse so that it is comparable with media 
analysis. The New York Times is selected because of its strong agenda-setting effect on 
other news sources (Golan, 2006; Page & Shapiro, 1984; Wanta & Hu, 1993), its 
demonstrated influence on foreign policy decision-making (Bartels, 1996; Van Belle, 
2003), and its wide readership acknowledged in Chapter 1. Wanta and Hu (1993: 255) 
suggest that even individuals who do not consume it “may have been exposed to other 
media that had taken salience cues from coverage in the Times.” Its inclusion here 
offers a chance to test the relationship between a frame’s effectiveness and its source’s 
credibility (Druckman, 2001). 
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The three cable news networks accommodate the growing influence of television, 
which “serves as the key international news source for most Americans” (Golan, 2006: 
330; see also Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). This trend has especially favored CNN, Fox 
News and MSNBC (Pew Research Center, 2016b), which collectively represent a 
diverse ideological spectrum and reach wide audiences. Several studies find that Fox 
News has a conservative and Republican bias; CNN ranges from center to slightly left 
of center; and MSNBC has a heavy Democratic and liberal gravitation (Aday, 
Livingston, & Hebert, 2005; Chalif, 2011; Feldman, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & 
Leiserowitz, 2012). These affiliations are important as the proliferation of news sources 
and increased partisanship among the electorate has led to targeted programming and 
consumption (Feldman et al., 2012; McCombs, 2005) where, for example, Fox News 
targets conservative Republicans (Aday et al., 2005; Gil de Zúñiga, Correa, & 
Valenzuela, 2012; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005), while CNN and MSNBC target liberal 
Democrats (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Fragmentation determines how audiences 
calibrate to different sources and the frames they are likely to encounter (Gil de Zúñiga 
et al., 2012). Moreover, as leading sources of news, these four actors have more 
flexibility and autonomy in developing frames (Entman, 2004).  
Executive branch texts attributed to the president and vice president as well as 
congressional texts are also included to directly compare the press and political elites in 
compatible terms. These texts are opportunities for political leaders and actors to 
articulate their policies, influence public expectations and preferences, and shape their 
personas (Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, & Walker, 1991; Winter & Stewart, 1977). 
They also provide raw versions of political elite discourse before it is filtered through 
media incentives to select what “will sell” (Hermann, 2008: 154). While the discourse 
analysis primarily focuses on defining moments and symbolic key events (e.g., 
executive orders or presidential vetoes), the content analysis adds a complementary 
perspective on the everyday minutiae of political rhetoric to show, more granularly, 
how language evolves, patterns emerge, and trends and shifts occur in political elite 
texts spanning across presidents and terms. This validates findings from the discourse 
analysis by linking objective data to interpretations of defining moments, and also 
facilitates comparisons with news media content, uncovering relationships between 
both types of actors.  
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A corpus – or collection of texts – is built for each actor using keyword searches (listed 
in table 3.1) in LexisNexis Academic (for press actors), the American Presidency 
Project28 hosted by the University of California at Santa Barbara (for presidents and 
vice presidents) and the Congressional Record (for congressional actors). The texts 
include newspaper articles and transcripts of shows for the cable networks; executive 
branch leaders’ speeches, press releases, public remarks, press briefings, executive 
orders, interviews, proclamations and other statements; and remarks, hearings, debates 
and proceedings from Congress. Prior to analysis, all texts are preprocessed using 
natural language processing tools in Python to extract meta data (e.g., date and source 
of text) and remove unwanted features (e.g., HTML tags).  
 
Table 3.1 Keyword Search for Content Analysis 
 
Terrorism Unauthorized Immigration 
   
Keywords terrori! OR gwot OR "war on terror" OR 
"overseas contingency operation"  
migran! OR migrat! OR immigra! 
OR refugee! or asyl! 
Begin Date Jan 1, 2001 Jan 1, 2001 
End Date Dec 31, 2016 Dec 31, 2016 
 
Following previous framing scholarship (e.g., Bennett et al., 2006; Rowling et al., 2011; 
Simon & Jerit, 2007), frames are identified based on the presence of signifiers. 
Signifiers can be words (e.g., immigrant), word stems (e.g., the feature immigr includes 
instances of immigration, immigrant(s), and immigrate(d/s)), sequences of words (e.g., 
illegal immigrant), more complex combinations of words like collocations (e.g., wall or 
fence occurring within five words of border; see also Blinder and Allen, 2016), or some 
combination of these rules. Because journalists adopt similar ways of presenting topics 
– or  “conventional frames” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2004; Pan & Kosicki, 1993)29 – the 
same signifiers are used for each actor. The selected signifiers employed in this research 
 
28 https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
29 Political elites face similar constraints: Hansen (2013: 6-7) argues that it would be “extremely 
unlikely—and politically unsavvy—for politicians to articulate foreign policy without any concern for 
the representations found within the wider public sphere as they attempt to present their policies as 
legitimate to their constituencies.” 
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are specific enough to capture the construct that the content analysis aims to measure, 
while also remaining broad enough to prevent overfitting. Overfitting risks understating 
the presence of frames, and not fully accommodating the nuanced ways in which 
different actors/sources invoke “conventional frames”. The signifiers are thus defined in 
this research using minimal keywords and restrictions.30 This choice follows precedents 
set by other scholars who demonstrate framing effects resulting from the substitution of 
a few keywords (e.g., Bennett et al., 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Simon & Jerit, 
2007).  
Both frames and their primary signifiers are identified in the discourse analysis. 
Specifically, the discourse analysis focuses on rhetorical links and differentiation 
between competing (de)securitizing basic discourses. These rhetorical links are used in 
the content analysis as signifiers to identify frames used in the securitizing and 
desecuritizing discourses. Multiple frames may constitute a securitizing basic 
discourse: in the immigration debate, for example, securitizing discourses include 
moral evaluation frames (immigrants as criminals and threats) and remedy proposal 
frames (increased border security). Desecuritizing discourses, conversely, move away 
from security and employ frames that provide different moral evaluations (immigrants 
as victims) and remedy proposals (pathways toward legalization and citizenship). The 
discourse analysis for each case study drives signifier selection, and the content 
analysis uses these signifiers to measure frame prevalence.  
Frame competition is measured by comparing the magnitude of opposing securitizing 
frames and desecuritizing frames. Given wide scholarly agreement that frame 
magnitude is the most important predictor of framing effects, it is the preferred 
mechanism here for measuring competition between (de)securitization frames. Guided 
by this consensus and extant research (Bennett et al., 2006; Rowling et al., 2011; Simon 
& Jerit, 2007), magnitude is measured as the number of occurrences of each signifier. 
For example, the magnitude of the border security frame in a single document could be 
 
30 The content analysis also does not discriminate between foreign policy, arts, sports, or style sections. 
This choice reflects the assumption that audience knowledge is constructed from different sources and 
settings (Blinder & Allen, 2016: 9). In expressing their policy preferences, they are likely to draw on 
whichever nodes are accessible (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; see also Domke et al., 1998; Higgins & King, 
1981), rather than deliberating on the literary, foreign policy or security connotations of, for example, 
torture and immigrants.  
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the number of instances of “border wall”, “border fence” or “border security” that occur 
in the text. In order to control for varying sizes of texts – television show transcripts, 
for example, are much longer than news articles – frame magnitudes are standardized to 
rates of the frame occurrence per ten-thousand words. Both aggregate and quarterly 
time series measures of magnitude are constructed for each actor and each frame.31 
These are converted into a single construct (e.g., a ratio of securitizing-to-
desecuritizing frame magnitudes) to measure frame competition. Both trends as well as 
aggregate measures of frame magnitudes are observed to assess differences in actor 
coverage of securitizing and desecuritizing frames (source differentiation), paving the 
way for analysis of how this relates to audience preferences. Importantly, the emphasis 
is on relative measures rather than absolute measures. In other words, the prevalence of 
frames is compared among actors, rather than specifying an arbitrary baseline against 
which to draw inferences (Hofstetter, 1976).  
3.3.3 Audience Evaluation 
Public opinion data has been underutilized in securitization research, but regular 
surveys and polls conducted by news organizations, governments, universities, think 
tanks, and polling agencies enable measuring public preferences for policies – such as 
exceptional measures – both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. These instruments are 
useful because of their “‘objective’ and seemingly decisive nature, as well as their 
ability to account for a multitude of individual opinions” while remaining 
“unprejudiced by ideology” to “communicate the general will” (Herbst, 1993: 2). 
Conducted on representative samples, public opinion surveys and polls accommodate 
geographically large and ideologically diverse audiences. By quantifying audience 
sentiment, it becomes possible to determine the extent of public support for exceptional 
measures across different security issues at different times, directly satisfying the 
secondary research question of this thesis.32 Identifying audience acceptance/rejection 
 
31 The use of time series to measure media effects has been used widely in framing literature to 
demonstrate interactions between the media and political agenda (Bartels, 1996; Baumgartner, Jones, & 
Leech, 1997; Box-Steffensmeier, Darmofal, & Farrell, 2009; Fogarty & Monogan III, 2016; Kellstedt, 
2000; Simon & Jerit, 2007; Soroka, 2002; Vonbun, Königslöw, & Schoenbach, 2016; Walgrave, Soroka, 
& Nuytemans, 2008; Wood & Peake, 1998). The current study shares these previous studies’ objective of 
quantifying the rhetoric of different actors and evaluating potential directions of influence. 
32 Balzacq (2011a) cautions that polls should be used in securitization theory strictly as indicators of the 
prominence of an issue – and not as evidence of securitization – because of their dual nature as effects in 
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of exceptional measures is also necessary for answering the primary research question 
– whether the press can be an independent securitizing actor – because a link needs to 
be made between press use of frames and audience attitudes. The use of public opinion 
polling and survey data makes it possible to directly measure whether audiences 
support or reject exceptional measures.  
Several studies outside of securitization have used polling and survey data to relate the 
public and other actors: Zaller (1992) shows that elite discourses shape mass opinion; 
Groeling and Baum (2008) use content analysis to show that elite rhetoric shapes public 
opinion on foreign policy and military issues; Berinsky (2007: 975) finds that “patterns 
of conflict among partisan political actors shape mass opinion on war”; and other 
studies (Hertog & Fan, 1995; Page et al., 1987) find that news media can influence 
public attitudes. These studies employ different methods toward different agendas, but 
they share a reliance on polls as indicators of public opinion on policy issues (though 
largely non-security ones) and the assumption that framing effects are top-down. In 
other words, political elites and the media influence the public rather than the other way 
around. This direction is cautiously assumed in the case studies in this research as 
 
and effects of securitization: “the results of polls can be instrumentalized and play a role in securitizing 
moves, but can also be utilized to account for (successful) cases of securitization” (42). On the one hand, 
public opinion is influenced by policy proposals and is a result of the securitizing move (effect of); on the 
other hand, securitizing actors can adjust policy to synchronize with public preferences (Campbell, 2012; 
Jacobs & Shapiro, 2002) – the effect in. Balzacq’s concern, then, is that using public opinion to measure 
the effect of discounts the possibility that public opinion may also be an effect in. This is especially 
problematic if the poll is only an effect in and never an effect of previous securitizing discourse. To 
mitigate this concern, the analyses in the case studies use several polls, recognizing that some may drive 
the effect in, but that those follow securitizing moves necessarily reflect the effect of (even though they 
may also be “instrumentalized” by securitizing actors for future securitizing moves).  
 
The problem is further mitigated by focusing on polls that measure audience evaluation of the specific 
exceptional measure proposed. These specific measures are only going to be the subject of public 
opinion inquiry after they have been proposed as potential policy options – in other words, the 
securitization move has already occurred. It is by virtue of being “newsworthy” or part of public debate 
that an issue warrants public opinion inquiry; it is unlikely to find a poll that queries the public’s concern 
for a threat (or support for exceptional measures to reduce the threat) before the threat has even 
materialized (or the measures have even been proposed).  
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well33 – specifically this project applies methods used in past research to measure 
audience acceptance or rejection of an exceptional measure, the level or extent of 
acceptance/rejection, and temporal shifts in these levels. In doing so, the following 
questions are addressed:  
1) Does the audience accept or reject the exceptional measure?  
2) How much does the audience accept or reject the exceptional measure?  
3) Has audience acceptance/rejection increased or decreased over time?  
These questions are answered using longitudinal poll and cross-sectional survey data to 
holistically analyze the audience in securitization. This approach to audience evaluation 
can accommodate large audience sizes and variability in parsimonious representations 
and models. While discourse analysis risks reducing the securitization audience to an 
invariable, monolithic and overgeneralized entity, longitudinal and cross-sectional 
models introduce variance and representative samples of the audience. Quantified data 
also make it possible to compare effects of different variables both within and across 
cases, because audience acceptance or rejection of securitization can be measured with 
precision in replicable ways. To that end, the macro-level longitudinal analysis charts 
audience evaluation over time, showing how public responses evolve during defining 
and low-salience moments. Using data from identically or similarly worded question-
response pairs,34 both audience threat anxiety and support/opposition for various 
 
33 Certainly public opinion influences policy outcomes, especially on highly salient issues (Campbell, 
2012). The literature widely acknowledges that public opinion influences policy (e.g., Aldrich, Gelpi, 
Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006; Burstein, 2003; Hartley & Russett, 1992; Smith, 1999); that policy 
outcomes affect public opinion (e.g., Stimson, 2015; Wlezien, 1995); that policy outcomes and public 
opinion are reciprocally linked (e.g., Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Hill & Hinton-Anderson, 1995; 
Monroe, 1998; Page, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1983, 2010; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995; Wlezien, 
1996); or that in some cases no relationship exists at all (Page & Shapiro, 1983: 189). But these studies 
emphasize policy outcomes rather than policy proposals. In securitization, audience reactions to policy 
proposals are the primary focus. 
34 Variability in phrasing, time, sampling methods, and context across polls can impact framing effects 
by activating different schemas and cognitions. Eichenberg (2005: 153) suggests this may be a 
methodological advantage though and recommends that “a reliable analysis requires the study of many 
survey questions that employ a variety of wordings.” Still, one way to minimize these contaminating 
effects and overcome this concern is to analyze only a subset of polls conducted by the same 
organization that frame the question similarly over time. If the subset yields trends and findings that are 
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policies are used to measure securitization. Because public opinion is measured during 
the same time period of the content analysis, preliminary assessments can be made 
regarding the influence of actors on audience preferences (e.g., McLaren et al., 2017; 
Simon & Jerit, 2007).  
A limitation with the longitudinal public opinion data used in the case studies that 
follow is that key individual-level variability is not always captured. For example, 
while attitudes toward threats and exceptional measures may be collected, attention to 
particular news sources and demographic information (that can potentially influence 
torture and immigration attitudes) may be overlooked. This forecloses linkages between 
frame exposure and preferences for exceptional measures. The cross-sectional analysis 
overcomes this limitation by using survey data that contain this individual-level 
richness. Specifically, survey data is used to estimate regression models that isolate and 
measure the relationship between support for exceptional measures and attention to 
sources. This complements the longitudinal analysis, which can show support or 
opposition toward exceptional measures over time, but cannot explain definitively what 
drives variation below the aggregate level. Read alongside results from the content 
analysis, the cross-sectional models can better link individual policy preferences to 
media exposure. While these models provide inferential richness and variability, they 
only provide a snapshot of public opinion at a given moment in time. To address this 
limitation, multiple waves of survey datasets are used. 
While cross-sectional models reveal potential alignments between attitudes and media 
consumption, they do not necessarily prove causal direction. Instead, they demonstrate 
the statistical significance, magnitude and polarity of alignments that may exist. For 
example, a positive statistically significant relationship between support for torture and 
consumption of a particular news source be interpreted as either attention to the 
particular news source producing support for torture or the news source calibrating its 
messaging to fit audience preferences. Securitization theory and the cascading 
activation model identify framing effects as a top-down process, where media frames 
flow to the public instead of the other way around. This process is assumed in the 
analyses. Certainly media actors are privy to the public mood and will tailor content to 
 
congruent with aggregate results, confidence in findings from the super set is increased. When possible, 
the case studies here use such subsets to validate inferences from larger data. 
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align with audience preferences. This feedback loop will nonetheless strengthen 
audience resolve on policy preferences, leading to a continuous reproduction of 
framing effects. Still, the limitation associated with the uncertainty of causality is 
discussed in greater detail in the final chapter.  
To summarize, the longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses are mutually reinforcing 
dimensions of audience reaction to (de)securitization frames from different sources. 
The former shows how audience evaluation moves over time and compares this to the 
evolution of political elite and the media frames. It provides preliminary evidence of 
audience responsiveness to content and source frames. The cross-sectional analysis 
focuses on individual moments along this timeline to make definitive links between 
individual-level variation in support for exceptional measures and attention to different 
sources. It shows whether individual preferences mirror the frames employed by the 
sources they pay attention to. While the macroanalysis shows how public opinion 
responds to frames over time, the microanalysis statistically links audience evaluation 
to the sources using those frames.   
3.3.3.1 Operationalization 
The operationalization of audience analysis is specific to each case study and is thus 
expanded upon in Chapters 5 and 7; nonetheless, some procedures apply generally. In 
both case studies, the longitudinal analysis uses polls to measure audience acceptance 
of the threat (the stage of identification); and audience acceptance of exceptional 
measures (stage of mobilization). The stage of identification is measured using polls 
that ask respondents to attribute levels of importance to various issues, while the stage 
of mobilization is measured using polls that ask respondents to indicate their support or 
opposition toward specific exceptional measures (and for the immigration case study, 
unexceptional policy proposals). Polls are retrieved from the Roper Center for Public 
Opinion Research using a keyword search, yielding question-response pairs from 
multiple polling firms. Table 3.2 shows the search criteria used to collect the data for 
each security sector. Using a combination of manual and automated techniques,35 
question-response pairs were vetted and retained based on their ability to meet the 
 
35 This involved an iterative process of manually reviewing question-response pairs and using a rules-
based automation approach to find other similar pairs. Similar question-answer pairs were grouped. This 
process was repeated until all pairs were matched to a particular group or discarded as irrelevant. 
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following criteria: construct validity (the question-response pair measures the desired 
construct); consistency (the selected question-response pairs use identical or near 
identical wording that minimizes the range of meaning perceived by respondents); and 
generality (questions-answer pairs are broad and concise, with minimal contaminating 
cues).36 Question-response pairs that did not match the logic of the stages of 
identification and mobilization were removed from consideration.   
 
36 Despite these strict criteria, the poll data is vulnerable to some limitations. While enforcing generality 
at the question level limits bias, it was difficult to control for other contextual influences (preceding 
questions, the format of the poll/interview, self-selection concerns) that may have affected responses. 
This research attempts to mitigate these concerns by using question-answer pairs that have a large 
respondent size as well as using a large number of question-answer pairs for the time periods under study 
in order to offset effects in individual polls.  
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Table 3.2 Search Query for Polls 
 
Terrorism Unauthorized Immigration 
Keywords terrori% OR tortur% OR 
interrog%  
migran% OR migrat% OR immigra% OR refugee% or 
asyl% 
Begin Date Jan 1, 2001 Jan 1, 2001 
End Date Dec 31, 2016 Dec 31, 2016 
 
 
Following other research on media effects (e.g., Coleman & Banning, 2006; 
Hetherington, 1996; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Kellstedt, 2000), the microanalysis 
employs survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), conducted 
during the general election years 2012 and 2016. The ANES surveys are conducted 
every general election year on a representative sample of Americans that are eligible to 
vote. The surveys are administered face-to-face and on the Internet. ANES data is used 
to estimate regression models that isolate the impact of attention to news media and 
political elites on evaluations of exceptional measures by controlling for demographic 
and contextual factors identified in previous research as significant drivers of support 
for those exceptional measures. These can include, for example, political ideology and 
partisanship (other control variables are discussed in the case study chapters).  
The dependent variables, listed in table 3.3, are uniform in all models for the military 
sector case study: respondents were asked to indicate their levels of support for torture 
as a counterterrorism policy. For the immigration case study, three different exceptional 
measures are explored across the two surveys.  
 
Table 3.3 Dependent Variable Selection for Microanalysis 
 
Terrorism Unauthorized Immigration 
   
Dependent Variable Support for torture (2012, 2016) Support for status checks (2012) 
Support for constitutional amendment (2016)  
Support for border fence (2016) 
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3.4 Conclusion  
In defense of methodological pluralism, Balzacq (2011a: 38) notes that “although one 
method could help grasp the main features of securitization... [others] could be 
mutually supportive in accounting for the nuances of the design and evolution of a 
security problem.” In this spirit, the components of the design proposed here – 
discourse analysis, content analysis and audience analysis – converge upon a holistic 
model of securitization. What distinguishes this pluralist framework from existing 
securitization research is that it is driven by two complementary components: (1) a 
longitudinal macroanalysis that characterizes each of and highlights relationships 
between media, political discourse and public opinion and (2) a cross-sectional 
microanalysis that tests findings from the macroanalysis in a statistically robust way. 
Each analysis overcomes limitations of others, and identifies, measures and explains 
different aspects of the securitization process. Nor are the disparate methods 
incompatible with each other. Discourse analysis, for example, provides the necessary 
“clues” to bound and guide the content analysis (Neuendorf, 2004: 35), which in turns 
offers a validity check on discourse analysis. Both contextualize and characterize 
securitizing actor rhetoric. Content analysis also standardizes discourse into 
quantitative features that can be used in conjunction with public opinion data to 
estimate relationships between (de)securitizing actors and their audiences. A similar 
symbiosis exists between the macroanalysis and microanalysis. The results of a content 
analysis illustrate frame competition and source differentiation, specifically linking 
different sources to different frames over time. Cross-sectional models can show 
whether individual attitudes mirror the frames used by their preferred sources of 
information while controlling for myriad other variables that influence opinion on the 
issues analyzed. This brings the generally under-analyzed audience into the 
securitization framework.  
Moreover, the research design described in this section provides an opportunity to 
blend the methods frequently used in framing literature with discourse analysis, the 
preferred approach for securitization scholarship. In doing so, it introduces a novel 
approach to both traditions by uncovering securitization dynamics at multiple levels 
over time. It also improves empirically upon extant research in securitization theory by 
studying two security issues in different sectors under a standardized research design, 
offering a chance to confidently determine where sector dynamics intersect and 
diverge.  
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The following chapters operationalize this methodology across two case studies: 
terrorism and immigration. To maximize theoretical and empirical gain, the terrorism 
case study focuses on the remedy proposal frame (specifically, the torture debate) while 
the immigration case study focuses on both the remedy proposal and the moral 
evaluation frame (evaluation of immigrants as criminals). For each case study, a 
discourse analysis first maps out juxtaposing identities and the competing 
(de)securitizing basic discourses that emerge (Chapters 4 and 6). Special attention is 
given to political texts at defining moments when the identities of (de)securitizing 
actors are most vulnerable (Donnelly, 2013). Next, media and political discourse are 
quantified (using frame signifiers identified in the discourse analysis) in a time-series 
representation to characterize frame competition and source differentiation between 
political elites and the press over a sixteen-year period (Chapters 5 and 7). The content 
analysis reveals whether press actors and political elites acted in concert or 
independently. This is compared to public opinion data during the same time period to 
characterize audience preferences and make preliminary assessments about 
(de)securitizing framing effects. Finally, individual-level cross-sectional models 
demonstrate whether preferences for exceptional measures mirror information 
consumption habits, while controlling for other attitude drivers.   
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Chapter 4: The Gloves Come Off: Political Elite 
Discursive Legitimization of Torture 
4.1 Introduction 
The “failure of imagination” (McCaul, 2016) on the part of security analysts to 
anticipate the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack (9/11) created in its aftermath an 
urgency for intelligence-gathering to predict and prevent future attacks. This had a 
profound effect on American security policy and public attitudes, most markedly on the 
use of torture against suspected terrorists. Early allegations of torture first appeared in 
the context of prisoner detention at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and at Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated black sites in Afghanistan, Poland, Romania, 
Thailand and elsewhere (ACLU, 2007; Honigsberg, 2009; McCoy, 2012; Pyle, 2009). 
But the debate was propelled into mainstream security discourse following the 2004 
revelation of “abuse” at the Abu Ghraib Iraqi prison facility. Photographic evidence 
confirmed rumors of US personnel subjecting detainees to various forms of physical 
and psychological torture, including intimidation by dogs and sexual humiliation 
(Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, 2004; McCoy, 2012; U.S. Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 2008). Further investigations would reveal that sleep 
deprivation, waterboarding (a technique that evokes a sensation of drowning), shoving, 
and threats to harm family members were all techniques used by the CIA to attempt to 
produce intelligence.  
While Americans initially rejected these abuses, growing tolerance eventually divided 
two competing sides: one that claimed torture was justified in some circumstances and 
another that categorically rejected it as antithetical to liberal values and international 
norms and laws, such as the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT). The UNCAT 
specifically defines torture as: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an 
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
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reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. (UN 
General Assembly, 1984) 
The Convention further states that “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether 
a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture” (UN General Assembly, 
1984). This prohibition against torture is further enshrined in the Eighth Amendment to 
the US Constitution, which bans the use of “cruel and unusual punishments”; the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states, “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (UN General 
Assembly, 1948); and in the Third Geneva Convention which states that “No physical 
or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war 
to secure from them information of any kind whatever” (ICRC, 1949).  
These obligations notwithstanding, a debate on the admissibility of torture has 
continued within the US. Drawing on the methodology laid out in Chapter 3, this 
chapter analyzes how two competing basic discourses emerged between 2001 and 
2016, and the opposing Selves they constructed in the terrorism security dialogue. 
These are uncovered through an analysis of speech acts contained in key speeches, 
official statements, interviews, and policy texts. Proponents of torture attempted to 
rebrand the techniques as interrogation; they emphasized the severity of the threat of 
terrorism and both potential as well as materialized successes of the “enhanced 
interrogation” program as an intelligence tool. By constructing a threatening terrorist 
Other, and rebranding and justifying torture through executive memos, legislation and 
media campaigns, this securitizing Self sought to legitimize torture. Opponents 
countered that, while the threat of terrorism was real, torture was to remain prohibited. 
Appealing to liberal values and international obligations on the treatment of prisoners, 
this desecuritizing Self moved away from security-centric language. The emergence of 
these opposing Selves was not inevitable; instead the Selves were constructed and 
invoked in response to each other and concurrent defining moments. This chapter 
charts their development, and the discursive links that bound and differentiated them. It 
uncovers both the basic discourses associated with each of the two competing selves – 
securitizing and desecuritizing – and key frames that constituted the basic discourses.   
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The debate is presented in chronological order, beginning with a specific securitization 
discourse ignited by 9/11. Key defining moments that occurred in four overlapping 
phases of denying, rebranding, justifying and silencing are presented. Following 9/11, 
allegations of torture at Guantanamo Bay and extraordinary rendition of prisoners to 
countries where torture was probable were denied as early as 2002 by the Bush 
administration (Pyle, 2009: 103; Rumsfeld, 2002b); Abu Ghraib was similarly blamed 
on “a few bad apples” and officials insisted that torture was not part of US security 
policy. The torture frame was invoked as part of a desecuritizing discourse that 
emphasized adherence to laws and norms. A strategy of rebranding the intelligence-
gathering process over the next few years produced a drumbeat of euphemisms like 
harsh interrogation or enhanced interrogation. This coincided with attempts to justify 
interrogation by linking it to counterterrorism and intelligence successes. While the 
securitizing basic discourse – which sought to justify and cultivate public support for 
interrogation – was predominant during the Bush administration’s final years, the 
Obama administration promoted the desecuritizing discourse early in its first term 
before ultimately retreating from the debate altogether. These two discourses are 
analyzed to identify frames and frame signifiers that can in turn be used to inform the 
content analysis in the following chapter.  
4.2 Political Discourse Analysis  
4.2.1 Discursive Innovation: A New Security Paradigm 
The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “global war on terror” sparked a new discourse in 
security policy that constructed a radical image of the terrorist Other (Davis et al., 
2013; Hynes, Lamb, Short, & Waites, 2016). This new manifestation “marked an 
historic juncture in America’s collective sense of security” (Schlesinger, Brown, 
Fowler, Horner, & Blackwell, 2004), ushering in a “new paradigm” that “require[d] 
new thinking in the law of war” (Bush, 2002). Vice President Dick Cheney (2002) 
argued that  
9/11 changed everything. It changed the way we think about threats to 
the United States. It changed our recognition of our vulnerabilities. It 
changed the terms of the kind of national security strategy we need to 
pursue.  
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This defining moment triggered an urgency to obtain information, as signaled in 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s remarks that “the most important thing, of 
course, is to try to find out as much intelligence as we can through the interrogations, 
and that is our principal focus.” (Rumsfeld, 2002c) President George W. Bush similarly 
called to do “whatever is necessary to protect America and Americans,” (2001h) 
emphasizing that:  
We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of 
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of 
war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. 
(2001a) 
This commitment was echoed by Vice President Dick Cheney, who announced in a 
televised Meet the Press interview:  
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've 
got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what 
needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any 
discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our 
intelligence agencies, if we're going to be successful. That's the world 
these folks operate in, and so it's going to be vital for us to use any means 
at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective. (Cheney, 2001) 
Cofer Black of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center underscored the exceptionalism of 
the new threat in his testimony to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, noting that 
“[a]fter 9/11 the gloves come off” (Black, 2002). In a 2002 memorandum for the 
President, then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales emphasized the novelty of the 
current security situation as well as the urgency for intelligence through interrogation: 
… the war against terrorism is a new kind of war. It is not the traditional 
clash between nations adhering to the laws of war that formed the 
backdrop for GPW [Geneva Convention III on the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War]. The nature of the new war places a high premium on 
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other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from 
captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities 
against American civilians, and the need to try terrorists for war crimes 
such as wantonly killing civilians. In my judgment, this new paradigm 
renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy 
prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions requiring that 
captured enemy be afforded such things as commissary privileges, scrip 
(i.e., advances of monthly pay), athletic uniforms, and scientific 
instruments. (Gonzales, 2002) 
These speech acts on the “new paradigm” and urgency to obtain intelligence using “any 
means at our disposal” had a performative effect: they set in motion the construction of 
new security identities and a new major security discourse. The discourse constructed 
the identity of the Other (terrorists) as a radical enemy, and in so doing, simultaneously 
juxtaposed two Self identities: a new securitizing posture that sought to work “the dark 
side”, do “whatever is necessary” to fight this “new war”, and free itself from the 
constraints of the Third Geneva Convention in the quest for intelligence gathering; and 
by implication, a hypothetical Self that would have resisted this posture.37 The repeated 
drumbeat-like messaging reinforced the threatening complexion of terrorism and the 
urgency for intelligence. But at this early stage, this securitizing basic discourse was 
largely uncontested: public insecurity following 9/11 created little appetite in its 
immediate aftermath for anything less than aggressive political leadership and 
reassurances that measures would be put in place to prevent a future terrorist attack. 
Thus the securitizing basic discourse was largely unchallenged and became the primary 
component of the overarching major security discourse; it comprised a problem 
definition frame centered on terrorism and a remedy proposal frame centered on 
 
37 Far from inevitable, the framing choices in these speech acts reveal subjective decisions made by the 
Bush administration. Donnelly (2013: 23) argues that “the acts of violence on September 11, 2001 did 
not speak for themselves.” But by labeling the attacks as “war” (Bush, 2001i, 2001l, 2001m, 2001n; 
Rumsfeld, 2001), the Bush administration constructed and reified a representation of the attacks that at 
once, necessitated an exceptional response befitting “war” conditions; closed off any possibility of not 
responding; and widened operational latitude (Donnelly, 2013: 22-23). The administration essentially 
both legitimized and necessitated its own course of action by choosing to invoke “war.” 
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information gathering, establishing a strong rhetorical link between intelligence and the 
securitizing basic discourse.  
4.2.2 Denying Torture 
4.2.2.1 Torture and the Emergence of a Differential Discourse 
Still, the Bush administration did not indicate publicly whether torture would be part of 
“every resource at our command” – in fact, officials denied it when it was first alleged 
in early 2002 media reports (e.g., Reid, 2002; Smyth, 2002). Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld rejected claims of torture, stressing that:  
…there are so many charges that it's hard to categorize them, but I've seen 
in headlines and articles words like “torture” and one thing and another, 
which is just utter nonsense. The policies of the United States government 
are humane, and the way the prisoners -- the detainees are being treated is 
humane. (2002b) 
Amnesty International (2002: 16) responded that it was “disturbed by allegations in 
March 2002 that the US authorities had transferred ‘dozens of people’ to countries 
where they may be subjected to interrogation tactics – including torture” and that “US 
intelligence agents remained closely involved in the interrogation”. It further added that 
an alleged leading member of al-Qa’ida, Abu Zubaydah, was arrested in 
Pakistan on 28 March 2002 and taken into US custody. Media reports 
suggested that he might be transferred to a third country where torture 
could be used during interrogation. The Secretary of Defence said that 
such reports were “irresponsible and wrong”. Nevertheless, pressed by a 
journalist as to whether he was excluding the possibility that Abu 
Zabaydah, “even if he’s under the control of the US”, could be 
interrogated in a country other than Afghanistan, Pakistan or the USA, he 
replied “I am not going to systematically rule out this, this, this and this”. 
Amnesty International is concerned at his unwillingness to issue a 
categorical denial. 
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A February 2004 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report similarly 
identified abuse in the Iraqi prison facility Abu Ghraib and stated that “persons 
deprived of their liberty under supervision of Military Intelligence were at high risk of 
being subjected to a variety of harsh treatments ranging from insults, threats and 
humiliations to both physical and psychological coercion, which in some cases was 
tantamount to torture, in order to force cooperation with their interrogators” (ICRC, 
2004).  
These criticisms and concerns surrounding the use of torture by Americans reflected 
the emergence of a desecuritizing basic discourse, the first fracture in the major 
securitization discourse constructed immediately after 9/11. Amnesty International and 
the ICRC voiced high-profile challenges to the post-9/11 securitizing basic discourse 
on intelligence-gathering, creating a confrontation between two differential Selves: a 
law-abiding identity concerned that torture was occurring against the earlier gloves-
come-off identity that urged using “any means at our disposal”. Bush administration 
personnel that had previously indicated international norms on the treatment of 
prisoners – such as the Third Geneva Convention – do not apply were now challenged 
by this new desecuritizing basic discourse that alleged human rights violations and 
torture. The juxtaposition placed those willing to work “the dark side” of the 
intelligence world against those wanting to observe rules and norms. Importantly, 
neither of the two basic discourses challenged the severity of the threat – they instead 
disagreed on the appropriateness of the response: while terrorism remained a threat, it 
was, according to the desecuritizing Self, not sufficiently threatening to adopt torture as 
an exceptional measure. This was thus desecuritizing to the extent that it was a move 
away from previous articulations to do whatever is necessary, and instead sought to 
impose restraint.38 Nor did actors previously aligned with the securitizing basic 
 
38 One interpretation of the emerging anti-torture discourse is that, rather than a desecuritizing discourse, 
it may have been a counter-securitizing narrative that sought to place American norms and values as the 
referent objects that were being threatened and had a legitimate claim to survival. In other words, the 
participation of the US government in torture was a threat to the American identity as a champion of 
liberal values. A key component of the securitization process requires that exceptional measures be 
imposed to counter a threat. In the case of the anti-torture discourse, no such exceptional measure was 
being advocated: instead, the push was toward a return to the status quo approach of not torturing. This 
was a call to return to procedures of detention that were consistent with established and accepted 
institutions, like the Geneva Convention.  
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discourse advocate using torture at this stage. When confronted with allegations, 
Rumsfeld and others rhetorically distanced their activities from “torture” and insisted 
that detainees were being treated humanely. The Bush administration appeared to 
briefly realign itself with the desecuritizing Self on the torture debate.  
While the intelligence frame had become strongly associated with the securitizing basic 
discourse through speech acts immediately after 9/11, these later episodes established a 
desecuritizing basic discourse comprised primarily of a torture frame, in which torture 
was rejected as antithetical to American laws and values. The Amnesty International 
and ICRC reports both expressed explicit concern for practices that were “tantamount 
to torture”. Further, both linked torture to interrogation and coercion, suggesting that 
the two activities were related, but different in scale and legitimacy. Still, while the 
torture frame had been introduced as part of the desecuritizing discourse, interrogation 
had not yet become fully associated with an oppositional securitizing discourse: 
officials were not defending interrogation as something that was different and 
oppositional to torture. This may have been part of a strategy by the Bush 
administration to distance itself from torture altogether: given the semantic proximity 
of both torture and interrogation, a concession of interrogation might activate links to 
torture for audiences, thus implicating the Bush administration. Strategically, it was 
best to simply reject torture – hence Rumsfeld’s attempt, as Defense Department chief, 
to insist detainees were being treated humanely and dismiss accusations of torture as 
“utter nonsense”. 
4.2.2.2 Abu Ghraib Revelations  
In April 2004, two months after the ICRC report failed to generate wide media 
attention, CBS television news released images of prisoners “stripped naked, sexually 
humiliated, blindfolded, and painfully shackled” (McCoy, 2012, Introduction) at the 
Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq. This accelerated Bush administration denials and 
defensive statements, who insisted that a few low-level personnel were responsible and 
that “abuse” at Abu Ghraib was not official policy. In public remarks to the press, Bush 
stated: 
Let me make very clear the position of my government and our country. 
We do not condone torture. I have never ordered torture. I will never order 
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torture. The values of this country are such that torture is not part of our 
soul or our being. (2004a)  
Vice President Cheney went further, claiming in an interview that prisoners were being 
treated “in accordance with the standards, for example, that we adhere for the Geneva 
Convention” (2004). He also acknowledged that while the need for intelligence 
remained, the methods applied in Abu Ghraib were extreme:  
But there’s a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it. And these forces 
in Iraq, people captured in Iraq, are subject to the Geneva Convention. 
And so, as I say, there are legitimate ways to handle that. And I don’t 
think in this case, you would want to call these methods legitimate. 
(Cheney, 2004) 
Still, Cheney’s position on the Geneva Convention was ambiguous. On the one hand, 
he claimed that, as unlawful combatants, “those people do not need to be treated under 
the Geneva Convention”39 (Cheney, 2004); but he later argued:  
So you've got a set of rule there that, in this particular case, given the 
United States' status as an occupying power, the Geneva Convention does 
apply to anybody captured in Iraq, and they're supposed to be treated 
accordingly. (Cheney, 2004, emphasis added) 
Despite the ambiguity, Cheney settled on impressing upon the public that the 
administration was so far from making torture part of its official policy that detainees 
were treated in accordance with Geneva Convention protocol. In a reversal from 
previous post-9/11 remarks to “spend time in the shadows of the intelligence world” 
 
39 This echoes similar points made by Rumsfeld (2002a) two years earlier who said of Guantanamo Bay 
detainees:  
 
They will be handled not as prisoners of wars, because they're not, but as unlawful 
combatants. The -- as I understand it, technically unlawful combatants do not have any 
rights under the Geneva Convention. We have indicated that we do plan to, for the most 
part, treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions, to 
the extent they are appropriate, and that is exactly what we have been doing.  
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(2001) and work “the dark side”, Cheney’s new rhetoric was de-escalatory and further 
aligned the Bush administration with the desecuritizing Self at this stage.  
Thus, Abu Ghraib was a defining moment that widened the rift between two Selves, but 
also further defined both. The photos themselves had a performative effect in that they 
reified a Self that defied rules and legal obligations, and was willing to take a “gloves-
come-off” approach by torturing suspected terrorists. The Bush administration initially 
sought to distance itself from this identity by villainizing those “bad apples” who were 
acting outside of “standard operating procedures”, insisting its own official policy on 
the treatment of detainees was humane and consistent with the Geneva Convention. 
This aligned the administration instead with a different Self that did not condone torture 
and sought to tackle terrorism the “right way” without compromising laws and values. 
While terrorism remained a security threat for both Selves, the difference was that one 
Self was willing to employ torture, while the other was not. The latter Self’s 
unwillingness to use certain exceptional measures positioned it in relative opposition to 
a more extreme, pro-torture securitizing Self – it was desecuritizing to the extent that it 
moved away from a particular exceptional measure and toward a rules-based system. 
The effect was not to unmake the threatening image of terrorism, but instead to scale 
back the exceptionality it warranted.  
It could be argued that, rather than desecuritization, the anti-torture response produced 
from the Abu Ghraib revelations constituted a counter-securitization (see Stritzel and 
Chang 2015), in which the Bush administration (and others) sought to protect the 
shattering identity of Americans as adherents to liberal values and norms. This 
representation, however, is inconsistent with the CS’ conception of securitization, 
because it lacks the central ingredient of proposing exceptional measures. Little was 
proposed to restore this identity beyond holding a set of individuals accountable – and 
accountability processes, in this case through court-martial, is certainly not an 
exceptional response – it instead falls within the standard operating procedures of 
penalizing military personnel.  
Instead, the anti-torture discourse was desecuritizing, because it emphasized the 
illegitimacy of operating in the exception, and both explicitly and by implication, called 
for a return to treating detainees “the right way” and in accordance with the established 
– and thus unexceptional – Geneva Convention. In Hansen’s (2012) characterization of 
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desecuritization, this would be a rearticulation of resolving an issue using less violent 
approaches.  
Abu Ghraib also reinforced the link between the term torture frame and the 
desecuritizing basic discourse. As Bush, Cheney and other administration officials 
responded to Abu Ghraib, they insisted that torture was not part of official policy and 
that it ran counter to American laws and values. Whenever torture was invoked – 
whether by administration officials, the ICRC or Amnesty International – it was part of 
a frame that rejected a particular exceptional measure in the fight against terrorism.  
Denial and alignment with the anti-torture basic discourse and desecuritizing Self 
limited damage to the Bush administration’s reputation when its legitimacy and 
overarching securitization of terrorism was particularly vulnerable. The initial public 
response and revulsion to the graphic photos of detainees at Abu Ghraib provided little 
political space for the administration to justify torture without drawing criticism. 
Rejecting torture instead shielded the administration from losing legitimacy and 
rendered a public impression of deference to laws. The damage contained and the 
national cognitive dissonance stayed, this denial, however, constrained future 
discourse. In its response to Abu Ghraib, the administration had ruled out torture as a 
weapon of intelligence on the grounds that it was anathema to legal and normative 
institutions. By reifying the rhetorical link between torture and these institutions, the 
Bush administration sealed off opportunities to condone torture in the future; doing so 
would destroy the particular impression of Self it had constructed and make itself 
vulnerable to criticisms that it had violated the normative and legal institutions it had so 
defiantly defended previously. Any public shifts in intelligence-gathering policy would 
have to be reconciled with this identity through a new rhetorical strategy.  
4.2.3 Rebranding and Justification 
4.2.3.1 The Detainee Treatment Act  
Bush’s second election victory in November 2004 precipitated a more audacious stance 
on intelligence-gathering and increasing realignment with the securitizing Self/basic 
discourse. Continued denials of torture were accompanied now by attempts to define 
conditions under which the administration had the authority to apply it if it wanted to, 
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while euphemisms were adopted and repeated to rebrand and justify intelligence-
gathering as constituting interrogation instead of torture.    
In October 2005 the administration tried to stop a legislative effort (led by Senator John 
McCain, a wartime victim and vocal opponent of torture) to ban torture against 
detainees. Appealing directly to Senate Republicans, Vice President Cheney insisted 
that even though torture is not part of official policy, “the administration needed an 
exemption from any legislation banning ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ treatment in 
case the president decided one [sic] was necessary to prevent a terrorist attack.” (Espo 
& Sidoti, 2005) Despite his efforts, the legislation passed as the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005, but President Bush appended the following signing statement40 to it:  
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, 
relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as 
Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on 
the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of 
the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the 
American people from further terrorist attacks. (Bush, 2005) 
The Act itself, apart from banning “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” also 
protected any personnel that had previously engaged in torture:  
In any civil action or criminal prosecution against an officer, employee, 
member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States 
Government who is a United States person, arising out of the officer, 
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent’s engaging in 
specific operational practices, that involve detention and interrogation of 
aliens who the President or his designees have determined are believed to 
be engaged in or associated with international terrorist activity that poses a 
serious, continuing threat to the United States, its interests, or its allies, 
and that were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time 
 
40 Kelley (2007: 738) defines a signing statement as “the presidential commentary on a bill after it is 
signed into law.” 
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that they were conducted, it shall be a defense that such officer, employee, 
member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know that the 
practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding 
would not know the practices were unlawful. ("Detainee Treatment Act," 
2005) 
Bush’s caveat to the Act signaled that “he might not always act in compliance with it” 
(Goldsmith, 2007: 210) and that he reserved the right to overrule its constraints on 
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” treatment. It deviated from the 
administration’s post-Abu Ghraib alignment with the desecuritizing basic discourse that 
rejected torture as inconsistent with American values; now the administration was 
signaling that there may be situations in which such actions were justifiable contingent 
on the president’s judgment. While not an outright shift to support for torture, the 
signing statement was a move that began to slowly and steadily realign the Bush 
administration with the securitizing Self it had distanced itself from immediately after 
Abu Ghraib. It was similar in spirit to the early post-9/11 securitizing basic discourse 
on doing “whatever is necessary” to gather intelligence – in this case, even “cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment” if sanctioned by the president.  
The further indemnification in the Act of personnel who had engaged in “specific 
operational practices” that were “lawful at the time they were conducted” also moved 
away from the previous disposition that abuse at Abu Ghraib was isolated to a few “bad 
apples”. The need to protect personnel – even after perpetrators at Abu Ghraib had been 
exposed – implied that illegal conduct had not only occurred but may have been more 
widespread. While no concession was made that the abuses were “officially 
authorized”, the Act at least ensured that those carrying out the abuses would receive 
official protection. The pivot from villainizing “bad apples” to protecting any “officer, 
employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States 
Government” signaled another shift in official discourse away from the desecuritizing 
basic discourse in the post-Abu Ghraib uproar.  
The Detainee Treatment Act marked a rhetorical turning point as well: the only two 
appearances of the term torture within the entire Act were both references to the title of 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture. It otherwise avoided torture, 
preferring instead cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and the more euphemistic 
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specific operational practices. This rhetorical juggling enabled President Bush to 
append his signing statement giving him authority to overrule the Act without explicitly 
linking the administration to torture. It instead associated the administration with cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, a link it perhaps found more politically palatable. 
This strategy to rebrand intelligence-gathering away from torture and toward different 
labels was necessary, because the administration had so vigorously championed anti-
torture norms following Abu Ghraib. It had constrained its ability to justify torture; any 
legitimization of intelligence-gathering that resembled torture would have to be 
relabeled. The language in the Detainee Treatment Act provided the administration 
rhetorical cover and commenced a pattern of adopting substitute labels or euphemisms 
to ultimately replace torture and silence the anti-torture narrative.  
4.2.3.1 Enhanced Interrogation: Securitization by Euphemism 
The rebranding of intelligence-gathering was further advanced by the emergence of a 
new frame that invoked the label interrogation and underscored CIA successes. 
President Bush’s 2006 remarks on the interrogation of senior terrorist leader Abu 
Zubaydah were emblematic of this strategy: 
We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent 
lives, but he stopped talking. As his questioning proceeded, it became 
clear that he had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so 
the CIA used an alternative set of procedures. (Bush, 2006c) 
In the same address, President Bush linked the alternative set of procedures to 
actionable intelligence on “the design of planned attacks on buildings inside the United 
States and how operatives were directed to carry them out”; “Al Qaida's efforts to 
obtain biological weapons”; “a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi using 
car bombs and motorcycle bombs”; “a plot to hijack passenger planes and fly them into 
Heathrow or the Canary Wharf in London”; finding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, “the 
mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks”; and other “information that has saved innocent 
lives by helping us stop new attacks” (Bush, 2006c). He further added: 
We're getting vital information necessary to do our jobs, and that's to 
protect the American people and our allies. Information from the terrorists 
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in this program has helped us to identify individuals that Al Qaida deemed 
suitable for Western operations, many of whom we had never heard about 
before. They include terrorists who were set to case targets inside the 
United States, including financial buildings in major cities on the east 
coast. Information from terrorists in CIA custody has played a role in the 
capture or questioning of nearly every senior Al Qaida member or 
associate detained by the U.S. and its allies since this program began. By 
providing everything from initial leads to photo identifications to precise 
locations of where terrorists were hiding, this program has helped us to 
take potential mass murderers off the streets before they were able to kill. 
(Bush, 2006c) 
Just over a month later, President Bush stressed again the successes of the intelligence 
program during his signing of the Military Commissions Act of 2006:  
This bill will allow the Central Intelligence Agency to continue its 
program for questioning key terrorist leaders and operatives like Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, the man believed to be the mastermind of the 
September the 11th, 2001 attacks on our country. This program has been 
one of the most successful intelligence efforts in American history. It has 
helped prevent attacks on our country.… Were it not for this program, our 
intelligence community believes that Al Qaida and its allies would have 
succeeded in launching another attack against the American homeland. By 
allowing our intelligence professionals to continue this vital program, this 
bill will save American lives. (Bush, 2006b)  
Bush’s list of intelligence successes bolstered the securitizing Self and basic discourse, 
because it linked the CIA interrogation program to foiled terrorist plots and American 
lives saved. Again, Bush avoided the label torture and instead promoted labels like 
interrogation and alternate set of procedures. These combined efforts steadily primed 
the public and set the stage for further executive efforts to systematize torture under the 
label of interrogation. On July 20, 2007, for example, Bush issued Executive Order 
13440, allowing the CIA to resume its previously suspended interrogation program 
(DeYoung, 2007), drawing criticism that “as long as the intent of the abuse is to gather 
intelligence or to prevent future attacks, and the abuse is not ‘done for the purpose of 
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humiliating or degrading the individual’ -- even if that is an inevitable consequence -- 
the president has given the CIA carte blanche to engage in ‘willful and outrageous acts 
of personal abuse.’” (Kelley & Turner, 2007) Notably, the executive order failed to 
“ban waterboarding, forced feeding, extremes of hot and cold, deafening noise, sensory 
deprivation, or long-term isolation” (Pyle, 2009: 169); it also excluded sleep among 
“basic necessities of life” accorded to detainees (Pyle, 2009: 168; Shrader, 2007). 
While the executive order was itself public, media reports indicated that it was 
accompanied by a classified document that detailed exactly which “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” were available to CIA operatives (Shane, Johnston, & Risen, 
2007; Shrader, 2007). This became the subject of a July 22, 2007, taping of NBC’s 
Meet the Press, in which interviewer Tim Russert questioned then Director of National 
Intelligence, Admiral Mike McConnell, about the methods authorized, prompting the 
latter to repeatedly insist that “enhanced interrogation” did not constitute torture:  
MR. RUSSERT:  Let me ask you about the executive order the president 
issued about enhanced interrogation measures.  What does that allow a 
CIA-held target—what kind of measures can they use to get information 
from them? 
Admiral McCONNELL:  Well, Tim, as you know, I can’t discuss specific 
measures.  […] So I won’t be too specific. Let, let me, let me go back to a 
higher calling in this context.  The United States does not engage in 
torture.  President’s been very clear about that. This executive order spells 
it out.  There are means and methods to conduct interrogation that will 
result in information that we need.   
[…] 
MR. RUSSERT:  But by the use of the term “enhanced interrogation 
measures,” there clearly are things that are used to elicit information.  
Have we eliminated waterboarding?  Can you confirm that? 
Admiral McCONNELL:  I would rather not be specific on eliminating 
exactly what the techniques are with regard to any specific.  When I was 
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in a situation where I had to sign off, as a member of the process, my 
name to this executive order, I sat down with those who had been trained 
to do it, the doctors who monitor it, understanding that no one is subjected 
to torture. They’re, they’re treated in a way that they have adequate diet, 
not exposed to heat or cold.  They’re not abused in any way.  But I did 
understand, when exposed to the techniques, how they work and why they 
work, all under medical supervision.  And one of the things that’s very 
important, I think, for the American public to know, in the history of this 
program, it’s been fewer than 100 people.  And so this, this is a program 
where we capture someone known to be a terrorist, we need information 
that they possess, and it has saved countless lives.  Because, because they 
believe these techniques might involve torture and they don’t understand 
them, they tend to speak to us, talk to us in very—a very candid way. 
MR. RUSSERT:  Does this new executive order allow measures that if 
were used against a U.S. citizen who was apprehended by the enemy 
would be troubling to the American people? 
Admiral McCONNELL:  I can report to you that it’s not torture. 
[…] 
MR. RUSSERT:  And we would find it acceptable if a U.S. citizen 
experienced the same kind of enhanced interrogation measures? 
Admiral McCONNELL:  Tim, it’s not torture.  I would not want a U.S. 
citizen to go through the process, but it is not torture, and there would be 
no permanent damage to that citizen. (Meet the Press, 2007) 
The ambiguity surrounding torture and enhanced interrogation continued as 
administration officials evaded press prodding. CIA director General Michael V. 
Hayden declined to comment when asked in a media interview if “enhanced 
interrogation” was “close to torture” (Shane, 2007). White House Press Secretary Dana 
Perino (2007) similarly skirted the issue of defining “enhanced techniques”, offering 
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instead that “the most important source of information we have on where the terrorists 
are hiding and what they are planning is the terrorists themselves, and that's why you 
have to interrogate them.” Two weeks later, President Bush was similarly evasive 
during a news conference:  
Q. What's your definition of the word "torture"? 
THE PRESIDENT: Of what? 
Q. The word "torture." What's your definition? 
THE PRESIDENT: That's defined in U.S. law, and we don't torture. 
Q. Can you give me your version of it, sir? 
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Whatever the law says. (Bush, 2007a) 
The reluctance to clarify torture and enhanced interrogation suggested that the 
differences were largely rhetorical. The response following Abu Ghraib made the label 
torture too politically toxic for the administration to use, but rebranding the CIA 
program as interrogation sheltered the administration from the criticism of having 
reversed its previous anti-torture position. Still, Bush’s 2007 executive order was 
perceived by military and legal professionals as an authorization of torture dressed up 
as “interrogation” – and press interactions exposed an administration struggling to 
differentiate torture from interrogation beyond the claims that torture was indefensible, 
while interrogation was acceptable and even successful. This further reinforced the 
juxtaposition between the torture frame and the interrogation frame, with the former 
having already been established as part of the desecuritizing basic discourse, and the 
latter increasingly associated with the securitizing basic discourse because it promoted 
exceptional measures. The Bush administration had realigned from a desecuritizing 
Self soon after Abu Ghraib – in which officials moved away from supporting 
exceptional measures linked to intelligence-gathering – back to its post-9/11 
securitizing Self – in which the administration sought to protect its interrogation 
program while also touting its successes in preventing terrorist attacks.  
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4.2.4 Silencing the Desecuritizing Basic Discourse 
The end of the Bush administration was characterized by a louder securitizing basic 
discourse and an increasingly muted desecuritizing basic discourse that continued into 
the successor Obama administration. President Bush either vetoed or threatened by 
Statements of Administration Policy41 (SAP) to veto legislation that would have curbed 
CIA interrogation powers. Vice President Cheney used public engagements to promote 
the securitizing basic discourse, effectively drowning out the desecuritization basic 
discourse. Finally, President Obama, though initially vocal in his resolve against 
torture, grew silent on the issue, both in rhetoric and judicial action. His 
administration’s failure to prosecute Bush era officials reflected a general desire on his 
part to discontinue the torture debate. 
4.2.4.1 Securitization by the Power of the Pen 
A series of Congressional legislations that sought to scale back CIA interrogation 
powers throughout the years of Bush’s presidency were derailed by executive veto 
power. In November 2007, the House of Representatives passed and submitted for 
Senate approval H.R. 4156, the Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment 
Appropriations Act (2008a). The White House responded with an SAP, declaring that it 
would veto the bill, emphasizing, among other criticisms, the bill’s limitations on 
interrogation:  
The Administration strongly opposes section 102 of H.R. 4156, which 
would require the CIA to use only those interrogation techniques 
authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Interrogations. 
This bill would jeopardize the safety of the American people by 
undermining the CIA's enhanced interrogation program, which has helped 
the United States capture senior al Qaeda leaders and disrupt multiple 
attacks against the homeland, thus saving American lives. Section 102 has 
 
41 Rice (2010: 692) defines Statements of Administrative Policy as documents 
produced by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), [that] outline the 
official administration position on legislation under consideration in Congress. 
Comments on the bill under consideration are solicited from relevant executive 
departments, and the OMB coordinates these (and presumably censors those inconsistent 
with the president’s views) into a single document containing the administration’s views 
on the bill.   
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no place in an emergency wartime appropriations bill that should be 
focused on ensuring that the men and women of our Armed Forces have 
the funding they need to complete their mission. (Bush, 2007c) 
Unlike previous statements from the administration, this speech act made no references 
to nor proffered any rejections of torture – it emphasized instead solely the value of the 
enhanced interrogation program. The absence of the desecuritizing torture frame 
suggested that the administration was no longer interested in rejecting torture, and was 
primarily concerned with promoting its CIA program through the interrogation frame. 
The SAP also strengthened the link between the interrogation frame and the 
securitizing basic discourse by again emphasizing that “interrogation techniques” 
would ensure the “safety of the American people”; it also argued that any attempt to 
curb these options had “no place in an emergency wartime appropriations bill”. The 
very fact that Congress was trying to bar these techniques – given that they were 
beyond what was authorized in the U.S. Army Field Manual – shows that these 
methods were exceptional. The bill stalled in the Senate and was not enacted.  
In December 2007, the administration issued another SAP, threatening to again veto 
H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 on the same 
grounds that the prohibition of certain interrogation techniques would “prevent the 
United States from conducting lawful interrogations of senior al Qaeda terrorists to 
obtain intelligence needed to protect” (Bush, 2007b). Specifically, the bill would have 
prohibited the CIA from using certain methods, such as waterboarding (Myers, 2008). 
Like the November SAP, this new one did not reject torture nor did President Bush’s 
February 2008 defense of his plan to veto the bill in a BBC interview (Bush, 2008a), 
further silencing the desecuritization narrative while amplifying the securitization 
narrative.42  The bill passed Congress, but was vetoed by President Bush in March 
 
42 Nor did the official statement of veto issued by the press secretary, which read:  
The President believes that he has no higher responsibility than protecting the American 
people. The President also believes in making sure the Intelligence Community has the 
tools necessary to protect America from attack. By requiring the Intelligence Community 
to use only the interrogation methods authorized in the publicly available Army Field 
Manual, the bill would have eliminated the legal alternative procedures in place in the 
CIA program to question the world's most dangerous and violent terrorists. The CIA 
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2008, who defended his decision saying, “Because the danger remains, we need to 
ensure our intelligence officials have all the tools they need to stop the terrorists.” 
(2008b)  
Similar threats of veto occurred throughout 2008. On May 15, 2008, Bush threatened 
by SAP to veto H.R. 2642, the Supplemental Appropriations Bill (2008b), because the 
bill again stipulated adherence to the U.S. Army Field Manual. The clause was 
removed from the final version of the bill. A week later, the president issued an SAP 
(Bush, 2008d) threatening to veto H.R. 5658, the Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (2008), which contained a “Requirement for 
videotaping or otherwise electronically recording strategic intelligence interrogations”. 
Once the bill had passed the House, Bush issued another SAP (Bush, 2008f) on 
September 9, 2008, threatening to veto the Senate version in objection of both its 
“Prohibition on interrogation of detainees by contractor personnel” as well as the 
original videotaping concern. This prompted the Senate to remove both requirements.  
A final SAP (Bush, 2008e) issued on July 16, 2008, threatened to veto H.R. 5959, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, with objection to its “Prohibition 
on the use of private contractors for interrogations” of CIA prisoners.  
While interrogation was defended in all four SAPs, the torture frame was entirely 
absent, demonstrating a complete abandonment of the previously used desecuritizing 
basic discourse. Previous statements that extolled the success of interrogation were at 
least balanced by assertions that torture was against American values; the SAPs, 
instead, were one-sided. These moves had the effect of drowning out the anti-torture 
narrative through the repetition and promotion of the securitizing frame.  
4.2.4.2 Cheney’s Media Offensive  
In interviews and remarks through throughout the last year of the Bush administration’s 
term, Vice President Cheney continued to repeat the securitizing frame while silencing 
the desecuritizing frame. In ten of seventeen interviews (Cheney, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, 
2008f, 2008g, 2008h, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d), he did not invoke the torture 
frame, but did invoke the interrogation frame; in all interviews where he was willing to 
 
program has produced critical intelligence and helped us prevent a number of attacks. 
(Bush, 2008c) 
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denounce torture, he defended interrogation. Again, this was a marked shift from the 
early post-Abu Ghraib period during which the administration either balanced both 
frames, or invoked the desecuritizing frame on its own. Cheney’s pattern mimicked 
Bush’s: threats were emphasized, CIA successes were highlighted and interrogation 
was linked to both. In a January 2008 interview on the Rush Limbaugh Show, for 
example, Cheney noted:  
But the fact of the matter is, the threat is still there, it still exists. I look at 
it every day in our intelligence brief. We need to perpetuate and protect 
our capabilities here, as well as in terms of our ability to interrogate 
prisoners. (2008c) 
In an interview with the Washington Times, Cheney suggested that “it would have been 
unethical or immoral for us not to do everything we could in order to protect the nation 
against future attacks” (Cheney, 2008b). In a December 2008, interview on Fox News, 
he argued that  
There has not been a single attack against the homeland, against the 
United States, in seven-and-a-half years. There have been attacks in 
Madrid, Spain; in London, England; in Mumbai and Bali and Mombosa -- 
all over the globe. And the threat is still out there and still very real. But 
the actions that we took, based on the President's decisions and based on 
some outstanding work by the intelligence community and by the military, 
has produced a safe seven-and-a-half years, and I think the record speaks 
for itself. (Cheney, 2008a) 
Cheney’s interviews not only amplified the securitizing interrogation frame, but they 
did so for a particular audience. Because the Washington Times, Fox News and the 
Rush Limbaugh Show have a primarily conservative and Republican bent – and thus 
were more willing to provide Cheney airtime – the securitizing Self that Cheney 
embodied became closely linked to the broader Republican/conservative identity.43 
 
43 This is discussed in greater depth in the following chapter on media content and audience attitudes.  
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4.2.4.3 Silencing under Obama 
On the other end of the political spectrum, Barack Obama spoke out against torture 
throughout his campaign and early presidency. He largely avoided the term enhanced 
interrogation, using it for the first time publicly well into his presidency during an 
April 15, 2009, interview in which he said, “some of the practices of enhanced 
interrogation techniques, I think, ran counter to American values and American 
traditions.” (Obama, 2009c) As candidate and president-elect, he widely invoked the 
desecuritizing torture frame, arguing that torture was antithetical to America’s “moral 
leadership” (Obama, 2008f), “moral standing” (Obama, 2008c), and “moral stature” 
(Obama, 2008a). He invoked this frame in eight texts for the year prior to his 
inauguration (Obama, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, 2008f, 2009b, 2009d) and 
avoided the securitizing interrogation frame altogether. Like Bush during the Abu 
Ghraib revelations, Obama was resolute that  
Our government does not torture. …That includes, by the way, renditions. 
We don't farm out torture. We don't subcontract torture. (2008b) 
Two days after taking the oath of office in January 2009, President Obama issued 
Executive Order 13491 to rescind the previous administration’s program, and firmly 
declare that 
Effective immediately, an individual in the custody or under the effective 
control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States 
Government, or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled 
by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict, 
shall not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any 
treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in 
Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (Manual). (Obama, 2009a) 
Obama’s Attorney General Eric Holder appointed a special prosecutor, John Durham, 
in August 2009 to “determine whether a full criminal investigation of the conduct of 
agency employees or contractors was warranted”. This prompted Dick Cheney to once 
again take to the airwaves and defend the CIA program in a Fox News interview:  
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But the interesting thing about these is it shows that Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah provided the overwhelming majority of 
reports on Al Qaida, that they were, as it says, pivotal in the war against 
Al Qaida, that both of them were uncooperative at first, that the 
application of enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically 
waterboarding, especially in the case of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, is 
what really persuaded him he needed to cooperate. 
I think the evidence is overwhelming that the EITs were crucial in getting 
them to cooperate and that the information they provided did, in fact, save 
thousands of lives and let us defeat all further attacks against the United 
States. (2009e)  
Over the next few years, several judicial decisions would clear Bush administration 
officials and CIA personnel of wrongdoing. In February 2010, the Justice Department 
issued a report clearing Jay Bybee and John Yoo – both responsible for authoring and 
signing off on the infamous torture memos44 – of “professional misconduct” (Lichtblau 
 
44 This collection of memos, authored in 2002 and 2003 by Deputy Assistant General John Yoo in the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and signed by his supervisor, Assistant Attorney 
General Jay Bybee, provided legal cover to interrogators. The limelight on Abu Ghraib and increased 
attention to torture precipitated the leak of these documents, the first one disclosed in June 2004. This 
memo (dated August 1, 2002) expanded the legal threshold for and narrowed the definition of torture. It 
limited culpability to intent to torture, stating that a “defendant is guilty of torture only if he acts with the 
express purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering on a person within his custody or physical control” 
(Bybee, 2009: 45). It further defined torture as “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.” (Bybee, 2009: 41) 
A second memo issued the same day cleared personnel for torturing Abu Zubaydah.  
 
When the first memo leaked to the press in June 2004, then head of the OLC Jack Goldsmith revoked 
both torture memos and resigned (Cole, 2009: 17; Honigsberg, 2009: 27). His revocation was not 
publicized until December 2004, when Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin publicly issued a 
revised memorandum to replace the original two. While the memo acknowledged that “Torture is 
abhorrent both to American law and values and to international norms” (Levin, 2009: 128), it detracted 
from the spirit of the original withdrawal and instead clarified the meanings of “severe”, “severe physical 
pain or suffering”, “severe mental pain or suffering”, and “specifically intended” in order to legitimize 
the boundaries of what was permissible. A footnote affirmed “that the CIA’s previous actions were not 
illegal, thereby assuring the interrogators that their previous, and even present, conduct would continue 
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& Shane, 2010; McCoy, 2012, Chapter 7). In November that same year, the Justice 
Department’s investigation of the destruction of CIA interrogation videotapes ended 
with no criminal charges (Mazzetti & Savage, 2010). On June 28, 2011, special 
prosecutor John Durham also cleared interrogators of wrongdoing, but recommended 
another investigation into the deaths of two CIA prisoners (Lichtblau & Schmitt, 2011). 
That investigation too ended without prosecutions, “eliminating the last possibility that 
any criminal charges will be brought as a result of the brutal interrogations carried out 
by the C.I.A.” (Shane, 2012).  
Though these judicial decisions did not explicitly advance the securitizing basic 
discourse, they damaged the efficacy and legitimacy of the desecuritizing narrative. 
Impunity signaled that, contrary to the desecuritizing basic discourse, either torture had 
not been committed or that it was not punishable. In either case, impunity challenged 
the coherence of the desecuritization narrative and sheltered the securitization narrative 
from fracturing. Cheney’s aggressive speech acts on Fox News and other conservative 
outlets defending “enhanced interrogation techniques” and its successes “in the war 
against Al Qaida” thus were left unchallenged by any equivalent drumbeat of 
desecuritizing discourse.  
The May 2, 2011, killing of Osama bin Laden further fueled the securitizing basic 
discourse. Yoo (2011) and Cheney insisted that intelligence gleaned from the 
waterboarding of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed led to the eventual killing of bin Laden, 
with the latter claiming on Fox News, “I would assume that the enhanced interrogation 
program that we put in place produced some of the results that led to bin Laden's 
ultimate capture” (Herridge, 2011). The 2012 release of the film Zero Dark Thirty – 
which chronicled the events leading to bin Laden’s assassination – also endorsed the 
securitizing basic discourse that the CIA interrogation program produced intelligence 
that helped find bin Laden. This narrative became so salient that it prompted, in a rare 
demonstration of bipartisan agreement, Senators Dianne Feinstein, Carl Levin and John 
McCain to issue a public letter to correct the film’s inaccuracies:  
 
to be protected” (Honigsberg, 2009: 27). The memo also contained a classified appendix that “expressly 
authorized the CIA to continue a number of coercive techniques, including waterboarding” (Pyle, 2009: 
112). 
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Regardless of what message the filmmakers intended to convey, the movie 
clearly implies that the CIA’s coercive interrogation techniques were 
effective in eliciting important information related to a courier for Usama 
Bin Laden. We have reviewed CIA records and know that this is incorrect. 
(Feinstein, Levin, & John, 2012) 
Nonetheless, the film put the torture debate on the 2012 presidential campaign agenda, 
with Republican candidates adamantly promoting the securitizing frame. McCoy 
(2012) identifies key moments in the debate on torture, by then  
fully normalized – no longer a crime that shocked the conscience and 
violated international law, but a routine policy option whose adoption or 
rejection was a matter of personal preference. At the Republican foreign 
policy debate in South Carolina, the leading candidates advocated 
waterboarding in a matter-of-fact manner, stripped of artifice or 
euphemism or allusion. Asked “whether waterboarding constitutes torture 
or is an enhanced technique,” candidate Herman Cain said it was not 
torture and promised to revive the practice if elected. Similarly, 
Representative Michele Bachmann (Republican, Minnesota) called 
waterboarding “very effective” and condemned President Obama for 
“allowing the A.C.L.U. to run the C.I.A.” Straining to best his opponents 
in pleasing the Republican Party’s right wing, front-runner Mitt Romney 
insisted that anyone bearing arms for Al Qaeda “is fair game for the 
United States of America.” … Romney later confirmed his view that 
waterboarding was not torture and promised to use “enhanced 
interrogation techniques … against terrorists.” (McCoy, 2012, Chapter 7) 
The ambiguity surrounding what constituted torture further damaged the desecuritizing 
narrative, making it incoherent and vague. In comparison, the securitizing narrative was 
much clearer and more cohesive, making it easy not only for Republican political elites 
to align their identities to it, but also to promote in settings like the debates. In contrast, 
while President Obama stressed his early 2009 ban on torture during the 2012 (and 
2016) campaign season, he remained otherwise disengaged from the debate. This 
reluctance persisted through 2014, when the Obama administration attempted to delay 
the declassification of the Senate Intelligence Committee Report on torture which 
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concluded that enhanced interrogation techniques did indeed constitute torture. On its 
release, President Obama reiterated his preference to move on from the debate, saying 
“Rather than another reason to refight old arguments, I hope that today's report can help 
us leave these techniques where they belong: in the past” (Obama, 2014f). This move 
eliminated yet one more major opportunity – and perhaps the last one – to legitimize 
the desecuritization basic discourse, relegating it to the sidelines as Obama’s tenure 
ended.  
4.3 Conclusion 
The 9/11 attacks led to the formation of a new security discourse centered on the threat 
of terrorism and ultimately the torture debate. Early statements by Bush administration 
officials sought to reassure an anxious electorate that intelligence-gathering efforts 
would be commensurate with the new threat. Speech acts emphasized a new kind of 
war that would require working in the “shadows of the intelligence world”, establishing 
a rhetorical link between intelligence-gathering and the developing securitizing 
discourse. This discourse was largely uncontested until Abu Ghraib shocked American 
citizens, and compelled the executive branch to assert and reinstate moral leadership by 
denouncing the “abuse”. The narrative of intelligence at all costs was for the first time 
challenged: a key frame that emerged in this desecuritizing basic discourse was that 
torture was inconsistent with American laws and values, and that while terrorism was 
still a threat, it was not sufficiently threatening to walk back norms.  
As the memory of Abu Ghraib receded, and following the Bush administration’s 
election to a second term, anti-torture desecuritizing rhetoric was increasingly replaced 
by a rebranding of the CIA’s coercive intelligence-gathering program as enhanced 
interrogation. The program was repeatedly celebrated by President Bush and other 
executive branch officials as successful, and congressional attempts to scale it back and 
make it consistent with the U.S. Army Field Manual were met with rhetorical and 
formal resistance. Through veto, the White House repeatedly protected the 
interrogation program when it was vulnerable. These acts and Obama’s general 
disengagement from the torture debate allowed the securitizing basic discourse to go 
largely uncontested in the final years of Obama’s tenure as the ambiguity and 
incoherence surrounding the desecuritizing counter discourse facilitated its loss of 
credibility. 
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Hermann (2008: 156) observes that “…what is not said may be as important as what is 
said, particularly if a theme emphasized over a length of time all of a sudden 
disappears.” If this is the case, what effect did Obama’s silencing of the desecuritizing 
discourse have on public opinion? McCoy (2012, Introduction) suggests that  
The release of the photos from Abu Ghraib produced a shock to the 
American psyche, creating a short-lived potential to reverse the processes 
of impunity that had been decades in the making. But the American self-
image soon recovered, and the public pressure for reform faded. Already 
accustomed to their leaders’ argument that torture, or “enhanced 
interrogation,” was necessary for national security, Americans, by now 
inured to abuse through its glamorized media representations, tried to 
move on as if nothing had happened. 
The following chapter, however, exposes a more drastic outcome: rather than moving 
on “as if nothing had happened”, the American public seems to have grown 
increasingly tolerant of torture – far more than they were before Abu Ghraib. Political 
discourse can partially explain this behavior; a fuller investigation of the 
(de)securitizing frames requires turning to the news media and audience themselves.     
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Chapter 5: The Exceptional Becomes Acceptable: 
Media’s Influence on Public Tolerance of Torture 
5.1 Introduction 
While the discourse analysis in the previous chapter revealed two of the competing 
discourses in the overarching securitizing of terrorism, this chapter endeavors to 
resolve how press and state actors promoted frames associated with each basic 
discourse, and how audiences responded. Previous research has documented a steady 
increase in American support for torturing suspected terrorists (Gronke et al., 2010; 
Mayer & Armor, 2012; Zegart, 2012). Paradoxically, the rise in support coincided with 
the transition from a Republican White House administration that promoted torture to a 
Democratic administration under President Barack Obama that was associated with 
anti-torture legislation and rhetoric. By the end of Obama’s second term in 2016, 
Americans held the third most favorable views on torturing enemy combatants (behind 
only Nigeria and Israel), with the percentage of Americans who opposed torture 
declining from 65% in 1999 – the last time the ICRC poll was conducted – to just 30% 
in 2016 (ICRC, 2016). The disconnect between public opinion and political cues offers 
unique conditions for testing security framing effects: contrary to both securitization 
theory and Entman’s cascading hierarchy, audiences appear to be rejecting political 
elite cues. Even as president, Obama’s early anti-torture stance was unable to stem the 
tide of growing support for torture. This paradox suggests that the traditional reading of 
securitization theory – in which political elites drive public preferences for 
extraordinary responses to threats – merits reconsideration.  
To that end, this chapter operationalizes the debate on competing press-state models 
and introduces media actors as potential (de)securitizing actors. The discourse analysis 
from the preceding chapter already provides some evidence that the news media – 
particularly conservative and Republican leaning outlets – gave airtime to former Bush 
administration officials to promote their preferred securitization interrogation frame. 
This chapter builds further evidence in three steps to identify which actors, if any, 
produce framing effects on public attitudes. First, the results of a holistic content 
analysis of news sources and political texts are presented to demonstrate frame 
competition and source differentiation as described in Chapter 3. Next, frame 
prevalence is related to public attitudes through a comprehensive analysis of aggregate-
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level longitudinal public opinion data. Expanding significantly on previous research 
(e.g., Gronke et al., 2010) – both in depth and breadth – public assessments of terrorism 
as a threat and willingness to mobilize against the threat using torture are presented. 
Attitudes are mapped to press coverage and political content to reveal preliminary 
alignments between public opinion and trends in framing. The final analytical section 
of this chapter cements these tentative findings on framing effects by explicitly 
modeling attitudes toward torture and attention to news sources, while controlling for 
other drivers of torture support. From a variety of perspectives, the analyses show that 
attitudes on torture – at the aggregate and individual levels – reflect the news frames 
individuals are most exposed to, increasing confidence that the press can act as an 
independent (de)securitizing actor.  
5.2 Content Analysis 
5.2.1 Frames and Features Selection 
Table 5.1 lists the two competing basic discourses and their constituent frame signifiers 
that were invoked strategically by political elite actors in the context of intelligence-
gathering to combat terrorism. The securitizing basic discourse emphasized the need to 
collect information using any means necessary. It was expressed by the executive 
branch through an interrogation frame that justified, protected and promoted the 
successes of its CIA program. Whether described as “harsh interrogation” or “enhanced 
interrogation techniques”, the interrogation frame was employed to legitimize 
exceptional measures in the name of security. The Bush administration also 
downplayed the exceptionalism of torture in an attempt to legitimize it (Rowling et al., 
2011). A desecuritizing discourse, conversely, sought to delegitimize the CIA program 
through the torture frame. Adherents of this desecuritizing discourse used the torture 
frame to argue that the program constituted torture and ran counter to both American 
and international norms, laws and values. It was employed to scale back the 
exceptionalism of the threat: while terrorism remained a threat, it was not sufficient to 
overstep these institutions. These two issue frames formed different schematic 
interpretations; like Chong and Druckman’s (2007) study on reactions to a white 
supremacist rally, the two frames on intelligence-gathering here became associated 
with different signifiers – torture with human rights and liberal values considerations, 
and interrogation with security and protection against the threat of terrorism.   
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Table 5.1 Content Analysis Frame Signifiers 
 Remedy Proposal/Issue Frame  
Securitizing discourse Interrogation 
Desecuritizing discourse Torture 
 
These signifiers, torture and interrogation, are thus used to drive the content analysis. 
While the discourse analysis demonstrated that each signifier was associated with a 
particular broader frame – and thus activated different schematic interpretations by the 
audience – previous research has also demonstrated differential effects. Rios and 
Mischkowski (2018), for example, demonstrate through a series of five framing 
experiments that using the signifier torture produced more negative evaluations than 
interrogation. Similarly, Blauwkamp, Rowling and Pettit’s (2018) experimental study 
demonstrates that framing in poll questions influences torture preferences – but they do 
not link attitudes to political and media frames. The approach here empirically tests 
whether similar framing effects emerge in natural settings where political elites and the 
press supply the information marketplace with competing discourses.  
Existing research on framing by press and political elite actors has also explored 
competing frames by using signifiers. Bennett et al. (2006) distinguish between abuse 
and torture to demonstrate that the indexing model best reflected the relationship 
between news media and political elites. In their eight-month content analysis from 
2004, they find that the press largely adopted the Bush administration’s preferred abuse 
frame over the less popular torture frame. Rowling et al. (2011) expand on this study 
and examine network and print news actors as well as congressional and executive texts 
over a longer period (2004-2006), to conclude – contra Bennett et al. (2006) – in favor 
of the cascading activation model. In short, they find that while congressional 
Democrats employed the torture frame and challenged the Bush administration’s 
preferred frames, the media neglected these cues. Jones and Sheets (2009) similarly 
find that the abuse frame dominated the torture frame in American print media outlets 
from 2004 to 2005.  
133 
 
While these studies are individually informative to understanding the competitive 
framing of torture, their confinement to the few years surrounding Abu Ghraib predates 
shifts in public opinion toward support for torture, and overlooks long-term trends in 
discourse, like the shift toward the interrogation frame and contextual political changes 
like the transition to the Obama administration. Further, the previous studies have 
restricted content analysis to certain network and print media actors – cable news has 
been largely ignored. This is a glaring omission given that cable news commands the 
widest audience in the American media landscape. Finally, extant literature has yet to 
link frames in natural settings (as opposed to experimental settings) – whether from the 
press or political elites – to attitudes on torture. The remainder of this chapter addresses 
these gaps.  
One newspaper – the New York Times – and three television networks – CNN, Fox 
News and MSNBC – are analyzed, collectively representing a spectrum of ideology and 
mediums. The broad corpus of texts was downloaded from the Nexis Academic 
database for each of the four news sources using the following search query:  
terrori! OR gwot OR "war on terror" OR "overseas contingency 
operation"45 
Political elite content was retrieved using similar search queries from the American 
Presidency Project and the Congressional Record. The keywords in the search query 
accommodate the different ways to represent the terrorism threat frame, aimed at 
casting a wide net and capturing all relevant articles. For all sources, the data was subset 
to content published between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2016 – as discussed in 
Chapter 3, this timeframe was chosen to encompass the entire Bush and nearly entire 
Obama administrations. The discourse analysis in the previous chapter revealed that 
both administrations took different positions in the torture debate, ensuring that this 
selected timeframe will capture rich variability in official framing. Guided by Entman’s 
cascade activation model and framing theory’s expectation that downstream actors are 
 
45 Items in quotes are searched as a phrase; exclamation marks indicate wildcard searches, where terrori! 
matches “terrorism”, “terrorist” and “terrorists”.  The term “gwot” is shorthand for “global war on 
terror[ism]”. 
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bounded in their range of discourse by cues from political elites, this variability is 
assumed to extend to the press. 
Table 5.2 lists the total number of texts collected and analyzed for each source, which 
together total 254,250 – this includes news articles for the New York Times; transcripts 
of individual shows for each of the television networks; texts from the Congressional 
Record; and speeches, press briefings, remarks, debate transcripts, addresses, and a 
variety of other texts attributed to the president and vice president. Unsurprisingly, news 
coverage largely exceeds political discourse in number of texts – as noted previously, 
news coverage is more voluminous while political discourse is more symbolic. Notably, 
however, the number of MSNBC segments that mentioned terrorism is only slightly 
more than the number of executive branch texts for the same period and less than the 
number of congressional texts. This may be attributed to MSNBC’s domestic 
orientation: a study led by the Pew Research Center found that CNN’s coverage of 
foreign stories (30% in 2007; 23% in 2012) led both Fox News (21% in 2007; 15% in 
2012) and MSNBC (25% in 2007; 7% in 2012)46 – findings that are fully consistent 
with the data in table 5.2 (Jurkowitz et al., 2013).  
Table 5.2 Number of texts by source 
Source Number of texts 
CNN 79,145 
Fox News 31,172 
MSNBC 10,580 
New York Times 101,782 
Presidential Elites 7,031 
Congressional Elites 24,558 
Total 254,250 
 
 
 
46 While the Pew study (Jurkowitz et al., 2013) does not specify which topics were included in “political” 
or “foreign” stories, the attribution of terrorism to foreign agents – e.g., al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden – 
and the protection against threats from abroad suggests that coverage of terrorism would be contained in 
“foreign” news.  
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5.2.3 Frame Competition  
5.2.3.1 Aggregate Analysis 
Given the wide consensus in literature that framing effects are primarily contingent on 
the frequency of exposure to a particular frame (e.g., Domke et al., 1999; Entman, 
2004; Oren & Solomon, 2015; Price & Tewksbury, 1996), frame competition is 
operationalized here by comparing the prevalence of the securitizing and desecuritizing 
frames within each source. A Python script was used to iterate over all texts, counting 
the occurrences of specific keywords and patterns that were linked to each of the two 
frames (see Appendix A for details on frame features and extraction methods). Table 
5.3 shows the frequency of occurrences of the securitizing (interrogation) and 
desecuritizing (torture) frames, and for additional context, the threat (terrorism) frame. 
Despite the Times having a higher aggregate volume of texts in the complete corpus 
(table 5.2), CNN had the highest frame count across all three frames – this is primarily 
because television news segments are longer than print news articles47 and thus contain 
potentially more frame instances. The relative primacy of CNN across all three frames 
in terms of total counts thus reflects not only its relatively large word count, but also its 
stronger foreign-policy calibration among the different cable news actors. The length 
and political commentary format of television shows also allows for a more diverse set 
of topics which explains the low frame rates (measured as frame occurrence per-ten-
thousand words). Newspaper articles, conversely, are focused on specific topics within 
each article, yielding a higher frame rate. For the Times then, when a frame was 
present, it was more likely to be the focus of the entire article.   
 
47 The average word count for each source was: 5,302 for CNN; 2,911 for Fox News; 8,256 for MSNBC; 
852 for the Times; 2,226 for presidential elites; and 8,397 for congressional elites.   
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Table 5.3 Terrorism and Issue Frame Aggregate Prevalence by Source 
 Terrorism Interrogation Torture  
CNN     
Total 315,838 15,803 17,466  
Rate 7.526 0.377 0.416  
Fox News     
Total 113,350 6,632 5,473  
Rate 12.491 0.731 0.603  
MSNBC     
Total 61,112 4,485 9,069  
Rate 6.997 0.513 1.038  
New York Times     
Total 158,527 10,612 11,571  
Rate 18.291 1.224 1.335  
Presidential Elites     
Total 34,863 452 714  
Rate 22.334 0.290 0.457  
Congressional Elites     
Total 198,741 6,536 9,436  
Rate 9.638 0.317 0.458  
All Sources     
Total 901,209 44,945 54,577  
Rate 9.774 0.487 0.592  
  
   
Note: Total values indicate the number of instances of each frame. Rate is calculated as the presence of 
the frame per ten-thousand words.  
 
 
Turning to the two opposing issue frames, the ratios of securitizing frames to 
desecuritizing frames in figure 5.1 suggest that, with the exception of Fox News, actors 
were likelier to employ the desecuritizing torture frame. Fox News alone was more 
likely to employ the securitizing interrogation frame – this is unsurprising given that it 
consistently provided airtime to Bush administration officials. Its conservative and 
Republican orientation drove it toward the preferred party frame and actors. 
Interestingly, figure 5.2 shows that Fox News leaned slightly toward the desecuritizing 
frame throughout the Bush administration; its aggressive securitizing strategy occurred 
largely in the Obama administration – in the absence of Republican political cues – 
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where it led with the securitizing frame by a factor of 1.7 to one. While this rebellion 
against Obama’s preferred anti-torture stance presents strong evidence of at least one 
press agent acting independently of the executive branch, it does tentatively suggest an 
alignment between Fox News and Congress, whose coverage also became increasingly 
securitizing during the Obama administration according to figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.1 Aggregate Ratio of Securitizing Frame to Desecuritizing Frame 
(2001-2016) 
 
Note: Ratio is calculated by dividing the number of securitizing frames by the number of desecuritizing 
frames. The dashed line represents the cutoff for equal coverage of both securitizing and desecuritizing 
frames.  
 
Figure 5.2 Ratio of Securitizing Frame to Desecuritizing Frame by 
Presidential Administration (2001-2016) 
 
Note: Ratio is calculated by dividing the number of securitizing frames by the number of desecuritizing 
frames. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, MSNBC covered the securitizing frame least among 
press actors in volume, and least among all actors relative to the desecuritizing frame. 
At the aggregate level, it covered the torture frame over twice as much as the 
interrogation frame. This performance was consistent across both administrations, and 
unlike Fox News, MSNBC’s coverage shifted in the opposite direction toward more 
desecuritizing coverage from the Bush years to the Obama years. The Times also 
moved toward increased desecuritizing coverage, but at a steeper rate than MSNBC, 
indicating a more drastic shift in tone between the two administrations. While the 
Times’ ratio of coverage is similar to CNN’s at the aggregate level, figure 5.2 show a 
critical difference: CNN’s coverage did not change very much, and remained fairly 
balanced through both presidents. In this regard, it shared with MSNBC a resistance to 
shift its tone between different political contexts, also indicating some separation from 
official influence on coverage between both administrations.  
The wide disparity between Fox News and MSNBC suggests that these two sources are 
likely to have strong framing effects on their audiences in opposite directions. Framing 
theory suggests that Fox News audiences, more exposed to the securitizing frame, are 
more likely to support torture as an exceptional measure, whereas MSNBC viewers, 
predominantly exposed to the desecuritizing frame, are likelier to reject torture. This 
expectation is strengthened by the increased coverage both actors gave to their 
preferred frame over time: figure 5.3 shows specifically that Fox News covered the 
securitizing frame 19% higher in the Obama years than in the Bush years, while 
MSNBC covered the desecuritizing frame 14% higher in the same timeframe. This is 
striking given that both decreased their coverage of the terrorism frame by 44% (Fox 
News) and 60% (MSNBC). Despite declining coverage among all other actors of all 
three frames, Fox News and MSNBC alone increased coverage of their preferred 
frames. Like MSNBC, the Times’ shift towards the desecuritizing frame suggests a 
likely alignment between its readers and opposition to torture during the Obama 
administration. On the other hand, CNN appears less likely to produce framing effects 
given its ambivalent coverage of both frames (see Druckman, 2004). 
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Figure 5.3 Percent Change in Frame Volume Between Bush and Obama 
Administrations 
 
Note: For each frame and actor, percent change is calculated by subtracting the number of invocations 
during the Bush administration from the number of invocations during the Obama administration and 
dividing by the number of invocations during the Bush administration. 
 
While at the aggregate level, both congressional actors and White House leaders were 
more likely to employ the desecuritizing frame, the differences between administrations 
show surprising results. Both congressional elites and presidential elites increased their 
coverage of the securitizing frame relative to the desecuritizing frame. The latter 
finding is especially interesting, because it suggests that the Obama administration was 
more likely to use the securitizing frame than the Bush administration, even though 
both showed an overall preference for the desecuritizing frame. This largely reflects the 
impact of Abu Ghraib, which necessitated a strong and loud anti-torture stance from the 
Bush White House (as discussed in chapter 4). During this phase, the Bush 
administration invoked the desecuritizing frame much more aggressively than either 
administration did in later phases. Moreover, Obama’s general disengagement from the 
debate – and thus fewer invocations of either frame evidenced in figure 5.3 – makes the 
ratio more sensitive to small changes. Congress, similarly, shifted from a heavy focus 
on the torture frame in the early post-Abu Ghraib period toward mostly securitizing 
coverage in the Obama years. But like presidential elites, Congress also invoked both 
frames much less, making its ratio of securitizing to desecuritizing more sensitive to 
small differences between the two. The drastic drop in coverage for both sets of 
political elites is illustrated in figure 5.3 – both Congress and presidential elites showed 
the highest drop in coverage of all three frames across all actors, suggesting that the 
press largely kept terrorism part of public discourse.  
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5.2.3.2 Quarterly Time-Series Analyses 
Disaggregating the data into quarterly time-series illustrates further nuances in frame 
invocations over time. Figure 5.4 shows the volume of securitizing and desecuritizing 
frames, measured in occurrences per ten-thousand words. It shows how much of overall 
terrorism discourse was made up of the torture and interrogation frames for each actor. 
Higher scores indicate periods of increased salience of either frame in terrorism 
discourse. Figure 5.5 illustrates the competition between the two frames: specifically, it 
plots the proportion of securitizing frames that occur in the sum of both securitizing 
and desecuritizing frames. In each panel of figure 5.5, the solid horizontal line at y=0.5 
marks the point at which the volume of securitizing and desecuritizing would be equal: 
the space above the line indicates a louder securitizing frame, while the space below 
indicates a louder desecuritizing frame. The vertical dashed line in the middle of each 
panel in both figures 5.4 and 5.5 marks the point at which the Obama administration 
came into office.  
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Figure 5.4 Frame Coverage as Word per Ten-Thousand for News Media and 
Political Elites 
 
Note: Each panel plots the rate of the interrogation and torture frames per ten-thousand words for each 
source. The vertical dashed line in 2009 marks the beginning of the Obama administration. 
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Figure 5.5 Quarterly Interrogation-Torture Proportion (2001-2016) 
 
Note: Each panel plots the proportion of securitizing frames that occur in the sum of both securitizing 
and desecuritizing frames for each source. The area above the horizontal line at y = 0.5 indicates a louder 
securitizing frame. The vertical dashed line in 2009 marks the beginning of the Obama administration. 
Gaps in the presidential discourse plot indicate periods of no coverage of either frame.  
 
The results are congruent with aggregate findings, but also provide critical insight into 
frame competition and salience in different political contexts. Beginning with press 
actors, figure 5.4 suggests that CNN was largely balanced at the aggregate level, but 
figure 5.5 suggests that its coverage was cyclical – while it led with the interrogation 
frame during the Bush administration’s first term, it mostly invoked the desecuritizing 
in the second and similarly oscillated throughout the Obama administration. Compared 
to other press actors, its coverage of both frames was less salient in overall terrorism 
discourse (measured in frame coverage per ten-thousand words). Both its ambiguous 
coverage and low salience of either frame suggests it likely had little if any effect on 
public attitudes toward torture. The Times, on the other hand, largely invoked the 
desecuritizing frame beginning in 2010 after a tenure of mixed coverage during the 
Bush administration. It shared with MSNBC a preference for the desecuritizing frame 
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during Obama’s administration, though MSNBC overwhelmingly reflected this pattern 
across almost all quarters, as evidenced by figure 5.5. During Obama’s presidency, 
only Fox News maintained a strong securitizing frame (relative to the desecuritizing 
frame). Figure 5.4 shows periods of high interrogation invocations by Fox News in 
multiple quarters during the Obama presidency – notably, many of these peaks are not 
echoed by other media actors. Again, Fox News was the only actor that invoked the 
securitizing interrogation frame more during Obama’s presidency than during Bush’s, 
while MSNBC was the only actor that increased its number of invocations of the 
desecuritizing torture frame from Bush to Obama. 
The time-series data also show that presidential elite content is mostly consistent with 
the discussion in the discourse analysis: the desecuritizing frame was adopted in the 
aftermath of Abu Ghraib (2004) during which the Bush administration insisted that 
torture was not parts of its official policy; rebranding and justification followed with a 
brief preference for the securitizing frame; and finally, an overall silencing of the 
debate occurred throughout Obama’s presidency, as indicated by several gaps in figure 
5.5. Still figure 5.5 provides evidence that Obama engaged the interrogation frame at a 
higher rate than expected – spikes in 2009 and 2014 correspond to Obama’s executive 
order (which banned torture) and the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
Report on the CIA’s program. In several quarters, Congress also gave more attention to 
the securitizing frame than the desecuritizing frame. Again, these peaks of securitizing 
coverage by congressional and presidential elites reflect an increased sensitivity given 
the reduced usage of both the securitizing and desecuritizing frames between the Bush 
and Obama presidencies.  
These results reaffirm previous findings of the media acting independently of political 
elites.  MSNBC and the Times both moved toward increased relative attention to the 
desecuritizing frame from one presidential administration to the next, while political 
elites – both Congress and the executive branch – moved in the other direction. The 
shift was more drastic for the Times. Perhaps motivated by the lack of political 
leadership and cues from the executive leadership, the Times more aggressively 
promoted the preferred liberal and Democrat torture frame, a reflection of the paper’s 
own leaning. While MSNBC’s coverage was relatively more stable, it was the only 
actor that invoked the desecuritizing frame more frequently moving from one 
administration to the next. Fox News did the same for the interrogation frame. As the 
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debate became less salient (in both political and media discourse), MSNBC and Fox 
News amplified the torture and interrogation frames respectively, signaling further 
evidence of independence from political elites. Even though Fox News and Congress 
aligned in their relative coverage of the two frames from one administration to the next, 
for Congress this was largely a reflection of lower coverage of both frames and thus 
increased sensitivity to differences. The Times, Fox News and MSNBC, then, appear to 
give increased attention to those frames that most reflected their political orientation as 
political elites gradually disengaged from the debate.  
Providing additional context and boosting confidence in these readings, figure 5.6 
shows that the prevalence of the threat frame (the total number of invocations of the 
terrorism frame) was largely similar across actors: it declined through 2012 for all 
actors before rising again briefly. The rise in later years is most prominent for cable 
news actors, indicating some similarity between them and a diversion from the Times 
and political elites. Still, together the sources showed higher consistency in the threat 
frame than in the (de)securitizing threat response frames, suggesting that the threat 
frame is adequately controlled for in interpreting differences between coverage of the 
torture and interrogation frames across actors. In other words, the differences across 
actors in securitizing and desecuritizing frame prevalence are not the effect of 
differential threat frame coverage. Trends in MSNBC’s coverage of the threat frame 
nearly mirror Fox News’ coverage, but MSNBC gives much less attention to the 
securitizing frame relative to the desecuritizing frame. CNN’s threat coverage is also 
similar, but its remedy proposal coverage differs significantly from its competitors. The 
synonymous attention by each actor to the threat frame suggests that differences in 
attention to the torture and interrogation frame by the actors are independent of 
terrorism coverage.  
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Figure 5.6 Quarterly Threat Frame Prevalence (2001-2016) 
 
Note: Each panel plots the number of invocations of the terrorism frame for each source. The vertical 
dashed line in 2009 marks the beginning of the Obama administration. 
 
5.2.4 Summary of Content Analysis 
From a variety of perspectives, then, the press appears to act independently of political 
elites. Fox News stands out especially: it was the only actor to have a greater volume of 
securitizing frames than desecuritizing frames at the aggregate level; it was the only 
media actor to increase its coverage of the securitizing frame in raw numbers moving 
from the Bush administration to the Obama administration; it had the highest ratio 
differential between the two administrations; and it continued to promote the 
securitizing interrogation frame, when the threat frame (for all actors) was near its 
sixteen-year low.  Attention to Fox News appears a likely predictor for pro-torture 
attitudes. MSNBC and the Times are the only two actors that invoke the desecuritizing 
frame at a higher rate than the securitizing frame between the two administrations – 
while the change is steeper for the Times, MSNBC has the lowest securitizing to 
desecuritizing ratio at all times. Both are likely candidates for producing a 
desecuritizing effect on the public. CNN’s coverage is ambiguous: its coverage is nearly 
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balanced at the aggregate level through both administrations and neither the torture nor 
interrogation frames are highly salient: this suggests weak (if any) effect of CNN 
viewership on torture attitudes. 
The differences between the actors not only suggests autonomy, but also provides 
strong evidence against a monolithic media that parrots the official frame. If any single 
media actor was popularizing the official frame, those moving in competing directions 
are necessarily not. What remains to be resolved is whether these differences in media 
coverage influenced public attitudes toward the threat of terrorism and the exceptional 
measures proposed to fight it – or in other words, whether the media had a 
(de)securitizing effect. The following two sections introduce the audience into the 
analysis by (1) evaluating relationships between changes in aggregate public attitudes 
and frame prevalence over time and (2) estimating the relationship between attention to 
specific sources and individual attitudes. 
5.3 Longitudinal Aggregate-Level Public Opinion Analysis 
This section uses public opinion data to measure two securitization constructs over the 
sixteen-year period: audience identification of the threat and audience preferences for 
mobilization. Identification of the threat is measured using polls that ask the 
respondents to indicate the most important problem (henceforth MIP) and their level of 
concern about a terrorist attack. Support for mobilization is measured as level of 
support for torture against terrorists. This data is used to tentatively relate audience 
attitudes and trends in framing across the sixteen-year period.  
5.3.1 Data 
Poll data was acquired from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research using broad 
search queries to get a comprehensive list of question-response pairs.48 Table 5.4 
summarizes the data size for each group. All polls underwent similar preparation for 
analysis, including converting responses to a binary structure where relevant and 
discarding uninformative and neutral responses (e.g., “Don’t know” or “No answer”). 
 
48 The following search query was used to return all terrorism related poll questions and responses: 
terrori! OR gwot OR "war on terror" OR "overseas contingency 
operation". A second query was used to obtain polls related to torture and interrogation: tortur 
OR interrogat 
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Polls frequently presented response options using a likert scale or other ordinal 
structure. For example, the following question and response options were frequently 
used in polls conducted by the Pew Research Center measuring attack concern: 
How worried are you that there will soon be another terrorist attack in the 
United States?...Very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, not at 
all worried 
To standardize different question-response pairs and make them compatible with each 
other, these responses were recoded from a 4-point scale (very worried, somewhat 
worried, not too worried, not at all worried) to binary responses (worried, not worried). 
The percentages for the upper half of options (very worried and somewhat worried) 
were summed to create a worried measure, while the bottom half (not too worried, not 
at all worried) were summed to produce a not worried measure.49 Similar recoding was 
applied to all poll questions that had more than two response options. Noncommittal 
and neutral responses (e.g., “Don’t know”, “No opinion”, or “Refused”) were 
removed.50  
Table 5.4 Public Opinion Data Summary 
 Number of  
poll questions 
Average  
sample size 
Identification   
MIP 311 1117.69 
Attack Concern 86  1786.52 
Mobilization   
Torture Support 114 1126.26 
 
 
 
49 This method for collapsing responses makes different data more uniform; it also follows Gronke et 
al.’s (2010) analysis of disparate public opinion data on torture (who attribute this method to Pew People 
and Press director Andrew Kohut). 
50 When an odd number of substantive response options were provided, the middle value was also 
removed to ensure a balanced binary structure.  
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5.3.2 Stage of Identification: Audience Assessment of Threat  
The MIP class of polls asked respondents to indicate what they perceived to be the 
most important problem. With subtle variations in wording across polls, the question 
was generally framed as51:  
What do you think is the most important problem facing this country 
today?  
Figure 5.7A shows the percentage of individuals that selected terrorism as the most 
important problem (dots) as well as a loess smoothed curve of this data (dashed line) 
over sixteen years. Terrorism as the MIP peaks soon after September 11, 2001, and 
then begins to decline, particularly in the years surrounding the 2008 financial crisis. It 
remains low until 2014, where it begins to increase in response to worldwide terror 
attacks, but still remains below its 2001 peak. Public perception of terrorism as the 
most important problem trends closely with cable news coverage and, to a lesser extent, 
political elite invocations of the threat frame (figure 5.6). As with the prevalence of the 
threat frame, there was a general decline in the attribution of most important problem to 
terrorism before an uptick beginning in 2012 for cable news. While this does not reveal 
anything about the differential framing effects of different press/political actors on 
audience attitudes, it suggests an alignment between the public and cable news. 
Political elite invocations of the threat frame, on the other hand, show a weaker 
alignment with public threat perceptions in the later years of analysis.   
  
 
51 Previous research has found that “most responses to ‘the most important problem’ (MIP) question are 
generally not affected by wording changes” (Soroka, 2002: 271; see also Smith, 1985). 
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Figure 5.7 Public Opinion on Terrorism and Torture, 2001-2016 Quarterly 
 
Note: Scatter points represent individual poll results and dashed lines represent loess smoothed curves. 
Shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.  
 
To increase confidence in these assessments, an additional measure of threat 
identification was analyzed. With subtle variations in wording, this second set of polls 
typically asked respondents:  
How worried are you that there will soon be another terrorist attack in 
the United States?...Very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, 
not at all worried 
Figure 5.7B shows the percent of respondents who indicated some level of anxiety 
(e.g., very worried or somewhat worried). Concern over the possibility of a terrorist 
attack in the US follows a U-shaped pattern similar to the identification of terrorism as 
the MIP. While responses largely varied over time, the smoothed line suggests that 
anxiety about an attack was high soon after 9/11, but declined in the mid-2000s, before 
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again reversing course and rising through the early 2010s. The responses suggest that 
the audience was more anxious about terrorism than news coverage and MIP polls 
reflected. As with the MIP polls, there are notable dips in public anxiety near the 
economic crisis of 2008 – this is expected as attention and anxiety largely shifted 
toward the economy. However, concern about an imminent attack bounced back soon 
afterward and stayed relatively high.52  
Both sets of threat identification polls show a strong alignment with cable news, but 
less alignment with the Times and political elites. Again, CNN, Fox News and MSNBC 
showed similar U-shaped patterns in their coverage of the threat frame (figure 5.6), 
with high coverage soon after 9/11, and a general decline until 2012 before bouncing 
back. Public perceptions of the threat of terrorism then appear to be strongly related to 
cable news media coverage, and less so with political elites. This relationship may 
reflect two underlying mechanisms at work: first, cable news, as a televisual medium, 
is naturally more prone to sensationalist content. The ability to show dramatic visuals 
of terrorist attacks and their aftermath offers cable news actors an opportunity to attract 
a wider audience. Second, as discussed in Chapter 2, emotive rhetoric and fear-
inducing coverage can produce strong framing effects (Gadarian, 2010), as evidenced 
by both sets of polls discussed here. The heightened use of such rhetoric and emotive 
visuals in cable news (and the lack of it in the comparably dispassionate and measured 
Times or political discourse) suggests a logical relationship between public threat 
perceptions and cable media coverage.  
5.3.3 Stage of Mobilization: Audience Assessment of Exceptional Measures 
Against the backdrop of shifting threat perceptions, audience acceptance/rejection of 
exceptional measures was assessed using polls that asked respondents to indicate 
whether they thought torture was justified or unjustified when used against suspected 
terrorists. The typical question read:  
 
52 The divergence from the MIP may be due to the latter’s measurement of what individuals consider to 
be the most important problem. With the memory of 9/11 fading and a lack of other large-scale terrorist 
attacks, relative concern for terrorism declined. The 2008 economic collapse further replaced terrorism 
with the economy as the primary concern. However, terrorism remained a salient concern, if not the most 
important one, as evidenced by figure 5.7B.  
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Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to 
gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, 
rarely be justified, or never be justified?   
Again, for uniformity and following the precedent set by Gronke et al.’s (2010) seminal 
discussion on American torture attitudes, polls were recoded and collapsed into two 
possible outcomes: support torture and oppose torture. In the example question above, 
those that selected often justified and sometimes justified were collapsed into a single 
support torture variable, and the original rarely justified and never justified responses 
were combined into a single oppose torture measure.  
Figure 5.7C plots the percentage of individuals that indicated support for torture (dots) 
as well as a loess smoothed curve of this data (dashed line) over sixteen years. Support 
for torture generally increased over time. Given the myriad ways to frame poll 
questions on torture and the potential for this to bias responses (Blauwkamp et al., 
2018), eleven polls conducted by the Pew Research Center (in which the same question 
was asked every time) are presented in isolation in figure 5.7D. The Pew data matches 
the upward trend seen in the composite data, and notably shows a slim majority 
preference for torture from late 2009 through 2015. Even when threat perception and 
the prevalence of the threat frame was low, support for torture increased, indicating 
during certain periods an unusual rise in support for exceptional measures against a 
diminishing sense of threat.  
Looking at specific periods, pre-Abu Ghraib support for torture was low, as expected. 
Torture and interrogation was only minimally part of public discourse at that time, and 
had not yet become a salient feature of the terrorism securitization. Nonetheless, early 
allegations by Amnesty International and the ICRC of torture at Guantanamo Bay and 
extraordinary rendition of prisoners to countries with lax torture policies in 2002 
pushed torture onto the public opinion agenda, making it a salient enough issue to poll 
on. During this period and throughout much of the early post-Abu Ghraib period, 
average support for torture remained low. This likely reflects both the public revulsion 
toward the Abu Ghraib images as well as a heightened identification with American 
liberal democratic values as a counterreaction to torture allegations. Support begins to 
rise 2006 onward, eventually surpassing an average of 50% during the Obama 
administration’s time in office.  
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Relationships between polls and media/political frames should be read with caution, 
given the diversity of polling methods, and framing effects in poll questions 
(Blauwkamp et al., 2018). Still spikes and periods of high variance in public support for 
torture coincide with or lag closely behind increased coverage of both frames by all 
four press actors, suggesting a strong relationship between attitudes and media frames. 
For example, both Fox News and MSNBC covered the securitizing frame at its highest 
annual rate in 2005, 2009 and 2011.53 In all three of these years, torture support 
exceeded 50% – in fact 2009 and 2011 had the highest levels of support for torture, at 
66% and 66.5% respectively. The year 2009 also marked the highest annual coverage 
rate of the securitizing frame for all press actors and presidential elites. Still, low 
coverage of both frames in 2015 did little to dislodge public support – which reached 
59% – suggesting that previous coverage of securitizing frames had created enough 
momentum to sustain support for torture.  
In general, the upward trend in support for exceptional measures suggests a strong 
relationship between aggregate public opinion and Fox News coverage of the 
securitizing frame, providing some confirmatory evidence of framing effects predictors 
discussed in Chapter 2. Both aggregate as well as time-series data suggest that Fox 
News preferred the securitizing frame, adhering to the “sine qua non” of successful 
framing: repetition and magnitude. Even though MSNBC provided a sharp 
counterargument in both magnitude and valence – with a score of 1724 desecuritizing 
frames against Fox News’ 664 securitizing frames in both news sources’ most active 
period, the second quarter of 2009 – public support for exceptional measures continued 
to rise. While this lends some support to the negativity bias that previous research on 
frame valence has found (frames that emphasize threats and danger are more likely to 
be effective), it contradicts the claim that frame magnitude influences frame 
effectiveness. The MSNBC desecuritizing frame was more than double Fox News’ 
securitizing frame, but seems to have had little overall impact on public support for 
torture. A likely explanation for this is variation in audience sizes: a 2014 Pew study 
found that Fox News had maintained the largest prime-time audience since 2002, with 
1.7 million viewers in 2013 – “a bigger audience than CNN, MSNBC, and HLN 
[Headline News] combined” (Holcomb, 2014). Figure 5.8 demonstrates the extent of 
Fox News’ leadership over its competitors. While MSNBC may have covered the 
 
53 See Appendix C for annual rates.  
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desecuritizing frame over twice as much as Fox News covered the securitizing frame, 
Fox News reached almost three times the audience of MSNBC. Both framing theorists 
(e.g., Edwards, 1990; Entman, 1989, 2004; Page et al., 1987) and Copenhagen School 
scholars alike argue that popularity and source credibility – or “the social conditions 
regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor” (Buzan et al., 1998: 33) – 
are important factors in frame effectiveness. Based on these criteria then, Fox News 
was able to reach a more critical mass in the framing competition.   
Figure 5.8 Cable News Prime-Time Viewership 
 
Note: Each of the three sets of points represents the audience size for different cable news actors. Data 
was only available for the years 2004 through 2013. Source: Pew Research Center (Holcomb, 2014).  
 
Other factors also explain the effectiveness of Fox News. Even though the magnitude 
of the Fox News securitizing frame was relatively low compared to, for example, CNN 
and MSNBC prior to 2009, it eventually became the “loudest” and most consistent 
voice. From late 2009 to late 2014, Fox News provided the most salient discussion of 
either frame relative to past coverage, emphasizing the securitizing frame. CNN 
covered the securitizing and desecuritizing frames at volumes comparable to Fox 
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News, but its position was ambiguous. In the absence of salient desecuritizing 
competition to offset Fox News’ securitizing frame, support for torture thrived. 
Because framing effects are weakened when competing frames are discussed 
simultaneously (Druckman, 2004; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004), CNN was unable to 
offset the imbalanced Fox News coverage. Fox News’ emphasis on the securitizing 
frame (when the desecuritizing frame was less salient) also benefitted from cultural 
congruence. Support for torture was already increasing (and briefly in the majority) – 
the securitizing frame only further validated audience preferences. As support began 
increasing, desecuritizing frames – particularly ones that questioned the morality of 
torture – may have been rejected by an audience seeking to avoid emotional and 
cognitive dissonance. The resilience of torture support even in the absence of a strong 
securitizing frame in 2015 underscores this cultural shift.   
Presidential elite rhetoric, similarly, had little obvious influence on support for torture: 
there were few quarters in which securitizing rhetoric exceeded desecuritizing rhetoric, 
and aggregate coverage favored the desecuritizing frame: still, torture support 
continued to rise. Congressional rhetoric, on the other hand, may have played a larger 
role in driving attitudes – its coverage became increasingly securitizing from one 
administration to the next, and thus appears to align with public support for torture. 
Still, as previously discussed, its coverage of both frames was significantly lower 
during the Obama years, when support continued to grow. Attention to political elites 
nonetheless merits further analysis and is more closely inspected in the next section.   
5.3.4 Summary of Longitudinal Aggregate-Level Public Opinion Analysis 
The longitudinal analysis demonstrates from a variety of vantage points that news 
media may have had a (de)securitizing effect, independently of political elites, in the 
securitization of terrorism. Fox News and MSNBC stand out because of their polarizing 
employment of (de)securitizing frames; the New York Times also staked out a position 
during the Obama years. Integrating these insights with public opinion data, it seems 
MSNBC’s dominance in frame magnitude was unable to offset Fox News’ audience 
reach, cultural congruence, frame coherence and negative news advantage. Thus the 
longitudinal audience and content analyses provide strong evidence that Fox News had 
a securitizing effect, challenging orthodox perceptions of media as simply a 
mouthpiece for political elites. Still, the evidence does not discount the influence of 
congressional rhetoric on attitudes: there is compelling evidence that media may have 
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played a role in the securitization of terrorism, but a direct link has yet to be made. The 
data presented thus far also obscure the impact of frames on attitudes at the individual 
level, particularly when controlling for other drivers of torture support. These 
limitations are addressed next. 
5.4 Cross-Sectional Individual-Level Public Opinion Analysis 
While the content analysis demonstrated a gap in media and political elite discourse in 
the framing of torture and interrogation, this section uses data from the 2012 and 2016 
American National Election Studies (ANES) nationally-representative surveys to 
estimate whether a similar gap exists in individual attitudes. It links attitudes directly to 
media sources at two specific points in time to make the relationship between framing 
and attitudes more explicit. The datasets are used to estimate linear regression models 
and determine if torture attitudes mirror the frames most frequently employed by the 
sources respondents pay attention to, while controlling for other predictors of torture 
support. The dependent variable in the model is derived from responses to the 
following question:  
Do you FAVOR, OPPOSE, or NEITHER FAVOR NOR OPPOSE the U.S. 
government torturing people, who are suspected of being terrorists, to try 
to get information? 
Respondents indicated the severity (a great deal, moderately, or a little) of support or 
opposition, producing a 7-point scale in which higher values of the dependent variable 
indicated increased levels of support for torture.  
5.4.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variables include both the potential framing effect variables – 
measured as attention to media and political elites – as well as several control variables 
identified in the literature as contributors to torture preferences. These include 
demographic variables and other security-specific variables.  
5.4.1.1 Framing Effect Variables  
Respondents indicated their attention to the New York Times, and programs from 
several television networks. The programs of interest included in the models here are 
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Anderson Cooper 360°, O’Reilly Factor, Chris Matthews Show (2012)54 and the Rachel 
Maddow Show (2016). Each of these represents prominent shows that are typical in 
commentary of their respective networks and are thus used as proxy variables for 
measuring attention to CNN, Fox News and MSNBC. Respondents were asked to 
select the programs or content they consume regularly. For each item, the response was 
1 if the respondent selected it and 0 otherwise.  
Similarly, attention to political elites was measured using responses to the following 
question:  
How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and 
politics? 
The available responses were recoded for this survey to reflect, in congruence with 
media variables, that higher values indicate greater attention: 1 – Never; 2 – Some of 
the time; 3 – About half the time; 4 – Most of the time; 5 – All the time.  
5.4.1.2 Security Variables 
Fear (likely attack) 
Steele (2017) argues that public insecurity drives support for torture, because people 
convince themselves that torture works and is justified. Similarly, Stam, Von Hagen-
Jamar, and Worthington (2012: 61) find a correlation between fear – defined as “the 
belief that the world is a dangerous place” – and support for hawkish foreign policies 
(see also Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). They concede that the correlation is 
imperfect and limited because it ignores other variables. The multivariate models here 
address this shortcoming and determine whether a perception of the world as a 
dangerous place affects support for torture when controlling for other variables. Other 
studies (Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005) have found 
that higher threat perceptions of a future terrorist attack in the US are more likely to 
 
54 The 2012 ANES survey specifically mentioned Chris Matthews Show, Chris Matthews’ program on 
NBC which he hosted in parallel to his tenure on MSNBC’s Hardball with Chris Matthews. Since the 
hosts were the same, and since NBC News and MSNBC are nearly ideologically identical (Pew Research 
Center, 2014a), and no other MSNBC programs were offered in the 2012 dataset, the Chris Matthews 
Show is used as a proxy for MSNBC. 
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lead to support for antiterrorism policies like “a curtailment of civil liberties” (Huddy et 
al., 2005: 604). Nisbet and Shanahan (2004) find that heavy consumption of television 
news increases terrorism threat perceptions, thus motivating the inclusion of a variable 
to control for individual threat anxieties. Directly related to the threat in focus here, the 
following question is used to measure respondents’ fear: “During the next 12 months, 
how likely is it that there will be a terrorist attack in the United States that kills 100 or 
more people?” Responses are recoded from the original ANES format and range from 1 
– Not at all likely to 5 – Extremely likely.  
Military Experience 
Because military experience incurs socialization toward and desensitization from 
violence, torture might appear to be less reprehensible and more tolerable (Beckham, 
Moore, & Reynolds, 2000; Jakupcak et al., 2007) to veterans and service members. But 
the fear of reciprocity as well as firsthand experience of the costs associated with 
violence (e.g., depression, guilt, and post-traumatic stress disorder) should motivate 
caution otherwise inaccessible to civilians (Gronke et al., 2010; Wallace, 2014: 502). 
Wallace (2014) and Nincic and Ramos (2011), however, find that when respondents 
were told that other side is using torture, they were not more or less likely to support 
torture. Other competing findings show that active duty soldiers serving in Iraq 
opposed torture (Gronke et al., 2010); veterans are likely to support torture (Wallace, 
2014); and that there is no difference between veterans and non-veterans (Richards, 
Morrill, & Anderson, 2012). These studies suffer some limitations: Gronke et al.’s 
(2010) respondents are active servicemen with direct experience in Iraq, while 
Wallace’s (2014) experiment and Richard et al.’s (2012) opinion survey focus on 
veterans and civilians, excluding active duty servicemen. The analysis employed here 
considers all respondents with both active and previous military service. A dummy 
variable is coded 1 for respondents with military experience, and 0 otherwise.  
Retributiveness (Support for Death Penalty) 
In addition to intelligence-gathering or utilitarian functions, torture has a potential 
retributive function: a detainee’s criminal past or possible connection to terrorism 
justifies punishment, even in the form of torture. Carlsmith and Sood (2009: 191) also 
find that “the desire for harsh interrogation is largely isomorphic with the desire to 
punish” and not the “perceived effectiveness” of the method used. The analysis below 
follows previous research (e.g., Liberman, 2006; Liberman, 2007) and uses attitudes 
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toward death penalty as a proxy to control for retributiveness as a predictor of torture 
support. A dummy variable is coded as 1 if the respondent favors the death penalty and 
0 otherwise. 
5.4.1.3 General Demographic Variables 
Several demographic variables are included as controls. These variables have been 
identified in the existing literature as being statistically significant predictors of support 
for torture.  
Race  
Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp (2009: 451) find that “non-whites are 2.28 times more 
likely than whites to say that torture is an inviolable human right,” suggesting that race 
may have an influence on torture support. They argue that non-dominant groups (i.e., 
non-whites and females) that are more vulnerable to becoming victims of human rights 
abuses or violence are driven by self-interest and empathy to oppose torture. Richards 
et al. (2012) also confirm in their opinion survey analysis that whites are more likely to 
support torture than non-whites. Still, Wallace (2014) and Liberman (2013) find that 
race is not a statistically insignificant predictor of torture support. To control for any 
possible influence, race is included in the models below. Following Hertel et al. (2009), 
the race variable used here is coded 1 for White Non-Hispanics, and 0 for all other 
categories.   
Income 
Gronke et al. (2010) suggest that worsening economic conditions at the time of their 
study led to declines in aggregate opposition to torture. They cite Miller’s (2010) 
finding that per capita income and opposition to torture are directly related; and Hafner-
Burton and Ron’s (2009) related finding that human rights norms receive greater 
support as per capita income increases. Mayer and Armor (2012), however, find that at 
the individual level, higher incomes predict support for torture. These competing 
effects are explored and controlled for in the models presented below. Annual income 
is measured using a 28-point scale, where higher values indicate higher income.  
159 
 
Region of Residence 
While some research suggests that residents of the American South tend to be more 
hawkish (Gartner, Segura, & Barratt, 2004; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), Haider-Markel 
and Vieux (2008) find no statistically significant relationship between region of 
residence and support for torture. Still, given the link to hawkishness, a dummy 
variable is coded as 1 for respondents residing in the South (Alabama, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Washington DC, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia or 
West Virginia); all other states are coded as 0.  
Gender 
Existing evidence has yielded mixed results for the effect of gender on torture attitudes. 
Some research shows women are more likely to support hawkish foreign policies, 
including torture (Stam et al., 2012: 63-64) and the use of force (Eichenberg, 2003: 
137), and that women “have a higher perception of the world as a dangerous place” 
(Stam et al., 2012: 63), making them more likely to support the use of force when the 
US is threatened. Other research suggests that women are less likely to support torture 
for a variety of reasons (Flavin & Nickerson, 2009; Haider-Markel & Vieux, 2008; 
Hertel et al., 2009; Richards et al., 2012; Wallace, 2014; Wemlinger, 2014). Hertel et 
al. (2009) suggest that sympathy for marginalized groups intensifies women’s support 
for human rights. Aggressive policies like torture also conflict with traditional anti-
violence socialization (Smith, 1984; Wemlinger, 2014) or an “ethic of caring and 
nurturance that translates into sympathy for the disadvantaged” (Cook & Wilcox, 1991: 
1111). Women are also likelier to lean Democratic (Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999; 
Norrander, 1999) and liberal (Norrander & Wilcox, 2008) – both affiliations linked to 
anti-torture Self identities. More generally, other studies have found that women are 
less aggressive and less supportive of using force in foreign policy (Shapiro & 
Mahajan, 1986; Wilcox, Hewitt, & Allsop, 1996). In the models below, a dummy 
variable is coded 1 for females and 0 for males.   
Political ideology 
The overwhelming consensus in the vast literature linking political ideology to torture 
attitudes is that conservatives are likelier to support torture than liberals (Flavin & 
Nickerson, 2009; Haider-Markel & Vieux, 2008; Hertel et al., 2009; Malka & Soto, 
2011; Mayer & Armor, 2012; Wallace, 2014; Wemlinger, 2014). This finding is 
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compatible with research on ideological correlates with human rights attitudes and 
hawkishness in general – liberals are more sympathetic to human rights (e.g., Crowson, 
2004; Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990), while conservatives (and Republicans) lean 
toward hawkish foreign policies (Huddy et al., 2005; Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2007). 
Though these are not direct measures of torture support, hawkishness and support for 
human rights overlap with motivations that determine torture attitudes. Political 
ideology is measured on a 7-point scale using the following categories: 1 – Extremely 
liberal; 2 – Liberal; 3 – Slightly liberal; 4 – Moderate, middle of the road; 5 – Slightly 
conservative; 6 – Conservative; and 7 – Extremely conservative.  
Partisanship 
There is also virtual unanimous consensus in the literature that Republicans are more 
likely to support torture (Crandall, Eidelman, Skitka, & Morgan, 2009; Flavin & 
Nickerson, 2009; Gronke et al., 2010; Haider-Markel & Vieux, 2008; Malka & Soto, 
2011; Mayer & Armor, 2012; Richards et al., 2012; Wallace, 2014; Wemlinger, 2014). 
In agreement with the discourse analysis presented in the previous chapter, Gronke et 
al. (2010: 437) argue that “torture may have become a partisan symbol”. They cite a 
7% contraction in opposition to torture among Republicans in World Public Opinion 
surveys conducted in 2004 and 2009. In addition to views on torture, Republicans are 
more hawkish on foreign policy, especially in response to terrorism (Huddy et al., 
2005; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2007). Partisanship is 
measured using the ANES’ party identification 7-point summary variable, where 1 
indicates Strongly Democrat and 7 indicates Strongly Republican.  
Age 
Existing research suggests largely agrees that younger people are more likely to support 
torture (e.g., Flavin & Nickerson, 2009; Haider-Markel & Vieux, 2008; Mayer & 
Armor, 2012; Wallace, 2014; Wemlinger, 2014). Age is measured here directly in 
years. 
Education 
Mayer and Armor (2012: 440) argue that because education is generally an indicator 
for support of “Miranda rights and other protections against government violations of 
civil liberties”, it should affect support for torture too. Specifically, higher levels of 
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academic completion should predict lower levels of support for torture.  Along with 
others (e.g., Flavin & Nickerson, 2009; Wallace, 2014; Wemlinger, 2014), they find 
this holds true. Education is also useful here as a proxy variable for measuring political 
engagement – Malka and Soto (2011: 1095) note that education “tends to be correlated 
with more direct indicators of political engagement and to hold similar patterns of 
correlates as do the more direct indicators.” Education is measured here using a 16-
point scale where 1 represents Less than 1st grade and 16 represents Doctoral degree 
(for example, PHD, EDD).  
Religion 
Religiosity may have competing effects on support of torture. Emphasis on prosocial 
norms (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002), humanitarian values, forgiveness 
(McCullough & Worthington Jr, 1999) and kindness suggest opposition to torture. 
Dubensky and Lavery (2006: 164) argue, for example, that “[m]any Christians agree 
that, as a matter of faith, torture is intrinsically wrong, is a sin, and an insult to God.” 
Christian fundamentalists’ sympathies for Israel and aversion to Islam (Mayer, 2004), 
however, may offset prosocial attitudes. The strong alignment between religiosity on 
one hand and politically conservative and Republican identification on the other hand 
(Claassen, Tucker, & Smith, 2015; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2006; Layman & 
Carmines, 1997; Layman & Green, 2006; Malka, Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen, & Miller, 
2012; Olson & Green, 2006; Unger, 2007) could also increase support for torture 
(Malka & Soto, 2011).55 Because conservatism is associated with more hawkish foreign 
policy (Baumgartner, Francia, & Morris, 2008), religion may indirectly motivate a 
tough stance against potential terrorists. Religion may also stimulate us-versus-them 
self-conceptualizing (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005) and thus fear or rejection of the 
Other, moderating natural inclinations toward forgiveness or kindness.  
 
55 Layman and Carmines (1997) test which of either religion or postmaterialism – both indicators of 
cultural conflict in politics – has a stronger effect on political preferences. They find that “while 
Material-Postmaterial value priorities do have some impact on American political behavior, a 
conceptualization of cultural conflict that takes into account the contemporary divisions between 
religious traditionalists on the one hand and religious liberals and secularists on the other hand fares 
considerably better in explaining the political orientations of the citizenry as a whole” (767). For this 
reason, religion – but not postmaterialism – is controlled for in the models used here.  
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Green (2007) finds contradictory evidence suggesting that weekly churchgoers (even 
Evangelicals who would most likely be associated with conservativism and 
Republicanism) are opposed to torture,56 but more recent studies suggest this effect 
may be outdated. Mayer and Armor (2012), for example, find that Catholicism and 
Protestantism are statistically significant predictors of support for torture. Malka and 
Soto (2011) find more nuanced effects: religious individuals with higher levels of 
political engagement are more likely to support torture, while religious individuals with 
lower levels of political engagement are likelier to oppose torture.  
In the models used here, religiosity is measured using responses to the question, “Do 
you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?” Affirmative 
responses are coded 1, while negative responses are coded 0.  
Children 
Haider-Markel and Vieux (2008: 14) argue that “those with younger children might be 
more anxious than others about a terrorist attack, and therefore be more likely to 
support harsh interrogation techniques.” This is particularly the case for mothers, 
whose concern for threats that may affect their children increases their support for 
hawkish policies they might have otherwise rejected. Wemlinger (2014: 118) finds that 
mothers, unlike non-mother females, do not differ from men in terms of opposition to 
torture, suggesting that having children indeed can affect foreign policy preferences. 
This variable is included in the models below to control for the possibility of these 
effects. A dummy variable is coded as 1 for respondents who indicate they have any 
number of children under the age of 17 and 0 otherwise.  
5.4.2 Results 
Table 5.5 displays the results of four linear regression models using the 2012 and 2016 
ANES datasets. Two models are presented for each dataset – a baseline model that 
excludes the media and political attention variables, and another that includes them. 
Models 1 and 2 are the baseline and full models respectively for the 2012 dataset, while 
models 3 and 4 are the baseline and full models respectively for the 2016 dataset. The 
effects of media and political attention on public support for torture are discussed first; 
 
56 No conclusions can be drawn, however, regarding less observant individuals because of statistically 
insignificant results. 
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this is followed by a discussion of other key findings and how they relate to previous 
research.  
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Table 5.5 Support for torture (2012 and 2016) 
 Torture Support  
 2012 
(1) 
2012 
(2) 
2016 
(3) 
2016 
(4) 
Framing Effect     
Attention to politics  0.006  -0.028 
  (0.039)  (0.060) 
CNN  0.017  0.168 
  (0.108)  (0.142) 
Fox News  0.836***  0.455*** 
  (0.114)  (0.155) 
MSNBC  -0.241*  -0.485*** 
  (0.143)  (0.173) 
New York Times  -0.318***  -0.250** 
  (0.122)  (0.119) 
(In)Security     
Fear of likely attack 0.236*** 0.180*** 0.166*** 0.079 
 (0.029) (0.042) (0.033) (0.052) 
Military experience 0.038 0.031 0.064 -0.174 
 (0.084) (0.110) (0.112) (0.182) 
Retributiveness 0.945*** 0.967*** 0.959*** 0.935*** 
 (0.062) (0.087) (0.079) (0.121) 
General Demographic     
Race (white) -0.159** -0.190** -0.303*** -0.221* 
 (0.063) (0.091) (0.086) (0.134) 
Income 0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Region (south) 0.062 0.030 -0.032 -0.111 
 (0.056) (0.078) (0.071) (0.111) 
Gender (female) -0.220*** -0.277*** -0.081 -0.076 
 (0.058) (0.082) (0.072) (0.111) 
Political ideology 0.189*** 0.151*** 0.216*** 0.158*** 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.032) (0.052) 
Partisanship 0.088*** 0.081*** 0.167*** 0.154*** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.037) 
Age -0.003* -0.007** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Education level -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.097*** 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.027) 
Religiosity 0.094 0.043 0.136* 0.128 
 (0.062) (0.085) (0.078) (0.118) 
Children 0.139** 0.068 0.010 0.068 
 (0.065) (0.095) (0.079) (0.120) 
Constant 2.132*** 2.876*** 2.341*** 3.535*** 
 (0.206) (0.324) (0.267) (0.465) 
Observations 4,517 2,293 2,614 1,031 
R2 0.163 0.223 0.260 0.325 
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.217 0.257 0.313 
Residual Std. Error 
1.795 
(df = 4503) 
1.746 
(df = 2274) 
1.716 
(df = 2600) 
1.641 
(df = 1012) 
F Statistic 
67.414*** 
(df = 13; 4503) 
36.190*** 
(df = 18; 2274) 
70.377*** 
(df = 13; 2600) 
27.096*** 
(df = 18; 1012) 
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Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 and 3 for each year excludes 
framing effect variables, while models 2 and 4 include them. Because of missing values in the ANES dataset, 
observations are reduced between the baseline and full models for each year. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01;  
 
 
5.4.2.1 Framing Effect Variables 
Both models 2 and 4 show a strong alignment between news media consumption and 
effects on attitudes toward torture in 2012 and 2016. While the relationship does not 
prove causality, top-down influence assumptions from securitization theory and the 
cascade activation model increase confidence that attention to these news sources 
helped shape individual attitudes. Across both years, Fox News, MSNBC and the New 
York Times are statistically significant indicators in directions consistent with 
expectations from the content analysis: Fox News viewers are likelier to support 
torture, while MSNBC viewers and Times readers are likelier to oppose torture even 
when controlling for ideology, partisan identification, and other germane factors. These 
effects are consistent with expectations from the content analysis: Fox News was not 
only the sole actor that preferred the securitizing frame at the aggregate level, it was 
also the only media actor that favored the securitizing frame after 2009. MSNBC and 
the Times both promoted the desecuritizing frame at the highest relative levels across 
all media actors. The effects of these three news actors on individual attitudes are thus 
highly reflective of their coverage of the different frames.  
The coefficients’ magnitudes shown here also align with the content analysis. In 2012, 
among the news variables, Fox News had the strongest effect (over three times that of 
MSNBC) on individual preferences for torture, but ceded its advantage to MSNBC in 
2016. Part of this difference may be explained by the different proxies used for 
measuring attention to MSNBC in the models: while the Chris Matthews Show was 
used as a proxy for MSNBC in 2012, the more popular MSNBC program The Rachel 
Maddow Show was used in 2016.57 Maddow’s more popular show reached a wider 
 
57 A variable for Maddow’s show was not available in the 2012 dataset. Maddow’s show was used in the 
2016 models, because its popularity (Katz, 2016) suggests it was more representative of MSNBC’s 
framing effects on the public. A separate regression model was run substituting Chris Matthews’ 
MSNBC show (Hardball with Chris Matthews) with Maddow’s show in the 2016 model. In this new 
model (see model 8 in Appendix B), Hardball with Chris Matthews was not a statistically significant 
predictor of support in 2016. Given the strong effect of Maddow’s program in 2016, it is likely then that 
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audience, increasing its potential for producing framing effects at the individual level 
consistent with MSNBC’s overall preferred frame. Still, Fox News’ high coefficient in 
2012 reflects its dominance in cable viewership and persistent coverage of the 
securitizing frame leading up to 2012 – a period when MSNBC (and other sources) 
were less active in their coverage of the debate (see figure 5.4). The 2014 Senate 
Intelligence Committee Report revived that debate within media, an outcome evidenced 
by the narrowing disparity of magnitudes between MSNBC and Fox News in the 2016 
model. MSNBC even overtakes Fox News in terms of effect size, reflecting the 
disparity in each outlet’s frame coverage leading up to 2016: from 2013 to 2016, 
MSNBC covered the desecuritizing frame 2.42 times as much as it covered the 
securitizing frame; in the same time period, Fox News covered the securitizing frame 
only 1.25 times as much as it covered the desecuritizing frame. While both outlets 
favored different frames, MSNBC’s coverage was much more skewed than Fox News’ 
relatively more mixed (and thus ambiguous) coverage; this likely diluted Fox News’ 
framing effect between 2012 and 2016. Still, these effects are confined to the individual 
level; at the aggregate level, Fox News commanded a larger audience than MSNBC, 
resulting in public opinion, more broadly aligning with the former’s securitizing frame.  
The Times is statistically significant and predicts opposition to torture in both years. 
This reflects the Times’ preference for the desecuritizing frame during the Obama 
administrations. Specifically, the content analysis revealed that after fairly mixed 
coverage since 2001, the Times began to heavily favor the desecuritizing frame in 
beginning 2011. This later shift appears to have motivated readers’ attitudes toward 
torture. Moreover, as the only print news source measured in the models, the Times’ 
statistical significance suggests that framing effects are not exclusive to cable news 
platforms – which allow for lengthier commentary and debate formats – but extends to 
the more objective, terse and dispassionate newspaper format – again, this assumes that 
influence flows from media to audience. In addition to asserting the continued impact 
and relevance of print news in driving attitudes, this increases confidence that the 
underlying motivator of security attitudes is framing itself rather than idiosyncrasies of 
television, such as its stimulating visual components.  
 
it would have also had a statistically significant and negative effect on torture support in 2012 had it been 
available in the dataset.  
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In neither year is attention to CNN a statistically significant predictor for torture. Even 
when substituting Anderson Cooper 360 with a different CNN program, Erin Burnett 
Outfront, CNN viewership remains statistically insignificant (see model 7 in Appendix 
B). This is unsurprising and aligns with expectations from the content analysis: CNN 
was the most neutral actor throughout the Obama administration’s tenure. Despite 
having the most voluminous coverage, it showed no overwhelming preference for 
either frame, thus failing to produce framing effects. This reflects (and reinforces) the 
theory that frame moderation – in this case, CNN’s coverage of both securitizing and 
desecuritizing frames in near equal proportions – reduces framing effects.  
Like CNN, political attention did not produce a statistically significant effect in either 
model, suggesting that political elite discourse may have had a less powerful effect on 
respondents’ attitudes toward torture than press actors. Certainly survey respondents 
may have conflated their attention to politics with attention to news sources – in which 
case, the news variables may have been capturing some of the effect of exposure to 
political elite discourse. To check for this, a separate set of regressions were estimated 
where variables for the press actors were removed (see models 5 and 6 in Appendix B). 
While political attention became a positive and statistically significant predictor of 
torture support in 2012, it remained insignificant in 2016. This reduces confidence that 
political elites had no effect in 2012, but reinforces the finding that media securitization 
effects were more likely, since the media variables were statistically significant in the 
complete models. Accepting that exposure to political elite discourse cannot be entirely 
disentangled from exposure to media sources, the results in table 5.5 at least show that 
through mediation, press actors can emphasize, select and spin elite discourse 
significantly enough to produce attitudinal differences.  
To the extent that “attention to politics” is an indicator of exposure to political elite 
discourse (even if it is an imperfect indicator as discussed above), however, its 
statistical insignificance in the models likely reflects the lack of messaging on the 
torture debate among political elites: the content and discourse analysis showed that 
presidential elites and Congress were much less engaged than they were during the 
Bush administration, allowing press actors to fill the discursive void. Another 
explanation for the lack of political elite framing effects may be that the Obama 
administration’s overall preference for the desecuritizing frame offset Congress’ 
stronger securitizing frame. In other words, mixed signals from different branches of 
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political elites could have had a moderating effect on each other. Because the ANES 
datasets do not distinguish attention to Congress from attention to presidential elites, it 
is impossible to isolate the effects of each and test this possibility. The ambiguity in 
political discourse, nonetheless, may have driven individuals to derive their cues from 
less ambiguous news actors to resolve the dissonance.  
5.4.2.2 Security Variables 
The models indicate that insecurity drives support for exceptional measures. Anxiety 
over terrorism – measured here as the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the next year – 
was a statistically significant predictor of torture opinion in both 2012 models and in 
the 2016 baseline model. This finding is somewhat consistent with the findings from 
the longitudinal public opinion analysis which showed that concern about an attack 
(figure 5.7B) began to rise after 2008, coinciding to some degree with the rise in public 
support for torture. Still, once news and political attention are introduced into the 2016 
model, anxiety becomes insignificant, suggesting that press framing may have been 
more influential on support for exceptional measures than identification of the threat 
itself. The difference between the 2012 and 2016 complete models suggests that 
perhaps, by 2016, torture preferences had become embedded in individual ideology 
above and beyond the link to terrorism.  
Contradicting some previous research (e.g., Gronke et al., 2010; Wallace, 2014), the 
models show that military experience has no effect on torture attitudes. This may 
reflect a broader shift in military attitudes over time; the effect of collapsing active duty 
personnel and veterans into a single category; or an offset of competing reciprocity 
concerns where some respondents were willing to use torture knowing that it was used 
against American soldiers, while others proactively rejected torture for fear that it may 
be used against Americans in the future. Either way, these results present an 
opportunity for further research between military experience – active duty and veteran 
– and support for exceptional measures. Finally, the link between torture and 
retributiveness – which is positive and statistically significant across all four models – 
corroborates previous findings.  
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5.4.2.3 General Demographic Variables 
For the most part, demographic variables align with expectations. Support for torture is 
strongly linked with lesser educated, younger, Republican and conservative males. 
These findings are largely in line with previous literature. A novel finding, however, is 
that political identification and media were simultaneously strong predictors of support 
across all models, showing that the effects of the latter reached beyond political 
identification. In other words, news actors had a statistically significant effect even 
when controlling for party identification and ideology location, suggesting that framing 
effects occupy a separate construct from political affiliation. Despite the strong political 
leanings of both Fox News and MSNBC, they continued to have an effect when 
political identity was controlled for.  
One notable divergence from existing literature is the finding in this study that whites 
are less likely to support torture – this holds true even in baseline models before the key 
theoretical variables are included. This either reflects a shift in demographics since 
earlier studies, or the effects of a more nuanced model that controls for factors 
neglected in previous research. Nonetheless, given the disparity between these results 
and findings elsewhere, future research should explore more deeply the link between 
race and support for torture. 
5.4.3 Summary of Cross-Sectional Individual-Level Public Opinion Analysis  
The linear regression models confirm a strong association between attention to key 
press actors and torture attitudes. Specifically, at the individual level, torture attitudes 
generally reflect the frames used most frequently by the information sources consumed. 
Not only is there a statistically significant effect for Fox News, MSNBC and the Times, 
the direction of effects is consistent with expectations from the content analysis: Fox 
News is the lone actor that aligns with pro-torture attitudes while MSNBC and the 
Times align with anti-torture attitudes. The strength of framing effects produced by Fox 
News vis-à-vis MSNBC from 2012 to 2016 also mirrors the content analysis: Fox 
News became less skewed in its coverage between those years, while MSNBC became 
more skewed. To the extent that the alignment is indicative of a top-down effect, the 
models consequently show Fox News’ framing effects moderate over time while 
MSNBC’s framing effects become more potent. Attention to CNN has no statistically 
significant effect, suggesting that it had a weaker framing effect on torture attitudes. 
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Previous framing effects research suggests that CNN’s mixed (and thus incoherent) 
coverage and ambiguity is the likely reason for its lack of effect. While exposure to 
political elite discourse cannot be entirely disentangled, the models at least demonstrate 
that “attention to politics” similarly has no statistically significant effect on torture 
attitudes, reflecting both the silencing among political elites as well as the mixed 
signals from different branches of government.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Building on the discourse analysis from the previous chapter, this chapter demonstrated 
how securitizing and desecuritizing frames manufactured by political elites were 
employed by the press. An analysis of public opinion – both at the aggregate and 
individual level – illustrated the influence that both sets of actors may have had on 
(de)securitizing the threat of terrorism through the use of oppositional basic discourses 
on exceptional measures. This section presents a summary of results and select 
theoretical and empirical implications of the torture debate within terrorism. A more 
comprehensive discussion of implications is relegated to the concluding chapter.  
The content analysis demonstrated that press actors acted independently of political 
elites when framing the torture debate within terrorism discourse. Fox News, MSNBC 
and the New York Times stood out as especially interesting because of their preferences 
for specific frames. Fox News prioritized the securitizing frame throughout the sixteen 
years, but also was the only actor to increase its coverage of the securitizing frame 
between the two presidential administrations. MSNBC did the same for the 
desecuritizing frame, covering it largely throughout the entire analysis. While the Times 
was fairly balanced and ambiguous in its coverage during the Bush administration, it 
privileged the desecuritizing frame when political elites (under Obama) became less 
engaged. CNN, on the other hand, remained ambiguous and balanced in its coverage 
throughout the entire sixteen years. Presidential and congressional elites showed 
conflicting results, but most importantly, both showed a significant disengagement 
from the torture debate under the Obama administration. These results from the content 
analysis led to some preliminary expectations: Fox News viewership should have a 
securitizing effect, while MSNBC viewership and the Times readership should have a 
desecuritizing effect. The effects of CNN viewership and attention to political elites 
were expected to be minimal, if present at all. Another significant finding in this 
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section was that, while the press frequently acted independently of political elites in its 
coverage of the torture debate, press actors also acted differently from each other.  
The audience was introduced in the following section, first at the aggregate level, and 
next at the individual, cross-sectional level. The first set of data revealed that public 
tolerance of torture increased over time – particularly by 2009 (the first year of 
Obama’s presidency), a majority of Americans found torture to be justifiable. 
Considering that Fox News commanded the largest audience among its competitor 
news organizations, aggregate public opinion appeared to follow Fox News. This 
relationship was made more explicit in the individual-level analysis, which showed that 
respondents’ attitudes towards torture reflected the frames that they were most exposed 
to. This was especially true for audiences of Fox News, MSNBC and the Times. Again, 
even though MSNBC and the Times aligned with desecuritizing effects at the 
individual level, Fox News’ wide viewership appears to have sustained overall support 
for torture at the aggregate level. Attention to politics had no discernible relationship 
with torture attitudes, thus increasing confidence that news outlets were more 
influential (de)securitizing actors than political elites in framing the torture debate to 
audiences. Certainly the models cannot fully account for causality, but theory-driven 
top-down assumptions suggest that elite frames likely influenced attitudes. From a 
variety of vantage points, then, the torture debate demonstrates that press actors not 
only played an independent role in (de)securitization, but that they may have exceeded 
political elites in producing framing effects.  
By cataloging the gradual acceptance of such an extreme measure, this case study has 
demonstrated its analytical utility in understanding how language can legitimize even 
the illegal in security climates. The results generally demonstrate that terrorism 
remained a salient and highly securitized threat through 2016, and that the press has 
been an integral purveyor of pro- and anti-torture messaging. Importantly, the press has 
buoyed the torture debate even as political elites have disengaged from it, pointing to 
the pivotal role of the former in driving an important component of terrorism discourse. 
At least in the case of torture, the press may have become more effective than political 
elites in shaping attitudes. Certainly, political elites played a role in the securitization 
process by setting the initial boundaries of permissible discourse – Bush administration 
officials gave meaning to the torture and interrogation frames – but as these 
dichotomous frames became institutionalized in mainstream discourse, political elites 
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forfeited their framing effect advantage to the press. While this analysis has focused on 
one domain of overall terrorism discourse – namely, torture – the press may be having 
similar impacts in other areas, suggesting that any political effort to deescalate the 
threat of terrorism will necessitate cooperation with (or at least strategizing around) 
influential news actors.  
The case study also contributes to framing effects research. Comparing different 
measures of frame effectiveness – volume, frame rate, and ratio of oppositional frames 
– in a real-world scenario over a sixteen-year period reveals what strategies matters in 
the long-term for news actors. CNN was unable to produce significant framing effects 
despite having the largest overall volume of coverage of either frame. In the torture 
debate, the ratio of coverage of oppositional frames determined which actor(s) would 
lead in a competitive framing environment. While magnitude may be important in 
framing effects, it is severely moderated by the strength and co-occurrence of 
competing frames. In other words, relative magnitude matters most. Despite the Times, 
MSNBC and Fox News all having lower volumes of coverage than CNN, their relative 
coverage of preferred frames strengthened their framing effects; conversely, CNN’s 
more balanced coverage may have inspired its failure to produce framing effects.  
Finally, the analysis of the securitization of terrorism has demonstrated how powerful 
the press is as an agent in international relations and international security. Press actors 
gained a competitive edge in shaping public opinion when political elites stepped away 
from the debate. In the specific case of torture, Jackson (2007) argues that the social 
legitimation of torture was not inevitable: “Discourses are never completely hegemonic 
or consistent, and must be continuously defended and reproduced in order to remain 
dominant” (368). While this point explains Fox News’ competitive edge at the 
aggregate level – Fox News consistently promoted the securitizing frame – it also 
points to a limitation of this case study. The individual-level analysis focused on two 
years, 2012 and 2016, during which political elites were less active. These results may 
still be generalizable – especially given that the 2014 Senate report on torture was 
produced in between these years and led to a spike in political elite messaging – but the 
comparison of vocal and less vocal actors clouds a complete understanding of what can 
occur in a more competitive context. The disengagement of political elites during the 
Obama administration created conditions under which Fox News could promote the 
securitizing frame with little opposition – but can the press command significant levels 
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of influence on issues actively debated by political elites? Having shown in this chapter 
one condition under which the press can lead in framing effects, the next case study 
explores how securitization unfolds in a more competitive discursive context.  
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Chapter 6: Some Are Evil: Mixed Political Elite Discourse 
on Unauthorized Immigration 
6.1 Introduction 
While immigration has been a major part of American policy debates for several 
decades, the sixteen-year period from 2001-2016 saw significant fluctuations in how 
the debate was framed. The 9/11 attacks – carried out by foreign nationals – generated a 
new security narrative that intertwined terrorism with vulnerabilities in the immigration 
system. This produced a renewed focus on the latter as a national security issue, and 
prompted the establishment of an immigration-terrorism nexus in security discourse 
(Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). As a security issue then, immigration has occupied the 
societal sector as a predominantly cultural and criminal issue and, more recently, as a 
national counterterrorism concern. But the rich tradition of immigration, the economic 
gains it has reaped and a large sympathetic electorate in the US have simultaneously 
produced a pro-immigrant, expansionist counternarrative that has sought to provide 
legal status to unauthorized immigrants. Efforts to resolve the competing interests of 
immigrant expansion and border security came in the form of multiple attempts to 
legislate comprehensive immigration reform. All of these attempts have failed, leaving 
the unauthorized immigration problem unresolved to date.  
Interestingly, the shifts in discourse have co-occurred with fairly steady immigration 
trends, suggesting that subjective factors have been driving the debate more than 
objective measures. Figure 6.1 shows that the size of the immigrant population in the 
US has been growing at a relatively linear rate since the early 1970s. Specifically, the 
share of foreign-born individuals in the U.S. increased from 11.1% in 2000 to 13.5% in 
2016 (Migration Policy Institute, 2017), while net migration increased slightly from 
3.5% to 3.9% (Central Intelligence Agency) and the number of unauthorized 
immigrants grew from 8.6 million to 11.3 million in the same timeframe (Passel & 
Cohn, 2017). This period has also witnessed, significantly, a net outflow of Mexican 
nationals from the US back to Mexico, the latter being the largest source of 
unauthorized immigrants in the former; specifically, approximately 1 million Mexicans 
returned home from the US between 2009 and 2014, while only 870,000 arrived 
(Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015; Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, 2018). Further, apprehensions 
of unauthorized border-crossers decreased steadily, though significantly, between 2000 
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and 2016: the number of unauthorized Mexican migrants apprehended fell from 1.6 
million in 2000 to just under 193,000 in 2016 (U.S. Border Patrol, 2019).58 These 
objective measures have been surprisingly inconsequential to the ebbs and tides of 
immigration discourse.  
Figure 6.1 US immigration Rates 
  
Note: Data retrieved from the Migration Policy Institute and the CIA World Factbook. The shaded region 
shows data for years that fall outside the range of this study (2001-2016), but contextualize current 
immigration levels.  
 
This chapter thus turns to subjective factors to explain shifts in immigration discourse. 
The primary aims are to identify how exceptional measures were (de)legitimized over 
time; investigate the construction and reproduction of competing basic discourses in the 
US immigration debate; and to identify the rhetorical links that united and 
differentiated the two Selves, revealing key frames that constituted each basic discourse 
along two functions: moral evaluation and remedy proposal. While there is little 
disagreement on the recognition of unauthorized immigration as a problem, the moral 
evaluation and remedy proposal functions constitute sites of contestation that have 
produced two distinct Selves and accompanying basic discourses. A securitizing basic 
discourse has constituted a restrictionist agenda that emphasizes border security 
(remedy proposal) and perpetuates the metaphor of unauthorized immigrants as 
criminal Others (moral evaluation). Its use has widened the gulf between the American 
Self and the immigrant Other. A competing desecuritizing basic discourse has 
 
58 The number of non-Mexican migrants apprehended rose from 39,555 in 2000 to 222,847 in 2016 (U.S. 
Border Patrol, 2019). Nonetheless, given the large decline in Mexican migrants, overall apprehensions 
decreased by over 75%.  
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promoted an expansionist agenda that seeks to integrate immigrants through pathways 
toward legalization/citizenship (remedy proposal) and recognizes unauthorized 
immigration as a procedural documentation problem rather than a criminal one (moral 
evaluation). In the latter case, unauthorized immigrants have been characterized as less 
of a threat through rhetoric that highlights shared values, narrowing the gap that 
separates the Self and the Other.  
Specifically, major political texts – including speeches, statements, interviews, debates, 
legislative acts, and executive policies – are analyzed to chart the evolution of these 
competing Selves and their respective (de)securitizing basic discourses between 2001 
and 2016. Events are first described and then analyzed from a social constructivist and 
discursive analytical lens to show how certain patterns of behavior and rhetoric had a 
performative effect on the (de)securitization of unauthorized immigration. More than 
simply identifying speech acts and summarizing texts, this requires emphasizing how 
texts were contemporaneously interpreted. The latter effort is aided through analysis of 
responses – whether critical or in support – to speech acts and texts by political elites. 
While the focus is largely on rhetorical moves and frames, actual legislation and 
implementation of exceptional measures are also discussed as relevant, because these 
become constitutive of ongoing securitizations (Bigo, 2002). Unlike the press, political 
actors do more than “speak”. They shape discourse and reproduce the criminal 
immigrant metaphor through rhetoric as well as public implementations of policy or 
legislation. The actualization of exceptional measures reinforces the (in)security 
implications of immigration – e.g., broadening the powers of the immigration 
enforcement agencies has a securitizing effect because it reifies the threatening 
complexion of immigration, increasing perceptions of insecurity. These public 
discourse-defining actions are then also included in the analysis.59 
Unlike the terrorism debate – which is often driven by discrete acts of terrorism – 
immigration is an ongoing phenomena that occurs as a continuous, long-term process 
(Suro, 2008). The goal is thus not to provide a comprehensive summary of the far-
 
59 While the same can be said about other security threats and issues, policy on immigration is more 
transparent and widely accessible to the public than, for example, policy on counterterrorism (like 
intelligence-gathering) that can be secretive, opaque and visible to the public only through speech acts 
and text.  
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reaching and multifaceted immigration debate over two presidential administrations, 
but rather to analyze – following Donnelly (2013) and Hansen (2013) – those defining 
moments that changed the direction and/or magnitude of (de)securitization dynamics. 
The analysis begins with a discussion of pre-9/11 immigration policy and rhetoric to set 
the context and identify the baseline discourse against which to measure later 
developments. Notably, in the seven months between President Bush’s inauguration in 
January 2001 and September 11, his administration worked to remove barriers toward 
legalization, increase the number of temporary workers, and encourage respect toward 
immigrants. The September 11, 2001, attacks however heralded a new securitizing 
narrative that linked counterterrorism to a restrictionist immigration agenda.60 Still 
political elites under the Bush administration’s leadership sought to balance policies by  
marrying immigration expansion with border security measures in multiple failed 
attempts at comprehensive immigration reform. While the Obama administration tried 
to fulfill this ambition, the congressional stalemate it oversaw was emblematic of a 
generally bipolar tenure on immigration policy. The analysis ends with a discussion of 
Donald Trump’s hardline yet discursively innovative approach to securitizing 
immigration during his 2016 presidential campaign, which largely overshadowed other 
elites’ rhetoric.  
6.2 Political Discourse Analysis  
6.2.1 Expansionism: El Grande Amistad Entre Nuestros Pueblos61 (2001) 
The months leading to 9/11 were characterized by political rhetoric and efforts aimed at 
removing immigration barriers and accelerating legalization for unauthorized 
immigrants already in the US. Newly elected President Bush employed a sympathetic 
and expansionist tone that encouraged respect toward immigrants and a dignified, 
inclusive immigration system. At a July 2001 Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) ceremony held at the Ellis Island Immigration Museum – a symbolic gateway for 
immigrants to the US – President Bush declared  
 
60 Lest the two case studies in this thesis be conflated, the discussion here focuses primarily on the 
immigration components of counterterrorism (unlike the terrorism case study, which focused largely on 
the torture component).  
61 The great friendship between our countries. The line was spoken by President Bush during joint 
remarks with Mexican President Vicente Fox on February 16, 2001 (Bush, 2001e).  
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Immigration is not a problem to be solved. It is a sign of a confident and 
successful nation. And people who seek to make America their home 
should be met in that spirit by representatives of our Government. New 
arrivals should be greeted not with suspicion and resentment but with 
openness and courtesy. (Bush, 2001g) 
In the same speech, he committed to reforms that would decrease processing hurdles, 
simplify sponsorship of children, and relax residency requirements. The president’s 
close relationship with Mexican President Vicente Fox – their five meetings as heads of 
state prior to September 11 included Bush’s symbolic first state visit and first hosted 
state dinner – motivated a shared ambition to grant legal status to over three million 
Mexican residents in the US (Rosenblum, 2011: 3; Schmitt, 2001) among other 
reforms. Both leaders tasked senior cabinet-level officials to “[forge] new and realistic 
approaches to migration to ensure it is safe, orderly, legal and dignified” (Bush, 2001c). 
That effort included “respecting the human dignity of all migrants, regardless of their 
status; recognizing the contribution migrants make to enriching both societies; shared 
responsibility for ensuring migration takes place through safe and legal channels” in 
order “to reach mutually satisfactory results on border safety, a temporary worker 
program and the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States.” (Bush, 2001c) 
In remarks to the press in late August 2001, President Bush reaffirmed his “great 
relation” with his Mexican counterpart and likened immigrant ambitions to American 
values:  
And I remind people all across our country, family values do not stop at 
the Rio Bravo. There are people in Mexico who have got children who are 
worried about where they are going to get their next meal from. And they 
are going to come to the United States if they think they can make money 
here. That's a simple fact. And they're willing to walk across miles of 
desert to do work that some Americans won't do. And we've got to respect 
that, it seems like to me, and treat those people with respect. (Bush, 
2001d) 
Similarly, pre-9/11 congressional efforts related to immigration included Section 245(i) 
of the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act which relaxed residency requirements for 
unauthorized individuals (Rosenblum, 2011: 2; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001), 
179 
 
provided reprieve from deportation, expanded visa categories, and increased the 
number of temporary professional workers (Storrs, 2005); the August 2001 introduction 
of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act aimed at 
providing legal status to individuals who had arrived to the US as children; and the July 
2001 introduction of the Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act 
intended to provide legal status to guest-workers in the agricultural sector (Rosenblum, 
2011: 2). Certainly there was resistance to “blanket amnesty” and certain provisions 
(Schmitt, 2001), but bipartisan efforts in Congress prior to 9/11 urged legal status for a 
growing immigrant population.  
President Bush’s early presidency was thus characterized by discourse that humanized 
rather than criminalized immigrants. This was a major reversal from the last major 
immigration legislation under his predecessor, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which promoted a more threatening 
complexion of unauthorized immigrants: the act aimed to deport and detain 
immigrants, expanded the Border Patrol force, and restricted benefits access to 
immigrants. Moving away from this metaphorical representation of immigrants as 
criminal Others that needed to be expelled through heightened border security, 
President Bush’s desecuritizing moves pushed unauthorized immigration down to a 
procedural issue to be resolved through integration. Rather than preventing immigrants 
from entering, he encouraged facilitating entry and residency. A key rhetorical feature 
in his speech was the use of  “undocumented” rather than the more ubiquitous “illegal” 
in the September 2001 joint statement – again, this reinforced the procedural (rather 
than threatening and criminal) nature of unauthorized immigration. Further, Bush’s 
close ties with his Mexican counterpart and attempts to relate immigrants’ “family 
values” to Americans’ rhetorically minimized the distance between the American Self 
and the non-threatening immigrant Other. His habitual use of Spanish in his speech acts 
(e.g., Bush, 2001e, 2001f, 2001j) had a performative effect: they directly confronted 
public anxieties over the erosion of English in communities and schools and embraced 
differences. Certainly Mexico (and other Spanish-speaking countries) did not constitute 
the only immigrant-sending nation, but as the largest sender of immigrants to America, 
Bush’s approach was symbolic. In short, Bush’s desecuritizing rhetoric stood in 
opposition to the securitizing spirit of the 1996 IIRIRA: while the latter perpetuated an 
impression of immigrants as criminals and promoted border security, Bush emphasized 
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nonthreatening features like shared values, and respect and dignity for “undocumented” 
immigrants.  
6.2.2 Securitization by Association: The Immigration-Terrorism Nexus 
September 11, however, precipitated a sharp return toward securitization, shifting 
unauthorized immigration from a law enforcement problem to a national security 
threat. This shift was accelerated by the revelation that the 9/11 attacks were organized 
and executed by student and visitor visa holders – including at least two persons who 
had overstayed their visas – suggesting a vulnerability in America’s border control and 
immigration processes. Thus the need to secure borders became closely intertwined 
with terrorism discourse through executive branch-led policies, congressional 
legislation, and expansion of immigration enforcement. These developments 
collectively contributed to characterizing the immigrant Other not only as a criminal, 
but as a national security threat, propelling the securitizing basic discourse. 
6.2.2.1 Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force  
The Bush administration formally forged the link between terrorism and immigration in 
its October 29, 2001, announcement of the newly formed Foreign Terrorist Tracking 
Task Force, intended “to work aggressively to prevent aliens who engage in or support 
terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any 
such aliens who are within the United States” (Bush, 2001b). In remarks to the press 
about the multi-year program, President Bush explicitly linked 9/11 to immigration:  
September the 11th taught us an interesting lesson, that while by far the 
vast majority of people who have come to America are really good, decent 
people, people that we're proud to have here, there are some who are evil. 
And our job now is to find the evil ones and to bring them to justice, to 
disrupt anybody who might have designs on hurting—further hurting 
Americans. (Bush, 2001k)  
The task force directive authorized a diverse array of actors – including immigration 
authorities like the INS, Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), 
the Secret Service, the intelligence community, “military support components”, and 
federal agencies (the Departments of Justice, State and Treasury) – to “deny entry” to 
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incoming individuals and “locate, detain, prosecute, or deport” those already in the US 
that were suspected of “[engaging] in, or supporting terrorist activity” (Bush, 2001b). 
The directive also ordered an increase in “the number of Customs and INS special 
agents assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces” resulting in “new positions over and 
above the existing on-duty special agent forces of the two agencies” (Bush, 2001b). 
Student immigrants became targets, especially those studying “sensitive” subjects  
“with direct application to the development and use of weapons of mass destruction”. 
Finally, the directive called for technological improvements to monitor immigrants and 
develop a shared immigration database with Canada and Mexico in order to tighten 
border controls (Bumiller, 2001). Underscoring the exceptionalism of the threat and the 
extrajudicial latitude available to enforcement agencies, Bush declared that “To the 
extent that there may be legal barriers to such data sharing, the Director of the [Office 
of Science and Technology Policy] shall submit to the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget proposed legislative remedies”. (Bush, 2001b) 
Bush’s directive intensified the securitization of immigration by expanding the scope of 
actors involved in immigration enforcement – to now include the intelligence 
community, law enforcement and the military – and authorizing the mobilization of 
technology to tighten border security. The inclusion of immigration enforcement 
personnel (namely Customs and INS agents) in a counterterrorist task force not only 
strengthened the association between criminal terrorists and immigrants, but also 
reified the threatening nature of unauthorized immigration as a problem to be resolved 
through exceptional law enforcement. This new frame diverged from previous 
evaluations of immigrants as individuals who “should be greeted not with suspicion 
and resentment but with openness and courtesy” – now, some immigrants were 
recognized as “evil” persons who needed to be expelled. The restrictions on students 
was also a marked reversal in tone from pre-9/11 discourse aimed at facilitating youth 
immigration. Moving away from empathetic rhetoric that emphasized shared family 
values and ambitions between the immigrant Other and American Self, Bush’s new 
tone emphasized conflict and differences between the two. By referring to immigrants 
as “aliens” eight times (against only one reference to “immigrants” in his opening), his 
speech act increased the metaphorical foreignness of the immigrant Other relative to the 
American Self. The directive also introduced a different remedy proposal frame: while 
previous rhetoric was aimed at expansionism and integration, Bush’s directive called 
for mobilization of technology to bolster border security. The introduction of new, 
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more sophisticated exceptional measures alone was indicative of a securitizing stance, 
but the directive’s invitation of “legislative remedies” to overcome legal barriers 
provided rare explicit latitude to abandon existing rules: the waiver underscored the 
exceptionalism of the threat and signaled to audiences that immigration enforcement 
was a high enough priority to overturn existing laws.  
In short, Bush’s directive not only widened the distance between the immigrant Other 
and the American Self, it also created a juxtaposition between two Self identities: a pre-
9/11 desecuritizing Self and a post-9/11 securitizing Self. The new securitizing basic 
discourse was qualitatively different from the desecuritizing basic discourse in two 
main respects: along the moral evaluation axis, immigrants were increasingly linked to 
criminality and terrorism; and along the remedy proposal axis, border security replaced 
integration and expansionism, whether through technological solutions or expansion of 
border security personnel.  
6.2.2.2 Immigration in Counterterrorist Legislation 
Less than two weeks after 9/11, Justice Department chief John Ashcroft explicitly 
linked immigration to the counterterrorism effort in his presentation of the Bush 
administration’s multi-pronged anti-terrorism proposal to the House Judiciary 
Committee. By placing immigration enforcement alongside proposals to improve the 
intelligence-gathering infrastructure through surveillance of communication metadata, 
raise the “penalties for conspiracy to commit terrorist acts to a serious level”, and seize 
financial assets, the Attorney General cemented the link between immigration and 
counterterrorism. Using both the criminal and border security frames, he requested  
to enhance the authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to 
detain or remove suspected alien terrorists from within our borders. The 
ability of alien terrorists to move freely across our borders and operate 
within the United States is critical to their capacity to inflict damage on 
our citizens and facilities. Under current law, the existing grounds for 
removal of aliens for terrorism are limited to direct material support of an 
individual terrorist. We propose to expand these grounds for removal to 
include material support to terrorist organizations. We propose that any 
alien who provides material support to an organization that he or she 
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knows or should know is a terrorist organization should be subject to 
removal from the United States. (Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 2001, 2001) 
Ashcroft’s proposals paved the way for Title IV of the PATRIOT Act62 – entitled 
“Protecting the Border” – signed into law on October 26, 2001. While the PATRIOT 
Act itself constitutes an exceptional measure, it simultaneously had a securitizing effect 
in that it perpetuated the link between immigration and terrorism more publicly. 
Alongside a number of counterterrorist measures, the act authorized the indefinite 
detention of immigrants and non-citizens (American Civil Liberties Union, 2001); a 
waiver of INS employment caps; a budget increase to triple the size of Border Patrol 
and other immigration authorities; $50 million to the INS and Customs Service for 
surveillance technology improvements; improvements to technology for background 
checks; a system to grant immigration authorities access to FBI criminal records; and 
data system integration with law enforcement databases as well as implementation of 
biometric technology at entry and exit ports (U.S. Congress, 2001). 
The immigration components of the PATRIOT Act also strengthened the association 
between border security and criminality frames on the one hand and the securitizing 
basic discourse on the other hand. The specific calls to increase the size of Border 
Patrol (as well as other immigration enforcement) personnel and funding for border 
surveillance signaled to the public that immigration was a problem to be resolved 
through exceptional measures like increased enforcement – both personnel and 
technology – at the border rather than procedural citizenship- or status-granting means. 
Measures like detention and integration with FBI and other law enforcement agency 
data systems, on the other hand, helped to reinforce the criminal immigrant metaphor 
by linking immigrants to processes typically associated with illegality. Importantly the 
PATRIOT Act garnered significant attention in mainstream discourse, ensuring that it 
was widely received by (if not necessarily accepted) and accessible to the public.  
Immigration became even more intertwined with terrorism and national security the 
following year when the previously independent INS was broken up into three new 
 
62 Alternatively, the USA PATRIOT Act, which is an abbreviation for Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.  
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agencies – U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services – and placed under 
the authority of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
(Rosenblum, 2011: 4). As the “largest restructuring of executive-branch functions since 
the establishment of the Department of Defense after World War II” (Rosenblum, 
2011: 4), the move placed all immigration related functions into the DHS, including 
internal enforcement, border security, and even citizenship granting services. Both the 
magnitude of this change as well as the permanent institutionalization of immigration 
under the umbrella of “homeland security” reified the heightened perception of 
immigration as a national security threat.  
Several other high-profile securitizing moves promoted a threatening characterization 
of unauthorized immigration, invoking language that perpetuated a criminal and 
terrorist immigrant metaphor. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, for example, provisioned funds for “additional surveillance, border 
enforcement, and immigration detention beds.” (Rosenblum, 2011: 5) Passed by the 
House in 2005 (though later rejected in the Senate), the Border Protection, Anti-
Terrorism and Illegal Immigration Act sought to criminalize “illegal immigration” and 
aid to unauthorized immigrants, and erect a 700-mile double-layered fence along the 
US-Mexico border.63 Directly linking immigrants to terrorism, it required that all 
unauthorized immigrants be cleared against a terrorist watch-list before being granted 
legal status. Finally, the REAL ID Act of 2005 linked immigration to terrorism by 
including provisions for deporting unauthorized persons and denying asylum to 
individuals associated with terrorism. The act also permitted waivers of environmental 
restrictions and other laws that obstructed the construction of physical barriers along 
the border, suggesting, like the 2001 Bush directive, that legal obstacles could be 
overcome in the name of security.  
Beyond the immigration-terrorism nexus, several other key immigration enforcement 
and border security initiatives emerged after 9/11 that continued to promote the 
securitizing basic discourse using border security and criminality frames. These 
 
63 The Act also had a provision requiring the DHS to “conduct a study and report to Congress respecting 
the necessity and feasibility of constructing a barrier system along the northern U.S. land and maritime 
border” (U.S. Congress, 2005).  
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included the 287(g) program, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 
Act (EBSVERA), the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) of 2005 and the Secure Fence Act 
of 2006. The 287(g) program extended federal immigration enforcement powers to 
state and local law enforcement agencies through a partnership with the INS (and later, 
ICE), authorizing “state and local officers to screen people for immigration status, issue 
detainers to hold them on immigration violations until the federal government takes 
custody, and generate the charges that begin the process of their removal from the 
United States” (Capps, Rosenblum, Chishti, & Rodríguez, 2011: 1). Enacted in May 
2002, EBSVERA mirrored PATRIOT Act mandates to accelerate data sharing and 
immigrant tracking systems (Rosenblum, 2011: 5). Like the REAL ID Act of 2005, 
both the SBI and Secure Fence Act aimed to expand border security through 
infrastructure and technological measures. Specifically, SBI sought to increase the 
number of Border Patrol agents; expedite removal and increase detention capacity; 
deploy unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors and surveillance systems along the border to 
assist enforcement; waive legal barriers “to ensure expeditious completion of the 14-
mile Border Infrastructure System”; and bolster interior enforcement through employer 
compliance mechanisms (Department of Homeland Security, 2005). The Secure Fence 
Act was more focused, calling for “the construction of an estimated 700 miles of 
double-fencing and additional surveillance infrastructure along the Southwest border” 
(Rosenblum, 2011: 8).  
By linking immigration to terrorism and expanding enforcement mechanisms, these 
securitizing moves were a major reversal from the Bush administration’s early 
expansionist agenda. They marked the (re)emergence of major efforts to regulate 
immigration through traditional tools – including deportation, detention, expansion of 
enforcement personnel and authority – as well as new technological capabilities that 
improved cross-agency data sharing, equipping immigration authorities with data and 
resources from law enforcement agencies like the FBI. Immigrants were not only 
linked to criminality, but now also to national security. Executive policies and 
legislative acts pooled immigration enforcement with terrorism, applying measures 
generally reserved for tackling national security threats in the context of immigration. 
While the coexistence of immigration enforcement and counterterrorism methods 
created an implicit link between the two, the consolidation of immigration enforcement 
agencies and citizenship granting functions into the Department of Homeland Security 
explicitly made immigration a national security issue. Even though these acts did not 
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explicitly say immigrants were terrorists, the simultaneous utterance of both identities 
alongside each other within the same context reinforced a rhetorical and metaphorical 
link between immigration and terrorism. The repetition and rehearsal of these links by 
political elites in speech, policy documents and legislation helped to commit these 
associations to long-term memory and to institutionalize the securitizing discourse. The 
spreading activation model also suggests that repeatedly linking immigration to 
terrorism helped reshape existing (or construct new) schemas that created mental 
associations between immigrants and terrorism. The activation of any one node – 
“immigration” or “terrorism” – could then trigger activation of the other. Consequently, 
these invocations made it possible for “terrorism” and “immigration” to occupy 
overlapping discursive and conceptual spaces. 
Post 9/11 speech acts and policies also strengthened the association of the border 
security frame with the securitizing basic discourse. The exceptionalism of the threat of 
immigration was underscored by multiple policies and statements sanctioning the 
waiver of existing laws to bolster border security. By April 2008, DHS Secretary 
Michael Chertoff had “waived more than 30 laws dealing with environmental 
protection, Native American autonomy, and historic preservation, in order to facilitate 
construction of border fencing at US-Mexico border.” (Mittelstadt et al., 2011: 9) This 
signaled to audiences that immigration was sufficiently threatening to nullify existing 
laws and thus operate in a state of exception beyond everyday politics. Collectively, 
post-9/11 speech acts and policies constructed a more radical conception of the 
immigrant Other, and by extension constructed a new securitizing Self that identified 
immigration as more threatening than before.  
6.2.3 Media Mobilization Kills Bills 
Still, the securitizing identity and discourse was not always unopposed, nor were 
political elites the only active participants in immigration discourse. Spurred by 
political debate on immigration between 2005 and 2007, several outspoken press actors 
– especially in talk radio and cable television – mobilized on both sides of the debate, 
playing key roles in inspiring and affecting legislation and the political mood. 
Specifically, the press helped derail two major attempts at comprehensive immigration 
reform (CIR) in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The CIR bills married border security, 
pathway toward citizenship or legalization, and a temporary worker program that was 
responsive to US labor market demands. While several structural factors regarding the 
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press landscape contributed to the potency of the media narrative64, a lack of sustained 
political leadership meant that political elites surrendered much of their influence to the 
press. President Bush – whose approval ratings had plummeted from 58% in 2004 to 
33% in 2006 (Suro, 2008: 35) – faced a crisis in credibility following a botched 
response to Hurricane Katrina and an unpopular war in Iraq; congressional Republicans 
were divided by infighting; and Democrats’ ambitions for regaining control of 
Congress in 2006 and then subsequent desire to protect narrowly won majorities 
motivated a more passive politics on divisive issues like immigration (Suro, 2008). 
Press actors rushed to fill the leadership void.  
Breaking party ranks, conservative media first criticized President Bush’s January 2004 
proposal for immigration reform. Emphasizing that immigration “represents the best 
tradition of our society, a society that honors the law and welcomes the newcomer” 
(Bush, 2004b), Bush encouraged Congress to pass legislation that would create new 
channels for matching temporary workers to employers according to labor market 
demands. His compassionate tone was exemplified by his preference for labeling 
unauthorized immigrants “undocumented” (a term he used six times in his remarks) 
over “illegal” (used only once). Despite Bush’s insistence that his proposal did not 
constitute “amnesty”, the conservative press insisted it did and rejected his 
compassionate tone (Suro, 2008). Fox News, for example, ran a story on its website 
headlined “Bush Amnesty Plan Raises Immigration Concerns”, noting that “any plan 
that allows, as the new Bush plan does, illegal aliens to remain legally and permanently 
in the United States without having to return to their home countries and apply to enter 
the United States legally like everyone else, is, in fact, an amnesty.” (Fox News, 2004) 
Similarly, the National Review argued in its article entitled “Amnesty Again” that 
Bush’s policy “is described as a guest-worker program, but the ‘guest’ concept is 
deceptive; in fact, the program would provide for the permanent importation of 
thousands of new workers from overseas and amnesty for illegal aliens already here.” 
(Krikorian, 2004) Notably, from a framing standpoint, these articles reflected a broader 
 
64 As highlighted in the introductory chapter, the effectiveness of media messaging during this era can be 
attributed to increased polarization and the repeal of the fairness doctrine, enabling pundits to promote 
one-sided, unverified and partisan exaggerations to drive a point (Suro, 2008: 8).  
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conservative rejection of the president’s use of “undocumented”, referring to 
unauthorized immigrants instead as “illegal”.  
In addition to criticizing “amnesty”, the press amplified the border security frame. This 
was most visible in 2005, when outlets gave disproportionate attention to the anti-
immigrant protest at the border staged by the vigilante citizen-border patrol group, the 
Minuteman Project (Douzet, 2009; Suro, 2008: 23). In an interview with the project’s 
founder Jim Gilchrist, Fox News anchor Sean Hannity voiced his support, invoking 
both the link to terrorism as well as the urgency for border security:  
I hope you call a lot of attention to it [the protest], because if we don't 
secure the borders of this country, we will always be potential victims of 
terror. And both parties aren't getting it now. And I hope they hear your 
message loud and clear. (Hannity & Colmes, 2005)  
The protest drew significant coverage by other media actors as well (Suro, 2008: 23), 
intensifying for many viewers the perception of an urgent and imminent immigration 
threat along the border.  
Empowered by this securitizing discourse, other anti-immigrant and pro-enforcement 
organizations – such as the Center for Immigration Studies, the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform and Numbers USA – also sought media coverage, 
motivating their members to apply pressure on lawmakers and thus cultivating “a 
highly effective echo chamber that reverberated on Capitol Hill” (Suro, 2008: 39). The 
combined pressure from these actors as well as the popularization of the securitizing 
basic discourse in the press culminated in the controversial House-passed Border 
Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437). As 
noted in the previous section, the bill called to criminalize unauthorized immigration 
(raising the penalty from a misdemeanor to a felony) and construct a 700-mile border 
fence. If the bill was not a direct byproduct of media influence, it was at least a 
reflection of the prevailing securitizing discourse the press was promoting.  
But the conservative press framing was not unchallenged. In response to H.R. 4437, 
Spanish language news media – including Telemundo, Univision and a number of radio 
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stations – mobilized and helped spur mass protests in American cities from March 
through May of 2006. Across three months, over 3.5 million people marched in 120 
cities, heeding the press’ calls to protest the bill’s criminalization statue (Suro, 2008: 
37). Just as the House had reacted to anti-immigrant press and the Minuteman Project, 
the Senate this time responded to pro-immigrant press coverage and the mass protests. 
It countered the controversial H.R. 4437 with its own CIR legislation, the 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611). While H.R. 4437 had 
focused solely on the criminal and border security frames, the Senate’s S. 2611 
attempted to find the middle ground: it invoked border security (a 370-mile wall) 
alongside provisions for a pathway toward citizenship and a special visa targeted 
toward guest workers. Unlike the House bill, S. 2611 did not link immigrants to 
criminality, and its concession for a border wall (albeit a smaller one than the House 
bill called for) was matched with expansionist provisions. Also unlike the House bill – 
which exclusively referred to unauthorized persons as “illegal aliens” – the Senate bill 
used a mix of qualifiers, including “illegal” and “undocumented”. Nonetheless the 
Senate bill was again attacked by the conservative press, prompting President Bush to 
remark: “Some in this country argue that the solution is to deport every illegal 
immigrant, and that any proposal short of this amounts to amnesty. I disagree.” (Bush, 
2006a). The inability to reconcile the two vastly different bills led to both H.R. 4437 
and S. 2611 being killed. 
A similar fate befell the 2007 attempt at legislating CIR. Despite attempts to negotiate 
and pass the bill quietly and quickly outside the media spotlight (Suro, 2008: 35), 
Congressional disagreement and infighting delayed voting, giving the conservative 
press sufficient time to launch an attack campaign (Baum & Groeling, 2007). The 
media response was largely one-sided: in the weeks surrounding the debate, CNN’s 
Lou Dobbs – who was a strong advocate of anti-immigration restrictionist measures 
(Facchini, Mayda, & Puglisi, 2017; Merolla et al., 2013) – devoted 43.1% of his 
program to immigration; Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly devoted 19.4% of his airtime to 
immigration; and Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes devoted 16.5% of their program’s 
airtime to immigration. On the generally liberal MSNBC, conversely, Chris Matthews 
only gave 5.1% of its newshole to immigration (Pew Research Center, 2008). While 
conservative pundits were vociferous in promoting their securitizing restrictionist 
agenda, their liberal counterparts were largely silent, enabling the securitizing basic 
discourse to become salient while other perspectives were marginalized. As with the 
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2006 attempt, the 2007 CIR bill was largely rejected by conservative personalities as 
amnesty, with conservative CNN anchor Dobbs invoking the illegal frame and 
emphasizing the threat to national security in his rebuff of the deal:65  
The pro-illegal alien and open borders lobby today winning what is an 
apparent major political victory. A bipartisan group of senators 
announcing a deal to give as many as 20 million illegal aliens amnesty. 
There are rising concerns tonight that that amnesty compromise could 
threaten national sovereignty and security, opening U.S. borders even 
further with Mexico and Canada. (Dobbs, 2007) 
Again, President Bush’s attempts to stave off such criticism as “empty political rhetoric 
trying to frighten our citizens” (Rutenberg, 2007) could not save the doomed bill. Like 
its predecessor the year before, the bill never passed.   
While the media’s role in (de)securitizing the immigration debate is explored in more 
detail in the following chapter, it is worth underscoring here that press rhetoric not only 
influenced prevailing discourse (especially as political elites became publicly less 
vociferous on the controversial immigration issue), but also helped mobilize legislative 
action. First, conservative outlets’ criticism of President Bush’s 2004 “amnesty” 
proposal combined with increased coverage of anti-immigrant and pro-border security 
groups like the Minuteman Project helped popularize the securitization basic discourse 
and its major component frames (border security and criminality). The press narrative 
that Bush’s amnesty proposal was rewarding “illegal aliens” for unlawfully entering the 
US aligned with the criminal frame while the increased focus on vigilante patrol groups 
emphasized the border security frame. These securitizing messages saturated 
immigration discourse, and helped popularize the impression of an urgent threat at the 
border. On the other hand, the counterreaction from Spanish language press to H.R. 
4437 also inspired action beyond rhetoric by encouraging protests. Explicit instructions 
given to protestors to wave the American flag over their own home country’s flag 
helped to narrow the gap between immigrant Others and the American Self, because 
 
65 A separate content analysis of media coverage found that, from May to June of 2007, Lou Dobbs 
mentioned “amnesty” in every one of 42 stories on immigration, while Bill O’Reilly mentioned 
“amnesty” in 18 of 34 stories (Suro, 2008: 39).  
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the gesture signaled a shared patriotism. Rather than emphasizing differences, press 
actors encouraged protestors to underscore similarities. Whether the effect was 
successful or not, the intention was at least to promote the perception that immigrants 
were not a security threat to Americans, but instead shared the same values (patriotism) 
and identities (being American). Finally, the second attempt at CIR sparked renewed 
censure from the conservative press, that again mainstreamed the securitizing basic 
discourse. Rhetoric by actors like Dobbs, who claimed the bill was a threat to “national 
sovereignty and security” helped to prevent it from being enacted.  
6.2.4 Compromising Discourse under the Obama Administration 
Like Bush, Obama’s speech acts and policies were mixed. Obama emphasized the need 
for border security in speech acts, but was more judicious in his invocation of the 
criminal frame and opted to describe unauthorized immigrants as “undocumented” 
more frequently than “illegal”. From a policy perspective, not only did CIR fail to pass 
under the new president, but detention practices during the 2014 migrant crisis and 
record-level deportations executed through internal raids promoted the impression of 
immigrants as criminal threats to be deported. These actions earned Obama the title of 
“deporter in chief” (Krogstad, 2014); Obama nonetheless rebutted this accusation, 
calling himself instead the “champion in chief of comprehensive immigration reform” 
(Obama, 2014c), owing to policies like the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and 
other executive actions during his presidency that either secured or attempted to secure 
temporary legal status for 3.5 million unauthorized immigrants. His presidency thus 
oversaw a mixture of both securitizing and desecuritizing basic discourses and frames.  
6.2.4.1 Mixed Rhetoric  
Characteristic of his compromising approach to immigration, Obama frequently related 
his policies to his Republican predecessor’s; rather than construct a wholly new Self to 
differentiate himself from Bush, Obama characterized his own ambitions as continuous 
with his predecessor’s. Early in his presidential campaign, Obama, like Bush, 
emphasized shared traits between Americans and immigrants, thus shrinking the gap 
between the Self and Other. In a June 2008 speech, he stated:  
America has nothing to fear from today's immigrants. They have come 
here for the same reason that families have always come here, for the same 
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reason my father came here – for the hope that in America, they could 
build a better life for themselves and their families. (Obama, 2008g) 
Similarly, after his election, in a July 2010 speech, he noted that the “estimated 11 
million undocumented immigrants” are “simply seeking a better life for themselves and 
their children.” (Obama, 2010) Still, he argued that “the presence of so many illegal 
immigrants makes a mockery of all those who are going through the process of 
immigrating legally.” Whether deliberate or otherwise, these excerpts interestingly 
reveal that Obama employed different qualifiers: when emphasizing shared ambitions, 
Obama used the term “undocumented immigrants”, but when acknowledging the threat 
to legal institutions, he used the term “illegal immigrant.”66 
Obama also sought to pass CIR legislation, using (perhaps intentionally) the same term 
for it as his predecessor. Days after his 2012 reelection, Obama spoke:  
And when I say comprehensive immigration reform, it is very similar to 
the outlines of previous efforts at comprehensive immigration reform. I 
think it should include a continuation of the strong border security 
measures that we've taken, because we have to secure our borders. I think 
it should contain serious penalties for companies that are purposely hiring 
undocumented workers and taking advantage of them. And I do think that 
there should be a pathway for legal status for those who are living in this 
country, are not engaged in criminal activity, are here simply to work. 
(Obama, 2012a)  
In response, the Senate introduced its 2013 CIR bill. Mirroring the 2006 and 2007 
legislations it was modeled upon, the bill advanced a mixture of expansionist and 
restrictionist measures, including a path to citizenship for unauthorized workers; 
temporary visa categories for guest workers; funding for fencing and technology along 
the Southern border; and an increase in border security personnel by over 40,000 agents 
(U.S. Congress, 2013). Obama recognized the similarity with Bush’s attempts, noting 
 
66 This differentiation occurred again in a May 2011 speech (Obama, 2011). 
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that his success would “be in large part thanks to the hard work of President George W. 
Bush” (Obama, 2013). 
Still, despite bipartisan Senate support for the bill, the House declined to vote on it, 
effectively killing the legislation. House Republicans responded instead with their own 
set of immigration principles, which used securitizing rhetoric and emphasized in a 
preamble that the nation’s immigration system is “jeopardizing our national security” 
("Standards for Immigration Reform," 2014). The proposals in the document 
emphasized exceptional measures like border security, but rejected legal status for 
immigrants “who broke our nation’s immigration laws” ("Standards for Immigration 
Reform," 2014). When House Republicans failed to vote on the CIR bill, Obama again 
alluded to his predecessor:  
It wasn't that long ago that my predecessor, George W. Bush, a 
Republican—a conservative Republican from Texas, with whom I 
disagreed with on a whole lot of things, made immigration reform one of 
his core priorities. “We cannot build a unified country,” he said, “by 
inciting people to anger or playing on anyone's fears or exploiting the 
issue of immigration for political gain.” That's what he said. Think how 
much better our economy would be if the rest of his party got the message. 
(Obama, 2015) 
The frequent comparisons between his own policy and Bush’s policy in speech acts 
suggest that Obama may have been strategically appealing to both sides – hardline 
restrictionist Republicans as well as pro-immigrant expansionist Democrats – of the 
immigration debate. This was evident in his rhetoric as well, which mixed securitizing 
calls for border security with desecuritizing calls for paths to citizenship. While he was 
more constrained in his use of the criminal/terrorist frame than his predecessor, he at 
least recognized that unauthorized immigrants had broken the law; still, Obama largely 
emphasized shared values, thus narrowing the gap between the American Self and the 
immigrant Other. The Self identity he had constructed through his rhetoric was also 
similar to the Self identity constructed by Bush era discourse – the difference was that 
Obama invoked the criminal frame less frequently, and thus promoted the threatening 
criminal metaphor less than his predecessor.  
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6.2.4.2 Expansionist Executive Actions 
Despite failed CIR attempts, the president provided temporary legal status to a large 
category of childhood arrivals and protected their parents from deportation through his 
2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, affecting 580,000 
immigrants (The Guardian, 2014). In a Rose Garden announcement, Obama invoked a 
familiar sympathetic tone that, again, minimized the distance between the American 
Self and the immigrant Other, while also suggesting that unauthorized persons were 
victims of a documenting procedure rather than criminals: 
Now, these are young people who study in our schools, they play in our 
neighborhoods, they're friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our 
flag. They are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way 
but one: on paper. They were brought to this country by their parents--
sometimes even as infants--and often have no idea that they're 
undocumented until they apply for a job or a driver's license or a college 
scholarship. (Obama, 2012b)  
Similarly, when the House failed to vote on the 2013 CIR bill, the Obama 
administration responded in 2014 with its Immigration Accountability Executive 
Action aimed at both improving border security as well as granting temporary legal 
status and work permits to certain categories of unauthorized immigrants. On the 
border security front, the policy largely reiterated previous commitments to prioritize 
“national security threats, serious criminals, and recent border crossers” for expulsion. 
The key new additions, however, were increased flexibility for current visa holders, the 
expansion of eligibility for DACA, and further protection for undocumented parents of 
legal permanent residents (Obama, 2014b). The latter policy, Deferred Action for 
Parents of U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), protected parents 
from deportation and enabled them to apply for work permits for up to three years at a 
time. While the executive action did not provide a pathway solution, it would have 
benefited at least 3.5 million of the 11 million unauthorized immigrants at the time of 
its announcement (Goo, 2015a). In his speech announcing the executive action, Obama 
balanced both a securitizing message on border security with an overall desecuritizing 
push to protect certain unauthorized immigrants from deportation. Specifically, he 
provisioned “additional resources for our law enforcement personnel so that they can 
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stem the flow of illegal crossings and speed the return of those who do cross over”  
(Obama, 2014a), while also noting of immigrants that  
They work hard, often in tough, low-paying jobs. They support their 
families. They worship at our churches. Many of their kids are American-
born or spent most of their lives here, and their hopes, dreams, and 
patriotism are just like ours. As my predecessor President Bush once put 
it, "They are a part of American life." (Obama, 2014a) 
Notably, in the same speech, Obama made five references to “undocumented 
immigrants” and no references to “illegal immigrants”, suggesting his preference to 
identify immigrants as a largely procedural problem rather than a criminal problem. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, ultimately blocked DAPA after Republicans in 
Congress challenged Obama’s authority to pass a policy that resembled legislation.  
Obama’s attempts, nonetheless, contributed to minimizing the threatening complexion 
of unauthorized immigrants. Specifically, the promotion of DAPA moved away from 
securitizing rhetoric (such as labeling unauthorized immigrants criminals) and instead 
focused on emphasizing similarities between immigrants and Americans. Obama 
further suggested that certain classes of unauthorized immigrants were not sufficiently 
threatening to warrant removal. The ensuing legal battle over DAPA however implied 
that the president was attempting to effect a significant policy that overstepped his 
authority; this had the effect of further otherizing unauthorizing immigrants, because it 
suggested any attempt to integrate them required Congressional deliberation.  
6.2.4.3 Restrictionist Executive Actions 
Obama’s expansionist measures were matched by heavily criticized detention policies 
and a record number of formal removals – over three million between 2009 and 2016 
(Breisblatt, 2017; Chishti, Pierce, & Bolter, 2017) – that helped promote a threatening 
and criminal impression of immigrants in public discourse.67 Certainly, the deportation 
statistics are more nuanced: while formal removals increased significantly under 
Obama, “voluntary returns” – or the process of allowing unauthorized border-crossers 
 
67 For context, the previous Bush administration deported just over 2 million individuals; and the Clinton 
administration deported less than 700,000 individuals (Chishti et al., 2017).  
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to return across the border without formal proceedings – decreased significantly, 
meaning that Obama actually oversaw fewer overall deportations than his predecessors. 
Moreover, Obama’s deportations became more focused throughout his tenure: his 
policies aimed at deporting noncitizens who had been convicted of “serious crimes” as 
well as those that had crossed the border recently. From 2009 to 2016, the percentage 
of noncitizens removed who had been convicted of “serious crimes” increased from 51 
to 90 percent. Meanwhile the emphasis on recent border crossers targeted individuals 
who were less likely to have established strong roots within the US. These 
considerations notwithstanding, the dominant narrative in immigration discourse 
focused on the increase in formal removals, signaling an aggressive border security 
strategy to the public.  
The Obama administration also signaled a hardline approach in its border enforcement 
policies and handling of the Central American migrant crisis in 2014. That year, an 
estimated 68,500 unaccompanied children were apprehended by Border Patrol at the 
Southwest border (Kandel, 2017), many fleeing regional violence and poverty in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Gonzalez-Barrera, Krogstad, & Lopez, 2014). In 
response, Obama requested from Congress across two letters in June and July of 2014 
the authority to pursue “an aggressive deterrence strategy focused on the removal and 
repatriation of recent border crossers”; and to “support a sustained border security 
surge through enhanced domestic enforcement, including air surveillance” (Obama, 
2014d, 2014e). Certainly requests were made for the resources to “care for children and 
adults” and “immigration litigation attorneys” (Obama, 2014d), but these latter 
measures were largely overshadowed in public discourse by the former border security 
elements. The American Immigration Council (2017) accused the Obama 
administration of “not [treating] this influx of Central Americans as a humanitarian 
issue, but rather as an enforcement issue”, adding further that poor detention facilities 
resulted in family separation, “substandard medical care” and “psychological distress 
including depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping”.  
Later that year, the DHS further emphasized both the border security and criminal 
frames in its announcement of “Polices for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal 
of Undocumented Immigrants”. The memo stressed that “DHS's enforcement priorities 
are, have been, and will continue to be national security, border security, and public 
safety” (Johnson, 2014), and it listed several criteria for high priority removal targets. 
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These included “aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage, or who 
otherwise pose a danger to national security”; “aliens convicted of an offense for which 
an element was active participation in a criminal street gang”; “aliens convicted of an 
offense classified as a felony”; and “aliens convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’” 
(Johnson, 2014). The “deportation raids” became systematized under the DHS’ 
Operation Border Guardian (enacted in January 2016) which focused on repatriating 
individuals who arrived as unaccompanied children after January 1, 2014, but had since 
become adults. Criticism from organizations and politicians demonstrate the discursive 
effect that these policies generated at the time. A joint letter signed by over 150 
immigrants’ rights organizations scolded: “The very title of this operation points to a 
much larger problem: DHS’s treatment of a humanitarian situation primarily as a 
border security issue.” (American Civil Liberties Union, 2016) It further noted, in 
protest of the administration’s use of the illegal frame, that “Statements by this 
Administration calling refugee unaccompanied children and mothers with their children 
an ‘illegal’ migration is not only false, but is inhumane.” (American Civil Liberties 
Union, 2016) The raids also drew criticism from congresspersons, who condemned the 
“enforcement operation targeting refugee mothers and children” (Johnson, 2016).  
Obama’s immigration legacy – and the (de)securitizing signals it produced in public 
discourse – thus remains mixed. On the one hand, his reputation for expanding the 
number of formal removals and detaining Central American migrants during the 2014 
crisis reified the perception of immigrants as criminals. The combination of record 
deportations and the specific targeting of individuals with criminal records also 
furthered the impression that there were a record number of criminal immigrants in the 
country, again strengthening the criminal-immigrant narrative. Similarly, the targeting 
of mothers and children from Central America in the 2016 raids sent the signal that the 
crisis was a border security and enforcement issue rather than a humanitarian one. On 
the other hand, the passage of DACA (and attempts to institute DAPA) signaled an 
expansionist agenda and promoted the desecuritizing basic discourse. Moreover, 
Obama’s rhetoric surrounding these policies was aimed at emphasizing similarities 
between the American Self and immigration Other. His Rose Garden speech, for 
example, argued that DACA beneficiaries lacked documentation, but had attended the 
same schools and played in the same neighborhoods as “our kids”. Similarly, in his 
2013 speech supporting CIR, he likened immigrants’ experiences to “our lives”, which, 
again, minimized the distance between the American Self and the immigrant Other.  
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Obama’s efforts generated, at the same time, criticism from both sides of the debate. 
When his policies had the potential to send securitizing signals (e.g., in his handling of 
the 2014 migrant crisis), frequent criticism from pro-immigrant groups buoyed the 
desecuritizing basic discourse. Similarly, Obama’s support for pathways toward legal 
status was answered by the House Republican set of immigration principles that 
emphasized border security. Interestingly, Obama’s attempts to appease two opposing 
sides, thus, ultimately cost him legitimacy among both.  
Another distinguishing feature of the Obama presidency was his attempt to align his 
immigration policy with his predecessor’s. Even during the campaign, Obama indicated 
that he would pass the CIR bill that his predecessor fought for. Further, like Bush, 
Obama employed a compassionate tone towards immigrants, using language that 
humanized immigrants and minimized the distance between the Self and the Other. 
Obama was also accused of providing amnesty and defended himself by insisting his 
proposals did not constitute amnesty. At the same time, Obama, again, like Bush, also 
called for border security measures and used detention. Most of all, however, Obama’s 
support of a CIR bill was portrayed as a continuation of his predecessor’s goal for 
immigration policy. The Self identity that Obama had constructed was – whether 
deliberately or otherwise – proximate to the Self identity that Bush had constructed. 
Both had shared agendas and similar rhetoric; both also oversaw several legislative and 
executive failures in their immigration expansionist attempts.   
6.2.5 Discursive Innovation: The Trump Campaign  
The final two years of Obama’s presidency were marked by a major disruptive shift in 
immigration discourse, led by Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric between 2015 and 
2016. Trump not only promoted anti-immigration policies that differentiated himself 
from both the Bush and Obama administrations, but he explicitly identified his agenda 
as different from his predecessors’ approach. Where his predecessors had sought a 
compromise in the form of CIR and often employed a compassionate tone, Trump 
instead campaigned on a strong securitizing narrative that exclusively emphasized the 
border security and criminal frames. In doing so, Trump’s speech acts constructed a 
more austere Self that simultaneously constructed the Other as far more threatening 
than it was perceived to be under the Bush and Obama governments. Trump was 
entrepreneurial to the extent that his tone wholly rejected compromise – then a salient 
feature of CIR and existing political discourse on immigration – and instead shifted all 
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attention to securitizing rhetoric. His statements at the December 2015 Republican 
primary debate are perhaps most emblematic of his overall position on immigration:  
We are not talking about isolation. We're talking about security. We're not 
talking about religion. We're talking about security. Our country is out of 
control. People are pouring across the southern border. I will build a wall. 
It will be a great wall. People will not come in unless they come in legally. 
Drugs will not pour through that wall. As far as other people like in the 
migration, where they're going, tens of thousands of people having cell 
phones with ISIS flags on them? I don't think so, Wolf [debate moderator]. 
They're not coming to this country. And if I'm president and if Obama has 
brought some to this country, they are leaving. They're going. They're 
gone. (Presidential Candidate Debates, 2015, emphasis added)  
Not only did Trump underscore at the outset that immigration was a security concern, 
but his speech act linked immigrants to terrorism by invoking ISIS, crime by invoking 
drugs, and security by invoking exceptional measures like a wall and deportation. His 
promise to undo Obama-era policies further constructed an oppositional Self. Certainly 
campaigns are arenas ripe for differentiating oneself from predecessors (especially 
among oppositional parties); but Trump’s rhetoric aggressively reshaped the boundaries 
of political discourse even while using familiar immigration framing devices like 
border security (e.g., the wall and deportation), criminality and terrorism. 
Border Security 
Trump’s June 2015 presidential bid announcement set the tone for his immigration 
stance and border security policy. He introduced what would become his signature 
campaign promise on immigration: he “would build a great wall, and nobody builds 
walls better than me, believe me, and I’ll build them very inexpensively, I will build a 
great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall.” 
(Trump, 2015a) While border barriers were not new, Trump’s insistence that Mexico 
would foot the bill was innovative and thus attracted significant attention from the 
press, other political elites and the public. Emboldened by the spotlight, Trump made 
the point a common refrain in his public events, and during a Republican primary 
debate held in December 2015, he justified both his wall and deportation, saying:  
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People that have come into our country illegally, they have to go. They 
have to come back into through [sic] a legal process. I want a strong 
border. I do want a wall. Walls do work, you just have to speak to the 
folks in Israel. (Presidential Candidate Debates, 2015)  
As the campaign progressed, Trump’s border security measures became more 
formalized as key components of legislation he promised to pass if elected. The 
proposed “End Illegal Immigration Act”, for example, proposed to fund “the 
construction of a wall on our southern border with the full understanding that the 
country Mexico will be reimbursing the United States for the full cost of such wall.” 
(Keith & Montanaro, 2016) The wall was also the foremost item in Trump’s ten-point 
proposed immigration policy (Trump, 2016c). In the same plan, he emphasized 
“[tripling] the number of ICE deportation officers”; “[ensuring] that other countries 
take their people back when they order them deported”; and ending the “catch and 
release” program: “anyone who illegally crosses the border will be detained until they 
are removed out of our country and back to the country from which they came.” In 
doing so, Trump differentiated himself from Obama by rebuking Obama’s policy 
allowing border-crossers to be returned to Mexico without formal removal proceedings. 
Further differentiating himself from previous presidents, Trump insisted he would 
remove all 11 million unauthorized immigrants (as of 2015) within two years (Haddon, 
2015; Preston, Alan, & Richtel, 2016), through a “deportation force” (DelReal, 2015). 
In an August 2016 speech, he warned that “For those here illegally today who are 
seeking legal status, they will have one route and one route only. To return home and 
apply for re-entry like everybody else” (Trump, 2016c). Even at the height of the 
Syrian refugee crisis, following the Obama administration’s announcement that it 
would take in ten thousand refugees, Trump declared “If I win, they’re going back”, 
suggesting that “[t]hey could be ISIS, I don’t know” (Finnegan, 2015).  
Criminal/Terrorist Frame 
Furthering the immigrant-terrorism narrative, Trump repeatedly linked immigrants to 
ISIS and criminality. Again, during his presidential bid announcement speech in June 
2015, Trump infamously remarked that Mexican immigrants “have lots of problems, 
and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing 
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crime. They're rapists.” (Trump, 2015a) The following month, he claimed to have 
placed himself in “great danger” by visiting the Mexican border (Hohmann, 2015), 
implying that proximity to Mexico increased his exposure to crime. Trump also 
invoked the criminality frame in the aforementioned ten-point policy plan laid out in 
August 2016, which called for “[zero] tolerance for criminal aliens” and the immediate 
repeal of “President Obama's two illegal executive amnesties in which he defied federal 
law and the Constitution to give amnesty to approximately five million illegal 
immigrants” (Trump, 2016c). 
Beyond the criminal link, Trump used the terrorist-immigrant narrative more 
aggressively than Bush. In an October 2015 Fox News interview, for example, he 
argued that his immigration policies could have prevented the 9/11 attacks; and he 
explicitly differentiated himself from President Bush by adding, “I’m not blaming 
George Bush. But I don’t want Jeb [Trump’s Republican primary opponent] to say ‘my 
brother kept us safe’” (Richardson, 2015). Again, in June 2016, Trump drew a link 
between immigration and terrorism in his discussion of the Orlando mass shooting:  
The killer, whose name I will not use, or ever say, was born to Afghan 
parents who immigrated to the United States. His father published support 
for the Afghan Taliban, a regime which murders those who don’t share its 
radical views. The father even said he was running for president of that 
country. The bottom line is that the only reason the killer was in America 
in the first place was because we allowed his family to come here. 
(Trump, 2016b)  
In the same speech, after linking “radical Islam” to terrorism, he warned that his 
opponent “Hillary Clinton’s catastrophic immigration plan will bring vastly more 
Radical Islamic immigration into this country, threatening not only our security but our 
way of life”. He added, “If we want to remain a free and open society, then we have to 
control our borders” and that “[w]e have to control the amount of future immigration 
into this country to prevent large pockets of radicalization from forming inside 
America.” (Trump, 2016b) His proposed strategy was to institute a “complete 
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can 
figure out what is going on” (Trump, 2015b). Later deemed the “Muslim ban”, the idea 
evolved into a general suspension of immigration from certain countries. During the 
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same June 2016 speech in which he criticized Hillary Clinton’s plan, he promised, 
“When I am elected, I will suspend immigration from areas of the world when [sic] 
there is a proven history of terrorism against the United States, Europe or our allies, 
until we understand how to end these threats.” (Trump, 2016b; see also Trump, 2016a)  
Compared to Obama’s mixed securitizing and desecuritizing rhetoric, Trump’s speech 
acts were more focused, direct and one-sided. While both Bush and Obama had 
interlaced their border security policies with expansionist rhetoric – and in the case of 
Obama, expansionist actions like DACA – Trump solely promoted the securitizing 
basic discourse through repetition of threatening images of immigrants as criminals and 
terrorists. His repeated signature campaign promise for a border wall paid for by 
Mexico not only perpetuated the urgency for an immigration barrier, but it strengthened 
the link between border security and the securitizing frame. It also strengthened the 
construction of Mexican immigrants as a threatening Other from whom protection was 
urgent. The insistence that Mexico would pay for the wall helped to propel Trump’s 
message into mainstream discourse. There was nothing novel about a border fence – 
indeed, barriers were largely in place already owing to previous legislation like the 
REAL ID Act (2005) and the Secure Fence Act (2006). The suggestion that Mexico 
would pay for the wall made Trump’s rhetoric more sensational and newsworthy. The 
press naturally amplified the rhetoric and political elites responded. Nor was there 
anything new about linking immigrants to criminality (a persistent metaphor in the 
American immigration debate for decades) and terrorism (President Bush’s 
administration had pushed this association after 9/11). Trump, however, garnered 
attention for his employment of these frames by going beyond the typical criminal 
immigrant narratives, and emphasizing with specificity that immigrants were “rapists”, 
drug-dealers (Trump, 2015a), “killers” and “gang members” (Rappeport & Haberman, 
2016), again, making his frame novel and attracting increased attention. In both cases, 
the securitizing basic discourse commanded a larger proportion of overall immigration 
discourse. Trump was thus able to disrupt and reshape immigration discourse while still 
recycling the familiar securitizing border security and criminality framing devices.  
Trump was also innovative in that he deliberately presented his policies as different 
from his predecessors’. His hardline approach broke with the bipartisan climate aimed 
at achieving CIR (a key component of his competitors’ presidential campaigns). Rather 
than appealing to both sides of the debate – expansionists and restrictionists – Trump 
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emphasized threats. In doing so, Trump constructed and mainstreamed a new Self 
identity that stood in opposition to the more moderate (at least by comparison) Selves 
constructed under Bush and Obama. The impact of this was that it potentially gave the 
already polarized press, other political elites and the public a new identity to align with. 
While the extent to which the press and public rallied around this message is explored 
more deeply in Chapter 7, Trump’s electoral success – and the fact that immigration 
was a key part of his agenda – suggest that the securitizing Self he constructed through 
his securitizing speech acts may have resonated strongly with audiences.  
6.3 Conclusion 
Several critical insights emerge from this sixteen-year analysis of political discourse, 
providing a rare dissection of the immigration security debate spanning two 
presidencies. First, there were striking similarities between the Obama and Bush 
presidencies on immigration. Both presidents generally used compassionate rhetoric 
that minimized the distance between the American Self and the immigrant Other – 
specifically, the two presidents repeatedly invoked shared values and ambitions. Both 
also signaled to their audiences the desire to establish compromise through CIR 
legislation – with Obama explicitly linking his ambitions to his predecessor’s. Both 
presidents also saw these efforts fail in Congress repeatedly. While their rhetoric was 
largely compassionate, the two leaders sent securitizing signals in their policies: Bush 
oversaw the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the merger of immigration enforcement 
agencies under the DHS, and the waiver of several laws for border fence construction. 
Under Obama’s presidency, the DHS systematized “deportation raids” in Operation 
Border Guardian, and detention of unauthorized immigrants during the 2014 migrant 
crisis drew significant mainstream criticism. Still, 9/11 precipitated a terrorist 
immigrant link that Bush repeatedly invoked, leading to a generally stronger 
securitizing discourse under his administration; Obama avoided this narrative, keeping 
his overall discourse more balanced between the securitizing and desecuritizing frames.  
Trump, on the other hand, led an anti-immigrant campaign that exclusively invoked 
securitizing frames. If Bush and Obama had constructed relatively similar Selves 
through their rhetoric, Trump’s abandonment of moderation constructed a securitizing 
Self that was substantially new. Interestingly, Trump used familiar securitizing frames 
– border security and criminality – but in hyperbolic ways, making his messages more 
novel, and perhaps more newsworthy. His electoral victory – even in the face of 
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criticism from members in his own political party – suggests that repetition, and 
focused innovative securitizing discourse can both tap into and heighten anxieties, 
achieving a critical mass more effectively than compromising efforts like CIR. Not 
only does this align with framing literature that suggests a strong focused message is 
more effective than a moderated ambiguous one (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007), but 
it also confirms the negativity bias. To the extent that Trump’s electoral victory reflects 
his immigration agenda, securitizing discourse (that portrays immigrants using negative 
narratives like criminality and terrorism) driven by a few individuals may be more 
effective than desecuritizing messages employed by a wide array of actors. While the 
impact of desecuritizing discourse cannot be wholly dismissed – Spanish language 
radio and other press actors were able to mobilize significant popular protest of the 
2005 criminalization bill through their amplification of pro-immigrant frames – it has 
yet to produce a victory on the scale of Trump’s presidential election. 
Still, the media’s influence on the immigration security debate was significant. Press 
frames and their impact are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, but it is 
worth highlighting the magnitude of media impact on congressional legislation. The 
press backlash to the 2005 House criminalization bill prompted the Senate to pass a 
CIR bill that introduced pathways toward legalization and an expanded temporary 
worker program; similarly, press criticism of both that bill and the 2007 CIR bill 
effectively killed both attempted legislations (a further indicator of the likely greater 
strength of securitizing frames over desecuritizing frames). Bush’s and 
congresspersons’ outspoken frustrations that media was driving the immigration debate 
provide preliminary evidence of not only press independence from political elites, but 
also admission of press influence on the political process. The attempt to push the 2007 
CIR bill through Congress quietly and quickly before a media narrative could impede 
legislation underscores both the fear that political elites had of the press, as well as the 
power of press framing.  
Another interesting finding was the predominance of the subjective narrative over 
objective indicators and outcomes. While there was significant variation in discourse, 
objective trends in immigration stayed relatively stable, as identified in the 
introduction. Even more striking is the resonance of Trump’s strong securitizing 
language and insistence on a wall at the US-Mexico border when the net flow of 
Mexican migrants was in the opposite direction and border apprehensions were at their 
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lowest since 2000 (U.S. Border Patrol, 2019). This validates key tenets of securitization 
theory: securitizing discourses can emerge and resonate even in the absence of an 
objective threat; or in the case of immigration, in the presence of countervailing 
evidence. Again, to the extent that Trump’s 2016 victory reflected his immigration 
stance, his securitizing speech acts may have been key drivers of threat perceptions 
among audiences at a time when the threat was objectively least potent since 2000.  
Two final insights are notable about the discourses and frames more generally: 1) there 
is significant continuity between frames over the sixteen years; and 2) a longitudinal 
analysis here reveals that securitizing and desecuritizing discourses frequently cooccur. 
On the first point, border security and criminality were key recurring components of the 
securitizing basic discourse. Even new developments were framed using old tropes: 
9/11 produced a heightened criminal narrative (linking immigrants now to terrorism); 
the 2014 migrant crisis activated a border security narrative, with a focus on 
deportations and detention at the border; and though his insistence that Mexico would 
pay for it was novel, Trump’s promotion of a wall fit squarely within border security. 
Similarly, the desecuritizing basic discourse largely tried to minimize the criminality 
link, seeking instead to present unauthorized immigration as a procedural and 
documentation issue; it also tried to shrink the distance between the Self and Other. The 
sixteen-year focus here showed that these frames never occur in isolation. Even if one 
frame or basic discourse is predominant at some point, given enough time, a 
securitizing basic discourse can produce a sharp desecuritizing response, and vice 
versa. Though they may come from different (usually oppositional) actors, the 
polarizing nature of the immigration debate saw both accusations of amnesty and 
inhumanity directed at both Bush and Obama, sometimes simultaneously. Most 
illustrative of this effect is the inability to pass CIR legislation at any point since 2006: 
its border security policies have drawn criticism for being too strict, while its 
expansionist policies have been reduced by its critics to amnesty. The following chapter 
builds on these insights, using a content analysis to measure the prevalence of co-
occurring frames and identify which actors aligned with the two basic discourses over 
time. Moreover, it aims to define what impact these frames had on public opinion and 
the extent to which (de)securitizing discourses were successful.   
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Chapter 7: Shifting Media Coverage and Public Attitudes 
Toward Unauthorized Immigration 
Against the backdrop of shifting political elite discourse, this chapter introduces the 
press and audience into the (de)securitization process. Key themes that emerged in the 
discourse analysis were the juxtaposition of expansionist and restrictionist policies 
within the immigration debate; and a contestation between criminal and procedural 
frames. The attribution of illegality and criminality to immigrants was used to promote 
border security measures and restrict immigrant entry, while the procedural frame 
sought to remove the criminal stigma, and encourage pathways toward 
citizenship/legalization for unauthorized persons. This practical dichotomy underpins 
the analyses presented in this chapter.  
Previous research sets expectations that securitizing frames will be predominant. There 
is near unanimous agreement that the press tends to emphasize the criminal 
components of immigration over positive consequences of immigration (Blinder & 
Allen, 2016; Dunaway et al., 2010; Igartua & Cheng, 2009; Soroka, 2006). But public 
opinion has largely moved in the other direction. Across a wide array of indicators, 
American public attitudes toward immigrants – legal or otherwise – have become 
increasingly tolerant since 2001 despite an expanding enforcement framework that 
continuously reproduces the criminal immigrant metaphor. A 2018 Pew study found 
that 24 percent of respondents say that legal immigration into the US should be 
decreased (down from 53 percent in 2001) and 32 percent say that legal immigration 
should be increased (up from 10 percent in 2001) (Pew Research Center, 2018b). 
Similarly, the share of respondents who believe immigrants strengthen the country 
through hard work and their talents more than doubled from 31 percent to 63 percent 
between 1994 and 2016, the “highest level in more than twenty years of Pew Research 
Center surveys” (Pew Research Center, 2016a); the share of respondents that view 
immigrants as a burden to the country’s jobs, housing and healthcare more than halved 
from 63 percent to 27 percent (Pew Research Center, 2016a).  This has occurred 
despite record deportations and enforcement actions (notably under the Obama 
administration); recessionary periods and heightened economic anxiety (Pew Research 
Center, 2013a); and a decade-plus long record of stalemated attempts to achieve 
comprehensive immigration reform. 
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That news coverage of immigration is largely negative (e.g., Abrajano et al., 2017; 
Dunaway et al., 2010; Igartua & Cheng, 2009; Merolla et al., 2013; Soroka, 2006; 
Thorbjørnsrud, 2015) suggests at first that American attitudes are out of sync with press 
framing. But the effect of immigration frames on public opinion over time has received 
insufficient attention; while extant scholarship generally shows, unsurprisingly, that 
negative frames produce negative attitudes (Igartua & Cheng, 2009; Valentino, Brader, 
& Jardina, 2013), in the U.S. policy context, quantitative research linking public 
opinion and media coverage has been limited to cross-sectional studies or short-term 
studies centered on only some salient policies (e.g., the 2006 and 2007 CIR debates).68  
This chapter addresses that gap by analyzing media framing and public opinion over a 
sixteen-year (2001-2016) period, beginning with a content analysis of a range of 
influential actors – the executive branch, the legislative branch, cable news and print 
press – and a concurrent breakdown of public opinion on multiple measures of 
immigration attitudes. Building on the discourse analysis from the previous chapter, the 
content analysis focuses on constituent frames of the basic securitizing and 
desecuritizing discourses employed in the immigration debate. Both political elite and 
press rhetoric are analyzed to identify which frames prevailed under different political 
contexts. Next, public opinion is examined to determine how closely attitudes align 
with press coverage and political discourse over time. The data demonstrates not only 
the extent to which the public recognizes immigration as a problem (stage of 
identification), but also its willingness to adopt exceptional measures (stage of 
mobilization). Trends in public opinion are tentatively mapped to trends in political and 
press frames to identify potential relationships that may exist; these relationships are 
made more explicit in the final analysis which models audience attitudes toward 
exceptional measures in the immigration debate as a function of attention to politics 
and press actors. The main findings of these analyses are that media coverage is neither 
monolithic nor static: for most actors, coverage has become desecuritizing over time. 
Further, framing effects are evident for news actors across multiple years.  
 
68 McLaren et al.’s (2017) time-series study of media and public opinion notably covers a larger period 
than other research, 1995-2011, but their focus is on the British context. Other longitudinal analyses 
include those conducted by Héricourt and Spielvogel (2014) who cover 2002-2010 across Europe; and 
van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, and de Vreese (2014) who cover 2003-2010 in Denmark and 
the Netherlands.  
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7.1 Content Analysis 
7.1.1 Frames and Features Selection 
Two pairs of contrasting frames (presented in table 7.1) are analyzed along three 
dichotomous dimensions: frame tone (securitizing and desecuritizing); frame type 
(issue and equivalency); and frame function (moral evaluation and remedy proposal69). 
First, the attribution of criminality and illegality to immigrants is contrasted against 
frames that attempt to evaluate immigrants in non-criminal terms. These were regular 
themes in political elite discourse. The production of criminal immigrant 
representations in the press has also received wide scholarly attention (Thorbjørnsrud, 
2015; e.g., Blinder & Allen, 2016; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Innes, 2010; Kim, 
Carvalho, Davis, & Mullins, 2011; Suro, 2008), and deservedly so: Kim et al.’s (2011) 
content analysis found that crime was covered in the press more than any other 
consequence of immigration, including unemployment, national security, and social 
welfare. This prevalence has been attributed to a press tendency toward sensationalism 
and profit-maximizing incentives to appeal to large audiences already predisposed to 
anti-immigrant attitudes (Branton & Dunaway, 2009; Entman, 1990; Gilliam & 
Iyengar, 2000; Gilliam, Iyengar, Simon, & Wright, 1996). Kim et al. (2011: 310) argue 
that linking crime and immigration “will necessarily involve drama, conflict, good, and 
evil, the ingredients to attract a larger audience.”  
 
Table 7.1 Immigration Content Analysis Frames 
 Moral Evaluation/Equivalency Remedy Proposal/Issue 
Securitizing frame Illegal immigrant Border security 
Desecuritizing frame Undocumented immigrant Pathways to legal status 
 
 
69 The moral evaluation and remedy proposal frames functions are selected for analysis here, because 
they represent the axes along which contestation is most likely to occur. While there is some agreement 
on the cause and definition of the problem of immigration, there is more debate – and thus greater 
competition – on how to evaluate and resolve the problem. 
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The content analysis here tests this inclination by examining the prevalence of labels 
used to morally evaluate immigrants as either “illegal” on the one hand and 
“undocumented”, “unauthorized” or “irregular” (henceforth undocumented frame) on 
the other hand. These equivalency frames (Merolla et al., 2013) reflect strategic 
signifier choices to either stigmatize immigrants as lawbreakers (Thorbjørnsrud, 2015) 
through a securitizing basic discourse that constructs immigrants as a threat (Innes, 
2010); or a desecuritizing basic discourse that moves away from the immigrant 
criminal threat construction. The illegal immigrant frame has been preferred by 
immigration restrictionists who argue that euphemisms like “undocumented 
immigrant” can “mask the fundamental legal violations committed by those who 
overstay their visas or enter the country without one” (Merolla et al., 2013: 790; see 
also Santa Ana et al., 2007; Westen, 2009: 4). Conversely, Blinder and Allen (2016: 
18) note that “frequently describing immigrants as illegal” contributes to “constructing 
a particular conception of immigration that (1) highlights the issue of legal status and 
(2) depicts immigrants as law-violators”, inevitably associating immigration with 
illegality. Pro-immigration advocates argue that this signifier “tilts[s] policy debates in 
favor of immigration enforcement and restriction” (Merolla et al., 2013: 793; Santa 
Ana et al., 2007). They argue alternative labels – like “undocumented” – can humanize 
immigrants and remove the criminal stigma.  
Previous research shows that the illegal immigrant frame dominates cross-nationally 
and across news sources. Blinder and Allen (2016) find in their 2010-2012 content 
analysis of British media coverage on immigration that “illegal immigrant” was the 
most frequently occurring collocation of the word “immigrant”. Merolla et al. (2013) 
also find in their content analysis of American media from 2007 to 2011 that the illegal 
frame dwarfed the undocumented frame by, at its minimum, 96% to 4% (for the Times). 
Fox News invoked it at the highest rate (99%), followed in descending order by CNN, 
MSNBC and the Times. The authors also find that conservative newspapers were 
likelier to mention illegal immigrants in stories on immigration. Santa Ana et al. (2007) 
similarly find in their content analysis of immigrant press attention that the illegal 
frame dominated the undocumented frame in US newspapers from 2001-2005 despite 
President Bush’s use of undocumented. More generally, elite-left media have been 
linked to pro-immigrant frames (Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2015) while elite right 
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media have been found to promote anti-immigrant speakers and emphasize the 
problems illegal immigration creates for society (Benson & Wood, 2015: 802).  
Having explored the moral evaluation axis, this chapter next operationalizes the remedy 
proposal axis by juxtaposing exceptional security measures and unexceptional policies 
promoted by different actors to resolve the perceived immigration problem. Issue 
frames from two oppositional basic discourses are examined: a restrictionist one that 
aims to deter immigration through border security; and an expansionist one that seeks 
to integrate immigrants through pathways toward legalization or citizenship. The 
pathways frame has been favored by pro-immigrant advocates while those against 
immigration have invoked the border security frame (Merolla et al., 2013).  Not only 
do these frames fit neatly into the securitization model – as unexceptional policies and 
exceptional security measures respectively – but as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, they represent the most persistent policies discussed in the US immigration 
debate (Zamith, 2013) and are both key components of CIR. Kim et al. (2011: 311) 
found that these two “opposite approaches to reducing illegal immigration” received 
the most attention across policies, including economic aid to sending countries and 
stricter law enforcement.70 The salience and importance of these frames is further 
evidenced by their frequency in polls: in all immigration-related public opinion polls 
conducted in the U.S. since 2000 that were collected for this study, questions on 
pathways and border control dominated all other questions on specific immigration 
policy.71  
While these two controversial policies have been the subject of persistent debates in 
immigration policy, the dramatic imagery of a physical barrier at the border suggests 
that border security may be more newsworthy, particularly for television (Kim et al., 
 
70 Dekker and Scholten (2017) find in their media analysis that the economic frame is the least covered, 
suggesting strong reason to exclude it in content analyses of immigration.  
71 Using data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, between 2005 and 2018, there were 
203 questions asking respondents to choose between deportation and pathways as an appropriate policy 
solution for dealing with immigrants. The only question types that exceeded this number were questions 
asking respondents to list the most important issue (485 questions) and questions asking respondents to 
specify how important immigration was (274 questions).  There were 30 poll questions during the time 
period that gauged support for a wall or fence; and 139 queries on whether (and in which direction) 
immigration levels should change.  
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2011; Shoemaker & Reese, 2011). The cognitive costs associated with complex 
pathways solutions suggest that it will receive less attention. But surprisingly, Kim et 
al. (2011) find parity between the pathways72 and border security frames in their 
content analysis, attributing this “coexistence of two contradicting solutions” to the 
“philosophical disagreement in America on how to approach the issue” (Kim et al., 
2011: 311). Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud (2015) also find that enforcement is only 
slightly more prominent than reform in American news coverage of immigration, and 
that this difference is even narrower for elite-left newspapers and broadcaster websites. 
Comparing both the moral evaluation and remedy proposal axes, Merolla et al. (2013) 
find that the framing of policy matters more than labels like “undocumented” and 
“illegal” in terms of producing framing effects on immigration attitudes. They also find 
that CNN and Fox News led in their use of anti-immigration policy frames, while 
MSNBC and the Times were more likely to use the pathways frame.  
While a negative bias and a net plurality of securitizing frames is expected to emerge in 
the content analysis for both the moral evaluation and remedy proposal frame sets, this 
chapter builds on previous findings to determine whether these effects can be 
generalized across multiple political contexts and over sixteen years. Again, anti-
immigrant attitudes among audiences and media tendencies toward sensationalism 
(Branton & Dunaway, 2009) largely converge upon negative depictions of immigrants, 
either as “illegals” or a threat to be deterred by erecting walls. What remains to be 
resolved is the extent to which these securitizing frames dominate desecuritizing labels 
like “undocumented” and more esoteric pathways-oriented solutions, and how this 
varies over time, across news sources and across varying political contexts.  
 
72 The authors categorize their frame as “immigration reform”, defining it as “the effort to correct the 
restrictive and complicated process to become a legal alien” (Kim et al., 2011: 311). The label 
“pathways” is preferred here for the same concept to avoid ambiguity arising from the similarity between 
Kim et al.’s label and “comprehensive immigration reform”, of which both pathways and border security 
are constituent components.   
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7.1.2 Data 
Television transcripts (for CNN, Fox News and MSNBC) and newspaper articles (for 
the New York Times) were downloaded from LexisNexis using the following search 
query and a date range of January 1, 2001, to December 31, 2016:  
migran! OR migrat! OR immigra! OR refugee! OR asyl!73 
The search query is broad enough to capture all texts related to immigration, including 
stories on refugees and asylum-seekers.74 Similar queries were used to retrieve political 
discourse texts from the American Presidency Project (for presidential elites), and the 
Congressional Record (for congressional actors). Table 7.2 lists the total number of 
texts retrieved for each source. Immigration coverage is lower for every actor compared 
to coverage of terrorism (Chapter 5), but the relative ordering between the actors is 
equivalent for both issues: the Times leads all other sources in volume of texts, while 
CNN leads the television media actors, followed by Fox News and MSNBC. 
Presidential elites have the lowest total number of associated texts – this is expected 
given the relative infrequency of presidential statements.  
Table 7.2 Number of texts by source 
Source Number of texts 
CNN 39,420 
Fox News 14,666 
MSNBC 7,562 
New York Times 84,041 
Presidential Elites 2,872 
Congressional Elites 6,157 
Total 154,727 
 
 
 
 
73 Exclamation marks denote a wildcard where migran! includes both “migrants” and “migrant”. The OR 
connector between root words is used as a boolean to return only articles with at least one of the root 
words. The word roots here are chosen to collectively return the majority of articles related to 
immigration. These match similar search queries used by others doing corpus linguistics analysis of 
immigration (e.g., Blinder & Allen, 2016).  
74 Blinder (2015) and Innes (2010) find that asylum-seekers are frequently conflated with immigrants. 
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7.1.3 Frame Competition  
7.1.3.1 Aggregate Analysis 
Using keyword and regular expression patterns as identifiers for frames, table 7.3 
shows the aggregate prevalence (both total and rate of frame occurrence per ten-
thousand words) of the threat frame as well as the opposing securitizing and 
desecuritizing frames. Details on frame features and frame extraction can be found in 
Appendix A. On balance, these aggregate figures confirm that a negative bias against 
immigrants exists in the press: along the moral evaluation axis, all actors were more 
likely to employ the illegal frame over the undocumented frame; and along the remedy 
proposal axis, all were more likely to emphasize border security over pathways. 
Notably, across all frames analyzed here, the alternative immigrant labels received the 
least attention, with a mean occurrence rate of 0.159 per ten-thousand words across all 
sources, while border security received the most aggregate attention at a mean 
occurrence of 0.919 per ten-thousand words.  
Table 7.3 Immigration Aggregate Frame Prevalence by Source 
 Threat Frame Securitizing Frames Desecuritizing Frames 
 
Immigration Illegal Border security Undocumented Pathway 
CNN      
Total 176,738 14,782 19,850 4,210 4,162 
Rate 7.114 0.595 0.799 0.169 0.168 
Fox News      
Total 57,547 7,079 8,824 478 1,380 
Rate 10.376 1.276 1.591   0.086 0.249 
MSNBC      
Total 38,238 2,558 2,704 882 1,356 
Rate 5.877 0.393 0.416 0.136 0.208 
New York Times      
Total 223,447 13,023 5,148 2,895 2,760 
Rate 24.504 1.428 0.565 0.317 0.303 
Presidential Elites      
Total 10,737 407 1,461 86 245 
Rate 14.787 0.561 2.012 0.118 0.337 
Congressional Elites      
Total 93,937 1,507 14,164 635 1,153 
Rate 8.443 0.135 1.273 0.057 0.104 
All Sources      
Total 613,526 40,408 54,209 9,371 11,666 
Rate 10.399 0.685 0.919 0.159 0.198 
  
    
Note: Total values indicate the number of instances of each frame. Rate is calculated as the presence of 
the frame per ten-thousand words.  
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Across the press, figures 7.1A and 7.1B show that Fox News was the likeliest to use the 
securitizing frames. Along the moral evaluation axis, Fox News preferred the illegal 
frame by an astonishing factor of almost fifteen to one – a factor over three times 
higher than the next highest and five times higher than MSNBC’s ratio of coverage. 
Surprisingly, however, figures 7.2 and 7.3 show that Fox News and MSNBC were very 
similar to each other in terms of the relative coverage each gave to the securitizing and 
desecuritizing frames throughout the Bush administration; MSNBC, however, shifted 
its tone significantly by the Obama administration, offering the most desecuritizing 
coverage of either axis among the press. Interestingly, all actors showed a steady 
decline in securitizing coverage from the Bush to Obama administrations, but the 
decline was least steep for Fox News, especially for its coverage of remedies to 
immigration. This suggests that while it was more willing to accommodate alternative 
labels for immigrants, Fox News showed little appetite for shifting its tone on border 
security vis-à-vis pathways. CNN, MSNBC and the Times, on the other hand, all 
shifted toward desecuritizing labels for immigrants as well as expansionist policies.  
Political elites – both in the White House and in Congress – also showed a steady 
decline in securitizing rhetoric between the two presidential administrations. The 
sharpest decline was in presidential elites’ labeling of immigrants: Obama’s White 
House showed a preference for the undocumented frame after the Bush administration’s 
extreme preference for the illegal frame by a factor of 50 to one. Notably, Obama’s 
preference for the desecuritizing label is the only instance of any actor preferring the 
desecuritizing label over its oppositional securitizing label. While not as drastic, there 
was also a desecuritizing shift between both administrations in proposed remedies. 
Obama was more willing to engage the pathways debate than his predecessor. In 
comparison, Congress showed much less consistency across the two axes: while it was 
the most willing to use pro-immigrant labels, it also showed the highest preference for 
restrictionist security measures over expansionist policies. It covered the border 
security frame over twelve times as much as pathways (figure 7.1B), showing the 
highest preference for the border security frame across all actors (figure 7.3). This 
latter finding is consistent with previous scholarship that identifies congressional 
framing of immigration as being more security-centric (e.g., Frederking, 2012).   
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Figure 7.1 Aggregate Ratio of Securitizing Frames to Desecuritizing Frames 
(2001-2016) 
  
 
Note: Ratio is calculated by dividing the number of securitizing frames by the number of desecuritizing 
frames. Panel A shows the ratio of securitizing-to-desecuritizing frames for the competing moral 
evaluation frames, while panel B shows the ratio for the remedy proposal frames. A ratio of 1 indicates 
equal coverage of both frames; thus, the panels here show that securitizing coverage was predominant.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Ratio of Securitizing Frames to Desecuritizing Frames by 
Presidential Administration – Moral Evaluation Axis 
 
Note: Ratio is calculated by dividing the number of securitizing frames by the number of desecuritizing 
frames. The y-axis is presented on a log scale. Based on ratio, all actors became increasingly 
desecuritizing between the Bush and Obama administrations.  
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Figure 7.3 Ratio of Securitizing Frames to Desecuritizing Frames – Remedy 
Proposal Axis 
 
Note: Ratio is calculated by dividing the number of securitizing frames by the number of desecuritizing 
frames. The y-axis is presented on a log scale. Based on ratio, all actors became increasingly 
desecuritizing between the Bush and Obama administrations.  
 
 
Despite an overall preference for securitizing frames, these aggregate findings 
demonstrate a trend toward pro-immigrant rhetoric. The findings also tentatively 
introduce some disconnects between press coverage (especially Fox News) and 
political discourse. First, all four press actors showed much less preference for border 
security than Congress – even Fox News was nearly twice as likely as Congress to 
invoke pathways. And while aggregate presidential discourse on remedies was nearly 
aligned with Fox News’ coverage, the latter showed little movement between the two 
administrations while presidential elites moved significantly. CNN moved closely with 
presidential elites, but, like MSNBC and the Times, it was slightly more willing to 
discuss pathways. The relatively lower coverage of border security by news actors 
compared to political elites is surprising, because the press appears to be opting out of 
employing dramatic and simple frames. Border walls are not only easier to understand 
– particularly in comparison to complex pathways policies that may be inaccessible and 
more cognitively costly for audiences – but they are also more captivating stories. 
Despite border security being more newsworthy and a larger component of legislator 
debate, the discussion of pathways toward citizenship/legalization is competitive, 
especially for MSNBC and the Times. While surprising, this result is consistent with 
previous research on the relationship between pathways and border security frames 
(Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; Kim et al., 2011).  
A second major disconnect between the press and political elites is Fox News’ overall 
preference for the securitizing illegal label. In general, it showed the most resistance 
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toward the undocumented label. While other press actors – CNN, MSNBC and the 
Times – had aggregate ratios that were similar to political elites, a closer inspection of 
these figures between administrations reveals some sharp differences. The Bush 
administration was much more likely to use the illegal frame than any of the press 
actors during its tenure, while the Obama administration was much more likely to 
invoke the undocumented frame during its tenure. Congressional use converged with 
some press actors by the time Obama was in office, but was largely out of sync with the 
press during the Bush years.  
7.1.3.2 Quarterly Time-Series Analyses 
For additional context and granularity, figures 7.4 and 7.5 break the data down into 
quarterly time-series and depict the proportion of securitizing frames invoked by media 
and political actors over time. In each panel of these two figures, the solid horizontal 
line at y=0.5 signifies a boundary where the area above the line indicates a higher 
proportion of securitizing coverage, and the area below indicates a higher proportion of 
desecuritizing coverage.75 The vertical dashed line in the middle of each panel in both 
figures marks the point at which the Obama administration came into office.  
Moral Evaluation Axis 
CNN, MSNBC and the Times all shifted from the illegal frame to the undocumented 
frame in 2012 (for MSNBC) and 2013 (for CNN and the Times). This major finding 
marks the first instance in extant immigration research of any actor invoking the 
undocumented frame more than the illegal frame and indicates a striking shift in 
otherwise anti-immigrant press coverage. The Times’ shift is likely a consequence of its 
style guide update, which was updated in 2013 to “consider alternative terms” to 
“illegal immigrant” (Merolla et al., 2013: 794; see also Hallin, 2015). This shift is also 
evident in figure 7.6, which shows that the Times’ rate of the illegal frame (again 
measured in occurrences per ten-thousand words) fell significantly beginning 2013 
while its rate of undocumented climbed steeply – similar trends occur for MSNBC and 
CNN, though less steeply. The discursive shift, nonetheless, seems to have been led by 
Congress, who was the first of the six actors to privilege the undocumented frame. This 
is surprising given that Congress itself showed little overall preference for this frame, 
 
75 Gaps in the plot (e.g., presidential discourse between 2001 and 2003 in figure 7.4) indicate no 
coverage of either frame within a quarter.  
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but it conforms to expectations set by the cascading activation model that, as discursive 
entrepreneurs, political elites can set the boundaries of discourse. In this case, some 
press actors picked up on this cue and led with the undocumented frame. Fox News, on 
the other hand, largely ignored it and used the illegal frame – figure 7.6 shows that, 
from 2012, it trailed its news competitors in usage of the undocumented frame, and 
beginning 2014, it led all other press actors in usage of the illegal frame. Emblematic of 
this tone was Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly, who “repeatedly recounted crimes committed 
by illegal migrants as evidence of failed immigration policies” (Suro, 2009: 10). 
 
Figure 7.4 Moral Evaluation Axis (Illegal and Undocumented) Frame 
Proportion (2001-2016) 
 
Note: Each panel plots the proportion of securitizing frames that occur in the sum of both securitizing 
and desecuritizing frames for each source. The area above the horizontal line at y = 0.5 indicates a louder 
securitizing frame. The vertical dashed line in 2009 marks the beginning of the Obama presidency. Gaps 
in the presidential and congressional discourse plots indicate periods of no coverage of either frame.  
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Turning to political elites, presidential and congressional actors favored the illegal 
frame in much of the first half of the time-series but shifted in later years to more 
mixed usage. Beginning in 2010 (for Congress) and 2012 (for the Obama 
administration), overall preference for the two terms oscillated, suggesting no 
consistent preference for either term. In general, Bush and Obama used either of these 
frames rarely, hence the gaps and extremes in figure 7.4.76 Congress, similarly used 
both phrases infrequently during certain periods, but opted for a stronger securitizing 
label in the final two years, when Obama administration officials (and some news 
actors) were slightly likelier to invoke the desecuritizing label. The volatile and mixed 
usage of the two frames by political elites differed from CNN, MSNBC and the Times 
on the one hand – all of whom had higher desecuritizing coverage and less volatility – 
and Fox News on the other hand – which steadfastly preferred the securitizing frame.  
Remedy Proposal Axis 
Political elites were more active in their discussion of remedies, preferring border 
security to pathways (see figure 7.5). The 2006 and 2007 CIR debates in Congress were 
especially lopsided, owing to the withdrawal of Democrats from the conversation, 
giving Republicans an uncontested platform from which to promote the border security 
frame (Suro, 2009: 17). Congressional actors showed more willingness to invoke 
pathways in 2010 and 2012 – coinciding with the debate of the first CIR bill to be 
considered under the new administration and the president’s DACA announcement 
respectively – but this was short-lived and never exceeded border security invocations. 
Consistent with the aggregate findings, Congress regularly prioritized border security 
over expansionist measures – even during the 2013 CIR bill debate, when it gave peak 
attention to the pathways frame (see figure 7.7), it devoted nearly eight times as much 
attention to the border security component of the bill.   
 
76 Low levels of usage will yield more extreme proportions as shown in presidential discourse in figure 
7.4. In the second and third quarter of 2012, for example, there were a low number of invocations of the 
undocumented frame, but no invocations of the illegal frame – this results in an extreme proportion of 
zero. In the final quarter of 2012, however, there were two invocations of the illegal frame, and none of 
the undocumented frame – yielding an extreme proportion of one.  
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Figure 7.5 Remedy Proposal Axis (Border Security and Pathways) Frame 
Proportion 
 
Note: Each panel plots the proportion of securitizing frames that occur in the sum of both securitizing 
and desecuritizing frames for each source. The area above the horizontal line at y = 0.5 indicates a louder 
securitizing frame. The vertical dashed line in 2009 marks the beginning of the Obama presidency. Gaps 
in the presidential discourse plot indicate periods of no coverage of either frame.  
 
 
Presidential rhetoric was also unbalanced during this time. Even Obama’s 2012 DACA 
announcement did not upend the administration’s emphasis on border security. Given 
that 2012 was a general election year, this may have been a political strategy to balance 
a tough message on immigration while energizing a democratic base through anti-
deportation policies. Still, compared to the Bush administration, the Obama presidency 
showed a narrower preference for the border security frame over the pathways frame.  
Border security dominated press coverage during the Bush administration as well. 
Again, during the 2006 and 2007 CIR debates, conservative news actors – like Fox 
News and CNN’s Lou Dobbs (Akdenizli, 2008: 57; Facchini et al., 2017) – capitalized 
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on Republican infighting and Democratic silence by filling the “leadership vacuum” 
(Suro, 2009: 14) and emphasizing border security. Surprisingly, Fox News led other 
media in its pathways coverage during the 2006 and 2007 CIR bill debates (see figure 
7.6), but only to criticize it as “amnesty” (Suro, 2009: 3)77 – and it still gave much more 
attention to the border security frame at this time too. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Conservative media’s exceptionally vocal coverage contributed to derailing 
both bills. Other evidence confirms that coverage was heavily one-sided during 2007: a 
Brookings study found that “Immigration was not in the top 10 stories for evening 
programs” for MSNBC, while “it was the third biggest story” for Fox News in 2007 
(Akdenizli, 2008: 57). Looking at specific programs, MSNBC’s Chris Matthews filled 
only 5.1% of his show with immigration coverage against Bill O’Reilly’s 19.4% on 
Fox News during the 2007 debate (Akdenizli, 2008: 53) – essentially “the conservative 
talkers and bloggers roared” while liberal actors were muted (Suro, 2009: 18). 
Similarly, Fox News accelerated its coverage of the border security frame immediately 
following the bipartisan Senate-passed bill in June 2013. The bill – which proposed a 
path to citizenship alongside $40 billion in border security (The Guardian, 2014) 
including provisions for a two-layered 700-mile border fence (U.S. Congress, 2013) – 
generated qualitatively different coverage for different sources. While other news 
sources certainly addressed the border security components of this bill, they were less 
one-sided than Fox News – the Times and MSNBC instead focused more attention on 
the pathways component (figure 7.6). 
  
 
77 See Appendix C for annual time-series data of the amnesty frame across all actors. Fox News’ 
coverage rate of the amnesty frame reaches its highest points in 2006 and 2007 respectively, lining up 
with its increased attention to both the pathways and border security frames. Fox News leads its 
competitors in the amnesty frame by over a factor of two in 2006, and by a slightly smaller margin in 
2007. Lou Dobbs brought CNN close behind in both years.  
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Figure 7.6 Frame Coverage as Word per Ten-Thousand for News Media 
 
 
Note: Each panel plots the rate of a specific frames per ten-thousand words for each news media source. 
The vertical dashed line in 2009 marks the beginning of the Obama administration. The panel in the first 
row represents the threat frame, while the panels in the second and third row represent each of the 
securitizing (left) and desecuritizing (right) frames for the moral evaluation (second row) and remedy 
proposal (third row) axes.  
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Figure 7.7 Frame Coverage as Word per Ten-Thousand for Political Elites 
 
 
 
Note: Each panel plots the rate of a specific frames per ten-thousand words for political elites. The 
vertical dashed line in 2009 marks the beginning of the Obama administration. The panel in the first row 
represents the threat frame, while the panels in the second and third row represent each of the 
securitizing (left) and desecuritizing (right) frames for the moral evaluation (second row) and remedy 
proposal (third row) axes. For visualization, the y-axis on the Illegal Immigrant Frame plot uses a square 
root scale to accommodate high presidential values while still keeping congressional trends visible.  
 
In general, Fox News covered the border security frame at high rates throughout the 
period analyzed. Not only was it more likely to cover border security over pathways in 
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all quarters (except for the first quarter in 200178), its coverage rate exceeded all other 
press actors. Conversely, CNN, MSNBC and the Times showed a stronger appetite for 
the pathways frame than both Congress and Fox News, especially during Obama’s 
presidency. For CNN, the sudden drop in relative attention to border security in 2009 
corresponded with Lou Dobbs’ exit from his primetime program. Regarded at the time 
as “perhaps the nation’s most visible critic of illegal immigrants” (Folfenflik, 2009), as 
demonstrated in his routine criticism of the 2007 CIR bill as amnesty and lacking on 
border security (Akdenizli, 2008: 52; Merolla et al., 2013: 792), Dobbs “led the way in 
characterizing unauthorized immigrants as threats to the health and safety of ordinary 
Americans, portraying them as a category of people who are not merely undesirable but 
who need to be expelled in order to preserve the nation.” (Suro, 2009: 9-10; see also 
Facchini et al., 2017; Merolla et al., 2013) His CNN replacement, John King, on the 
other hand, was noted at the time for being “more consistent with CNN’s intended 
brand as a source of objective reporting” (Folfenflik, 2009). The lineup change was 
followed by increased desecuritizing coverage throughout Obama’s presidency.  
Unlike its competitors, the Times showed less deviation toward the extremes, and 
particularly during the Obama administration, it straddled the center line, suggesting 
that its coverage was the most balanced across actors for the remedy proposal axis. This 
strongly mirrors the aggregate findings (figure 7.1B), which show that the Times was 
closest out of all actors examined here to giving equal coverage. The Times also 
emphasized the pathways frame at the highest rate through most of the Obama 
administration (figure 7.6), suggesting it had the strongest desecuritizing coverage 
across all actors along the remedy proposal axis.  
Still, in the final years of the analysis, coverage of border security begins to rise for all 
press actors. This rise coincides with the 2016 general election campaign season, 
during which presidential candidate Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric triggered 
intense media attention toward his proposal for a border wall to be funded by Mexico. 
Both the novelty and newsworthiness of his candidacy and hardline immigration 
message drew significant press attention as well as responses from other political elites 
 
78 This early preference for the pathways frame may have been a response to President Bush’s efforts to 
promote diplomacy with Mexico when he first entered office. 
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(including fellow White House contenders), further amplifying the border security 
frame in campaign coverage, and leaving little space for discussion of expansionist 
policies. The temporal parameters of this research preclude an analysis of whether the 
press’ orientation to Trump was persistent or if some actors – like the Times, MSNBC 
and CNN – were able to regain their autonomy once the novelty of a new discourse 
wore off and competing actors had sufficient time to reintroduce pro-immigrant 
messages into the discursive marketplace. The analysis here is also limited to the 
volume of frame coverage rather than the tone or valence of coverage – while the 
Times, MSNBC and CNN undoubtedly increased their coverage of the wall during 
Trump’s candidacy, it is possible that the coverage was critical rather than supportive.79  
7.1.4 Summary of Content Analysis 
The aggregated and time-series data converge upon similar findings and reveal 
previously undiscovered trends in framing that indicate a profound transformation in 
media coverage of immigration. While previous research literature has largely found 
that criminal metaphors and anti-immigrant press coverage are predominant, the results 
here show that some media actors became increasingly pro-immigrant and moved away 
from the criminal characterization by the end of 2016. For example, previous research 
found that the illegal frame dominated the undocumented frame by at least 96% to 4% 
as recently as 2011. The analysis here shows that in several instances, CNN, MSNBC 
and the Times used the undocumented frame more than the illegal frame. They also 
showed an increased willingness to discuss expansionist policies alongside restrictionist 
border security measures during the Obama presidency, indicating a sea change from 
the 2006 and 2007 CIR debates, during which only conservative commentators were 
vocal. The increased attention to the pathways frame signaled a change in the perceived 
problem of immigration from a security threat to an issue centered on documentation, 
legalization and citizenship. Political elites also showed more willingness to invoke the 
pathways and undocumented frames during the Obama administration.  
Despite this overlap between the press and political elites, however, there are 
noteworthy differences in relative attention to frames that indicate a disconnect 
between both sets of actors. Along the moral evaluation axis, the press was more 
 
79 This limitation is discussed more deeply in Chapter 8. 
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consistent – CNN, MSNBC and the Times became more desecuritizing over time, while 
Fox News was consistently securitizing. Political elites showed volatility along the 
moral evaluation axis during the Obama years – while this was a shift from largely 
securitizing discourse under the Bush administration, presidential and congressional 
actors were less consistent than the press. Another major difference was that 
congressional actors showed a significant preference for discussing border security 
over pathways toward legalization/citizenship. While this tone was shared by Fox 
News (and to a lesser degree, CNN), MSNBC and the Times were more willing to 
invoke pathways.   
In summary, three trends stand out in the content analysis. First, Fox News led press 
actors in its coverage of securitizing frames while CNN, MSNBC and the New York 
Times led in coverage of desecuritizing frames. The combination of Fox News’ 
preference for the securitizing frame along both the moral evaluation and remedy 
proposal axes creates the expectation that it had a strong securitizing effect. Second, 
over time, desecuritizing frames became louder in some cases. The criminality and 
border security frames rates declined – even for Fox News – while formal stylistic 
changes and discursive shifts propelled the undocumented frame to substantial growth 
in CNN, MSNBC and the Times. Even though Fox News maintained a high ratio of 
coverage of securitizing frames, its overall rate of securitizing frames shrank over the 
years, at a time when CNN, MSNBC and the Times shifted toward desecuritizing labels 
and slightly more competitive coverage of the pathways frame. All three of the latter 
press actors are thus likely to have produced a desecuritizing effect, particularly during 
Obama’s second term. Finally, press coverage frequently drifted from political elite 
rhetoric, suggesting a disconnect between the two. Press coverage was less volatile 
along the moral evaluation axis and more willing to employ the desecuritizing frame 
for both axes. The effect of political elites as a whole is uncertain – while Congress and 
executive branch actors alike largely invoked the border security frame over pathways, 
both were mixed in their moral evaluation of immigrants during Obama’s term. These 
concurrent mixed signals may be offsetting each other, limiting framing effects 
altogether. The next two sections explore whether framing effects occurred by linking 
these trends in messaging to evolving public opinion.  
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7.2 Longitudinal Public Opinion  
This section explores trends in aggregate public opinion to assess whether attitudes 
match trends in framing. Preliminary evidence of framing effects is provided by 
mapping audience reactions to press and political elite frames across multiple measures 
of attitudes toward immigration. These measures include polls that ask respondents to 
indicate the most important problem (MIP); satisfaction with current levels of 
immigration; preference for deportation over pathways; and support for building a 
border wall or security fence. The first two sets of polls measure respondents’ anxiety 
towards immigration (the identification component of securitization), while the latter 
two measure audience approval for proposed remedies (the mobilization component).  
Previous research has shown that the public is largely critical of irregular immigration 
(Beyer & Matthes, 2015) – more so than news media (Hallin, 2015) – and that exposure 
to frames linking immigrants to crime stimulate negative attitudes toward immigrants 
(Igartua & Cheng, 2009; Jacobs, Meeusen, & d’Haenens, 2016; Valentino et al., 2013). 
These conclusions lead to the expectation that public opinion, though largely anti-
immigrant, will otherwise follow trends in news media frames. The content analysis in 
the preceding section showed that while securitizing news frames dominated 
throughout the Bush administration, the rhetoric later dampened across all press actors, 
if not in proportional coverage (e.g., CNN, MSNBC and the Times), then in overall 
invocation rate (e.g., Fox News). Political elite rhetoric was more mixed – while 
Congress and presidential elites remained largely devoted to border security throughout 
the sixteen years, they were mixed on moral evaluations. In this context, the following 
section analyzes trends in aggregate American immigration attitudes to assess which 
actors public opinion on immigration aligned most closely with.  
7.2.1 Data 
Poll data was retrieved from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research and 
classified into relevant categories.80 For each category, uninformative and neutral 
responses like “Don’t Know” or “Decline to Answer” were discarded. Polls with 
multiple responses (e.g., those using a likert scale) were collapsed into a binary 
 
80 The following keyword search query was used to gather all polls:  
migran% OR migrat% OR immigra% OR refugee% or asyl% 
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oppositional structure. For example, the responses “strongly favor” and “somewhat 
favor” were collapsed into a single category (by summing their percentages), while 
“strongly oppose” and “somewhat oppose” were collapsed into a separate category. 
Multiple polls that were asked on the same day were averaged to simplify scatterplot 
visualizations. Table 7.4 provides a summary of the data collected for each class of 
polls. 
Table 7.4 Public Opinion Data Summary 
 Number of  
poll questions 
Average  
sample size 
Identification   
MIP 435 1132 
Levels 124  1614 
Mobilization   
Pathway/Deport 158 1465 
Fence  37 1210 
 
7.2.2 Stage of Identification: Audience Assessment of Threat   
Figure 7.8 shows the percentage of respondents that indicated immigration was the 
most important problem (MIP) facing the country81 (solid black represents the loess 
smoothed curve while black points represent individual poll results). For comparison, 
other issue areas (the economy, healthcare and terrorism) are also plotted. Anxiety 
 
81 While the MIP polls took various forms, they were similarly worded and the most commonly asked 
version of this question was:  
Which of the following issues would you say is most important to you in deciding how 
to vote for Congress?...Education, Social Security, retirement and investments, 
terrorism, health care/Rx (prescription drugs), the economy, jobs, taxes, crime and 
safety, environment, national defense/foreign affairs/Iraq, national deficit/spending, 
energy, gas prices, immigration 
The data was filtered to retain only responses related to immigration – in this subset, the three most 
frequent available responses were “Immigration” (n=278), “Illegal Immigration” (n=131) and 
“Immigration issues” (n=8). 
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towards immigration has for the most part remained low in comparison to other salient 
issues. Concern grew from 2006 to 2007, coinciding with the heavy conservative media 
criticism of the two CIR debates that occurred in both years. The preceding content 
analysis showed that Fox News and CNN (during Lou Dobbs’ tenure) covered the 
border security frame at their highest levels in 2006 and at high levels again in 2007. 
The illegal frame was at its highest coverage in the Times during these two years as 
well, with Fox News coverage close behind. Immigration’s overtaking of terrorism as 
the MIP between 2010 and 2013 also corresponds closely to news coverage – Fox 
News covered the border security frame at its second highest overall rate in 2010, and 
its third highest in 2013. The Times also covered the illegal frame at high rates during 
this time frame – its last time before switching to the undocumented frame. 
Importantly, however, all news media devoted significant attention to the pathways 
frame from late 2012 through 2013 (perhaps driven by Obama’s 2012 DACA 
announcement). This suggests that immigration as the MIP might be multifaceted: 
respondents may be expressing concern not only toward immigration as a threat, but 
also as a problem to be resolved (e.g., through pathways toward citizenship).82   
 
82 Figure 7.8 should be interpreted with caution given that it reflects only what individuals listed as the 
most important problem. Research on immigration attitudes suggests that anti-immigrant sentiments rise 
during recessionary periods (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Dunaway et al., 2010; Kwak & Wallace, 2018). The 
MIP data obscures this, because respondents may have listed the economy as the MIP during the global 
economic recession over immigration. In reality, anxiety about immigration may also be increasing, as a 
lower order concern. For clarity, other public opinion indicators are assessed in this section. 
230 
 
Figure 7.8 Immigration as the Most Important Problem 
 
Note: Black scatter points reflect the percentage of individuals that selected immigration as the MIP; 
solid and dotted lines reflect loess smoothed curves. The shaded region represents the 95% confidence 
interval for the immigration smoothed curve. Data was retrieved from the Roper Center for Public 
Opinion Research.  
 
To explore this possibility further, an additional measure of immigration opinion was 
considered. Figure 7.9 – which shows the percentage of respondents that favored 
increasing/decreasing immigration levels83 – supports this dual interpretation. The 2006 
and 2007 CIR debates were marked by a brief leveling off of support for increasing the 
level of immigration – in fact, data points between 2006 and 2008 suggest that support 
briefly decreases. This reflects, again, the “roars” of conservative and anti-immigrant 
media. Following a brief slump in pro-immigration attitudes around the 2008 recession 
– during which Americans expectedly see immigrants as a threat in the labor market 
and thus want to see immigration lessened – support for increasing the level of 
immigration recovered around 2009, and steadily climbed, narrowing significantly 
during years when later MIP scores were high. The difference between support for 
increasing and decreasing levels of immigration shrank from its December 2001 peak 
of 50% to a remarkable 4% in May of 2010, just before the Senate passed its CIR Act 
 
83 The highest frequency question in the levels category was:  
Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, 
or decreased?  
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of 2010. The next lowest difference (6%) occurs in May 2013, just before the Senate 
voted on its CIR bill. What differed between the 2006 and 2007 CIR debates on the one 
hand and the ones that occurred during the Obama presidency on the other hand was 
that conservative frames were largely uncontested in the first round. As securitizing 
frames became less prominent and CNN, MSNBC and the Times increased their 
desecuritizing coverage, public opinion en masse appears to have followed their cues.  
 
Figure 7.9 Support for Immigration Levels 
 
Note: The plot shows the percentage of polled individuals that either favored increasing (green) or 
decreasing (red) immigration levels. Scatter points represent individual poll results and solid lines 
represent loess smoothed curves. Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
While MIP scores then do not necessarily demonstrate a securitizing or desecuritizing 
effect, they do show that public concern about immigration co-occurs with periods of 
heightened immigration coverage in news media and political discourse. Read 
alongside the levels data, however, it becomes clearer that periods of high immigration 
concern can also coincide with rising support for increasing immigration levels. That 
the narrowest margins on the immigration levels data occurred during the CIR debates 
in 2010 and 2013 suggests that the heightened coverage of the pathways frame in those 
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years – which would have facilitated immigration – may have resonated more strongly 
than the border security frame – which would have decreased immigration.  
7.2.3 Stage of Mobilization: Audience Assessment of Exceptional Measures 
Figures 7.10 and 7.11 support these inferences and show directly that, since 2010 – 
again, the year the Senate passed a CIR bill – public support for pathways increased, 
while support for deportation and a border wall dropped.84 In both cases, this suggests a 
reversal of a previous trend toward more restrictionist attitudes, particularly during the 
global recession. Figure 7.10 shows that support for deportation was growing and 
support for pathways was shrinking, but both leveled off in about 2009, before 
reversing in 2010. This coincided with a general desecuritizing shift in press coverage 
for CNN, MSNBC and the Times.  
  
 
84 The most frequently occurring question in the deport/pathways category was:  
Which statement comes closest to your view about how the immigration system should 
deal with immigrants who are currently living in the US illegally? The immigration 
system should...allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirements, allow them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens, or 
identify and deport them? 
 
The most frequently occurring question in the border wall category was: 
Do you favor or oppose building a wall along the US-Mexico border to try to stop 
illegal immigration?  
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Figure 7.10 Support for Deportation versus Pathways 
 
Note: The plot shows the percentage of individuals that preferred either deporting unauthorized 
immigrants (red) or providing pathways toward citizenship/legalization (green). Scatter points represent 
individual poll results and solid lines represent loess smoothed curves. Shaded regions represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
Both figures 7.10 and 7.11 also suggest that the public rejected political elite cues in 
some cases. Support for pathways declined while support for deportation increased in 
the lead up to the Obama presidency. However, Obama’s high deportation record may 
have increased public resistance toward deportation. Public support for deportations 
dropped in consecutive years of record deportations.85 Interestingly, support for 
deportations began to increase again in 2014, perhaps a reaction to the surge in 
unaccompanied children from Central America and resulting anti-immigrant protests 
(Marlow, 2015). In further evidence of rejecting political elite cues, neither President 
Obama’s 2014 executive action to expand the number of irregular immigrants allowed 
to stay in the US (Obama, 2014a) nor congressional efforts to respond to the border 
crisis through its Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act in the same year staved 
off this rise. Instead, the public followed the media’s cues here too: border security 
coverage had increased for all four news actors analyzed here in 2014. The public did 
 
85 The United States Department of Homeland Security provides the following estimates for removals 
under Obama: 391,283 (2009); 381,593 (2010); 385,778 (2011); 415,900 (2012); 433,034 (2013); 
405,589 (2014); 326,962 (2015); and 340,056 (2016). (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017)  
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not reverse course again until presidential candidate Donald Trump called for deporting 
immigrants and building a wall along the border (Goo, 2015b), demonstrating yet 
another instance of the public rejecting political elite cues.86 Figure 7.11 shows that, for 
the first time since Obama became president, the majority of Americans shifted to 
opposing the wall following Trump’s 2015 statements.87 The shift in public opinion 
further validates the possibility that increased news coverage of the border security 
frame during the 2016 presidential campaign by the Times, MSNBC and CNN may 
have largely been critical of Trump’s policies.   
 
Figure 7.11 Support for Border Wall 
 
Note: The plot shows the percentage of individuals that either favor (red) or oppose (green) a border 
wall. Scatter points represent individual poll results and solid lines represent loess smoothed curves. 
Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
86 This suggests that Trump’s general election victory (his loss of the popular vote notwithstanding) may 
not be entirely attributable to his immigration policies.  
87 Confidence intervals in figure 7.11 are spread out, because of the shortage of polls between 2008 and 
2015, indicating some uncertainty about exactly when majorities shift, but it is nonetheless evident that 
the majority of Americans opposed the wall after Trump’s statements were made. 
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7.2.4 Summary of Longitudinal Aggregate-Level Public Opinion Analysis 
The analysis thus far has demonstrated overlaps between trends in press coverage and 
aggregate public opinion on immigration. During periods of high securitizing coverage 
and silenced desecuritizing coverage (i.e., the 2006 and 2007 CIR debates), the public 
expressed a lower tolerance for immigrant levels and a greater willingness to erect 
border barriers or deport. Consistent with press coverage, however, public opinion has 
become increasingly tolerant and expansionist toward immigration over time, even 
during periods of record deportations and anti-immigrant political rhetoric. The end of 
Obama’s presidency marked, for the first time since before his presidency began, 
greater public opposition to a border wall than support for it. It also witnessed 
decreasing support for deportation and growing support for pathways toward 
legalization and/or citizenship. The content analysis illustrates that these changes in 
public opinion largely co-occurred with desecuritizing movements in news coverage.  
The findings also add to existing research by illustrating how immigration is covered 
and perceived not only during salient periods of crisis and political debate – like the 
CIR debates and the unaccompanied migrant children border crisis in 2013 – but also in 
the periods in between. This is important, because immigration is itself not an episodic 
or cyclical phenomenon, but a steady process, and the results here show how both the 
media and public response vary by context. During periods of dominant anti-immigrant 
press coverage – as during the 2006 and 2007 Republican-led CIR debates – the public 
responded similarly negatively, despite Republican politicians’ own calls for tolerance 
and laying the blame for failed legislative attempts on fearmongering in the rightwing 
press (Pew Research Center, 2013b; Suro, 2009: 17-18). Silence and a lack of 
counterbalancing pro-immigrant voices in media may have enabled these uncontested 
securitizing frames to harden public attitudes. During periods when immigration was 
less salient, the public still seemed to get its cues from the press. As some news sources 
shifted toward more desecuritizing or balanced coverage over time, public opinion 
followed. This is especially evident during Obama’s presidency, following the 
departure of Lou Dobbs from CNN and the increased replacement of the illegal frame 
by the undocumented frame to qualify immigrants.  
Importantly, the public softening on immigration seems unrelated to political elite 
discourse and action: Obama’s record deportations, tough stance on immigration 
(Hennessy-Fiske, 2016), and overall preference for border security in rhetoric and 
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practice did little to reverse pro-immigration public attitudes.88 Nor did Congressional 
preference for invoking border security over pathways reverse public attitudes. Yet 
these inferences are only preliminary, and do not definitively link public attitudes to 
press framing effects. While the content and poll analyses paint an aggregate picture, 
they blur the drivers of attitudinal gaps at the individual level and cannot demonstrate a 
rigorous statistical link between individual attitudes and exposure to frames. The 
following section addresses this shortcoming by linking individual attitudes on 
immigration to media and political attention.  
7.3 Cross-Sectional Individual-Level Public Opinion Analysis 
While the content analysis indicated differences in media coverage (and political 
discourse), this section clarifies if a similar gap exists in immigrant attitudes between 
individuals, and if this gap is related to news consumption habits and political 
attentiveness. Regression models are estimated using data from the 2012 and 2016 
American National Election Studies (ANES) nationally-representative surveys to link 
audience evaluation of exceptional measures directly to news media consumption and 
attention to political elites.  
Previous studies offer strong evidence that negative frames produce anti-immigrant 
attitudes in different geographic and temporal contexts (Blinder & Allen, 2016; 
Dunaway et al., 2010; Facchini et al., 2017; Héricourt & Spielvogel, 2014; Innes, 2010; 
van Klingeren et al., 2014). In U.S-centric studies, Facchini et al. (2017) used survey 
data to illustrate that media exerted influence on immigration attitudes during the CIR 
debates in that year. Specifically, they found that Fox News viewers were 9% more 
likely than CBS viewers to oppose an immigration expansionist legislative bill, and that 
CNN viewers responded similarly, attributing the latter to the “Lou Dobbs effect”. 
Surprisingly, they found no effects for MSNBC in 2006. Merolla et al. (2013) used an 
experiment to find strong support for issue framing effects – emphasizing pathways to 
citizenship over amnesty in survey prompts produced statistically significant 
 
88 The American Civil Liberties Union recognizes the following as evidence of Obama’s anti-
immigration record as of 2012: 1) deportations amounting to over 1.5 million immigrants leaving 
“hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizen children without parents and in foster care”; 2) record detentions; 
continuation of the 287(g) program granting local and state police federal immigration enforcement 
powers; and 3) record border enforcement spending (Jain, 2012). 
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differences in support for the policy being discussed. However, both their research and 
Knoll et al.’s (2011) experimental survey – conducted in 2007 and 2008 – found null 
effects for equivalence framing effects, which they tested using the immigrant labels, 
illegal and undocumented. While neither of these latter two studies tested for specific 
media effects, their results suggest that exposure to pro-immigrant framing will 
produce more lenient attitudes on immigration policy.  
Given the increasing use of alternative labels emphasized in the preceding content 
analysis, there is reason to believe that the null findings on experimental manipulations 
of equivalency frames may be outdated. Both Knoll et al. (2011) and Merolla et al. 
(2013) used survey data that preceded the Times’ style guide change and the general 
adoption of the “undocumented” frame by other news sources. Using more recent 
survey data, the current analysis implicitly tests whether discursive shifts have made 
terms like “undocumented” more accessible, thus influencing their capacity to produce 
framing effects. In addition to using data from a new discursive context – particularly 
outside of the 2006-2007 CIR bill debates – this research also adds to existing 
scholarship by linking media consumption habits directly to support for a wider range 
of immigration policies, including status checks, birthright and the border fence.  
Beyond the US, notable case studies in other Western countries have also linked media 
coverage to public support for immigration policies. McLaren et al.’s (2017) 
longitudinal design (1995-2011) shows that negative news has stronger effects on 
British immigration attitudes than positive news, suggesting that anti-immigrant news 
sources are likelier to resonate with public.89 While Blinder and Allen (2016) and Innes 
(2010) do not use empirical public opinion data, they infer from their respective content 
and discourse analyses that negative news media characterizations of immigrants and 
asylum-seekers as threats has contributed to anti-immigrant attitudes among Britons. 
Outside of the UK, Jacobs et al. (2016) find that attention to commercial news coverage 
is a predictor of negative attitudes toward immigrants in Belgium; van Klingeren et al. 
(2015) find that positive news coverage reduces anti-immigrant sentiment among 
 
89 McLaren et al. (2017) make a strong case for their decision to use MIP public opinion data as a proxy 
for anti-immigrant sentiment. While this may be appropriate to their context, the longitudinal poll 
analysis in this research suggests that MIP values have increased at the same time as pro-immigrant 
attitudes in the U.S., suggesting that their methodology would have limited applicability to the U.S. 
immigration landscape.   
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Dutch respondents; and Hericourt and Spielvogel (2014) find in Europe broadly that 
newspaper readers are likelier than television news viewers to hold pro-immigrant 
attitudes, but that attention to media in general predicts anti-immigrant attitudes. This 
section explores whether variation in framing across different actors can create 
differentiation in attitudes in the US context. 
7.3.1 Dependent Variable 
To account for the multifaceted nature of immigration policy and thoroughly 
investigate securitization effects, three different exceptional measures are used as 
outcome variables using two surveys from 2012 and 2016. They represent 
contemporaneous issues that were salient in immigration policy in a timeframe that has 
received little attention in current framing effects scholarship on American immigration 
attitudes in the US. The available response options for each issue were favor, oppose, 
or neither favor nor oppose. Favorable responses for exceptional measures were coded 
as 1, while the other two were coded 0 in order to construct binary variables 
(accordingly, logistic regression models are used for estimation), such that positive 
statistically significant coefficients on predictors indicate support for exceptional 
measures. This coding strategy was selected to better align with the prevailing 
assumption in securitization theory that acceptance of exceptional measures is the 
anomaly (or the exception) and thus represents a deviation from the baseline.  
Two models are estimated for each policy issue: a baseline model that excludes the 
media/political attention variables, and a second test model that includes all predictors. 
The first pair of models estimates support for legislation that would grant federal 
immigration enforcement powers to state and local police. The ANES question 
specifically prompts: 
Some states have passed a law that will require state and local police to 
determine the immigration status of a person if they find that there is a 
reasonable suspicion he or she is an undocumented immigrant. Those 
found to be in the U.S. without permission will have broken state law. 
From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor 
oppose these immigration laws? 
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The question is reminiscent of Section 287(g) from the Immigration and Nationality 
Act legislation – which gave state and local officers federal immigration enforcement 
powers. It became salient in 2012 when ICE called for discontinuing the program. The 
proposal also resembles the controversial 2010 Arizona State Senate bill, SB1070, 
which required police to check the citizenship status of suspected unauthorized 
immigrants (Migration Policy Institute, 2013). Importantly, by invoking law 
enforcement and requiring police officers to check the status of individuals, the 
measure links immigrants to criminality, offering a reliable proxy to measure individual 
assessments of immigrants as illegal criminals or otherwise. Figure 7.12 shows 
Americans overwhelmingly supported this measure in the 2012 ANES surveys.  
 
Figure 7.12 Support for Immigration Exceptional Measures in ANES Surveys 
 
Note: Status checks data retrieved from the 2012 ANES (5,853 responses). 
Constitutional amendment and border fence data retrieved from the 2016 ANES (4,250 
and 4,251 responses, respectively).  
 
The 2016 survey measured respondents’ attitudes to two other salient exceptional 
measures. The first prompted:  
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Some people have proposed that the U.S. Constitution should be 
changed so that the children of unauthorized immigrants do not 
automatically get citizenship if they are born in this country. Do you 
favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal? 
The proposed change to the Constitution was intended to limit birthright citizenship 
and discourage so-called “anchor babies” (Merolla et al., 2013). It was exceptional in 
that it sought to not only restrict citizenship, but proposed to do so by curtailing the 
breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which states that “all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States.” Though more extreme, the question also serves as a 
proximate measure of attitudes toward pathways toward citizenship given the overlap 
with naturalization procedures. Pro-immigration advocates have asserted that the 
Constitutional right should not be changed. Consonant with growing support for 
pathways toward legalization and citizenship discussed in the previous section, figure 
7.12 shows that more people opposed this proposal than supported it in 2016.  
The second issue addressed in the 2016 survey – support for a border fence – similarly 
exhibits greater opposition than support. It asked respondents:  
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose building a wall on the 
U.S. border with Mexico? 
While slightly more respondents were in favor of the wall than were in favor of the 
constitutional amendment, more were opposed to it, and there were fewer uncommitted 
responses. This also mirrors findings in the preceding public opinion analysis: 
beginning in 2015, more Americans opposed the border wall than supported it, 
indicating an aggregate rejection of Trump’s campaign rhetoric.  
7.3.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables include both the main theoretical variables – attention to 
media and political elites – as well as several control variables identified in previous 
research as predictors of immigration attitudes. These include demographic variables, 
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contextual variables and other drivers of insecurity that, once controlled for, provide 
greater confidence in evaluating the isolated effects of the key framing effect variables.  
7.3.2.1 Framing Effect Variables 
Both the 2012 and 2016 ANES surveys asked respondents to indicate their 
consumption of the New York Times, and specific cable news programs, including 
Anderson Cooper 360° (CNN), Hardball with Chris Matthews (MSNBC)90, and the 
O’Reilly Factor (Fox News). As prominent news programs representative of their 
respective networks’ tone, these variables are instrumental in gauging the effects of 
CNN, Fox News and MSNBC on immigration policy support. Respondents were asked 
to select the programs or content they consume regularly. For each item, the response 
was 1 if the respondent selected it and 0 otherwise. Attention to political elites was 
measured using responses to the following question:  
How often do you pay attention to what's going on in 
government and politics? 
The available responses were recoded to: 1 – Never; 2 – Some of the time; 3 – About 
half the time; 4 – Most of the time; 5 – All the time.91  
7.3.2.2 Contextual and Insecurity Variables 
Border State  
Dunaway et al. (2010) find that media coverage of immigration is more voluminous in 
border states. Their analysis of MIP public opinion polls shows that residents of border 
states also express higher anxiety about immigration. Others find similar evidence to 
support the influence of exposure to immigration – living in a border state, proximity to 
environmental cues like border barriers – on political behavior and attitudes (Branton, 
 
90 In the 2012 ANES survey, the prompt asked respondents if they viewed The Chris Matthews Show, 
which was Matthews’ concurrent show on MSNBC’s ideologically equivalent (Pew Research Center, 
2014a) sister network, NBC. Given the shared host, ideologically similar networks and similar show 
formats, this variable is used as a proxy for MSNBC in 2012, while the 2016 survey directly measures 
support for Matthews’ MSNBC program, Hardball with Chris Matthews.  
91 In the original dataset, these codes were reversed. They are recoded here to align with the four news 
variables, which are coded higher values (1) for consumption and lower values (0) for no consumption.  
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Dillingham, Dunaway, & Miller, 2007; Tolbert & Hero, 2001). Following Dunaway et 
al. (2010), a variable for border state was assigned a value of 1 for respondents from 
Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California and Florida92 and 0 otherwise. As an 
additional objective measure of ethnic context, a separate variable was used to control 
for the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the respondent’s state of 
residence. Using 2014 data from the Pew Research Center (Passel & Cohn, 2016), this 
variable stored the population of unauthorized immigrants in the respondent’s resident 
state as a percentage of the state’s total population.  
Financial Situation Concern 
Previous research has linked anxiety about the economy and finances to immigration 
attitudes. Because immigrants can be perceived by natives as competition for 
employment, they are regarded as a threat. The effects of the economy – both perceived 
and objective – however remain unresolved in existing scholarship. Valentino et al. 
(2013) and Sides and Citrin (2007) find links between negative personal financial 
outlooks and support for anti-immigrant attitudes among Americans. Others similarly 
relate pessimism about the economy to negative perceptions of immigrants (Burns & 
Gimpel, 2000; Dunaway et al., 2010). On the other hand, however, Citrin, Green, 
Muste, and Wong (1997) find that higher optimism about the economy increases 
opposition to immigration. This influence is controlled for using a variable that records 
how worried the respondent is about their current financial situation, recoded on a scale 
of 1-5 where 1 signifies Not at all worried and 5 signifies Extremely worried.  
Terrorist Attack Concern 
Border security became a part of counterterrorism discourse following 9/11. In addition 
to economic factors then, immigration anxiety may also be linked to traditional security 
concerns. In support of this, Hopkins (2010) found that 9/11 incited anti-immigrant 
attitudes for a brief period; Legewie (2013) used survey data to show that in various 
European countries, individuals became more anti-immigrant following terrorist 
attacks; and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) show that immigration opposition 
increases when immigrants are linked to crime more generally. Anxiety of a terrorist 
 
92 While Florida does not share a land border with another country, its proximity to Caribbean countries 
(e.g., Cuba) and large immigrant inflow makes its inclusion in this list pertinent. Moreover, excluding it 
had no impact on the significance or direction of the key theoretical variables in the regression models. 
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attack is controlled for using the question, “During the next 12 months, how likely is it 
that there will be a terrorist attack in the United States that kills 100 or more people?” 
Responses are recoded from 1 – Not at all likely to 5 – Extremely likely. 
Group Bias and Cultural Anxiety 
Anti-immigrant attitudes may simply be a reflection of ethnocentrism or negative affect 
toward immigrant groups. Lee and Ottati (2002) find that support for anti-immigration 
policies was higher among Anglo-American participants when the target of this 
legislation was Mexicans immigrants, and lower when the target was Anglo-Canadian 
immigrants, suggesting an out-group bias. Valentino et al. (2013) use feeling 
thermometer measurements to show that negative attitudes toward Hispanics have a 
significant influence on support for restrictive immigrant policies. Sides and Citrin 
(2007) similarly find that cultural unity and preservation of national identity are 
stronger predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes than economic dissatisfaction. Following 
Valentino et al. (2013), this study uses a feeling thermometer to assess respondent 
affect toward Hispanics. Respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards 
Hispanics on a scale of 1 to 100.  
7.3.2.3 General Demographic Variables 
Race  
Existing research suggests that whites and blacks are more likely to oppose 
immigration (Abrajano et al., 2017; Suro, 2009: 3), while Hispanics are more likely to 
hold pro-legalization attitudes (Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; Facchini et al., 2017). 
Given these differences, the models here control for race by using a dummy variable, 
coded 1 for Hispanic respondents and 0 otherwise.   
Income 
While Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) find no relationship between income and 
immigration attitudes, other research agrees that higher income (and higher 
occupational status) correlate strongly with support for pro-immigration policies 
(Facchini et al., 2017; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Valentino et al. (2013) find, 
counterintuitively, that higher income predicts opposition to immigrants. Hainmueller 
and Hiscox’s (2007) more nuanced results show that wealthier natives are less likely to 
oppose low-skilled immigration compared to poorer natives. The effect of income is 
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tested in the models here to control for these tensions. It is measured using a 28-point 
ordinal scale where higher values indicate higher income. 
Gender 
For the most part, females have been linked to pro-immigrant attitudes (Dunaway et al., 
2010; Knoll, Redlawsk, & Sanborn, 2011), but Facchini et al. (2017) find that this 
effect is statistically insignificant when controlling for ideology and party 
identification. They explain this by noting that “women are on average more liberal 
than men so that – when not controlling for ideology – the ideology effect on illegal 
immigration attitudes is absorbed by the female dummy” (Facchini et al. 2017: 20). 
Still O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) find in their study of 24 countries that women tend to 
be more anti-immigrant than men. These mixed findings are controlled for here using a 
dummy variable, coded 1 for females and 0 otherwise.  
Political ideology and Partisanship 
Consistent with the content and discourse analysis, there is near unanimous support that 
Republicans and conservatives are more likely to oppose immigration and support anti-
immigration policies (Abrajano et al., 2017; Dunaway et al., 2010; Knoll et al., 2011; 
Suro, 2009). Partisanship is measured using a 7-point summary variable in the ANES 
dataset where 1 indicates Strongly Democrat and 7 indicates Strongly Republican; 
ideology is measured on a seven-point scale where 1 represents Extremely liberal and 7 
represents Extremely conservative.  
Age 
The effects of age on immigration attitudes are mixed – while some research has found 
that older respondents are more likely to perceive immigration as a problem (Dunaway 
et al., 2010; Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Suro, 2009) and 
favor restrictions (Mayda, 2006), others find mixed effects (Facchini et al., 2017). Age 
is measured directly in years.  
Education 
Higher educational attainment predicts pro-immigration attitudes (Chandler & Tsai, 
2001; Facchini et al., 2017; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Scheve & 
Slaughter, 2001) and less concern about immigrants as a problem (Dunaway et al., 
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2010; Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993). Burns and Gimpel (2000) find education to have 
the strongest influence on immigration attitudes. Education is measured here on a 
sixteen-point scale, with 1 representing Less than 1st grade and 16 representing 
Doctorate degree (for example: PHD, EDD).   
Children 
Immigration restrictionists have frequently expressed concern that non-English 
speaking immigrants will burden school systems that accommodate secondary language 
development and divert resources away from English-speaking students. This concern 
is likely to be more salient for respondents with children since their children are likely 
to be affected. To control for this anxiety, a dummy variable is coded 1 if the 
respondent has children and 0 otherwise.  
Authoritarianism 
Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ (2007) find a strong link between authoritarianism and 
anti-immigration preference. Claassen and McLaren (2019: 21) add nuance to these 
findings, showing that “it is primarily individuals with authoritarian predispositions 
who become increasingly intolerant in the face of threats to social conformity”, 
particularly when posed by “culturally distinct migrants”. Other literature has also 
shown that authoritarians have negative attitudes toward those perceived to stray from 
social norms or uniformity (Altemeyer, 1996; Stenner, 2005). Yet, American 
identification with egalitarian and humanitarian values can also moderate tendencies to 
reject outsiders, suggesting a possible link between authoritarianism (in this case 
adherence to American tradition and values) and positive affect towards immigrants 
(Oyamot, Fisher, Deason, & Borgida, 2012). This study uses the ANES 
authoritarianism measure to control for either relationship, where the dummy variable 
is coded 1 for the presence of an authoritarian characteristic and 0 otherwise.  
7.3.3 Results 
Table 7.5 presents logistic regression results from the 2012 (models 1 and 2) and 2016 
(models 3-6) ANES data sets. For each of the three exceptional measures analyzed, a 
baseline model (that excludes the experimental framing source variables) and a full 
model are presented.   
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Table 7.5 Support for restrictionist exceptional measures (2012 and 2016) 
 Status Checks 
Constitutional 
Amendment 
Border Fence 
 2012 2012 2016 2016 2016 2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Framing Effect        
       
Attention to politics  -0.031  0.069  0.313*** 
  (0.053)  (0.087)  (0.102) 
CNN  -0.297*  0.058  -0.364 
  (0.153)  (0.212)  (0.269) 
Fox News  1.043***  0.570***  0.951*** 
  (0.179)  (0.209)  (0.235) 
MSNBC  -0.455**  -0.287  0.576* 
  (0.213)  (0.276)  (0.321) 
New York Times  -0.798***  -0.395**  -0.721*** 
  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.225) 
Contextual and Insecurity        
       
Border state resident 0.170 0.166 0.290* 0.554** -0.222 -0.167 
 (0.114) (0.171) (0.153) (0.251) (0.175) (0.308) 
Percent unauthorized  -0.020 -0.024 -0.022 -0.019 0.050 0.007 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.038) (0.063) (0.043) (0.076) 
Financial concern 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.081** 0.103 0.094** 0.134* 
 (0.030) (0.046) (0.041) (0.069) (0.046) (0.081) 
Terrorist attack concern -0.216*** -0.172*** -0.112** -0.045 -0.244*** -0.116 
 (0.039) (0.058) (0.044) (0.075) (0.051) (0.090) 
Hispanic thermometer -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
General Demographic        
       
Race (Hispanic) -1.240*** -0.838*** -0.792*** -0.690** -0.684*** -0.654 
 (0.119) (0.182) (0.199) (0.350) (0.216) (0.403) 
Income 0.013*** 0.004 0.006 0.005 -0.011 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) 
Gender (female) -0.109 0.048 -0.171* -0.141 -0.136 0.125 
 (0.071) (0.105) (0.092) (0.154) (0.105) (0.184) 
Ideology 0.281*** 0.261*** 0.244*** 0.186** 0.444*** 0.385*** 
 (0.031) (0.047) (0.043) (0.072) (0.050) (0.086) 
Partisanship 
 
0.253*** 0.239*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.347*** 0.307*** 
(0.021) (0.031) (0.029) (0.051) (0.033) (0.059) 
Age 0.008*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.009 0.009** -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
Education level -0.067*** -0.055** -0.031 -0.048 -0.109*** -0.159*** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.023) (0.040) (0.026) (0.047) 
Children -0.002 -0.095 -0.055 -0.122 0.060 0.082 
 (0.084) (0.131) (0.108) (0.176) (0.123) (0.206) 
Authoritarianism  -0.270*** -0.234** -0.028 -0.157 0.352*** 0.423** 
 (0.073) (0.106) (0.097) (0.167) (0.106) (0.187) 
Constant -0.082 0.471 -1.141** -0.990 -1.882*** -1.892** 
 (0.345) (0.550) (0.454) (0.813) (0.507) (0.940) 
Observations 4,436 2,248 2,582 1,022 2,576 1,020 
Log Likelihood -2,452.523 -1,174.598 -1,451.040 -545.482 -1,164.863 -406.726 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,935.045 2,389.196 2,932.079 1,130.963 2,359.725 853.452 
Model χ2 1244.326*** 765.136*** 392.224*** 202.074*** 943.088*** 422.375*** 
Note: Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Models 1, 3 and 5 for each 
year exclude framing effect variables, while models 2, 4 and 6 include them. Because of missing values 
in the ANES dataset, observations are reduced between the baseline and full models for each year. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01;  
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Framing Effects Variables 
Across the board, attention to the New York Times and attention to Fox News were 
statistically significant predictors of attitudes toward immigration policies, in directions 
consistent with the content analysis: Times readers were less likely to support status 
checks, amending the Constitution to end birthright citizenship, and border fences 
while Fox News viewers were likelier to support all three policies. Causality cannot be 
ascertained from this model; but assuming a top-down flow of influence, the odds 
ratios (presented in table 7.6) suggest that the impact of both sources was larger on 
status checks and border fence preferences than on the birthright issue. Again, 
assuming theoretical directions of influence, this suggests that the sources had stronger 
framing effects on the former two issues. Specifically, Fox News viewers were almost 
three times as likely to support status checks and the fence respectively, but less than 
twice as likely to support constitutional changes than non-viewers; while Times readers 
were just less than half as likely to support status checks and the wall, and just over 
two-thirds as likely to support constitutional amendments as non-readers. This is 
unsurprising given that the corresponding frames for each of these issues received 
congruent levels of attention in the content analysis: the illegal and border security 
frames received more attention in the press than the pathways frame for all actors. Both 
the Times and Fox News gave significant attention to these frames as well, but their 
coverage was also qualitatively different: while Fox News showed the greatest 
preference for the border security frame among the media actors, the Times showed the 
least. Fox News also showed the greatest preference for the illegal frame across all 
actors (by a factor of nearly 15 to one). Criminal and border security frames – and their 
desecuritizing counterparts – then seem to have produced significant framing effects on 
audiences. Importantly, even though the Times allotted more overall coverage to the 
securitizing frame than the desecuritizing frame, its readers were still unlikely to 
support exceptional measures, indicating that Americans may expect a baseline level of 
negative coverage of immigration. As long as that negativity remains below a certain 
threshold, the press can still generate pro-immigration effects.  
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Table 7.6 Odds Ratios 
 
Status Checks 
Constitutional 
Amendment 
Border Fence 
Political Elites 0.970 1.072 1.367*** 
CNN 0.743* 1.060 0.695 
Fox News  2.839*** 1.768*** 2.588*** 
MSNBC 0.635** 0.750 1.779* 
New York Times 0.450*** 0.673** 0.486*** 
Note: Odds ratios correspond to logistic regression results presented in table 7.5. 
 
MSNBC and CNN may have missed this threshold in 2016, given that their viewers 
were less uniform in expressed support for anti-immigration measures. While both 
predicted a negative relationship with support for status checks in 2012, CNN viewers 
were neither more nor less likely to support either exceptional measure in 2016, and 
MSNBC viewership surprisingly predicted support for the border fence. These findings 
may be attributable to a broader “scrambled” politics described by Benson (2013) as 
the convergence of ideologically opposed identities into “strange bedfellow alliances” 
(7). Jobs, the labor market, and environmental protection – traditionally leftist concerns 
– for example, might unite Democrats with anti-immigration conservatives (Benson, 
2013; Benson & Wood, 2015). This effect is amplified during election years when 
ideological gerrymandering becomes an attractive strategy to pull swing voters. The 
2016 general election, however, did not witness anti-immigration agendas by 
Democrats, making it unlikely that MSNBC would go out of its way to promote this 
frame. Moreover, the content analysis shows limited evidence to support this: the only 
major difference between MSNBC and the Times is a sudden reversal for the former in 
2016 toward preferring the “illegal” frame over the “undocumented” frame. 
A more likely explanation for this counterintuitive result may be idiosyncrasies 
associated with Chris Matthews’ show, which was used as a proxy for MSNBC. 
Matthews had been an outspoken critic of Obama’s and Democrats’ weaknesses on 
border security (Jain, 2012), his anti-immigration viewpoints culminating in an election 
night 2016 on-air spat with co-anchor Rachel Maddow about the lack of an enforceable 
immigration system. However, replacing this variable with Rachel Maddow’s more 
249 
 
popular primetime program in model 6 resulted in a null effect for MSNBC (see table 
B.2 in Appendix B). While it may be that Maddow’s show shares similar 
idiosyncrasies, other factors may also be at play. Maddow’s show does, for example, 
become statistically significant in the expected direction when excluding partisanship 
and ideology, suggesting that the political identity variables may be capturing some of 
the effect of the MSNBC program.  
Still, the finding that viewers of Matthews’ show are likely to support the border wall, 
in spite of this contradicting MSNBC’s general political orientation, is significant 
evidence of media actors – in this case, Chris Matthews – having influence. Attention 
to one anchor alone predicted anti-liberal policies, despite being on a liberally biased 
network. This is further impressive given that, at the aggregate level, Americans were 
largely against the wall by 2016, and that immigration was a highly salient issue in the 
2016 general election. To the extent the alignment between attention to Matthews’ 
show and respondent preferences indicates influence of the former on the latter, 
Matthews was able to overcome partisan/ideological beliefs and push cognitively 
dissonant frames that conflicted with the majority opinion both in the country and in 
the ideological camp. Future research would benefit from conducting isolated content 
analyses of specific shows to determine the extent to which particular anchors – like 
Matthews – deviate from the broader network message and tone.  
The relationship between attention to politics and public opinion is also mixed. 
Certainly attention to political elites cannot be entirely disentangled from the media 
variables (given that individuals learn about political elite rhetoric from consuming 
media); the models thus do not full isolate the effect of political elite discourse. Still, 
political attention is a statistically significant predictor of support for only the border 
wall. This may be attributable to Trump’s outsized influence – his oft-cited promise of 
the border wall funded by Mexico received disproportionate interest (particularly in 
comparison to changes to the Constitution), overexposing politically attentive 
individuals to this cue and attracting press coverage. Then, in the case of immigration, 
political discourse appeared to resonate when the message was sensational, provocative 
and disruptive. Second, the fact that political attention is positively related to support 
for the wall suggests that political elite-driven framing effects are acting against the 
majority public opinion, given the overall decline in support for anti-immigration 
policies (and the wall specifically). While the decline in support for exceptional 
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measures represented in the ANES dataset between 2012 and 2016 (figure 7.12) should 
be read with caution – given that all three variables measure different policies – it 
aligns with previous aggregate-level findings that Americans have become increasingly 
supportive of pathways toward legal status, against the wall, and against deportation. In 
short, Trump’s entrepreneurial disruption to the overall discourse on a highly salient 
issue may have driven support for an otherwise unpopular policy.  
The findings generally align with the scholarly consensus that anti-immigrant frames 
produce anti-immigrant attitudes. Facchini et al.’s (2017) analysis of public opinion 
from the 2006 CIR debates showed that Fox News and CNN viewers held anti-
immigrant beliefs and MSNBC produced no effect. Fox News produces similar results 
here while CNN and MSNBC were mixed. Again, CNN’s moderation is likely the 
effect of Lou Dobbs’ departure. Merolla et al. (2013) and Knoll et al. (2011) found null 
effects for equivalency frames (illegal and undocumented). The former explain this 
2007 result as an issue of inaccessibility for the public: “mainstream news media 
outlets made little reference to undocumented immigrants (as opposed to illegal 
immigrants)” which “may limit the extent to which the term resonates with the general 
public and is associated with more positive or neutral stances towards the group” 
(Merolla et al., 2013: 800). Their predictions that increased usage would make the 
distinctions between undocumented and illegal more accessible are largely supported 
here: while a definitive link cannot be made using the data presented in this research, 
the timing of MSNBC’s sudden reversal in 2016 to preferring the illegal frame over the 
undocumented frame aligns closely with its audience’s shift toward support for anti-
immigration policies like the fence.  
Contextual and Insecurity Variables 
Turning to ethnic context and other insecurity variables, subjective variables have a 
stronger effect on immigration attitudes than objective factors. Group bias and concern 
about one’s personal financial situation are statistically significant indicators in almost 
all models, suggesting that for many Americans, support for anti-immigration measures 
is linked to unfavorable feelings towards Hispanics and economic insecurity. There 
may also be some conflation between immigrants and terrorist actors, given that 
increased concern about a likely terrorist attack is a strong predictor of support for anti-
immigration policies in 2012, and in the 2016 baseline models. By 2016, at least part of 
this relationship can be attributed to news sources and/or political elites. Surprisingly, 
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objective factors are less conclusive: the size of the local unauthorized immigration 
population has no statistically significant effect in any of the models, and when the 
framing effect variables are introduced to the models, border state residents are more 
likely to support only a change to the Constitution.  
The disparity between objective and subjective variables generates significant support 
for securitization theory. It shows that public support for exceptional measures is driven 
more by perception than by objective reality, and that immigration attitudes may be 
unrelated to immigration rates. Further, having children had a negative relationship 
with support for the wall (the only time this variable was statistically significant), 
suggesting that respondents with children were unlikely to support exceptional 
measures. This is surprising given the anti-immigration argument that immigrants 
burden schools, divert resources away from Americans to support foreign language 
speakers, and have other adverse effects on students. In reality, parents are no more 
likely than non-parents to support anti-immigration policies, and in one case, non-
parents are likelier to support anti-immigration policies. Together, these objective 
variables were only intermittently significant, whereas subjective variables – bias 
against Hispanics and personal financial outlook – were significant in every model. The 
added significance of media variables in all the models suggests that the press may be 
managing the public’s perceptions, above and beyond “real” conditions experienced by 
individuals. This is congruent with other research: Blinder and Allen’s (2016) findings 
lead them to make the case for “media as an autonomous influence” on public opinion 
even when actual patterns of immigration flow are incongruent with media coverage; 
and Sides and Citrin (2007) also find that immigration attitudes are unrelated to 
contextual factors like immigration flow or the objective state of the economy.  
General Demographic Variables 
The only consistent finding across demographic variables is that Republicans and 
conservatives were more likely than Democrats and liberals to support anti-
immigration measures in all cases; and that Hispanics were least likely to support anti-
immigration measures in most cases. Gender did not play a role in any of the full 
models, suggesting that it had little influence when other variables were being 
controlled for. In contrast to Espenshade and Calhoun’s (1993) finding that age and 
education were strong predictors of public opinion toward unauthorized immigration 
and immigrants, the effects of age and education here are mixed, but generally show 
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that lower educated and older individuals are more in favor of anti-immigration 
policies. Age was only significant in the baseline models, thus suggesting that some of 
its effect was subsumed in the framing effect variables. 
7.3.4 Summary of Cross-Sectional Individual-Level Public Opinion Analysis  
Integrating top-down assumptions into this analysis, the results largely suggest that 
news media and, to a lesser extent, political elites – at least by 2016 – were able to 
influence attitudes toward immigration policies. The New York Times and Fox News in 
particular predicted attitudinal gaps for all three policies, mirroring differences found in 
the content analysis: while the Times led other sources in covering desecuritizing 
frames (particularly after 2012), Fox News led its competitors in covering securitizing 
frames. The corresponding individual-level analysis here showed that respondents’ 
attitudes mirrored the messaging of their preferred information sources, particularly on 
criminality (as measured through status checks) and border security (the fence) – both 
are sites in which the Times and Fox News predicted the strongest (de)securitizing 
effects. Lending greater support to securitization theory, the results here also 
demonstrated that objective threat indicators – including proximity to borders and the 
percent of unauthorized immigration in one’s state – had little effect on attitudes. 
Instead, subjective indicators – like economic anxiety and group bias – were key 
contextual drivers of support for exceptional measures.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed changes in political elite and press frames on immigration over 
different political contexts – in this case, two presidential administrations spanning 
sixteen years – and mapped these to public attitudes. An additional layer of conceptual 
richness was added by examining frames along multiple dichotomous dimensions, 
including frame tone (securitizing and desecuritizing), frame functions (moral 
evaluation and remedy proposal) and frame types (issue and equivalency). The moral 
evaluation axis differentiated functionally equivalent labels that linked immigrants to 
criminality (illegal immigrant) or to a procedural problem (e.g., undocumented 
immigrant). The remedy proposal axis, on the other hand, juxtaposed frames linked to 
border security with those linked to pathways toward legalization and/or citizenship. 
These two issue frames sought to resolve the perceived immigration problem through 
either restrictionist barriers or integrative, expansionist policies. This final section 
253 
 
describes key findings in the operationalization of these dimensions within the content 
and audience analyses; it also presents theoretical and empirical implications unique to 
the immigration debate. Broader implications for securitization theory are discussed in 
the following chapter.   
In contrast to earlier research on immigration frames, the content analysis here found a 
profound transformation in press coverage, which had become increasingly 
desecuritizing and pro-immigrant by the end of 2016. The shift along the moral 
evaluation axis was especially notable, because it showed that left-leaning press actors 
– CNN, MSNBC and the Times – had gone from largely preferring the illegal label 
toward euphemisms like undocumented to describe unauthorized immigrants, thus 
diluting the long-running criminal metaphor. These same actors also showed an 
increased willingness to contribute to the debate on how to resolve the perceived 
problem of immigration, marking a shift from their general disengagement during the 
Bush years. Still, the press was not monolithic: while pro-immigrant frames became 
more common among some actors, Fox News showed more resistance. It was the only 
actor to consistently prefer anti-immigrant securitizing rhetoric throughout all quarters 
of the Obama presidency, whether in promoting the criminality link or border security. 
Political elites also showed an increased willingness to promote desecuritizing frames, 
but there were significant differences in comparison to the press. Political elites 
demonstrated more volatility and much less consistency along the moral evaluation 
axis, and a stronger preference for the border security frame than most press actors.  
Over time, audiences seemed more receptive to the pro-immigrant press coverage at the 
aggregate level – this has been demonstrated by growing support for increasing 
immigration; growing support for offering unauthorized immigrants a pathway toward 
legalization or citizenship; decreasing support for deportations; and increasing 
opposition to a border wall. Importantly, while a majority of Americans had supported 
a wall throughout the Obama administration, a shift occurred late in his presidency and 
during the 2016 general election campaign, suggesting a sharp rejection of Trump’s 
proposal for a border wall. This finding was echoed in the individual-level cross-
sectional analysis which not only showed that a plurality of Americans opposed the 
wall (and a constitutional amendment restricting citizenship to immigrants), but that 
attitudes to immigration policies were strongly linked to press attention, in expected 
directions: Times readers were likelier to oppose restrictionist policies while Fox News 
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viewers were likelier to support them. Political elites (as measured through attention to 
politics more generally) only predicted support for the border wall in 2016 – this is 
likely linked to Trump’s oversized influence on immigration discourse. Another major 
finding in this section that validates key assumptions in securitization theory is that 
subjective evaluations – such as economic anxiety and group bias – were stronger 
predictors of immigration attitudes than objective factors – like proximity to a border or 
the level of unauthorized immigrants in the respondents’ state.  
While the immigration debate has received wide attention in securitization and framing 
studies, this chapter makes several novel contributions to understanding what 
immigration (de)securitization looks like in the US and how it has evolved over a 
sixteen-year period that covers two different political contexts. First, previous research 
has found that terms like “undocumented worker” backfire because the public 
recognizes them as manipulative euphemisms (Westen, 2009). While this may be the 
case in early stages, the analyses here suggest that alternative labels eventually become 
mainstreamed and normalized. Aradau (2004: 402) argues that “dangerous others” can 
only be desecuritized by losing their securitized identity: “What is first needed is a 
process of dis-identification, a rupture from the assigned identity and a partaking of a 
universal principle”. The audience analysis here suggests that these effects may have 
been at play: as the undocumented frame became more common relative to the illegal 
frame – thus diluting the criminality metaphor typically applied to immigrants – the 
public appears to have become more pro-immigrant by some indicators.  
Growing pro-immigration attitudes and media frames notwithstanding, the content 
analysis here supports claims in extant research that the media focuses 
disproportionately93 on the criminal immigrant narrative (see also Blinder & Allen, 
2016; Merolla et al., 2013; Santa Ana et al., 2007), but it also demonstrates that 
alternative depictions are becoming competitive. That pathways toward legalization 
and citizenship have sometimes received as much, if not more, coverage than border 
security is especially surprising, because the press is forgoing potentially more 
stimulating and dramatic content for drier, more esoteric policies. The exception may 
be Chris Matthews on MSNBC, whose coverage and viewers were more sympathetic to 
 
93 In reality, illegal immigrants and legal immigrants are just over half and one-fifth, respectively, as 
likely as natives to be incarcerated (Landgrave & Nowrasteh, 2018).   
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a border fence. While this was a surprising result, it is reinforcing evidence of the 
significance of media actors as strategic and independent. Not only was Matthews able 
to overcome his network’s general liberal bias, but also the prevailing national mood on 
the border fence. 
Finally, Donald Trump’s entrance into the immigration debate showcases a turning 
point in framing trends, and also offers a deeper understanding of how discursive 
entrepreneurs can affect the behavior of the press and public. The novelty and 
sensationalism of Trump’s provocative campaign statements drew significant media 
coverage and may have reshaped the boundaries of immigration discourse. This 
suggests that it may be strategic and expedient to use extreme and disruptive language 
to influence (or reverse trends) rather than attempting to introduce changes gradually. 
The press’ natural tendency to calibrate toward sensationalistic events increases the 
likelihood of producing a shock in discourse as Trump’s proposal for a border wall did. 
But the audience analysis also suggests that shocks may be unpopular at the aggregate 
level, even if they resonate strongly at the individual level. As with terms like 
undocumented, however, this aggregate revulsion may be temporary: audiences might 
receive extreme language with skepticism at first and be suspicious of manipulation, 
but consistent drumbeat messaging may result in a gradual normalization, leading to 
tolerance, acceptance and even support for frames previously considered radical. Even 
if the effect is audience polarization, disruptive content certainly increases the 
likelihood of framing effects during early stages as seen in the analyses presented here. 
A content analysis of the press and political discourse beyond the temporal limits of 
this research can demonstrate the full extent of Trump’s influence and whether the 
press was able to regain some autonomy during his presidency. But through 2016, the 
press appeared to calibrate its coverage toward Trump’s message.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The Bush administration’s early characterization of the post-9/11 national security 
climate as a “new paradigm” (Bush, 2002) was prophetic. For nearly two decades, 
anxiety about the foreign Other has profoundly influenced policy debates, the 
legitimization (and execution) of exceptional measures and the public mood. While 
terrorism has been the predominant concern in security discourse since 2001, the threat 
was extended to unauthorized immigration as well – certainly immigrants have long 
been associated with criminality, but the post-9/11 narrative further added the 
complexion of a national security threat. These changes in security discourse have 
cooccurred with seismic shifts in the ever-complex media and information marketplace, 
meaning that public processing of these issues has also changed dramatically. The 
proliferation of media actors, digital and traditional, has stimulated more targeted news 
produced for niche audiences. While cable news was well out of its infancy by 2001, it 
has since matured into a more polarized genre of news that commands the widest 
audience among any other type of news source.  
These two broad changes are the impetus for the primary research question explored in 
this thesis: can the media be an independent (de)securitizing actor? In answering this 
question, the contributions of this research are theoretical, methodological and 
empirical. Securitization theory in IR has largely dismissed the potential of media 
actors to act as independent and strategic agents in security discourse generation – this 
is understandable given the wide literature in political communication that accords the 
press a conveyor-belt function (Baum & Potter, 2008; Bennett, 1990; Bennett et al., 
2006). Yet shifting media business incentives and a changing landscape have prompted, 
in the latter discipline, revised models that accommodate the possibility of independent 
and strategic press actors. This thesis has sought to bridge that gap within the particular 
logic of security framing, and demonstrate that media actors are more than mere 
functional actors (Buzan et al., 1998). The contribution also spans media research: 
analytical models explaining the interaction between mass media, public opinion and 
political elites have traditionally simplified the media to an undifferentiated mass 
(Baum & Potter, 2008). Here, the media has been disaggregated into specific outlets, 
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recognizing the dynamism and diversity in the information marketplace, and also that 
media consumption is a different experience for different American audiences.  
Yet the prescribed methodology in securitization theory, discourse analysis, has been 
inadequate for measuring press discourse and its framing effects on audiences. The 
methodological contribution of this thesis thus stems from cross-fertilization with the 
broad framing scholarship. Specifically, the integration of quantitative content and 
survey data analyses with traditional discourse analysis makes it possible to fold in 
these two sets of actors who have generally been either neglected or underdeveloped in 
securitization theory (Balzacq, 2005, 2011a; Watson, 2012). Quantification also 
facilitates objective and standardized comparisons across actors and cases. Certainly 
discourse analysis plays a major role – it was used here to identify unique features of 
competing securitizing and desecuritizing narratives. The goal was to bolster discourse 
analysis with other tools, ultimately using a method of triangulation to fuse insights 
from different vantage points.  
Finally, the empirical contributions are manifold. While the US itself is a novel setting 
for the largely Eurocentric securitization theory, terrorism and unauthorized 
immigration have been principal security concerns for nearly two decades, making 
them critical targets for analysis. The period under analysis has also seen majority 
swings in support for exceptional measures to address these issues: public opinion 
moved from largely being against torture soon after Abu Ghraib, to supporting it early 
during Obama’s first term, and now stabilizing at a near even split; attitudes toward a 
border wall have swung from mostly in favor to mostly opposed in recent years. This 
thesis has attempted to deepen the understanding of these swings and the role that 
elite/media framing played in influencing them. Given that attitudes have moved in 
different directions on these two issues, the case studies contribute to a better 
understanding of both securitization and desecuritization, helping to answer the 
secondary research question in this thesis: how did exceptional measures become 
(de)legitimized in the US in response to the perceived threats posed by terrorism and 
unauthorized immigration, and how were these contested by competing frames? 
This final chapter first presents the main findings of this thesis with a focus on 
synthesizing cross-sectoral similarities and differences. While the two case studies – 
terrorism and unauthorized immigration – have largely been discussed in isolation, the 
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focus now shifts to thematic overlaps and differentiations between the two. The 
discussion then segues into the implications of this project for securitization theory, 
media and framing studies, and policymaking. Finally, limitations are acknowledged 
and directions for future research are recommended.  
8.2 Cross-Sectoral Summary of Research Findings 
Both case studies explored the emergence of frames in political elite discourse; the 
selection, prioritization and presentation of particular frames by the press; and the 
impact of discourse on public evaluations. Theoretical assumptions in the cascade 
activation model suggest that political elites largely set the initial boundaries of 
discourse available to downstream actors (Entman, 2004). The analyses here showed 
that once oppositional (de)securitizing discourses and identities emerged, press actors 
increasingly exercised autonomy in their selection, prioritization and presentation of 
particular frames. While an immediate causal impact on attitudes cannot be 
demonstrated, evidence from multiple vantage points shows a strong association 
between public opinion and media frames. Even if theoretical assumptions about the 
direction of influence from the press to the public are suspended, the association at least 
points to a continuous reproduction of (de)securitizing discourses: press actors may 
certainly be tailoring their framing to satisfy preexisting attitudes, but framing choices 
reinforce audience attitudes and perpetuate a shared understanding of security issues. 
These effects were analyzed across both case studies, but using varying degrees of 
complexity along the frame functional axis. The first case study on terrorism focused 
on competing remedy proposals; the second case study on immigration focused on the 
moral evaluation and remedy proposal axes. Key findings are summarized below.  
8.2.1 Emergence of (De)Securitizing Frames in Political Elite Discourse 
While both Presidents Bush and Obama largely toed their respective party lines, the 
discourse analyses unearthed surprising similarities between the two. Expectedly, 
President Bush reflected typically hawkish Republican values in his support for torture. 
Still, the support was not automatic, but cultivated over time through a rebranding of 
the administration’s interrogation program as an effective intelligence strategy that was 
separate from torture. The administration’s initial reaction to Abu Ghraib created little 
political space to promote torture outright, but by erecting a rhetorical wall of 
separation between its “enhanced interrogation” program and torture, the Bush 
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administration negotiated a politically sustainable securitization narrative. President 
Obama, on the other hand, rejected the practice – whether labeled torture or enhanced 
interrogation – both rhetorically and procedurally (e.g., banning the Bush-era program 
through executive order) early in his tenure. While both presidents rejected torture, 
Bush used that rejection as a rhetorical strategy to differentiate and cultivate support for 
his administration’s interrogation program. Obama, on the other hand, recognized 
interrogation as just a euphemism for the practice of torture.  
More surprisingly, in the case of immigration, both presidents (and congresspersons 
from opposing parties) showed considerable overlap. For Bush, 9/11 propelled an 
immigrant-terrorist linkage that manifested in rhetoric and policy, such as the USA 
PATRIOT Act and the consolidation of immigration enforcement agencies under the 
Department of Homeland Security. Still, despite this linkage, Bush minimized the 
distance between the immigrant Other and the American Self through language that 
emphasized shared family values and economic ambitions. He pushed for compromise 
legislation that married border security with pathways toward legalization. Obama’s 
presidency was similarly characterized by compromise: pro-immigrant rhetoric and 
integrative programs like DACA and DAPA coincided with record deportations and an 
aggressive enforcement strategy. Like Bush, Obama also pushed for and oversaw failed 
attempts in Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform. And while the 
absence of attacks on the scale of 9/11 prevented an immigrant-terrorist linkage during 
his administration, the 2014 Central American migrant crisis catalyzed a detention and 
border security program that prompted criticism of Obama for mishandling a 
humanitarian issue using enforcement measures.  
While these cross-sectoral differences may be attributable to the personas and 
political/security priorities of the two presidents involved, they may also reflect broader 
variation in tolerance for exceptional measures in the military and societal sectors 
between Democrats and Republicans. Again, general hawkishness may make 
exceptional measures in the military sector more palatable to Republicans. Democratic 
support for international norms and institutions, on the other hand, likely drives 
resistance to exceptional measures outlawed by the Geneva Conventions and UNCAT. 
Military sector events – especially 9/11 – are also more pronounced, creating the 
potential for hardened attitudes and greater polarization. While societal sector issues 
can also be sensational – such as the 2014 migrant crisis – they may be less polarizing, 
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resulting in relatively greater policymaking leeway. Immigration in particular may fit 
this bill, because of its tendency to produce a “scrambled politics” and “strange 
bedfellows” alliances (Benson, 2013; Benson & Wood, 2015). The adverse effects of 
unauthorized immigration on the labor market, the environment (e.g., through 
overcrowding of cities and urban sprawl), and welfare programs – all traditionally 
leftist concerns – may generate greater tolerance for exceptional measures among 
Democrat leaders in the societal sector, hence Obama’s occasional hardline approach. 
Similarly, awareness of shifting demographics and the increasing make up of 
immigrants in the American voting electorate creates political incentives to balance 
hardline approaches with pro-immigrant rhetoric and policies, demonstrated by both 
Bush and Obama.  
A key overlap between the case studies was the use and mainstreaming of euphemisms 
– yet this rhetorical mechanism served different agendas in terrorism and immigration 
discourses. In the securitization of terrorism, the euphemism interrogation was used to 
legitimize an exceptional measure, thus serving a securitizing function. The Bush 
administration initially used the term alongside torture to juxtapose the two practices: 
the former was rejected as illegal and against American values, while the latter was 
presented as an acceptable alternative that was linked to counterterrorism and 
intelligence successes. While this research does not aim to adjudicate the objective 
boundaries of torture and interrogation, the discourse analysis revealed that opposing 
identities privileged one term over the other, and that the labels became symbolic of 
competing issue frames. Torture had a desecuritizing effect to the extent that it 
challenged the legitimacy of a particular practice in the fight against terrorism; the 
interrogation narrative, on the other hand, promoted that practice as an acceptable 
measure. Thus torture and its euphemism, interrogation, were signifiers of two broader 
competing issue frames.  
In the case of immigration, the euphemistic qualifier undocumented served a 
desecuritizing purpose: it was used to cast unauthorized immigration as a procedural 
issue linked to documentation (or lack thereof). This was regarded by opponents as 
rhetorical maneuvering to sugarcoat the criminal infraction at the root of illegal 
immigration. Immigration expansion advocates however sought to destigmatize 
unauthorized immigrants from the association with criminality imposed by illegal. 
While in the illegal interpretation, societal security was at stake (illegal immigrants 
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were a threat to legal institutions), the undocumented interpretation shifted attention 
toward the everyday procedural aspects of immigration, moving it outside the security 
domain. These different evaluations had remedy ramifications too: the criminality 
frame was employed in the promotion of border security and immigration enforcement. 
On the other hand, undocumented highlighted the documentation component of 
immigration; it was part of a more compassionate discourse that promoted integrating 
individuals through citizenship and legalization pathways.  
While previous scholarship suggests that euphemisms are recognized as tools of 
deception by audiences and thus largely rejected (e.g., Westen, 2009), this longitudinal 
study suggests otherwise. The use of interrogation co-occurred with rising public 
support for torture; and the widening use of undocumented as a substitute for illegal 
correlated with growth in pro-immigrant attitudes – even if framing effects did not 
occur and a causal relationship does not exist, the alignment between attitudes and 
frame prevalence suggests that euphemisms at least did not produce a backlash. 
Certainly audiences may initially recognize euphemisms as duplicitous tools to 
influence evaluations, but over time, these vocabularies can become mainstreamed and 
cemented in discourse, eclipsing their original intent. In short, euphemistic 
representations may be an effective long-run policy framing tactic.  
8.2.2 Selection of Frames in Media  
Cross-sectoral similarities in framing across media actors were more pronounced than 
across political elites. In both case studies, Fox News was more likely to employ 
securitizing frames than its other cable news competitors and the New York Times. At 
the aggregate level, MSNBC and the Times showed the greatest preference for the 
desecuritizing frames, while CNN’s coverage fell in between. It is difficult to 
generalize from only two case studies, but the content analyses suggest that Fox News 
may be more prone to advocating securitizing discourses, at least in the societal and 
military sectors.94 As sectors that juxtapose an American Self against a dangerous 
foreign Other, this may reflect an inward orientation for Fox News, and a more 
cosmopolitan orientation for MSNBC and the Times – alignments that mirror their 
respective conservative and liberal audiences. On the whole these alignments may be 
 
94 As discussed more deeply in the final section of this chapter, the environmental sector may produce 
different dynamics.  
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an indictment on these actors’ obligations toward objectivity and balanced reporting. It 
is at least confirmatory evidence of a media strategy moving away from capturing (or 
maintaining) the broadest viewership possible and toward fostering a narrower, but 
stronger audience base.  
There were also broad differences in the direction of trends and magnitude of coverage 
between media actors in both security sectors. In the case of terrorism, moving from the 
Bush to the Obama administration, the Times and to a smaller degree MSNBC showed 
an increase in relative coverage of the desecuritizing frame (compared to the 
securitizing frame), whereas Fox News went in the other direction. While coverage 
grew more desecuritizing between the two administrations for all actors in the 
immigration case study, the magnitude of the change was less dramatic for Fox News. 
Two major takeaways emerge from this, both challenging the perception of a 
monolithic media and reinforcing the value of examining media as a set of 
disaggregated actors. First, framing strategies change differently across actors over 
time. These actors responded to context and contemporaneous events differently, 
suggesting competing strategies and interpretations of the news they were reporting. 
The divergence in the torture debate (and to a lesser extent in immigration coverage) 
may be constructing different albeit parallel realities for American audiences of these 
outlets – an outcome that is discussed in more detail below. Second, divergence 
between news outlets necessarily means that at least some press actors acted 
independently of political elites at various times, providing strong evidence that the 
media can be an independent and strategic (de)securitizing actor – actors are selecting 
and prioritizing alternate frames, and thus constructing varying representations of 
reality.   
Differences in political elite attention to each issue may explain cross-sectoral variation 
in news coverage trends. Specifically, the Obama administration disengaged from the 
torture debate early in its tenure. The lack of salient cues from the White House thus 
created a vacuum, freeing media actors to form their own narratives, largely unopposed 
by prominent political elite cues. Fox News amplified its coverage of the former Bush 
administration’s security-imperative framing of interrogation, while MSNBC amplified 
its coverage of the preferred liberal desecuritizing version. The immigration debate, on 
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the other hand, enjoyed no equivalent long-term lull in political elite discourse95 – 
political elites actively contributed during both administrations. In this case, while the 
magnitude of the shift was different across all actors, the direction was the same – all 
actors employed the securitizing frame at a smaller rate vis-à-vis the desecuritizing 
frame moving from the Bush administration to the Obama administration. The 
silencing of political elites in security dialogue then has the potential to generate less 
uniformity and more independence among media actors, while political elite 
engagement can rein in the boundaries of media discourse.  
Still, it is interesting that immigration coverage became less anti-immigrant (at least in 
terms of ratio) across all actors between the two presidential administrations. Even 
though the magnitudes of change differ, this is striking given the wide negative bias 
recognized in most scholarship on media coverage of immigration. The starkest 
evidence of this was in the moral evaluation of immigrants – while previous 
scholarship has recognized only insignificant usage of the undocumented label, this 
research found that it had outpaced the illegal label in several quarters during the 
Obama administration, suggesting a major discursive shift in the way immigration is 
discussed. Desecuritizing frames became more common (relative to securitizing 
frames) in the terrorism case study for MSNBC and the Times moving from the Bush 
administration to the Obama administration, but the shift was less pronounced; and 
CNN and Fox News moved in opposite directions. This suggests that security discourse 
on immigration – at least with regard to the components analyzed here – softened 
between the Bush and Obama administrations, whereas media coverage of terrorism – 
and more specifically, the debate on torture as an acceptable response – remained 
mixed. While a predominant negativity bias still exists in immigration coverage, the 
gap is closing and a shift may be under way, heralding a profound change in how 
immigrants are discussed in the press.  
8.2.3 Framing Effects on Audience 
There were significant cross-sectoral differences in aggregate public opinion. While 
Americans have become increasingly supportive of torture, they have simultaneously 
become more pro-immigrant across an array of immigration attitude indicators. 
 
95 Short-term disengagement by political elites occurred briefly during 2005-2007, when the press took 
advantage and largely drove the debate.  
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Immigration may remain a securitized threat, but public opinion appears to be moving 
with the media shift recognized in the content analysis. This suggests that insecurity is 
felt more profoundly in the military sector than the societal sector; or alternatively, 
despite both security dialogues constructing an American Self versus an Other, the 
terrorist Other resonates as a more compelling threat than the immigrant Other at the 
aggregate level. What accounts for this cross-sectoral difference in attitudes? Silencing 
may play a role here as well – Fox News’ coverage of the immigration debate generally 
decreased at a time when other news actors (particularly the Times) picked up their 
coverage of the desecuritizing frame. This is different from the torture debate, where 
Fox News actually amplified both its volume and securitizing ratio of coverage of the 
securitizing frame. While MSNBC did the same for the desecuritizing frame, its 
viewership was much lower than Fox News’, and was thus unable to have a comparable 
influence on attitudes.  
Surprisingly, these framing effects persisted even when controlling for objective factors 
– in the case of immigration, the size of the unauthorized immigration population in 
one’s own state, for example, had little effect on attitudes toward exceptional measures 
altogether. Instead, the individual level analyses showed that attitudes toward 
exceptional measures in both sectors largely aligned with the dominant frames used in 
preferred news sources. The results were most consistent for viewers of Fox News – 
who aligned with positive support for exceptional measures across the board – and New 
York Times readers – who opposed exceptional measures in all the models. MSNBC 
viewers were mostly against exceptional measures, though were somewhat surprisingly 
more likely to support the border wall in 2016 than non-viewers. This effect was 
attributed to the use of Chris Matthews’ MSNBC show as a proxy variable for the 
whole network; departing from the network’s general tone, he was largely in favor of 
increased border security. The effect is also significant validation of media influence on 
attitudes: attention to this program alone was able to generate framing effects that ran 
counter to both the overall network’s ideology and the aggregate sentiment on the wall, 
suggesting that Matthews overcame both ideological beliefs and the tide of general 
public opinion. Attention to CNN was largely unrelated to support for exceptional 
measures, suggesting that it had no major framing effect. As discussed in each of the 
case study chapters, this was unsurprising given the ambiguity in frames employed by 
CNN. Similarly, attention to politics – used as a proxy for exposure to political elites – 
mostly failed to show any relationship with attitudes. The only exception occurred in 
265 
 
2016, when attention to politics was a significant predictor of support for a border fence 
– this is unsurprising, given that Trump’s campaign largely centered around this salient 
issue. Those paying close attention to political elites may have been persuaded by 
overexposure to Trump’s campaign rhetoric.  
8.3 Implications and Major Contributions  
These findings implicate securitization theory, media research and public policy. For 
securitization theory, the main takeaway is that the press can be a strategic and 
independent (de)securitizing actor; it should accordingly be factored into analyses as an 
active participant in the social (de)construction of security threats and the 
(de)legitimization of exceptional measures. The case studies here demonstrated that 
press actors were not only speaking differently from each other, but also from political 
elites, thus confronting orthodox perceptions of media as simply a functional actor in 
the securitization process. Most citizens learn about international security and foreign 
policy issues from the press, because, unlike domestic issues, they are less likely to be 
impacted by these issues on a day-to-day basis (Baum & Potter, 2008; Graber & 
Dunaway, 2018; Paletz, 2009). Thus, audiences are especially susceptible to framing 
effects in the news, since it is their primary form of exposure to foreign policy issues 
that they cannot directly experience. Moreover, increased polarization and 
politicization in the U.S. media over the last few decades has blurred the line between 
dispassionate, apolitical journalists/commentators and political elites, resulting in news 
personalities (especially on cable news) on whom the American public depends for 
information assuming politician-like identities. As perceived authorities, these 
commentators then have substantial influence on preferences for exceptional measures, 
and on evaluations of threats themselves.  
Beyond securitization theory, the politicization and polarization in news evidenced here 
reinforces existing literature on echo chambers and attitudinal segregation. News 
frames impact not only what audiences learn, but how threats and exceptional measures 
are cognitively processed. A negative outcome then is that different interpretations of 
exceptional measures are promoted by press actors to non-overlapping audiences. The 
immediate consequence is that self-selecting audiences will be under-informed (or 
worse, misinformed), because unlike politics, disagreeing news outlets – like Fox News 
and MSNBC – need not come together to compromise or resolve differences in 
traditional political arenas like Congress. Absent a balanced news diet, audiences are at 
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risk of being exposed to a limited subset of frames and only one side of a debate. The 
longer-term ramification of two fundamentally opposed and isolated discourses is that, 
without any attempt to resolve differences, further polarization within society will fuel 
mistrust of “fake news” generated by real or perceived political opponents. Rampant 
assertions by news personalities and cable network slogans of being the most “fair and 
balanced” news source will foster unearned confidence in one’s own views and 
rejection of others’, resulting in further electoral segmentation and societal polarization. 
Populations will coexist in separate but parallel realities, confounded every four years 
to realize half the country does not share their political outlook. This is especially 
concerning given that neither political predispositions nor objective contextual factors 
(such as the rate of unauthorized immigration or terrorist attacks) can block framing 
effects. Moreover, given the expanding reach of cable news, politicians may find it 
politically expedient to align their own framing with news actors, thus ceding their 
autonomy and independent decision-making to unelected journalists and commentators, 
and shifting the power balance between the press and political elites. The press is then 
likely to become an even more powerful agent in international relations and 
international security, particularly when political elites become briefly disengaged from 
a policy debate and let news personalities fill the discursive void. Combative rhetoric 
and attacks against competing news outlets already gives press actors the semblance of 
politicians – it is reasonable to expect audiences to then regard them as political 
authorities, elected or not.  
Two lessons follow for policymakers: first, policymakers should be cautious about 
becoming disengaged and silent on security issues, especially if they hope to maintain 
control of the narrative and public attitudes. This research has demonstrated that 
political elite silence can result in ceding discursive influence to press actors. This 
effect was especially evident in the torture debate: rather than taking cues from the 
Obama administration’s disengagement and pulling back, Fox News and MSNBC 
actually increased their coverage of their preferred frames. But even in the immigration 
analysis, it was clear that Democrat silencing allowed media actors to control the 
narrative and obstruct passage of compromise immigration bills during Bush’s second 
term, to the frustration of political elites in both parties. A second consideration for 
policymakers is to reinstitute formalized norms of objectivity, balance and fairness into 
the press. While it may be too late to close Pandora’s box for cable news, the 
reintroduction of regulation akin to the fairness doctrine that existed until 1987 for 
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other news media may help foster a more balanced and diverse news diet. 
Alternatively, further resources and subsidies could be devoted to support and promote 
non-commercial media, such as the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), where business 
incentives to reach niche audiences through biased content would be mitigated.  
Like silencing, another rhetorical mechanism with broad implications for future 
academic research and policymaking is euphemistic language. As discussed previously, 
even if they are recognized as tools of deception (e.g., Westen, 2009: 4), euphemisms 
can gain resonance over time, eventually replacing the terms they were designed to 
sugarcoat. Again, this appears to have happened with terms like interrogation and 
undocumented immigration. The mainstreaming of these terms does not necessarily 
mean that interlocutors and audiences overlook the strategic and political intentions 
beneath the terms – it may simply be a symbol of a particular identity for others to rally 
around. In short, euphemisms may provide a useful heuristic for identity formation and 
alignment. Policymakers should recognize the powerful potential of these rhetorical 
devices. Scholars studying frames and framing effects – whether in international 
security or more generally – should also consider whether euphemisms can serve as 
proxies for broader frames and discourses. For securitization theory, euphemisms can 
have different effects – they can securitize by downplaying exceptional measures (e.g., 
interrogation) (Bandura, 2002: 101; Richards et al., 2012: 73; Wolfendale, 2009: 54), 
where the exceptional can be framed in unexceptional terms to drive support for 
exceptional measures. Alternatively, euphemisms can be used to desecuritize by 
rhetorically minimizing the severity of a threat (e.g., undocumented immigrant).  
In an era of proliferating “fake news” and information warfare, policymakers should 
also pay attention to and cultivate a strategy to counteract attempts by foreign (or 
domestic) adversaries seeking to weaponize effective framing tactics and misinform 
American audiences. This thesis reinforces conclusions from extant framing 
scholarship that the quantity of coverage of a particular frame can have significant 
impacts on attitudes. The 2016 general election season saw several misinformation 
campaigns flooding social media sites targeting the American public (Allcott & 
Gentzkow, 2017). Their success may be linked to the sheer volume of content peddling 
identical frames, ensuring that audiences were repeatedly exposed from different angles 
(e.g., different websites made to resemble legitimate news sources) (Benkler et al., 
2018). As one method of defense, policymakers could design media literacy 
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educational programs to help citizens both recognize biased frames and balance their 
news diet. Alternatively, machine learning tools can be integrated with the content 
analysis methods applied in this research to detect and respond appropriately (e.g., 
through counter-messaging) to anomalies, such as spikes in coverage of particular 
topics and frames.  
Such counter-framing responses may be necessary to reverse the trend of growing 
support for torture in particular. Against international norms and the liberal democratic 
consensus against torture, that a debate is even occurring is a stain on American 
morality and leadership. Whether or not terrorism is to remain heavily securitized, 
political elites should unambiguously rule out torture and clearly signal that 
intelligence-gathering efforts will respect domestic and international rules. The failure 
to provide these signals will further erode American soft power – it may also inspire 
reprisals by foreign adversaries, ultimately creating an inescapable loop of retributive 
attitudes among the electorates on whose behalf the belligerents are acting. Still, this 
project (and the immigration case study in particular) reveals the limits of political elite 
framing – while Trump’s campaign rhetoric may have appealed to some, it coincided 
with generally pro-immigrant attitudes and rejection of exceptional measures at the 
aggregate level. His shocking securitizing rhetoric appears to have briefly backfired 
among most Americans (if not his base). But these effects may be short-term, and akin 
to the anti-torture public opinion wave that followed the shocking revelations of Abu 
Ghraib. As the shock and novelty (and thus newsworthiness) of his message wears out, 
the public may also become inured to the rhetoric. Absent a strong counter-frame from 
other elites or the press, the long-term effects of unchecked political discourse could be 
a normalization of anti-immigrant discourse and an uncritical acceptance of threat 
constructions as Americans become resigned to the new reality and new way of 
framing unauthorized immigration. In short, media as the fourth branch of government 
may be desirable, but a balance should be sought where political elites and the press act 
as checks on each other.  
Finally, this thesis demonstrates the value of synthesizing concepts in framing 
scholarship with securitization theory. Methodological tools commonly used in framing 
studies – content and public opinion analysis – empower securitization theory with 
quantitative sophistication and hypothesis-tested assumptions that are overlooked in 
discourse analysis, the preferred approach for securitization theorists. Extant framing 
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literature, for example, has pointed to several mechanisms – derived from experimental 
studies – that determine frame efficacy, such as strength, magnitude, and cooccurrence 
with competing frames. This provides a set of expectations on what will make certain 
discourses more effective and more likely to cut through to produce shifts in audience 
attitudes. These insights can be applied within securitization theory to explain and 
understand why (de)securitizing discourses succeed or fail. A quantitative content 
analytic approach also enables rigorous comparison of multiple actors – in this case, 
political elites and a diverse set of media outlets – across multiple cases, making it 
possible to isolate effects in the securitization process. The approach here, for example, 
was able to point to particular news outlets (and television programs) that likely 
influenced audience attitudes toward threats and exceptional measures. Finally, the 
identification of competing frames along different functional axes (e.g., remedy 
proposal or moral evaluation) provides a conceptual and methodological basis for 
identifying and measuring desecuritizing frames. In short, this synthesis unlocks and 
aids analysis of several underexplored features within securitization theory, including 
non-political elite securitizing actors, audiences, and desecuritization. Future 
scholarship in securitization theory should use the research design presented here, 
triangulating insights from a combined discourse analysis (to identify frames and the 
boundaries of discourse), content analysis (to objectively measure the prevalence of 
frames) and public opinion analysis (to measure discourse impacts on audiences).  
8.4 Limitations/Future Research Directions 
The contributions of this research notwithstanding, its limitations should guide and be 
addressed in future research. First, limited consideration is given to framing and 
framing effects in poll questions. In observing political and media vocabulary, 
securitizing and desecuritizing frames are isolated, but no such distinction is made in 
poll questions. In the terrorism study, for example, the ANES survey data used the term 
“torture”. Assuming that audience information processing is based on the impression-
driven model described in Chapter 2, the use of “torture” in questions should activate a 
negative response. Interestingly, the results of the polls and ANES surveys suggest 
otherwise and show that “torture” is not a barrier to Fox News viewers indicating 
support (nor are MSNBC and Times audiences swayed by the “suspected terrorist” cue 
in the prompt). This seeming contradiction – that framing effects can occur in media 
and political texts, but not in questions – may be the outcome of extra contextual 
information provided in media and political elite texts that is missing in public opinion 
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polls. The term “torture” alone does not create the desecuritizing effect, but it indicates 
the probable presence of the desecuritizing frame in a larger text; in other words, 
“torture” itself does not constitute the entirety of the desecuritizing frame. In the form 
of a short survey prompt and without additional context, “torture” may lose the moral 
and legal connotations that are constructed in larger media and political texts. Drawing 
from research in cognitive psychology, Simon and Jerit (2007: 267) note that moral 
judgment can be regarded  “as a function of social intuition as opposed to a deliberative 
process” and that “humans typically generate responses to everyday moral questions, 
including surveyed attitudes, spontaneously and without conscious thought”. If this is 
the case, then framing effects in polling questions (unlike longer and context-rich news 
and political elite texts) should be negligible, because they lack the supporting details 
that help construct (de)securitizing effects. The rising support for torture in polls and 
the results of the microanalysis support this claim. Simon and Jerit (2007) further 
postulate that when faced with competing frames, individuals can “select” different 
terms and reason over them according to their learned schema. In that case, respondents 
may have selected those aspects of the prompt that fit their existing schema; or else, the 
cues may have simply offset each other.  
Nonetheless, the possibility that this phrasing may have influenced results should not 
be dismissed (see also Blauwkamp et al., 2018). Future studies should accordingly 
control for framing effects in questions for thoroughness. This could entail different 
versions of the question being administered, where key words (like “torture” or “illegal 
immigrant”) are substituted by their (de)securitizing complements (“interrogation” and 
“undocumented immigrant”). Moreover, polls can be both reflective and constitutive of 
discourse – they can lead the public into particular lines of thought, set boundaries for 
permissible options and normalize security discourses (Solomon, 2009). Thus, future 
research should examine public opinion polls as a site of discourse formation as well as 
a reflection of audience preferences.  
A second key limitation is the assumption of causality underlining framing effects. The 
alignment between news frames and audiences exposed to those frames yields two 
possible interpretations. A conservative reading is that the press and their audiences 
share security dialects because of higher-order traits, like political and cultural identity. 
Partisan news sources, privy to the public pulse, will employ frames that are likely to 
be culturally congruent with their audiences, and audiences will select ideologically 
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consonant news sources, because it is less emotionally and cognitively costly 
(Scheufele, 1999). The prevailing assumption, however, is that foreign policy issues are 
distant from citizens’ lives, and thus attitudes must be activated through cues from the 
press (Baum & Potter, 2008; Powlick & Katz, 1998). This top-down assumption is 
implied in securitization theory and Entman’s cascade activation model as well. This is 
especially the case for agnostic or undecided individuals whose exposure to the press 
can motivate and harden attitudes. Political identity may initiate calibration to 
particular news sources, but it is the news source that motivates attitudes. Thus, a 
causal relationship between media frames and audience attitudes is possible from a 
theoretical standpoint, but the cross-sectional models are insufficient to definitively 
prove this. For this reason, statistical relationships have been cautiously noted as 
associations; and cause-effect claims have been caveated with theoretical assumptions.  
Still, a more accurate representation may be an information marketplace model 
resembling economics, where feedback loops generate and reinforce particular 
discourses between a variety of actors (Baum & Potter, 2008). Future research may 
want to explore other ways to model this behavior. One approach is to estimate a vector 
autoregressive model that links current and lagged measures of political elite discourse, 
news content and public opinion to determine whether there are statistically significant 
directions of influence. This model was ruled out in this study because of the lack of 
public opinion data to build complete time-series datasets; but future research can 
consider other proxy data that has a similar cadence to news and political elite content, 
such as twitter or other social media data. Oren and Solomon (2015: 324) argue that 
securitization succeeds when the audience repeats (or “chants”) the “mantras” used by 
securitizing actors, effectively promoting and perpetuating elite discourse, such that 
they become “materially ‘inscribed’ in people’s bodies”. Social media analysis could 
thus demonstrate the extent of “catchy” rhetorical devices (like enhanced interrogation 
or undocumented immigrant) permeating public discourse.  
Third, the measurement of frames using key terms may be reductive. Admittedly, word 
differentiation (e.g., torture versus interrogation and illegal versus undocumented) 
forecloses consideration of pejorative intentions or nuances in language like sarcasm 
and valence. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, schema activation suggests that 
related concepts are stored cognitively in clusters of networks; the activation of one 
node within a network triggers the activation of other nodes through the process of 
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spreading activation. Certainly context can change the semantic interpretation of text 
with minimal additional cognitive cost, but the utterance of a particular term will still 
activate a particular connotation and its related nodes. Even pejoration and sarcasm rely 
on a pre-negotiated cultural understanding of a term, in order for the pejorative or 
sarcastic intent to be effective. To refer to “so-called undocumented immigrants” 
pejoratively acknowledges that the term undocumented immigrants belongs to a 
cultural connotation that is being challenged or attacked. Not only is that cultural 
meaning recalled then (along with other nodes that share its schematic space), but it can 
even be reinforced. Negation experiences a similar problem, in that a particular 
connation is still activated, even if the overall construction of the statement is to contest 
that connotation. This echoes a similar point by Huysmans (2002) regarding the 
normative dilemma of reinforcing security linkages when trying to dismantle them. In 
dismissing the euphemism “interrogation” or “undocumented” as being fictitiously 
benign, a discursive link is established between the terms and benignity. Oren and 
Solomon (2015: 325) also argue that speakers with a desecuritizing agenda can 
“contribute to the consolidation of a generalized atmosphere of threat” by simply 
invoking securitizing phrases in their speech. By using the same terminology in 
securitizing discourse, opponents “partake in fostering a shared sense of danger” (Oren 
& Solomon, 2015: 327). It is unsurprising, then, that the cross-sectional analyses from 
2012 and 2016 validate the methodological choice to use terms as indicators of frames: 
they show that support for exceptional measures aligns with attention to the news 
sources that most frequently used the securitizing frame; and that opposition aligns 
with attention to actors that most frequently employed the desecuritizing frame.  
Future research can nonetheless mitigate this limitation by leveraging natural language 
processing and sentiment analytical methods to better capture nuance and subtleties in 
language. While sarcasm remains difficult to detect, other rules-based methods can help 
identify valence and negation. Rather than a naïve binary (present or not-present) 
classification for frames then, a probabilistic model could be adopted where the 
likelihood of frames is calculated as a function of labels as well as additional contextual 
factors, such as proximate negation terms or other indicators of challenging the frame. 
This approach should be used to compare results against the binary approach used in 
this research to determine the extent of overlap between both methods.  
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Finally, scope and depth considerations limited the extent to which this project could 
consider additional actors, sectors and regions. While cable television and traditional 
newspapers continue to be the dominant sources of news and information for 
Americans, social media and other digital options are catching up. Between 2016 and 
2018, the percentage of American adults that use social media as a news source 
increased from 18% to 20%, while cable news fell from 57% to 49% (Shearer, 2018). 
While a significant gap still exists, the continuation of this trend and curation 
algorithms portend new dynamics in security attitude formation. The rise of podcasts 
and preeminence of conservative talk radio also makes these two mediums fruitful 
areas of future research. Press actors (traditional or otherwise) need not be the only 
drivers of security attitudes – other entertainment media like television and movies 
should also be considered, particularly given the potential for these formats to heighten 
the sensationalism already attached to security issues like terrorism (e.g., Croft, 2006). 
Depictions of torture and terrorism violence in television (e.g., 24 and Homeland) or 
Hollywood (e.g., Zero Dark Thirty) may desensitize audiences and even advance the 
narrative that torture works. Hansen’s (2013) security discourse analysis structure 
similarly accommodates other fiction and non-fiction genres. Future research should 
test the effects of these disparate media in producing (de)securitization effects.  
Similarly, this research was limited to two case studies in the societal and military 
sectors of the US. First, a further analysis of other sectors would be illustrative of 
broader themes and trends in American security discourse. This thesis finds somewhat 
contradicting outcomes: despite the internal logic of both threats being somewhat 
similar (i.e., a foreign Other threatening the American Self), in the military domain, 
Americans have become more accepting of exceptional measures, but in the societal 
sector, they have become more resistant. The particular logic of foreign Other versus 
American Self produces similar dynamics in some media: Fox News promotes 
securitizing rhetoric while MSNBC and the Times increasingly promote desecuritizing 
rhetoric. How does this vary in other security sectors that belong to different logics? 
For example, environmental security (e.g., climate change) has historically been a 
liberal priority; certainly, MSNBC, CNN and the Times would be more likely to 
accentuate the severity of the threat, while Fox News would downplay or neglect it. 
Future studies should expand the sectoral focus in the US to see how the press behaves 
under different threat logics. This effort may unearth different rhetorical mechanisms 
(comparable to euphemisms in this research) that can aid securitization analysis. 
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Second, scholars should investigate whether the media effects seen here replicate 
across non-American contexts. European contexts are obvious candidates given that 
securitization theory is well established and diverse media landscapes offer potentially 
rich results. But illiberal and autocratic regimes where the press is more restrained may 
also be insightful. Scholarly comparative pursuits can contribute to a more universal 
understanding of securitization and media dynamics.  
The combination of exponential information growth and near frictionless transmission 
of content across borders underscores the urgency of these efforts. Certainly access to 
information is a normatively desired outcome – a healthy democracy requires an 
informed electorate. But the proliferation of news sources has resulted in different 
versions of (mis)information and different realities for news consumers – in the U.S., 
the fault lines largely occur along already fractious political identity, limiting the 
possibility of dialogue and exacerbating echo chambers. The broad ramifications of this 
are not only distrust in “other” media, but also in fellow citizens and truth itself, 
spawning what has been dubbed the “post-truth” era (Benkler et al., 2018). For security 
issues, the consequences are especially severe: public legitimization of exceptional 
measures like torture removes a powerful barrier against such legal and moral abuses – 
the fragility of legal and normative institutions is all the more acute under impulsive 
leadership. Understanding the discursive mechanisms that motivate these dynamics can 
inform policy and behavior to either reverse the disturbing trend of misinformation, or 
build defenses to mitigate its damage.   
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Appendix A – Content Analysis Frame Extraction  
All text was first lowercased to accommodate variations in case. Next a Python script 
iterated over all text to count the number of pattern matches.  
Table A.1 shows the pattern matches for the terrorism case study. For example, if a 
word started with interrog, it was counted as an instance of the securitization frame.  
Table A.2 shows the pattern matches for the immigration case study, which used 
Pythonic regular expressions to identify frames.  
Table A.1 
Remedy Proposal  
Securitizing (Interrogation) [starts with] interrog 
Desecuritizing (torture) [starts with] tortur 
 
Table A.2 
Moral Evaluation  
Securitizing (Illegal 
immigrant) 
illegal\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\w{0,2}migrant\w{0,8}
|\w{0,2}migrant\w{0,8}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?illegal\w{0,4
} 
Desecuritizing 
(Undocumented immigrant) 
undocumented\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\w{0,2}migrant\w{0,8
}|\w{0,2}migrant\w{0,8}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?undocument
ed| 
unauthorized\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\w{0,2}migrant\w{0,8}|\
w{0,2}migrant\w{0,8}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?unauthorized|ir
regular\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\w{0,2}migrant\w{0,8}|\w{0,2
}migrant\w{0,8}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?irregular 
Remedy Proposal  
Securitizing (Border security) border\w{0,3}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,8}?wall\w{0,3}|wall\w{0,3
}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,8}?border\w{0,3}|border\w{0,3}\W+(?:\
w+\W+){0,8}?fenc\w{0,4}|fenc\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,8}
?border\w{0,3}|secur\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,8}?border\w
{0,3}|border\w{0,3}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,8}?secur\w{0,4} 
Desecuritizing (Pathways to 
legal status) 
path\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?legal\w{0,8}|legal\w{0,8
}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?path\w{0,4}|path\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\
W+){0,10}?citizen\w{0,5}|citizen\w{0,5}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,
10}?path\w{0,4}|citizen\w{0,5}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\bear
n\w{0,2}|\bearn\w{0,2}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,15}?citizen\w{0,5
}|\bearn\w{0,2}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?legal\w{0,8}|legal\w{
0,8}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\bearn\w{0,2}|path\w{0,4}\W+(?
:\w+\W+){0,10}?\bearn\w{0,2}|\bearn\w{0,2}\W+(?:\w+\W+
){0,10}?path\w{0,4}|\w{0,3}migra\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0
,10}?path\w{0,4}|path\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\w{0,3
}migra\w{0,4}|path\w{0,4}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\bresid\w
{0,6}|\bresid\w{0,6}\W+(?:\w+\W+){0,10}?\w{0,3}path\w{0
,4} 
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Appendix B – Alternate Regression Models 
Table B.1 lists alternate regression models from the terrorism case study. Models (5) 
and (6) include just the political attention variable and none of the media variables. 
Model (7) substitutes Erin Burnett’s show for Anderson Cooper’s on CNN. Model (8) 
substitutes Chris Matthews’ program on CNN for Rachel Maddow’s.  
Table B.2 shows an alternate regression model for the immigration case study. Model 
(9) substitutes Rachel Maddow’s program for Chris Matthews’ on MSNBC.   
277 
 
Table B.1 Alternate regression models for terrorism case study  
 Torture Support  
 2012 
(5) 
2016 
(6) 
2016 (CNN  
substitution) 
(7) 
2016 (MSN 
substitution) 
(8) 
Framing Effect     
Attention to politics 0.062** -0.040 -0.022 -0.038 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.060) (0.060) 
CNN   0.006 0.130 
   (0.253) (0.144) 
Fox News   0.471*** 0.453*** 
   (0.155) (0.156) 
MSNBC   -0.444*** -0.221 
   (0.171) (0.180) 
New York Times   -0.238** -0.249** 
   (0.119) (0.120) 
(In)Security     
Fear of likely attack 0.234*** 0.170*** 0.078 0.080 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.052) (0.052) 
Military experience 0.034 0.064 -0.177 -0.155 
 (0.084) (0.112) (0.182) (0.183) 
Retributiveness 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.940*** 0.941*** 
 (0.063) (0.079) (0.121) (0.121) 
General Demographic     
Race (white) -0.157** -0.301*** -0.235* -0.225* 
 (0.063) (0.086) (0.134) (0.135) 
Income 0.004 0.001 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
Region (south) 0.061 -0.028 -0.105 -0.094 
 (0.056) (0.071) (0.112) (0.112) 
Gender (female) -0.202*** -0.092 -0.077 -0.076 
 (0.058) (0.073) (0.111) (0.111) 
Political ideology 0.190*** 0.216*** 0.153*** 0.171*** 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.052) (0.052) 
Partisanship 0.086*** 0.166*** 0.154*** 0.161*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) 
Age -0.004** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Education level -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.097*** -0.099*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) 
Religiosity 0.087 0.136* 0.127 0.136 
 (0.062) (0.078) (0.118) (0.119) 
Children 0.137** 0.008 0.073 0.054 
 (0.065) (0.079) (0.120) (0.120) 
Constant 1.993*** 2.422*** 3.544*** 3.516*** 
 (0.214) (0.276) (0.466) (0.467) 
Observations 4,517 2,614 1,031 1,031 
R2 0.164 0.261 0.324 0.321 
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Adjusted R2 0.161 0.257 0.312 0.309 
Residual Std. Error 
1.794 
(df = 4502) 
1.716 
(df = 2599) 
1.642 
(df = 1012) 
1.646 
(df = 1012) 
F Statistic 
63.078*** 
(df = 14; 4502) 
65.452*** 
(df = 14; 2599) 
26.982*** 
(df = 18; 1012) 
26.579*** 
(df = 18; 1012) 
   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table B.2 Alternate regression models for immigration case study  
 Border Fence 
 2016 
 (9) 
Framing Effect   
  
Attention to politics 0.321*** 
 (0.102) 
CNN -0.265 
 (0.264) 
Fox News 1.002*** 
 (0.235) 
MSNBC 0.041 
 (0.392) 
New York Times -0.683*** 
 (0.223) 
Contextual and Insecurity   
  
Border state resident -0.148 
 (0.306) 
Percent unauthorized  0.000 
 (0.075) 
Financial concern 0.132 
 (0.081) 
Terrorist attack concern -0.117 
 (0.090) 
Hispanic thermometer -0.017*** 
 (0.005) 
General Demographic   
  
Race (Hispanic) -0.622 
 (0.400) 
Income -0.003 
 (0.014) 
Gender (female) 0.122 
 (0.184) 
Ideology 0.369*** 
 (0.086) 
Partisanship 
 
0.304*** 
(0.059) 
Age -0.008 
 (0.006) 
Education level -0.160*** 
 (0.047) 
Children 0.087 
 (0.206) 
Authoritarianism  0.425** 
 (0.187) 
Constant -1.803** 
 (0.942) 
Observations 1,020 
Log Likelihood -408.295 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 856.591 
Model χ2 419.236*** 
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Appendix C – Raw Scores and Frame Rates 
 
Table C.1 Terrorism Case Study Frame Annual Scores and Rates (News Media) 
 Fox News MSNBC CNN New York Times 
 Torture Interrogation Torture Interrogation Torture Interrogation Torture Interrogation 
Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 68 0.192 102 0.288 22 0.120 59 0.322 221 0.159 402 0.289 303 0.338 267 0.297 
2002 242 0.355 386 0.567 322 0.448 196 0.273 483 0.202 1157 0.484 330 0.343 601 0.625 
2003 355 0.728 314 0.644 650 0.648 355 0.354 642 0.335 999 0.521 527 0.644 567 0.693 
2004 393 0.645 376 0.617 545 0.693 549 0.698 1443 0.419 1927 0.559 908 1.146 1465 1.849 
2005 882 2.061 591 1.381 622 1.049 452 0.763 2361 0.779 1295 0.427 1485 2.649 1225 2.185 
2006 630 1.073 651 1.109 487 0.676 251 0.348 1720 0.467 1124 0.305 1037 1.679 844 1.367 
2007 491 1.118 341 0.776 722 1.317 238 0.434 1961 0.606 1092 0.337 1010 2.114 797 1.668 
2008 212 0.467 204 0.450 574 1.214 159 0.336 725 0.277 530 0.203 667 1.709 812 2.080 
2009 652 1.472 1179 2.663 2694 5.984 927 2.059 2046 0.760 2270 0.843 967 3.106 1042 3.347 
2010 107 0.264 424 1.046 308 0.732 194 0.461 418 0.188 474 0.214 372 1.288 443 1.534 
2011 186 0.480 463 1.195 387 1.236 353 1.127 938 0.429 612 0.280 582 1.665 360 1.030 
2012 208 0.489 293 0.690 163 0.539 53 0.175 543 0.284 245 0.128 567 1.569 340 0.941 
2013 182 0.368 319 0.644 273 0.512 162 0.304 552 0.287 773 0.402 561 1.522 314 0.852 
2014 531 0.593 644 0.719 1041 1.589 396 0.604 1865 0.684 1712 0.628 974 2.464 616 1.558 
2015 196 0.187 159 0.152 133 0.194 120 0.175 513 0.154 522 0.157 567 1.250 347 0.765 
2016 138 0.147 186 0.199 126 0.364 21 0.061 1035 0.317 669 0.205 714 1.148 572 0.920 
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Table C.2 Terrorism Case Study Frame Annual Scores and Rates (Political Elites) 
 Presidential Elites Congress 
 Torture Interrogation Torture Interrogation 
Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 2 0.035 8 0.138 206 0.161 21 0.016 
2002 19 0.146 5 0.038 253 0.151 49 0.029 
2003 132 1.150 13 0.113 531 0.239 91 0.041 
2004 257 0.961 93 0.348 1227 0.684 660 0.368 
2005 39 0.356 23 0.210 2439 1.145 1402 0.658 
2006 56 0.355 53 0.336 1144 0.713 848 0.529 
2007 21 0.182 54 0.467 1083 0.489 559 0.252 
2008 35 0.369 82 0.864 781 0.714 603 0.551 
2009 39 0.627 57 0.917 433 0.340 659 0.517 
2010 12 0.195 13 0.211 192 0.259 406 0.547 
2011 21 0.498 3 0.071 195 0.225 512 0.591 
2012 11 0.282 6 0.154 89 0.132 31 0.046 
2013 5 0.105 6 0.126 215 0.276 166 0.213 
2014 15 0.214 28 0.399 252 0.386 275 0.422 
2015 23 0.262 5 0.057 275 0.290 221 0.233 
2016 27 0.264 3 0.029 121 0.181 33 0.049 
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Table C.3 Immigration Case Study Frame Annual Scores and Rates (News Media) 
 CNN 
 Amnesty Illegal Undocumented Border Security Pathways 
Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 261 0.442 308 0.522 29 0.049 93 0.158 17 0.029 
2002 85 0.125 77 0.113 4 0.006 209 0.308 4 0.006 
2003 110 0.176 294 0.47 30 0.048 235 0.375 9 0.014 
2004 340 0.319 440 0.413 60 0.056 627 0.588 45 0.042 
2005 277 0.211 547 0.416 44 0.033 1461 1.111 36 0.027 
2006 2914 1.336 2807 1.287 336 0.154 5285 2.424 528 0.242 
2007 3008 1.287 2744 1.174 114 0.049 3189 1.364 453 0.194 
2008 869 0.506 631 0.367 40 0.023 1698 0.989 244 0.142 
2009 271 0.177 1062 0.695 99 0.065 516 0.338 99 0.065 
2010 350 0.206 2126 1.252 149 0.088 1169 0.689 266 0.157 
2011 274 0.248 641 0.581 58 0.053 465 0.421 114 0.103 
2012 201 0.13 679 0.441 178 0.116 328 0.213 237 0.154 
2013 283 0.2 219 0.155 250 0.177 726 0.513 616 0.435 
2014 397 0.29 300 0.219 586 0.429 795 0.582 294 0.215 
2015 578 0.248 874 0.374 795 0.341 1090 0.467 524 0.225 
2016 1226 0.367 1033 0.309 1438 0.43 1964 0.587 676 0.202 
 
 Fox News 
 Amnesty Illegal Undocumented Border Security Pathways 
Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 130 1.126 141 1.221 13 0.113 47 0.407 2 0.017 
2002 107 0.686 266 1.706 13 0.083 186 1.193 4 0.026 
2003 46 0.527 183 2.095 6 0.069 68 0.779 2 0.023 
2004 142 1.517 190 2.029 5 0.053 129 1.378 23 0.246 
2005 176 1.006 464 2.651 14 0.08 488 2.788 24 0.137 
2006 855 2.951 832 2.872 18 0.062 1354 4.674 243 0.839 
2007 612 1.842 957 2.88 40 0.12 698 2.1 123 0.37 
2008 160 0.696 236 1.027 7 0.03 243 1.057 49 0.213 
2009 78 0.372 316 1.508 11 0.052 145 0.692 11 0.052 
2010 388 1.079 564 1.568 31 0.086 1120 3.114 90 0.25 
2011 157 0.602 305 1.17 14 0.054 434 1.664 51 0.196 
2012 128 0.41 212 0.678 13 0.042 132 0.422 47 0.15 
2013 354 0.952 282 0.758 29 0.078 881 2.37 260 0.699 
2014 735 1.142 620 0.964 58 0.09 1042 1.62 108 0.168 
2015 650 0.735 889 1.005 123 0.139 868 0.982 232 0.262 
2016 474 0.462 622 0.607 83 0.081 989 0.965 111 0.108 
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Table C.3 Immigration Case Study Frame Annual Scores and Rates (News Media) 
(Continued) 
 MSNBC 
 Amnesty Illegal Undocumented Border Security Pathways 
Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 30 0.27 29 0.261 0 0 9 0.081 2 0.018 
2002 77 0.304 51 0.201 2 0.008 78 0.308 1 0.004 
2003 141 0.38 348 0.937 9 0.024 72 0.194 5 0.013 
2004 137 0.688 81 0.407 4 0.02 67 0.336 9 0.045 
2005 38 0.164 93 0.402 2 0.009 108 0.467 3 0.013 
2006 393 0.963 407 0.997 15 0.037 485 1.188 67 0.164 
2007 224 0.67 264 0.79 8 0.024 134 0.401 38 0.114 
2008 51 0.215 47 0.198 5 0.021 43 0.181 16 0.067 
2009 16 0.081 128 0.644 8 0.04 32 0.161 8 0.04 
2010 85 0.224 282 0.744 46 0.121 227 0.599 81 0.214 
2011 77 0.271 131 0.462 38 0.134 112 0.395 32 0.113 
2012 72 0.129 128 0.23 98 0.176 84 0.151 93 0.167 
2013 238 0.293 136 0.167 133 0.164 439 0.541 570 0.702 
2014 315 0.417 89 0.118 218 0.289 342 0.453 162 0.215 
2015 196 0.238 203 0.246 199 0.242 219 0.266 201 0.244 
2016 138 0.251 141 0.256 97 0.176 253 0.459 68 0.123 
 
 New York Times 
 Amnesty Illegal Undocumented Border Security Pathways 
Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 152 0.282 623 1.156 41 0.076 98 0.182 31 0.058 
2002 85 0.17 421 0.843 26 0.052 171 0.342 19 0.038 
2003 67 0.149 626 1.393 24 0.053 88 0.196 23 0.051 
2004 89 0.198 519 1.155 49 0.109 127 0.283 52 0.116 
2005 92 0.19 649 1.341 25 0.052 195 0.403 42 0.087 
2006 303 0.533 1707 3.004 68 0.12 624 1.098 209 0.368 
2007 239 0.455 1814 3.454 102 0.194 332 0.632 162 0.308 
2008 93 0.196 914 1.929 40 0.084 180 0.38 95 0.2 
2009 80 0.193 730 1.758 59 0.142 97 0.234 80 0.193 
2010 108 0.251 985 2.293 46 0.107 197 0.459 122 0.284 
2011 148 0.275 1100 2.043 85 0.158 343 0.637 124 0.23 
2012 144 0.228 1126 1.779 122 0.193 184 0.291 189 0.299 
2013 211 0.326 749 1.156 336 0.519 681 1.051 785 1.212 
2014 230 0.361 329 0.517 430 0.675 342 0.537 258 0.405 
2015 261 0.355 294 0.4 569 0.774 603 0.82 316 0.43 
2016 355 0.325 437 0.4 873 0.798 886 0.81 253 0.231 
 
Table C.4 Immigration Case Study Frame Annual Scores and Rates (Political Elites) 
 Presidential Elites 
 Amnesty Illegal Undocumented Border Security Pathways 
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Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 16 0.716 2 0.089 4 0.179 10 0.447 4 0.179 
2002 3 0.142 0 0 0 0 78 3.69 0 0 
2003 3 0.189 3 0.189 0 0 20 1.258 0 0 
2004 39 0.882 12 0.271 0 0 52 1.175 13 0.294 
2005 31 1.448 87 4.062 0 0 105 4.903 5 0.233 
2006 160 3.062 174 3.329 0 0 399 7.635 35 0.67 
2007 100 1.799 78 1.403 3 0.054 279 5.019 15 0.27 
2008 1 0.046 0 0 0 0 14 0.65 1 0.046 
2009 1 0.029 19 0.545 1 0.029 40 1.148 7 0.201 
2010 5 0.113 14 0.315 1 0.023 114 2.567 9 0.203 
2011 1 0.027 3 0.08 2 0.053 51 1.355 12 0.319 
2012 3 0.05 2 0.033 9 0.151 26 0.435 10 0.167 
2013 3 0.049 2 0.033 17 0.278 101 1.649 62 1.012 
2014 18 0.25 7 0.097 29 0.404 75 1.044 34 0.473 
2015 3 0.042 3 0.042 14 0.197 51 0.718 18 0.253 
2016 3 0.033 1 0.011 6 0.066 46 0.506 20 0.22 
 
 Congress 
 Amnesty Illegal Undocumented Border Security Pathways 
Year Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate Count Rate 
2001 44 0.053 53 0.063 5 0.006 132 0.158 15 0.018 
2002 54 0.077 30 0.043 10 0.014 1072 1.535 9 0.013 
2003 68 0.07 57 0.059 9 0.009 324 0.334 14 0.014 
2004 56 0.072 62 0.08 7 0.009 491 0.633 8 0.01 
2005 265 0.262 186 0.184 49 0.048 2036 2.009 55 0.054 
2006 1283 1.632 427 0.543 188 0.239 3366 4.281 343 0.436 
2007 689 0.601 235 0.205 123 0.107 1840 1.605 154 0.134 
2008 16 0.027 15 0.026 13 0.022 273 0.464 4 0.007 
2009 50 0.053 42 0.045 13 0.014 322 0.343 23 0.025 
2010 187 0.547 68 0.199 27 0.079 197 0.576 59 0.173 
2011 15 0.034 19 0.044 1 0.002 222 0.51 8 0.018 
2012 28 0.069 24 0.059 6 0.015 97 0.24 17 0.042 
2013 441 0.777 117 0.206 104 0.183 2501 4.408 354 0.624 
2014 285 0.54 77 0.146 35 0.066 604 1.144 58 0.11 
2015 118 0.179 61 0.093 26 0.04 424 0.645 14 0.021 
2016 73 0.166 34 0.077 19 0.043 263 0.599 18 0.041 
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